

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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MEETING OF 11/17/97 THE BOARD APPROVED PROTECTION OF  
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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OIM-97-0010  
14 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director  
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Deputy Director for Administration  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Required Protection of [JFK Act 6 (1)(B)]  
[JFK Act 6 (1)(B)] as CIA Facility

1. ~~(S)~~ This memorandum is submitted pursuant to the decision by the Assassination Records Review Board (hereafter "ARRB" or "Board") to release the term [JFK Act 6 (1)(B)] in the context of a CIA facility and the Board's subsequent decision on 17 November 1997 to reconsider this issue. It provides additional information as to why [JFK Act 6 (1)(B)] [JFK Act 6 (1)(B)] as a CIA facility must be protected from public disclosure and hence the cover of this clandestine facility maintained.<sup>1</sup>

2. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this document, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared,

<sup>1</sup> (S) The documents at issue contain the term [redacted] however the actual name of the CIA facility at [redacted] is the [redacted] [JFK Act 6 (1)(B)] In point of fact, even CIA personnel tend to use the terms interchangeably.

[JFK Act 6 (1)(B)]

CL BY: 0700265  
CL REASON: 1.5(c)  
DECL ON: X1  
DRV FM: LOC 5-82

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and to return this memorandum for retention to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.

3. ~~(S)~~ As we advised previously, identifiable and serious damage to the mission, the people and the very existence of [redacted] could reasonably be expected to occur as a result of any confirmed affiliation with the Agency. Before examining with particularity the damage that would flow from disclosure, I believe that it would be helpful to understand in some detail the activities which currently constitute the [redacted] mission and what new, costly and critical activities are being developed for [redacted]

4. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] is much more than a [redacted] for the CIA operating under the relatively fragile cover of [redacted]

While it does serve this function, and thus houses at the site known as [redacted] some of the Agency's most important and sensitive Top Secret Codeword material,<sup>3</sup> it is currently the very heart of the CIA's worldwide communications effort, a critical

<sup>2</sup> (S) Pursuant to classification guidelines promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence, this fact is currently and properly classified at the SECRET level.

<sup>3</sup> (S) Because of the sensitivity of CIA records, the Archivist of the United States has authorized the CIA to maintain this [redacted] for both [redacted] [redacted] pending ultimate transfer to the National Archives no sooner than 50 years after their origination. This [redacted] currently houses nearly [redacted] cubic feet of records classified up to and including Top Secret codeword and composed of various media ranging from paper to original imagery from our national aerial and satellite surveillance platforms. In addition, [redacted] also houses the CIA's [redacted] which would provide the only basis for continuity of operations should disaster befall CIA headquarters. In addition and because of the security offered, the [redacted] serves a similar role for the National Security Council and the Office of the Management and Budget.

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element in our foreign signals intelligence effort, and a principal location for training and conferencing of officers engaged in highly clandestine technical intelligence collection activities. The facilities at  in support of these efforts include:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

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- members and staff from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

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5. ~~(S)~~ As detailed on the attached annotated photographs, [ ] and its [ ] are a critical support element for the clandestine intelligence collection mission of the CIA and the United States. Whether sending a message to a covert foreign national asset in Havana, or receiving a message from the CIA Chief of Station in [ ] or supporting military and diplomatic representatives in Bosnia, [ ] is a key element in that effort. Moreover, it is extremely vulnerable to physical attack because of the proximity of uncontrolled public roads and spaces. Accordingly, and as considered in more detail in paragraph 6 below, any affiliation of [ ] with the CIA, no matter how insignificant the individual occurrence or document release may seem, has the very real potential to jeopardize lives, negatively affect the Agency mission, and thereby do irreparable harm to the national security of the United States.

6. ~~(S)~~ But in addition to this established mission and extant risks, there are new activities at [ ] in direct support of the nation's leadership which must be considered -- specifically, the establishment of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) [ ] and an alternative [ ] site for [ ] has been chosen to be the primary [ ] given its location, communications, information services, and life support capabilities. Needless to say, the fact that [ ] is not an officially recognized CIA facility adds a dimension of secrecy which will be needed to enable the DCI to continue his work during any emergency situation. Additionally, active consideration is being given to also designating [ ] as the

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Agency's primary [redacted] JFK Act 6 (1)(B) Given the amount of time, money and resources which will be expended to insure that the facility is maintained in such a way that it will be prepared for any emergency situation, it would certainly be in the best interests of the US Government not to permit any official affiliation, no matter how minor, of [redacted] and the CIA.

7. (S) The preceding descriptions of ongoing and planned activities at [redacted] presents, I believe, an intuitive sense of the damage to national security which would follow from a linking of [redacted] with CIA. In sum, the conduct of covert communications and support activities as well as the presence of officers who will soon be serving overseas under cover in highly sensitive positions can not take place at a facility linked to CIA. But there are some very specific damage issues that I wish to highlight and they include:

- (S) Serious and Immediate Impairment to Physical and Personnel Security: Our [redacted] cover allows us to maintain a relatively low profile in the [redacted] community and a very low profile outside of the immediate area. If [redacted] became recognized as a CIA facility, the increased visibility and scrutiny would place employees, facilities, and daily operations at greater risk. In sum, [redacted] would become an easy "target of opportunity" for the media, foreign counter-intelligence agents, terrorist and militia activities, demonstrators, and emotionally unstable individuals. Facts, examples, and specific concerns include:

[redacted]

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maintains security through a low profile.<sup>7</sup> In the past in the United States, identification of CIA facilities have led to a number of surreptitious entries, bombings, and physical disruptions. Simply stated, CIA is a target for both hostile individuals and organizations;<sup>8</sup>

- On the individual level and in the past three years, [ ] has experienced an increase in security incidents including a physical breach of [ ] compound security, two suspect package incidents, and additional unsolicited contacts and "gate turn-around" incidents;<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> ~~(S)~~ As detailed on the attached annotated photographs, the array of communications equipment and its proximity to public spaces and roads is clear. For example, [ ]

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<sup>8</sup> ~~(S)~~ The current Kasi prosecution provides ample evidence of the risks posed by the public identification of CIA domestic facilities. Any individual intent upon seeking retribution for perceived wrongs quite naturally seeks a target providing the largest possible public notice and while CIA headquarters is an excellent target, a covert facility is even a better target, and a covert facility supporting the foreign espionage activities of the CIA is the best possible target for a political and public statement.

<sup>9</sup> ~~(S)~~ The breach of compound security was by an out-of-state vehicle which followed an employee through a remote gate and the driver had no credible explanation for their actions; the incident is considered suspicious and unexplained. The suspect package incidents include a box which was placed (not dropped) next to our facility which we believe was intended to test and thus observe our response to suspicious packages. Gate turn-arounds number 8-10 per month and include only those vehicles which ignore clear signs that they are entering a classified government facility but proceed in any event to our gate; it is instructive to note that, very few of these individuals state

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- Moreover, in the past several years, the federal government has had a heightened awareness of the violent domestic organization threat posed by the self-styled "militias" which have a stated intent to destroy government communications capabilities and facilities. We know, from information provided by federal law enforcement authorities, that the target list of such organizations includes federal communications centers and [redacted]
- By way of examples in this regard, in June of this year, the Sheriff of [redacted] reported to [redacted] information regarding, first, a local militia group, and, second, "unusual" comments from individuals living near [redacted] that we were communicating with UFO's;
- Any higher profile would realistically and seriously threaten the physical and personnel security of [redacted]. And, as evidenced by the attached map of [redacted] such threats do not need to penetrate the fence line: *Agency officials are of the opinion that a bomb commensurate with the one which exploded at the Oklahoma City federal building could do substantial damage to the Agency's communications equipment and could kill numerous federal employees at [redacted] from outside the fence line in circumstances we do not control and could not prevent.*

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or imply that they know that [redacted] is a CIA facility and, hence, it would appear that our cover, in fact, is quite good.

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- ~~(S)~~ Likely Future Compromise of Covert Employees in Overseas Assignments: As discussed above, numerous CIA employees involved in communications, technical intelligence collection, and human intelligence collection train and operate at [ ] for the exact reason that it provides a secure environment disassociated from the CIA. We know from ample evidence that foreign intelligence services have as a primary goal the identification of US citizens who appear to be ordinary public servants or private business people but are, in actuality, clandestine intelligence officers.<sup>10</sup> Simply stated, the identification of this facility with CIA will label any and every individual associated as a likely intelligence officer and thus substantially negate their operational ability if not place their lives in jeopardy.
- ~~(S)~~ Loss of [ ] for DCI: [ ] -- whether they be for the President or Cabinet officials -- have value only as long as their identity is secret. The public disclosure of the fact that [ ] would serve as such an [ ] -- which could come from a general compromise of [ ] as a CIA facility plus subsequent visual surveillance -- would negate Agency planning in this regard, vitiate expenditures, and leave the Agency with few realistic options for survivability. We must assume that any

<sup>10</sup> ~~(S)~~ We know from captured STASI (the former intelligence service of East Germany) and clandestinely-acquired KGB files that substantial resources have been directed at such identifications. Typically, a suspect American will be surveilled for some time in order to identify his or her target and cooperating foreign nationals. To identify a communicator is one of the highest priorities since it provides a possible entrée to cryptographic compromise as well as an opportunity to "roll-up" or identify the numerous human intelligence collection officers who rely on that particular communicator to transmit information back to the United States.

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entity which had the willingness and capability to attack the CIA would be inclined to inflict the maximum damage. Identification of [ ] even as a generic CIA facility poses an unacceptable risk to this key aspect to CIA continuity of operations.

- ~~(S)~~ Potential Compromise of Classified Communications or Technical Collection Platforms: In addition to the foregoing physical threat to our communications facilities (e.g., the potential to destroy towers, satellite dishes and transmitting facilities by terrorist act), the disclosure of [ ] as the transmit and receive site for CIA classified communications to [ ] sites as well as [ ] in the field presents a significant opportunity for any number of foreign nations to enhance their signals and communications intelligence efforts at our expense. While the scope and classification level of this memorandum does not permit a detailed discussion, I am convinced that this disclosure would make [ ] a target of hostile foreign intelligence services.

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<sup>11</sup> ~~(S)~~ The official term for such procurements is [ ] which means that the tangible items purchased cannot be traced to CIA but only to a non-sensitive government agency. For example, if an officer is assigned undercover to [ ] then it would be most imprudent to carry a personal computer and a cellular telephone which could easily be traced to CIA. At a minimum, that officer would be subject to foreign counter-intelligence surveillance and all of his or her contacts compromised (i.e., identified and neutralized).

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If the [ ] cover is eroded due to affiliation with the Agency, past procurements could be retroactively compromised while subsequent procurement activity would necessitate involving headquarters elements, indirect delivery and forwarding to [ ]. The loss of response time would negatively impact on the operational capabilities of [ ] tenant organizations.

• ~~(S)~~ Loss of Secure Training and Conference Capability:

[ ] is often used as a conference facility not only by Agency groups, but also by other US Government organizations. For example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher's pre-planning session for the Bosnian Peace Accord Talks was held at [ ] based on the need for a discreet location in which Department of State (DoS) officials, to include two ambassadors, and the military could secretly discuss strategic planning without undue attention (media coverage). If CIA affiliation is acknowledged in any way, [ ] value to the entire US Government is greatly diminished. Additionally, its value to the Agency is also diminished in that personnel from OED and other operational elements who use this facility would be running a greater risk of exposure and cover compromise if they visited [ ]. Since access roads can be monitored and registration lists, and/or luggage tags can be obtained at hotels used to accommodate some of these visitors, their association with the CIA would be much harder to protect.

- ~~(S)~~ Heightened Scrutiny of Classified Mission: For more than 40 years, [ ] We have been a good "neighbor" and have developed close working relationships throughout the town. To confirm what many have suspected but could never prove (or what a few "knew" but willingly protected) will have a negative

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impact on our credibility and will create an "open season" for the local media and others as they quite naturally attempt to learn any and all aspects of our mission -- *those clandestine officers who could come and go previously with little notice will now be a highly visible target.*<sup>12</sup>

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

8. ~~(S)~~ In summary, it is my considered judgment that the release of the term [redacted] which will create an affiliation of [redacted] and the CIA, would cause major disruptions to CIA operations, possible physical harm to CIA facilities and personnel, and hence identifiable and serious damage to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Board defer release of such information. In doing so, I am mindful of the Board's mission

<sup>12</sup> ~~(S)~~ It is not unreasonable to believe that the loss of cover for [redacted] would require a five fold increase in physical security personnel at [redacted] and even then security could not be ensured given the proximity of the facility to public spaces and roads.

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and the necessity for the American public to have the fullest possible disclosure regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, however, I believe that this reference is not relevant to the public's understanding and that disclosure would cause harms significantly disproportionate to any public benefit.

9. (U) If the Board should have any questions with regard to this matter, I have asked Lee Strickland, who serves as Chief of the Agency's Information Review Group, to be available to the Board in order to provide such additional classified or unclassified information as might be required.

Richard D. Calder

(S) Attachment  
Annotated View of

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

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JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

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JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

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OFSS/FMG, [redacted] kak/49570 (07 Nov 97)  
modified OIM/IRG/LSStrickland/31289 (13 Nov 97)

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1 - C, [redacted] FMG/OFSS

1 - DC, [redacted]

1 - OFSS Registry

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

g:\ipcrdwp\general\lss\arrb [redacted]

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26 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director  
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: John F. Pereira  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Release of  
[redacted] JFK Act 6 (1)(B) in the Lopez Report

*David,*

1. The attached memorandum is provided in support of our request that the JFK board reconsider its decision to release the reference to [redacted] JFK Act 6 (1)(B) in the Lopez Report (p. 44).

2. We request that this memorandum and attachment be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on this issue.

Attachment

*John Pereira*

OFSS-96-3975  
25 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Information Review Officer,  
Directorate of Administration

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration  
Director of Facilities and Security Services  
Chief, Facilities Management Group, OFSS

FROM: Chief, [redacted] FMG/OFSS

SUBJECT: [redacted]  
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

1. (S) This memorandum is written pursuant to yesterday's discussion with regard to the release of JFK-related documents that refer to [redacted] and/or derivatives of a [redacted]. It documents executive-level "evidence" as to why [redacted] needs to be protected. In brief, significant damage to mission, people, and the very existence of the [redacted] [redacted] would occur as a result of the second- and third-order effects of any confirmed affiliation with the Agency.

2. (S) As background, the Central Intelligence Agency has gone to great lengths to protect sensitive missions and prevent identification of covert personnel as Agency employees. The latter is especially profound as the very lives of these employees are often placed in jeopardy at hostile overseas posts. The anonymity provided by cover is essential to their protection.

[redacted]  
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)


3. (S) The cover mechanism itself is very fragile. Per mandate of the cover providers, [redacted] the affiliation of WTC and the Agency, is classified SECRET vice CONFIDENTIAL. [redacted]

CL BY: 2004977  
CL REASON: 1.5(c)  
DECL ON: X1  
DRV FROM: LOC 5-82

SUBJECT: (S) [redacted] JFK Act 6 (1)(B) Cover Considerations

cover operates solely on the ability to sustain plausible denial. In spite of previous rumors of an Agency affiliation, categorical denial of such has worked to the point that the media currently refers to [redacted] as a [redacted]. In addition, the public-at-large truly believes that [redacted] is a [redacted]. Given a generally inquisitive media (one radio station, two newspapers -- all with connections to affiliates in the Washington Metropolitan Area) and recent publicity over a [redacted] issue, the re-release of references to [redacted] in the JFK-related documents would precipitate an unwelcome focus on [redacted]. This would lead to the real possibility that cover would be compromised.

4. (S) With the closure of [redacted] is the sole remaining federal facility in the [redacted]. As a result, the affiliation of Agency records or [redacted] under any ruse, will provide a direct link to the [redacted]. This will pose severe problems for installation activities. While the Agency [redacted] is located at [redacted] the media frequently refers to WTC in its entirety. Activities at the other [redacted] that would be compromised are as follows:



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SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~

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Cover Considerations

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[redacted] cover allows it to maintain a very low profile. It is that low profile which protects the personnel and missions as described above. Removal of that protective cover, by act or deed, would provide easy targets of opportunity for counter-intelligence activities, terrorist activities, demonstrations, and emotionally unstable individuals.

5. ~~(S)~~ In summary, any affiliation of [redacted] and the Agency, no matter how insignificant the individual occurrence or document release may seem, has the very real potential to jeopardize lives, disrupt the Agency mission, disrupt world-wide classified message traffic, and, thereby, do irreparable harm to the national security of the United States.

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

CL BY: 705641

CL REASON: Section 1.5 C

DECL ON: X1

DRV FRM: COV 1-82

**TO:** John F. Pereira  
Brian S. Latell  
**FROM:** [REDACTED] JFK Act 6 (1)(B)  
**OFFICE:** DCI  
**DATE:** 10/20/97 02:21:49 PM  
**SUBJECT:** Re: Release Issue/JFK Board

Thanks. I passed along to D/EXDIR and EXDIR. The D/EXDIR may want Brian Latell to provide some more background on this issue at the meeting tomorrow.

Original Text of John F. Pereira

*Original Text of John F. Pereira*

*Following is in response to questions raised by the EXDIR:*

**1. Members of JFK Board:**

*Chairman: Judge John Tunheim (Federal District Court, Minnesota)*

*Four other members: Henry Graff; History Professor Emeritus, Columbia U.  
Kermit Hall; Dean of Humanities, Ohio State  
William Joyce; Assoc. Librarian, Princeton U.  
Anna Nelson; History Professor, American U.*

**2. Intermediate steps before appeal to President:**

*a) We are discussing our concerns with JFK Board Staff, and will ask the Board to reconsider its decision.*

*b) We'll propose that a senior Agency officer brief the Board on the sensitivity of Warrenton.*

**3. Who would make the appeal to the President ?**

*Thus far, the process calls for the Agency's General Counsel to forward the appeal to the White House Counsel, with the approval of the EXDIR and/or DCI.*

**4. Has there been an appeal to the President before ?**

*CIA has submitted one appeal, in early 1996. The issues concerned identification of certain European stations and liaison relationships. The White House directed the Board and the Agency to "work it out", which was done. After the ADDO briefed the*

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*Board, a compromise was reached.*

*The FBI has submitted three appeals, none of which was successful.*

5. *Does ISCAP have a role ?*

*Thus far, ISCAP has had no role with regard to JFK, as far as we are aware.*

**CC:** Regina A. Genton, Brian S. Latell, Edmund Cohen @ DA, James R. Oliver @ DA  
**Sent on 20 October 1997 at 02:21:49 PM**

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