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
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Cuba

CUBA'S NEW COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE LAW

Cuba's draft law on compulsory military service, explained in detail by Raul Castro in a nationwide broadcast on 12 November, has far-reaching social and political ramifications. It is to be an important new instrument of control over the population and a means of "re-educating" Cubans who have not yet become adjusted to living and working in a "socialist" country.

When Fidel Castro first announced last July that such a law would be forthcoming, it was in the context of a bitter attack on the remnants of the Cuban middle class. He said the law would make Cuba a nation "more and more of workers and less and less of parasites" and ensure that the "sons of today's parasites do not become tomorrow's potential lumpen" (his word for recalcitrants and dissidents, whatever their class origin.)

In a talk to representatives of Cuba's central labor organization on 15 November, Raul Castro indicated that politically unreliable Cubans will be impressed into labor battalions rather than inducted into regular military units. He expressed confidence that many "lumpen" so impressed will be rehabilitated.

Raul Castro declared that the law will not be officially promulgated for another two or three weeks. In the interim, the "people" are to discuss and "approve" it in meetings of their "mass organizations."

The draft law makes all Cuban males between the ages of

17 and 45 liable to three years of active military service. Women between 17 and 35 who volunteer will be accepted for two-year terms. The law states that an individual may fulfill his obligations either by serving full time for three years or, at the discretion of the state, as a member of the reserves. Students and others whose civilian duties are judged to be of sufficient importance may be assigned to the reserves, but will nevertheless be required to take military training during certain periods of the year.

The pay for draftees on active duty is to be a token "allowance" of only seven pesos per month--as compared with the 60 to 80 pesos that the lowest ranking Cuban soldiers now receive. Castro justified this by indicating that all the draftee's personal needs, as well as those of any dependents he might have, would be taken care of by the state.

All eligible Cubans are to register during the month of December. Castro estimated that some 1.5 million Cuban males will participate in the initial registration. His calculations indicate that approximately 28,000 are to be called to active service each year. Thus, after the program has been in effect for three years, there will be about 84,000 men on active duty under this program. (CONFIDENTIAL)

TRAINING OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL

In his 12 November speech, Raul Castro stated that some 7,000 Cuban students had joined the armed forces when Fidel Castro asked for volunteers to train in the handling of special weapons. He added that he had recently attended the graduation of Cuban students completing the first phase of instruction for "antiaircraft missile troops."

Cuban surface-to-air missile (SAM) trainees recently

completed the four-month classroom phase of SAM instruction at San Julian airfield and are scheduled to begin field training at SAM sites this month. The 7,000 Cuban students said to be enrolled in "special weapons" courses probably include the SAM trainees as well as those training in radar, cruise missile, Snapper antitank rocket, and possibly FROG tactical rocket operations. (~~SECRET~~)

DEPARTURES OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM CUBA

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Five Soviet passenger ships have arrived in Cuba and departed for home since 9 November. Four of these arrived directly from the USSR while the fifth came from Brazil.

The number and type of personnel arriving is unknown. Each ship normally carries 340 passengers.

[redacted] one vessel was to carry a full complement on the voyage to Cuba.

Available evidence indicates that about 1,000 Soviets--most of them probably military--left Cuba for the USSR aboard three of these ships, and suggests that another 700 departed on the remaining two vessels. (~~SECRET KIMBO~~)

THE BARGHOORN CASE

The release of Professor Barghoorn on 16 November, two days after President Kennedy's public condemnation of Soviet behavior, apparently reflected a decision by the Soviet leaders to disengage as quickly as possible from this episode and to try to minimize the damage to Soviet-US relations.

Ambassador Kohler believes the Soviet authorities failed to anticipate the US reaction to Barghoorn's arrest and that they were bewildered and genuinely alarmed by the volume and intensity of US protests and actions. Moscow's terse announcement of Barghoorn's release stated that in view of the "concern of high US officials," the Soviet Government had decided "merely to expel him from the Soviet Union" rather than bring him to trial on espionage charges. Gromyko informed Kohler privately that this decision was the result of Khrushchev's personal intervention and requested that this be brought to the attention of President Kennedy.

Soviet propaganda has played down the incident, deplored the "hue and cry" raised in the US, and expressed the pious hope that Washington "will correctly evaluate the good will of the Soviet Government" in releasing Barghoorn.

In Ambassador Kohler's view, this episode does not reflect a deliberate decision to worsen relations with the US or to jettison the peaceful co-existence policy and move closer to Chinese Communist positions. Although the ambassador acknowledges that Soviet authorities regard an occasional espionage case as a useful device for warning the Soviet people against unmonitored contacts with Westerners, he feels the primary motive in the Barghoorn affair was the desire to secure a hostage for I. A. Ivanov, an employee of the Soviet "Amtorg" trade organization in New York who was arrested on 29 October. Gromyko told Kohler on 16 November that the USSR expects that the US Government "will take the necessary measures" to release Ivanov.

Moscow's apparent desire to avoid further damaging public exchanges over this case was evident in Gromyko's "confidential" warning to Kohler that if any US official publicly attempts to justify Barghoorn's behavior, thus casting doubt on the legitimacy of Soviet actions, the USSR "will reserve the right to publish materials of the investigation, including the deposition of F. Barghoorn himself." (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

HARMONIZED ALLIED PROCEDURES

TEXT OF SUMMARY OF ALLIED PROCEDURES TRANSMITTED TO SOVIETS ON 29 OCTOBER 1945

SOVIET PROCEDURES AS COMMUNICATED TO THE ALLIES ON 16 NOVEMBER 1945

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

- 1. Advance notification will be given for convoys of eight or more vehicles.
- 2. Prior notification will be given orally not later than 15 minutes before arrival of convoy at Soviet checkpoint. Allies also agreed that this provision would not alter existing self-imposed restraints on landing convoys containing six or seven vehicles.

- 1. Not mentioned
- 2. Not mentioned

- 1. Advance notice must be given in accordance with established practice. Convoys of less than five vehicles are processed through without advance notice.
- 2. Not mentioned

DISMOUNTING

- 1. Drivers, co-drivers, and crew members do not dismount for headcount.
- 2. Passengers in buses, whether the buses are travelling singly or as part of a convoy, will not dismount.
- 3. Passengers in other single vehicles will not dismount, except that those in vehicles carrying 10 or more passengers will be prepared to dismount.
- 4. Passengers in any convoy with more than 30 passengers (not counting bus passengers) will be prepared to dismount.
- 5. Passengers in convoys with 30 passengers or less (not counting bus passengers) will not dismount, except that those in individual vehicles carrying 10 or more passengers, within the convoy, will be prepared to dismount.
- 6. Dismounting for headcount (if requested by a Soviet checkpoint officer) will be carried out under the following conditions:
 - a) Dismounting will be executed on order of the Allied convoy commander and not of a Soviet officer.
 - b) Allied convoy commander will determine where the troops should form for headcount, taking into account considerations of the danger of excessive public displays.
 - c) In event troops dismounted for headcount are photographed or exposed to propaganda broadcasts, distribution of propaganda pamphlets, or other forms of propaganda, or are otherwise harassed, they will promptly remount.
 - d) Headcount in no case will exceed 15 minutes in duration. Otherwise troops will remount.
 - e) Dismounting will not be performed in inclement weather (extreme cold, rain, snow, etc.)

- 1. (See 4 below.)
- 2. Passengers in buses, whether the buses are travelling singly or as part of a convoy, will not dismount.
- 3. Not mentioned
- 4. In any convoy with more than 30 passengers (i.e., exclusive of drivers, assistant drivers, and, in the case of specialized vehicles, other crew members), the passengers will be prepared to dismount for headcount.
- 5. Convoys with 30 passengers or less will not dismount for headcount, except that individual vehicles with 10 or more passengers, in the convoy, will be prepared to do so.
- 6. Dismounting for headcount will be carried out under the following conditions:
 - a) Dismount will be executed on order of the Allied convoy commander.
 - b) The Allied convoy commander will determine where the troops should form for headcount.
 - c) In the event troops dismounted for headcount are photographed or exposed to propaganda broadcasts, distribution of propaganda pamphlets, or other forms of propaganda, or are otherwise harassed, they will promptly remount.
 - d) Headcount will be performed expeditiously. Otherwise the troops will remount.
 - e) Dismounting will not be performed in inclement weather.

- 1. Drivers are not counted in determining whether a convoy should dismount.
- 2. Troops travelling in buses are checked without a lineup.
- 3. Troops travelling in single vehicles are checked without a lineup.
- 4. Allied troops travelling in convoys dismount and line up for verification. Two men may be left with each vehicle as guards.
- 5. Verification of personnel is allowed in the vehicles if the sum total does not exceed an average of two or three men per vehicle, not including drivers.
- 6. Not mentioned

- a) Not mentioned
- b) Not mentioned
- c) Not mentioned
- d) Not mentioned
- e) A check of personnel will be made in the vehicles in case of bad weather, i.e., snow or rain, with the permission of the Soviet commander, at the present practice.

INSPECTION

- 1. On vehicles carrying passengers, tailgates the tops of which are over six feet from the ground will be lowered at Soviet request. No tailgates six feet or lower will be lowered.
- 2. Only convoy commander's identity card will be presented to the Soviets together with freight documents.

- 1. On vehicles carrying passengers, the Allied convoy commander will be prepared to lower tailgates the tops of which are over six feet from the ground. No tailgates six feet or lower will be lowered.
- 2. Not mentioned

- 1. Verification can be made with tailgates down or with tailgates up if a count is then possible.
- 2. Allied convoys are processed by presenting established documents.

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USSR REJECTS ALLIED STATEMENT ON BERLIN ACCESS

Moscow's rejection of the Allied statement on harmonized procedures on the Berlin autobahn maintains the deadlock on the question of "control" over procedures and is another tactical maneuver to draw the West into a formal discussion of the whole question of access to Berlin.

The USSR's reply of 16 November dismissed the Allied statement as representing merely "internal instructions" and again emphasized its own claim to control the passage of persons and goods of Allied forces through Soviet checkpoints.

The Soviet response, delivered to representatives of the Allied military liaison missions, reiterated earlier remarks of Foreign Minister Gromyko in insisting that a 29 June 1945 meeting of Allied commanders in chief "exactly established" that Soviet authorities "take care of protection, control and traffic regulation" for access routes used by the Allied military forces.

The ambiguous presentation of Soviet procedures by the chief of the Soviet military liaison mission deliberately preserved wide lati-

tude for Soviet checkpoint commanders in processing Allied convoys.

In a further attempt to demonstrate Moscow's firmness on this issue, Gromyko told the Danish foreign minister that the USSR would not give in on the question of autobahn procedures. He also told the UK ambassador on 14 November that the 1945 agreement "could not be changed one iota."

A series of incidents in the Berlin air corridors between 14 and 16 November apparently were not staged to pose the threat of more serious and drastic harassment of the Allied access routes. Flares sighted by civil air pilots in the air corridors on 14 November were probably related to a Soviet military field exercise in the area.

The sporadic shining of high-powered searchlights on US civil aircraft on all three days may have been the work of local East German border troops acting without authority from higher military headquarters. The US representative at the Berlin Air Safety Center protested this action, and there have been no further incidents reported since 16 November. (SECRET KIMBO NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

PEIPING RENEWS ATTACK ON MOSCOW

The Chinese Communist leaders apparently regard Khrushchev's 25 October request for a cessation of polemics as an expression of Soviet weakness. They certainly view it, not as genuine, but as a tactical move aimed at gaining a needed respite. The Chinese have no intention of giving Khrushchev this respite.

Moscow's recent effort to arrange a stage-managed international

Communist meeting to condemn the Chinese was apparently resisted by other Communist parties. The Chinese probably believe that this was a significant setback to Khrushchev's attempts to isolate them. They therefore feel, as they did when he called for a cessation of polemics last February, that this is a good time to press the attack.

This emerges clearly from a 19 November combined Red Flag -

The Communist World

People's Daily article--the fifth in Peiping's current series of attacks on the positions outlined in the Soviet Union's 14 July open letter. A long commentary on the "questions of war and peace," the article advanced no new ideas of this oft-debated issue but concentrated on heavy personal abuse of Khrushchev. Just before the Soviet October Revolution celebrations on 7 November, when the Chinese were uncertain whether they would be faced with an extreme challenge from the USSR, their war of words with Moscow had taken on a more ambiguous tone. The fourth commentary, published on 21 October, did not attack Khrushchev with the customary vigor.

The flavor of the current article, however, is contained in the comment that the US imperialists have not become "beautiful angels in spite of Khrushchev's bible-reading and psalm-singing; they have not turned into compassionate Buddhas in spite of Khrushchev's prayers and incense-burning."

The Barghoorn affair gives the Chinese a ready-made example of how the Soviet leadership has abandoned principle and knuckled under to US pressure while gaining nothing in return. Peiping has lost no time interpreting it this way. Although there has been no editorial comment as yet, selective reporting in the Chinese press makes the point clearly. Using Western news stories, Pei-


ping details the forms of pressure the US applied to gain Barghoorn's release and then depicts Khrushchev's personal intervention as a hasty and complete surrender.

The Chinese realize that Khrushchev's requests for a tempering of the dispute are welcome among other Communist parties which find the constant crossfire difficult to escape. To counter this, Peiping has periodically cited the number of anti-Chinese articles which continue to appear in the Soviet press. In preparation for their renewed assault, the Chinese on 15 November printed a hasty and "incomplete" count which showed that more than 80 articles with anti-Chinese commentary had appeared in the Soviet press in one two-week period following Khrushchev's 25 October request for a pause.

Moscow, unless stung to a quick response by the fury of the Chinese attack on Khrushchev, will probably maintain its self-imposed ban on its polemics while it seeks a way to convince other Communist parties to join in the isolation of Peiping. The Soviets now have begun to hint that, instead of an international gathering, another bilateral meeting might be held. Moscow probably believes that the almost inevitable failure of bilateral talks would show that its constant attempts to be reasonable produce no change in Chinese behavior. (CONFIDENTIAL)



Rumania's Gheorghiu-Dej
is visiting Yugoslavia...



... to sign an agreement for develop-
ment of the "Iron Gate" of the Danube.



He was preceded in Yugoslavia
by Khrushchev in August



... and Hungary's Kadar
in September.

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RUMANIA OPENS DOORS FOR COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Rumanian party First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej arrived in Belgrade on 22 November as leader of the highest ranking group from the Soviet bloc to visit Yugoslavia since its rapprochement with the bloc began nearly two years ago. Although ostensibly for the purpose of signing an agreement for construction of an ambitious hydroelectric and navigation project on the Danube border --the so-called Iron Gate-- the eight-day visit will undoubtedly be the occasion for party and governmental talks on a wide variety of subjects.

For Yugoslavia, Dej's visit will complete the process of re-establishing contacts at a high level with all the states of the Soviet bloc. During the past year, Khrushchev, Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov, and Hungarian party First Secretary Kadar have visited Yugoslavia. Tito has been to the USSR and Hungary and is expected to visit Poland in the spring. Visits by delegations at the politboro level have already been exchanged with Czechoslovakia and Poland, and Belgrade sent an important delegation to East Germany's party congress last January.

While Rumania did not participate in the last anti-Yugoslav campaign as heartily as

most bloc states, it has lagged behind these states in recent months in improving its relations with Yugoslavia. This demonstration of reserve toward Belgrade has complemented Bucharest's failure to attack the Chinese directly in the Sino-Soviet dispute and has apparently been intended in part to demonstrate Rumanian independence from the USSR.

Before accepting Tito's invitation Dej reportedly insisted on certain economic preconditions, the Iron Gate agreement being the most significant. The contrast between Bucharest's tough internal orthodoxy and Belgrade's relatively liberal domestic policies has apparently also been an impediment to closer Yugoslav-Rumanian relations.

Now, the fact that both countries, Yugoslavia more so than Rumania, refuse to subordinate their national economic programs to Soviet bloc interests provides a basis on which their relations could be rapidly improved. Both countries obviously attach considerable importance to the visit. The Rumanian delegation includes four key regime figures in addition to Dej, and there has been an enthusiastic press build-up in both states. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SATELLITES UNDERMINE GDR'S POSITION ON BERLIN

The terms of trade agreements concluded between several East European countries and West Germany undercut basic East German positions on the Berlin and German questions. This development reflects the greater willingness of the East European countries to put their national interests ahead of those of the Soviet bloc and has the effect--whether intentional or not--of isolating the GDR from its Eastern neighbors on the Berlin issue.

Both the Rumanian trade protocol with West Germany--initialed on 17 October--and the Hungarian agreement signed on 9 November contain a "Berlin clause"--i.e., a declaration that the agreement is applicable to the currency area of the Deutsche Mark West, which includes West Berlin. They resemble the Polish - West German agreement signed last March which included a secret protocol to this effect.

Any public acknowledgment of West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic is anathema to the East German regime, which maintains that West Berlin is an entity separate from the Federal Republic. The USSR also has pressed Bonn hard to avoid any reference--any written one, at least--to this subject in connection with the Soviet - West German trade agreement.

In addition, the opening of West German trade missions in Eastern Europe will detract from the GDR's claim to be the sole representation of Germany in the satellite capitals. The situation is aggravated from the GDR's point of view by the fact that the new

West German offices will have a semidiplomatic status.

Walter Ulbricht displayed his annoyance in a speech on 11 November to the GDR State Council in which he commented on Bonn's "more flexible tactics" toward Eastern Europe. "The reduction in tensions is being exploited by imperialist forces in Bonn," he said, "to penetrate into the GDR and the people's democratic countries by changed methods." While the East German leader did not expressly refer to the recent West German trade pacts, this is the one area where the more elastic policies forecast by West German Foreign Minister Schroeder in August 1962 have shown results for Bonn.

In the case of the Rumanian agreement, Bucharest reportedly took careful steps to keep the GDR--and perhaps the USSR--in the dark on the progress of negotiations. The British minister in Bucharest had heard that the GDR Embassy was "extremely discomfited" by the signing of the agreement and expected a new chill in East German - Rumanian relations, already none too cordial.

Meanwhile, Czech party leader Novotny has also made a bid to negotiate an exchange of trade missions with Bonn. Bulgaria, too, has shown a willingness for talks and may have begun negotiations this week. Berthold Beitz, Krupp's effective and ubiquitous general manager, was in Sofia in September as a guest of the Bulgarian premier and has been invited to visit Czechoslovakia in December. Negotiations for the renewal of the Soviet - West German trade agreement are tentatively scheduled for January. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

