

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : LIST: TABLE OF CONTENTS: ELEVEN (11) DOCUMENTS DATED
1960-1964/COPIES OF DOCUMENTS ARE ATTACHED
DATE : 07/23/1964
PAGES : 42

SUBJECTS : QJWIN
ZRRIFLE
JFK ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10431-10050

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. OIRT-2173, 13 October 1960; Subject: Envelope for James N. RABNEY (P).
2. LUXE-0261 (IN 41433), 11 November 1960.
3. Blind Memorandum, dated 19 December 1960; Subject: Harold MELTZER with aliases.
4. Thirteen pages of receipts, etc., regarding QJWIN.
5. Memorandum for William K. HARVEY, dated 19 February 1962; Subject: Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities.
6. Memorandum for William K. HARVEY, dated 6 March 1963; Subject: Extension of Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities.
7. Note attached to above memorandum.
8. Memorandum for Chief, Foreign Intelligence, dated 27 June 1963; Subject: QJWIN.
9. OLLS-369, 30 September 1963; Subject: Administrative/Finance - QJWIN.
10. Nine pages of notes in draft regarding ZRRIFLE Project.
11. OLLA-1974, 24 April 1964; Subject: QJWIN Termination.

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12/23/65

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~S-E-C-R-E-T R-V-E-A-T~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: CHIEF, KUTUBE ATTN: DANIEL C. BRILLARD

INFO: CHIEF, WE ATTN: JACK T. FAGG

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, LUXEMBOURG

SUBJECT: QJWIN TERMINATION

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ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
OLLA-1925; 14 FEBRUARY 1962

1. QJWIN HAS BEEN TERMINATED. ROZENEY TOLD HIM ON 21 APRIL THAT THE OPERATION IN WHICH HE WAS TO PLAY A ROLE HAD BEEN SHELVED AND THEREFORE HIS CONTRACT, WHICH RAN OUT ON 29 FEBRUARY, WAS NOT RENEWED. HE WAS REASSURED THAT THIS ACTION DID NOT RESULT FROM ANYTHING HE HAD DONE AND HIS PAST COOPERATION WAS APPRECIATED. IT WAS MENTIONED AS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE OPERATION MIGHT HAVE BEEN OFF AND RUNNING IF HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH HIS COVER LAST YEAR. QJWIN ACCEPTED THE REASON FOR TERMINATION AND SAID HE WOULD ALWAYS BE AVAILABLE IF HE COULD BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE. IN DISCUSSING HIS FUTURE, ROZENEY SUGGESTED, NOW THAT HE HAS RECEIVED ALL THE NECESSARY AUTHORIZATIONS FOR DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY, HE SERIOUSLY CONSIDER GOING AHEAD WITH THE VENTURE IN COLOGNE. QJWIN SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH HIS WIFE. HIS ONLY HESITATION IS IN COMMITTING HIMSELF TO A LONG LEASE ON A SHOP.

2. SINCE JANUARY 1962 (SEE PARAGRAPH 6, OLLA-1426 OF 15 DECEMBER 1961) QJWIN'S ONLY ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN TO ESTABLISH COVER. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS CONFIRMED BY DIR-12541 OF 28 MAY 1962 AND DURING ROZENEY'S DISCUSSIONS IN HEADQUARTERS IN JULY 1962. 27 MONTHS AND SOME \$18,000 LATER, HE IS STILL NOT IN PLACE, ALTHOUGH ROZENEY MADE AN ISSUE OF THIS WITH HIM IN AUGUST 1963. WHETHER HE EVER REALLY INTENDED TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO THIS ASSIGNMENT REMAINS A QUESTION. ROZENEY HAS STRONG DOUBTS. QJWIN'S PERSONAL HISTORY REFLECTS MAJOR INSTABILITY AND THE HABIT OF HEDGING HIS BETS IS UNDOUBTEDLY PART OF HIS CHARACTER. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY A SECURITY BREACH. THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED HIS KUBARK RELATIONSHIP WITH ANYONE EXCEPT, PERHAPS, HIS WIFE.

3. ROZENEY IS KNOWN TO QJWIN BY TRUE NAME. ROZENEY USED THE NAME "PIERRE" WITH HIM, BUT IT IS ASSUMED THAT HE HAS IDENTIFIED ROZENEY'S TRUE NAME. QJWIN KNOWS THE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE STATION OUTSIDE PHONE. THIS PHONE IS BEING DISMANTELED IN OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR. QJWIN'S ADDRESSES ARE FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

ATTACHMENT
KUTUBE - 2 W/ATT U/S/C
WE - 2 W/ATT U/S/C
FILES - 2

Monroe B. Rozeney
MONROE B. ROZENEY

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OLLA-1974	DATE 24 APRIL 1964
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T R-V-E-A-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

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Project ZRRIFLE

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1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~and~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~probs~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WF and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other Division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of ~~of~~ code and cipher materials, ^{and information concerning such materials,} in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Background:
needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

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4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: ~~Q~~ QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half ~~he~~ ^{she} was contacted ~~in~~ ^{by} sporadically by CS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ~~September~~ ^{October} 1960,

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Q *firm annual salary*

\$ 7,200

Travel + ops expenses for

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Q *firm + other agents + agent candidates*: 2,000

Needs for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates:

2,000

Travel of staff employees

engaged in Zorible activity:

2,500

Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses:

1,000

\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB (Crossup, Bandera group, Khablitzo) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CF-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/pts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, ^{with minimum high regard for operational security.} Assessments ~~are all important~~

3) Maximum security:

a. Khabark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Soviet agencies

b. Within Khabark, one focal point for control, search, training, case officing, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Dei officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no backchannels ^{re trips} (except for research)

d. No PA's or intermediaries; rigid case-officing, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govt. ~~REPRODUCTION~~

f. No ~~use of unproven~~ agent who ~~eyes needed for a U.S. Govt. agency. Training by opposition would need.~~ ~~PROHIBITED~~

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Marshel) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Khabarkers who can

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pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretent: Nutake/D search; this established (is Rome).
j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.
4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visas

b. No chain of ~~communications~~ ^{strictly} person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meetings ^{any} ~~conducted~~ ⁱⁿ home territory.

d. Exclude organization ^{e.g., Sicilians} criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers ~~involved~~ - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for ~~blowing~~ ^{blowing} houses or leaks in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have phony 201 in RT to backstop this, all documents therein forged & backdated. Should look like a CE file.

10. Possible use of ~~staff~~ ^{staff} for ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~ops~~ ^{ops}.

11. Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

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freed to travel

Legal, operational + ethical → morale problems.

Khobillov case.

- 1) Maximum security ^{→ siglet not secure enough.} + within Khabark only (e.g., how much does Sivagusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Abuse of Luride objective.
- 2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Oversee one-man control base with own (non-Station) comm.
- 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

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- Non-attributability:
- 4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g. Quinn) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ~~All~~ ^{all} ~~sub~~ ^{sub} ~~work~~ ^{work} personnel ~~involved~~ ^{involved} should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorn & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~each~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~For~~ Danger of standbys.

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