

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10336-10012  
RECORD SERIES : JFK  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJFILES-ARRB REQUESTS

Released under the John  
F. Kennedy  
Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992  
(44 USC 2107 Note).  
Case#:NW 53217 Date:  
06-24-2017

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : ARRB  
FROM : ARRB  
TO : CIA/HRG  
TITLE : ARRB REQUEST: CIA-IR-13: OFFICE/PERSON DEALING WITH  
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CUBA  
DATE : 04/16/1997  
PAGES : 19  
  
SUBJECTS : FORD CHARLES  
JFK ASSASSINATION  
UNIT INDEX  
ARRB REQUEST  
FISCALINI  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER  
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/13/04  
COMMENTS : JFK-M-20 : F13 : 20030731-973803 : UNIT INDEX

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10336-10012

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson  
April 16, 1997  
Page 9

DRAFT

"George Bush" in question. CIA is now checking whether the search query included George Herbert Walker Bush prior to 1970. CIA should determine whether George Herbert Walker Bush is the person to whom the memorandum refers and should provide a definitive statement regarding the scope of its search and the basis of its conclusion.

CIA-IR-10 IG Reports.

CIA will determine whether the IG's office maintains an index or inventory of its reports and determine whether the IG's office prepared a report on the handling of Oswald.

CIA-IR-11 Warren Commission critics.

We are asking that CIA determine whether it possesses any files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher. The Review Board is not requesting information *per se* regarding any FOIA requests by these individuals or any Public Affairs news clippings.<sup>7</sup>

CIA-IR-12 Contacts with journalists or publishing houses.

The Review Board seeks to determine to what extent, if any, CIA might have attempted to influence any journalists or publishers regarding public discussion of the assassination. This request, originally discussed in March 1997, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO had no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-IR-13 Office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba.

The Review Board requested that CIA make a particular personnel file available. The file was made available by CIA for review. The Review Board will discuss with you whether any further steps need to be taken. X

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<sup>7</sup>To the extent that CIA possesses FOIA files or records on any of these individuals, and to the extent that those records contain information that was not filed with the courts, such records *are being requested for review by the Review Board.*

25 March 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-13, for Information  
Concerning Office or Person Dealing with  
Organized Crime and Cuba

1. ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-13, asked for information on a specific office or person which may have dealt with organized crime and Cuba about the time of the Kennedy assassination. Further, the request asked for a response concerning the searches made by the Agency to identify this office or person.

2. The Agency conducted an extensive records search for any employee who might have been involved in activities akin to those described within the request. The search identified a former employee, Charles D. Ford, as one who may have had such responsibilities for a period of time.

3. The former employee's personnel file was requested by the ARRB staff and it was provided. Review of the file by a ARRB staff member resulted in a number of documents being declared assassination records -- three fitness reports and a recommendation, approval document and citation for an Agency Career Intelligence Medal. These documents have been added to materials awaiting indexing and review by the ARRB.

3. The inclusion of these documents within the JFK collection for future processing completes HRP action on subject request.

J. Barry Harrelson

Seen: Concur

\_\_\_\_\_  
For the Directorate of Operations      date

\_\_\_\_\_  
For the Directorate of Administration      date


14 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Laura Denk  
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson  
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-13, Office or Person Dealing with  
Organized Crime and Cuba

1. This is in response to referent request.
2. Searches were made for information responsive to the request and materials were provided for examination by ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents to be included within the JFK Collection. Those documents have now been included within the JFK Collection and are being processed for release to NARA.
3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any question, please advise.



J. Barry Harrelson

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INTERVIEW FORM

NAME: PORD, Charles

TELEPHONE                     

ALIAS                     

OFFICE OTR

OFFICE APPROVAL                       
Signature

                      
Date

DATE OF INTERVIEW 18 Sept 75 TIME 120-1315

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW Carrol Arms

TRANSPORTATION REQUIRED: YES                      NO                     

FROM HEADQUARTERS                       
(time)

OTHER                     

INTERVIEWED BY: Postal, Gordon Rhea, Rhett Dawson,  
Fred Baron, Robert Kelly.

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations - Task Force W -  
Assassination of Castro - Mafia connections.

COMMENTS: Under oath. This was second meeting.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: Attached.

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(2)

Interview by Senate Committee Investigators

Director of Training

1026  
C of C

3245

19 September 1975

*Step*  
*Mary*

DDTR

DTR

Chief, Division D  
7B-44 Hqs.

*logged - no file*

Assistant to the Director  
6D-15 Hqs.

SEP 1 3 17 PM '75

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19 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview by Senate Committee Investigators

1. On Thursday, 18 September 1975, I was interviewed for the second time by investigators from the Senate Committee. The interview lasted from approximately 11:20 a.m. until 1:15 p.m. My testimony was recorded and will be transcribed. When the transcription is ready I will be required to read it and swear to the truthfulness of the statements I made. Under ordinary circumstances, a Senator would have been present to swear me in at this interview. However, because of the televised public hearings, no Senators were available. An unidentified woman operated the equipment which consisted of a Sony cassette recorder and dictaphone cassette recorder. The primary questioning was by Mr. Postal and Mr. Gordon Rhea, the same investigators with whom I spoke on the earlier occasion. At one point or another during the proceedings three other men joined us for various periods of time. Mr. Rhott Dawson appeared shortly after the interview began and remained for about an hour. Mr. Fred Behren (I can't vouch for the spelling) arrived after about half an hour and remained for approximately twenty minutes, having received a phone call which took him away. Mr. Bob Kelly arrived shortly after Mr. Behren and stayed for about 10 minutes longer than Mr. Behren. The interview was conducted in a room in the Carroll Arms a former hotel across the street from the Senate Office Building.

2. The meeting began with a reminder that I could have an attorney present and that I could refuse to answer any question which might tend to incriminate me. I was asked to describe in general terms my work with CIA. I told them that I joined in 1949; that I was and am now a member of the Office of Training; that in 1960 or thereabouts I had a short tour of duty with the Economic Action Group in the DDP, and that I went directly from that assignment to MI/4 in September of 1961.

3. I was asked to recall my major activities while with the Cuban operation and I did so. I reported that my first assignment was the handling of a Cuban agent, one we were using to build a nucleus of an organization for eventual operations into Cuba. I identified this man as Mr. Rojas (Mr. Rhea, having heard my description of this activity at our earlier session, did not pursue this matter any further).

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4. The investigators were interested in when I was assigned the code name Fiscalini; the circumstances under which the name was assigned, and who had assigned it. I told them I had seen a Xerox copy of the memorandum (I saw this during a meeting with Bill Sturbits last Friday in Bill's office) which requested that identification in the name of Fiscalini be assigned to me. I explained the circumstances, which Mr. Postal and Mr. Eves had heard at our earlier meeting, and said that I thought the date was the end of March, 1962. The circumstances involved a contact by a New York lawyer, thru the Department of Justice, concerning a client who had access to Cuba and wanted to visit Castro to put in a special plea on behalf of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. I identified the individual concerned (I still can't remember his name) as the manager of the Teresa Hotel in New York. I did not identify the lawyer and was not asked for his name. I identified a man I met at a second meeting in New York as "Bubbles" Abdallah. I explained that the latter individual proposed to accompany the manager of the Teresa to Cuba, the manager being an elderly gentleman with some difficulty in walking. I explained to the investigators that I had no further contacts with these people after I discovered that Abdallah was wanted, or under indictment - I forget which - by Texas authorities for smuggling drugs from Mexico. Mr. Robert Kelly was clearly interested in pursuing the matter of who assigned my "Code Name." I indicated that the documentation that I received came from the Office of Security but that I did not know whether that Office selected the name or not.

5. We went over again the story of my contact with a Canadian named "Joe" (I know this man's last name but have not been asked for it and have not volunteered it). I described one meeting and a telephone call involving Joe. In the meeting he claimed that he could travel back and forth from Canada to Cuba; revealed to me that he was interested in starting a smuggling activity involving goods on the proscribed list; that he wanted United States citizenship and a great deal of money in exchange for allowing us to send materials or tamper with some of the shipments if we could get the proscribed goods to Canada. I explained to the investigators that my interest lay in the fact that Joe claimed he could speak with Che Guevara and that I had attempted to get Joe to serve as a means of communication between us and Che, which Joe refused to do. As for the telephone call, I told them that when Joe returned from his trip to Cuba he called to say that big things were going on in Cuba and we should meet right away. Being aware that at that point we in the Agency were deep into what would later be called the Cuban Missile Crisis, I told Joe I could not see him and that we probably already knew what he had to tell me. That was the last I heard of Joe.

6. We spent a great deal of time going over my meetings with the Attorney General and his interest in a small group of Cubans who claimed to have supporters in Cuba ready to create an uprising in Santiago Province. This is the case described in paragraph 3 of my earlier memorandum. The investigators were quite interested in the identity of the man whom I saw at the request of the Attorney General. I went over this again in as much detail as I could remember but without being able to recall who this man was. I was asked if I could describe the

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man and I said that I recalled him as a fairly tall man of average build with black hair, black eyebrows and glasses. Of considerable interest is the fact that perhaps 15 to 20 minutes later I was shown an 3 X 10 glossy photograph of several people walking in front of what appeared to be a public building and was asked whether I could identify any of the people in the picture. I could not. Mr. Postal pointed to the central figure and asked if I could identify him. I said I could not. (The picture was of a man probably in his mid-sixties with flowing white hair - somewhat on the order of Senator Keating - a large down-curving nose, white, straight eye brows behind dark glasses, a somewhat lined, puffy face, and a slightly receding forehead accentuated by the fact that his hair was combed straight from front to back. The man was wearing a dark blue or black suit, and one man appeared to be accompanying him to his left and slightly ahead, and another man slightly to his right and rear. Without having any reference points by which to judge, my best guess would be that the subject was about 5'10" tall. He appeared to be rather heavy, perhaps in the range of 220 pounds. There seemed to be a caption of some sort at the bottom of the picture but this was hidden from my view.) Mr. Postal asked whether the main figure in the photograph could have been the man the Attorney General directed me to see. I replied that, even allowing for the difference in years, the man in the photograph in no way resembled the man I saw on behalf of the Attorney General.

7. Messrs. Postal and Rlica again brought up the subject of assassination and asked whether I had engaged in or had heard mention of, in Task Force W or SAS, discussions on the subject of assassination either in general or specifically with respect to Castro. I told the investigators that the subject came up repeatedly when we were speaking with Cubans, many of whom, having been forced to flee Cuba, sincerely wished for Castro's immediate demise. I said that I had never heard of or engaged in conversations with Agency officers about any plan the direct and only aspect of which was the assassination of Fidel Castro. I pointed out that on a number of occasions I dealt with Cubans who wanted to kill Castro, but that my job was simply to attempt to extract from these contacts the names of people in Cuba who might be of potential use to us in intelligence operations. I said that I had never engaged in plotting with Cubans regarding assassination but that I had many conversations with Cubans regarding their desire to conduct paramilitary activities which, as a by-product, might well result in Castro's death. I pointed out emphatically that the Agency's policy prohibits political assassination.

8. I was asked if I knew Bill Wainwright and Nestor Sanchez. I told them that I knew them both and that Nestor and I shared an office for a short period near the end of my attachment with SAS. I was asked if "AM-LASH!" meant anything to me and I replied in the negative. This was followed by whether Bill and Nestor had discussed with me or mentioned an operation of theirs involving a high level officer of the Cuban government, a military man who made frequent trips out of Cuba. Again I could only reply in the negative. I added the juxtaposition of Bill and Nestor in the context of a single operation surprised

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me inasmuch as I believed Nestor to have been involved only in psychological operations and Bill working at collecting foreign intelligence. I was then asked if the word "AMOTS" meant anything to me and I said it did but that all I could say was that it had to do with counterintelligence activities. Mr. Rhea asked me whether I could say that the "AMOTS" activity was concerned with contacting Cuban exiles in the Miami area and I indicated that this was my understanding. The subject was not pursued further.

9. I was asked about my visit to New Orleans (which I had mentioned during the previous session) and I explained that these two trips were for the purpose of attempting to find ways of establishing channels of communication between the exiled Cubans in New Orleans and their friends in Cuba. I indicated that I had been able to come up with a very fine prospect, a Cuban, and that I had turned him over to one of our FI Case Officers. I also said that I had several discussions with an American whom I declined to identify under the general ground rule relating to sources of information. Messrs. Postal and Rhea asked if I would respond affirmatively if they were to suggest some initials which might correspond to the name of my American contact. I agreed to do this but the initials which they mentioned meant nothing. (Unfortunately, I cannot recall them!) I volunteered the initials of my contact, "FJ", and this produced a blank expression on the part of both investigators and a shrug of Mr. Rhea's shoulders. The final question I was asked was whether I had any knowledge of the "Ponchartrain Operation". I told them that I knew where Lake Ponchartrain was, and that's as far as it went.

10. We spent a little time on the subject of General Landsdale. I admitted I had attended one meeting in General Landsdale's office in the Pentagon. I was asked whether anyone else was there and said that I could recall only one name, Cornelius Roosevelt, but that there were two other people at the meeting. In response to a series of questions about what was discussed at that meeting, I said that General Landsdale was interested in various paramilitary possibilities and that my role was limited to giving a quick assessment of whether we had the agent assets to assist in carrying out the various possible operations that General Landsdale suggested.

11. I was asked whether the term "Wongoose" meant anything to me and I indicated that it was a general term used to refer to a composite of planned operational activities. I said that I had no knowledge of any specific activity being planned under this name and further explained that it was possible that some of my Cuban contacts might have been taken over by other Case Officers for use under "Wongoose" but that I had no direct knowledge of such having been done.

12. Mr. Robert Kelly expressed considerable interest in the organization of Task Force W. At one point he asked how many echelons there were between me and Mr. Helms. I told them that I reported to Bill Harvey; that my title was Special Assistant; that Mr. Harvey reported to Mr. Helms; that I frequently received

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assignment and reported to Sam Halpern; and that occasionally I undertook tasks for Bruce Cleever, Harvey's deputy, although these tasks were concerned with the workings of Task Force W and did not involve contact with the Cubans. I was asked if there were any Special Assistant other than me in Task Force W and I replied that Mr. Logly, C/R/V prior to Mr. Harvey's arrival on the scene, had been retained as a member of Task Force W in an SA status. I said that there may well have been others because people would show up from time to time for short tours of duty for several months or so and then depart to carry on their work elsewhere, but that I could not recall anyone by name at the present time.

13. I was asked whether I used the name Fiscalini in circumstances other than those described. I said that I frequently carried identification in that name and used it on several occasions. I described one occasion which was an amusing one - the contact with no bearing on any item of interest to the committee. The investigator asked whether I had ever contacted Cubans in Miami and I replied in the negative.

14. I was asked if I had ever made contacts with people in New York City other than those described. I said that indeed I had but that in one case, although the man in question lived in New York, the meeting took place in Newark, New Jersey. In response to a question I said that the lead was provided by the FBI. I declined to identify the man involved on the grounds of the sensitivity of his position at that time and the fact that I do not know at present where he is or what he is doing. (This was the beginning of the unsuccessful ECHO Operation which should be recorded somewhere in the Task Force W or Miami Station files.)

15. I was asked whether I had any knowledge of a meeting of the Attorney General and Cuban exile leaders in the summer of 1962. I said that such a meeting would not have been unusual, in my opinion, but that I had no knowledge of such a meeting. I pointed out that it was common practice among many Cuban leaders to try to acquire the support, or at least the appearance of support, of U.S. agencies and prominent U.S. political figures. I further stated that numerous attempts were made to get the U.S. to support a Cuban government-in-exile and that I had had one meeting in Washington with a Cuban leader who was constantly attempting to get us to support him as head of such an arrangement. I identified this man as Mario Garcia-Kohly and added that he was sentenced to prison some years later for counterfeiting Cuban pesos. The name "Kohly" obviously rang a bell with Mr. Postal as he repeated it aloud in a surprised tone of voice. However, Mr. Postal did not pursue the matter.

16. Some of the other topics which were surfaced in connection with the above major items: I was asked whether I knew the following people or recognized the names. (My responses are summarized in the parentheses and I can't vouch for all the spellings):

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(Y)

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- (1) Carlos Teppedino (never heard of him)
- (2) Jose Orta (never heard of him)
- (3) Sam Giancana (read about him in newspaper; never met him)
- (4) Roselli (read about him in the newspaper; never met him)
- (5) Trafficante (read about him in newspaper; never met him)
- (6) Manuel Artino (a prominent member of Cuban brigade; never met him)
- (7) Big Jim O'Connell (heard about him in the newspaper; never met him)

I was asked whether "No Name Key" meant anything to me and I gave a negative response.

I was asked if I had visited Chicago in the course of my work and I told them I had not.

17. This is probably the appropriate point to underline my conviction that the main, if not the only, point of concern to the investigators is whether I was directed to sally forth and initiate contact with members of the underworld in the U.S. and who directed me to do so. Their interest is even more pointedly focussed on whether I had anything to do with the Rosselli, Giancana, et al, "operations". Once again, I explained that my job was broader than this by a long shot, and that I was never directed to take the initiative in establishing contacts with the underworld. I said that several, probably no more than five or six, of the people with whom I dealt were somewhat "shady" characters, in some cases with recorded run-ins with law enforcement agencies.

Charles D. Ford  
Chief, Training Services Staff, OTR

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Mr. Waller W ~~LET~~

Shepard W  
Milling W

W

Review Staff: 75/2723

Date 28 August 1975

~~File~~ ~~ISA~~  
~~DB~~

John,  
I checked with  
Walt Elder (3 Sept)  
and he says that  
IG has action on  
this. (Charlie Ford is  
OTR man I mentioned.)

Walter Elder ✓

Time \_\_\_\_\_

J. Waller  
Mr. Shepard  
Marilyn

I'd hold this memo  
in case there is some  
change of plan.

, reports that Mr. Helms  
ed that in response to a  
Robert Kennedy, the Agency  
lish contacts with the under-  
ssets for use against Castro.

Approved by \_\_\_\_\_  
18 Sept 75  
Shep  
Check with Dick -  
I'm sure Ford said as a  
memo in his interview. Shep

ficier was Charles Ford who  
si.

nation we have on this and  
Agency officer.

Comments:

Track down

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA	X	
A/DDI		
A/DDO		
A/DDS&T		
OGC		
OLC		
IG		
SA/PTG	✓	

Classified by G37703  
Exempt from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
Authority: 25 CFR 115.21  
Responsible: G37703

SECRET

(10)

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/2723

Date 28 August 1975

*BJ*

~~File~~ ~~SA~~  
~~DDI~~

TO : CIA Task Force  
FROM : The Review Staff, Walter Elder ✓  
SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request  
RECEIVED: Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_

*J. Waller*  
*Mr. Sheps*  
*Maryk*

Mike Madigan, SSC staff, reports that Mr. Helms and Mr. Halpern have testified that in response to a request by Attorney-General Robert Kennedy, the Agency assigned an officer to establish contacts with the under-world to look for possible assets for use against Castro.

Sam Halpern says the officer was Charles Ford who used the name, Rocky Siscalini.

Madigan wants any information we have on this and would like to interview the Agency officer.

Comments:

*Track down*

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA	X	
A/DDI	<i>[initials]</i>	
A/DDO	<i>[initials]</i>	
A/DDS&T		
OGC		
OLC		
IG		
SA/IDU	✓	

SECRET

*(11)*

Classified by CS7703  
Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
Exempt from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification on  
date applicable to Executive

THE  
**DARK SIDE**  
OF  
**GAMELOT**

ALSO BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH

*Chemical and Biological Warfare:  
America's Hidden Arsenal*

*My Lai Four:  
A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath*

*Cover-up:  
The Army's Secret Investigation of  
the Massacre of My Lai Four*

*The Price of Power:  
Kissinger in the Nixon White House*

*The Target Is Destroyed:  
What Really Happened to Flight 007 and  
What America Knew About It*

*The Samson Option:  
Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and America's Foreign Policy*

SEYMOUR M.  
**HERSH**



LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY  
BOSTON NEW YORK TORONTO

load its cargo of Cuban sugar, a CIA scientist broke into a warehouse and injected the sugar with a chemical to ruin the taste. "It was childish," Halpern says now. "But we were doing something under the pressure."

There was further humiliation for the men of Task Force W. Bobby Kennedy, increasingly impatient with the lack of progress in Cuba, decided in the early spring of 1962 to run his own operation. He once again moved into the back channel, as he had done with the Soviets, this time working with the Mafia. On his orders an experienced clandestine CIA operative named Charles Ford was assigned as the attorney general's personal agent. Kennedy's unprecedented request went up the chain of command to General Marshall Carter, the new deputy CIA director, for approval. Ford spent the next eighteen months, until the assassination of President Kennedy, making secret trips, at Bobby Kennedy's direction, to Mafia chieftains in the United States and Canada, while continuing to serve with Harvey and Halpern on Task Force W. "Bobby was absolutely convinced," Halpern told me, "that the mob had a stay-behind system in Cuba since they had so many assets left there. There were the casinos and gambling dens and prostitution rings and God knows what else. Kennedy thought that by tapping into those stay-behind units we could get some decent intelligence on what's going on in Cuba. The concept was crazy. The Mafia couldn't have set up a stay-behind system; it's too hard. Also, Castro had a great internal security system and you couldn't work contacts in the cities. That's why we" — in Task Force W — "operated in the countryside."

It was also possible, Halpern said, that Bobby Kennedy's primary purpose in dealing with Charles Ford was to do what Bill Harvey was not doing — find someone to assassinate Fidel Castro. "Charlie saw Kennedy in his office and of course talked to him on the phone quite regularly," Halpern told me. "Charlie was a good officer, and Bobby was his case officer. Charlie never reported that kind of information to me. He may never have reported it to anybody. He was Bobby's man. Nobody's going to touch him."

Kennedy initiated some of the telephone calls to Ford, Halpern said, but they were usually made on his behalf by Angie Novello, his longtime personal secretary. Novello, interviewed for this book briefly by telephone in 1994, said she remembered Halpern but had

"no memory" of ever calling CIA operatives, including Ford.\* Halpern told me that Ford would make it a point to stop by his cubicle in the Task Force W offices and say, "See you again, Sam. I'm off again." Ford averaged two trips a month for the attorney general, and would dictate reports for Kennedy upon his return. "I know," Halpern said, "he went to places like Chicago, San Francisco, Miami — wherever Bobby sent him — including one trip to Canada." Ford, obviously following instructions from Kennedy, relayed nothing to his nominal superiors in Task Force W. "We never got a single solitary piece of [written] information," Halpern said. Charlie Ford's reports, if they still exist, presumably are among the millions of pages of Robert F. Kennedy papers that have yet to be released by the John F. Kennedy Library.†

Halpern said he and his colleagues had an ongoing concern for Ford's security. "We like to control our meeting places," he explained. "We don't like to walk into an unknown place." The husky and dark-skinned Ford, who had served in Japan and knew a great deal about the CIA's extensive operations there, was given identity papers and a careful cover story in the hope that his identity as a clandestine CIA officer would not become known to the Mafia.

"I don't know how Bobby Kennedy squared that in his own mind," Halpern said. "On the one hand, he allegedly was going after

\* Halpern's recollection of conversations between Kennedy and Ford is supported in part by Robert Kennedy's telephone logs and appointment book for 1962, as made public by the Kennedy Library in 1994. They show that Kennedy met twice with Ford in September and also received a telephone call that month from Ford. In his 1993 memoir *CIA and the Cold War*, Scott D. Breckinridge, who was one of the authors of the CIA inspector general's 1967 report on assassination plotting, cryptically described the Ford assignment. As part of Mongoose, the CIA "was directed to provide an operations officer to meet with Mafia figures identified by Kennedy under circumstances over which CIA had no control." Breckinridge acknowledged in an interview for this book that he had been told the story by Halpern, and others, during the 1967 inquiry. Breckinridge did not identify Ford in his book, even after Ford's death, in keeping with the CIA practice of not naming previously unidentified clandestine agents. Halpern himself did not confirm Ford's involvement for this book until he was shown Ford's name and title on the attorney general's office logs.

† In a 1993 compilation, the Kennedy Library reported that its collection of RFK papers totaled 1,541 linear feet, of which 440 feet have been released for research. Few of Kennedy's working papers from his days as attorney general have been made available.



