

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD SERIES : JFK  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : NOSENKO RECORDS

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :  
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FORMS:ANATOLE RE NOSENKO  
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ANATOLE  
NBR

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RELEVANT (NBR). NOTES ARE DATED 15, 16 AND 17 JAN AND 14  
MAY 1969.

**CLASSIFIED  
ATTACHMENT**

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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"MR'S E -"

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

14 May 69

SUBJECT

ANATOLE RE NOSSENKO

FILE NUMBER

c/c was given a copy of the following for delivery to Anatole today:

A. Memo for Director Security  
"Solicitation Topics for Yuri Nosenko"

(A copy of the Draft was given to c/c on which I annotated final was dated 22 April.)

B. A carbon of the Memo for the Record dated 4 April 69,  
Subject: Anatole RE Nosenko  
with atts A B & C.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

G. Scott Miller

FORM 7-62 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

16 JANUARY '69

SUBJECT

ANATOLE RE Solie NOSENKO PAPER

FILE NUMBER

A Questions if he stated in re  
 his Dec '60 talk with Kowshuk  
 that it was a military  
 code clerk which was  
 recruited — more likely  
 he stated important  
 recruitment code clerk  
maybe military -

(Check ref in Solie paper - this  
 probably DA-54 - info from  
 FBI - not transcript (?) Kowshuk  
 in Dec 60)

OFFICE AND TITLE

V. J. e/c

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

16 January 69

SUBJECT

60-61 Nosenko's position

FILE NUMBER

(Analytic Reviewing Solie Nosenko paper)

2 points of "misinformation" from Nosenko

1. He was not in American Section, 60-61, and he could not be Deputy Chief - (N says he was)
2. There were no recruitments of AMEMB personnel during this period.

If N is established as in American Section then point 2, i.e., Nosenko's claim, follows but this is not the case.

Dec 60 - Jan 61 - in offices V. Petrov's Section. Petrov told personnel he could not find make reports and not look for it

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE
SUBJECT (2) 60-61 Nosecuro -	FILE NUMBER

If Petrov not responsible for Embassy why would he have "made" report in this Section?  
A overheard him ask for reports.

A says he is sure that before his defection N would have no problem learning about recruitments and operations. Strikano announced successes - rewards followed in few days - this known. Point A makes is that N would know - he could analyze who doing what and piece together with announcements & rewards to cases and targets.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE  
15 January '69

SUBJECT  
Nosouko trip to Cuba - Nov - Dec 60

FILE NUMBER

Asatell says only photographs  
will substantiate Nosouko, was  
Nikolaev, did travel thru  
Amsterdam - RR to Berlin -  
name alone as traveller on  
manifests, travel control, etc.  
not substantiation.

Requests he been shown  
documentation to substantiate  
actually was Nosouko.

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W. S. Miller

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 January '69

SUBJECT

N'seuko Attitude re Surfacing

FILE NUMBER

Anatole suggests consideration about asking N if he would agree to have true information published under his name, such as political info, sketch of Gibanov from what he has provided. This to be test see N's reaction - suggest this and see what he would say about writing article about Gibanov. Set stage see what might be done.

(U)  
Solic opinion he would agree.

A had asked and been told by Solie that N feared for his safety with respect to surfacing or living openly.

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U.S. Miller

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE  
15 Jan 69

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

Klippen - Gibbons relations -

Quintale says persons talk together re hunting or fishing - some thing re appointment in Moscow transcript he says the persons not right.

Did not understand point!

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G. Stiller

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 January 69

SUBJECT

NOSAIKO Notes

FILE NUMBER

Anatole categorically states it would have been impossible for N to transfer any notes or papers with him when transferring to another Department, check on safes and material constant. A says if he had been told N kept notes in his apartment A would say "madness" but believable. He cannot accept transfer notes with N.

A questions N's notes dealing with military targeting. How would he have A says flatly military unit under Kovstak. Possible Petrov in Section (sub) separate from Kovstak.

Giorgi Zhukov - ? Demotion 5B A agrees (ZHUKOV) Cherepanov papers show Chief Section. Used to check "C papers" re KOVSTAK status.

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U.S. [Signature]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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15 January '69

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

CHEREPANOV write-up from British  
(caption: alexsandr nikolaevich CHEREPANOV - 5 pages only)

Solic read. Copy to him today.  
JA read.  
Anatole

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 Jan '69

SUBJECT

KOVSHUK - in U.S. - demotions.

FILE NUMBER

Anatole says that Kovshuk got in trouble while he was in the US on a mission. He was recalled and demoted. He was a SCD officer not FCD. He was only in US 10 months.

Anatole does not accept Kosulko's explanation of reason for Kovshuk's demotion.

Anatole says, replying to Solie, he does not know if K's problem in US was girls. Solie said N indicated was involved girls in US.

However, Anatole says recall not because of girls according his information but did indicate needs investigation. Relates to cases he studying.

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W. S. Miller

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 Jan 69

SUBJECT

TAMARA MAMEDOVA

FILE NUMBER

Anatole, noting in transcript N's statement Sui, ask, was KGB suggests this he investigated. He is of opinion she might be KGB. Solie noted she traveled and active while in US - was in Washington.

A says he thinks she fits into case he studying - developing but in response to mild question which case said he had not previously mentioned but will when ready. A confirmed not case previously mentioned when Miles said he thought might be case to be reviewed.

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U. S. Miles

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 January, '69

SUBJECT

Nosenko - Charanov - Guk

FILE NUMBER

Available says N-C-G closest of friends, would know all C & G ops & agents and vice versa.

(Points) N could identify Varsal by name; would know C's agents.

A also commented that Guk in Suisse would have been targeted vs. Americans not concerned with frustration Swiss police.

A in answer to JA question said he knew for fact that N-C-G closest friends - professional, social-talk about women, etc., and he had been present when N & C talking about operations using language, i.e., doubletalk, so he, A, did not know what they really talking about but indicating to A they intimate re operations.

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U. S. Miller

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 January '69

SUBJECT

Y. Nosenko Duties American Section

FILE NUMBER

Anatole returned to point that he sees no substantiation or evidence that N was actually involved and working against Americans - in two years he should have been in "10 cases" as participant - Kribanov would not tolerate "planning" on part of experienced linguist. Even as a concession by A that N was "deputy" he would be directly involved - in contact. A notes Kovshuk, higher rank.

Kryazhev did not know language, Kos'topov and N should have worked and participated together.

Kovshuk and Churakov active - no cover.

Unbelievable he could stay 2 yrs without involvement and direct contact.

The response to Solie note re N approach to Kaysers at airport, which Solie noted Kaysers could not confirm, A says not confirmation - cover.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


DATE

SUBJECT

(2) N's Duties American Section

FILE NUMBER

A very positive weak point in N's story is American Section duty - N can substantiate - no confirmation - not normal - a reconstruction not actual role at time.



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U. S. Miller

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

15 Jan '69

SUBJECT

Y. NOSENKO

FILE NUMBER

ANATOLE emphasized point that Nosenko should have directly participated in approach to American Embassy personnel or been in social contact with Americans during the period Jan 60 - Dec 61 when he in Dept I Section I. A major point N's good language, experience, etc., according to A's knowledge, means that N should have followed American Section ops policy and been directly

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involved. In reply to A's  
 question Solie said only direct  
 confrontation N had with  
 American was in hallway  
 when [redacted] pitched her  
 [redacted] had not identified N.  
 Solie said N had attended  
 a (one?) 4<sup>th</sup> July celebrations  
 at AMEMB, Moscow.

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*W. E. Rice*

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD		DATE 15 January '69
SUBJECT Nosenko Bond Files		FILE NUMBER
<p><u>No</u> doubt, not even 1% doubt, that Nosenko is not a provocateur (is): a statement Anatole reiterated to J. Angleton, B. Solie and S. Miller. Anatole's concern is to point out the contradictions, major areas, necessary to protect our security.</p>		
OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE W. S. Miller	

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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17 Jan '69

SUBJECT

ANATOLE RE NOSENKO

FILE NUMBER

TAPE - 1

Anatole read thru several volumes of transcripts of Solie interviews with Nosenko, the Cherepanov papers including the Russian and Solie's paper re Nosenko and his files. He recorded the his comments.

Bowden - Cherepanov papers - met Bagley some and Dept SE Directorate. Didn't get file to review but it made clear to Bagley double agent. Newspaper account made it clear to A same source as discussed with Bagley 1962. went to McOne. 1964 rec'd file from Murphy re J. Quess 64 - analysis provided. Analysis limited to 60-61 KGB service background - no deep analysis of whole case. but notes information, etc. A position was - had to have all info he would/ could get but want to handle interrogation - puzzle

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Warned N re position - at time could not do research completely - latter agreement re interrogation to elicit entire story and that (A) would review material and ~~analyze~~ - see what do.

Mr. Solie did good job - did what SB failed to do fills many gaps - abundant info - touched important aspects of N background - after analysis thinks many things to discuss and N can be really assessed as bona fide or provocateur on a mission.

Can state Conclusion: 8-9 vols of info Solie elicited basis (good) for Conclusion -

Final vol conclusion - analysis of evidence - mistakes made - analysis & conclusions not supported by previous vols of N's information.

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Nosenko type caliber defector from KGB  
need to assess timing and meaning  
account for what happened before  
Penkovsky Case - relevant re  
walk-in - agents -

Popov genuine agent in GRU -  
info re ops - agents - military - personnel  
after Popov arrest within 4 1/2 yrs  
another GRU walk-in - need  
analyze Penkovsky light Popov  
parallel - up-dated info. look at Penkovsky  
from Popov

∴ Nosenko background against what  
went before - difference Penk 2 yrs  
key to Penkovsky was missile info  
which took more than year to prepare  
Penk or to Bobet School 59 - gave him basis  
similar to Nosenko what before  
Golitsyn came Dec 61 - info re KGB  
structure - major reorganization, new tasks  
personnel, operations, agents - some  
FCD + some SCD - info indicated  
some recruitments preparation P.M. in Moscow

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6 months after Golitsyn - Nosenko  
 contacts CIA in Geneva. Later here vast  
 info KGB, structure, personnel, operations -  
 speaks impressively freely - just like  
 Penkovskiy - And our (A) you question  
 bona fides because he gave freely -  
 cooperation not criteria to assess  
 defector - if defector respects himself  
 he may not cooperate all time.

The more cooperative the more suspect  
 because he had to tell story - do mission  
 Free response does not impress A -

If Popov gave vast info then Penkovskiy  
 had green light - parallel to Golitsyn

If KGB knows that Golitsyn made SED  
 info available to CIA then Nosenko gets  
 green light - difference in detail.

★ 2nd rule assessment - background -  
 Personal = pre-service bio = character = ops/professional/bio  
 NOT speak about Penkovskiy - speak of Nosenko

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I Bio pre-KEB - not important dwell on this  
 the Rosenberg - some of minutes - no question against  
 Analyze why SB concluded not N, etc.  
 important See if any connection to penetration  
 of CIA - not explained if hostile interaction  
 mistake or deliberate but was warning to N.  
 SB can make mistake or calculated -  
~~But don't say~~ If CIA accepted decision  
 (which A had made) that N could make  
 see if decision results not getting dis info.

II Personal Character - different opinions  
 rather well discuss - two sides - can be  
 important but not major - nonsense re  
 N's bragging - boasting - Boasting not  
 that much key - exaggerated - If  
 decides bona fide then important but  
 if still questioning then look differently -  
 open question -

III Service in KEB - attention  
 details of service accurate as given to CIA

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If he is not accurate in sources and years  
 if different than factual & significantly lacking  
 into repetitively then we cannot say as  
 was done in analysis that promotions,  
 salaries, etc. acceptable on basis of  
 speculation. Examine N info vs other  
 evidence - cannot discount evidence  
 if contrary what he says.

1 Dept 1 Section Dec 60 - Jan 62 (61  
 importance is coincides last 2 (Dec  
 A says)  
 info of G - important info.

Not true according to G's - G  
 knows for fact N did not serve I I  
 G told Bagley 62 - among list he  
 saw Nosenko name - G did not pinpoint  
 N - but said list wrong because G knew  
 N not in American Section.

Based on fact - not theory conventional  
 many people thought this still valid -  
 still fact.

Crucial

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A. Important to his mission but in this Dept. to give authoritative grounds speak about ops vs. AmEmb in this period.

B. Evidence against N

Here A speculate - maybe G tried to see if he knew look for N work in T.I. See first reaction - check about penetration - G did not react as they might have expected, Only said wanted analyze whole - did not exclude disinformation.

what is false about background is that he worked in T.I. and he held position Deputy - false as fact - 59 position abolished. In 60 was there and no N -

GRYZANOV was Deputy T.I. in '59 - when deputy abolished he became senior case officer - if there were details would be GRYZANOV to someone in T.I. not necessary

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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Assessment of info to judge sincerity -  
 two types Operational and political (policy - connection  
 KGB in work) 1959 Shelepin - soup - etc  
 He has provided VAST info KGB personnel,  
 Agents & operations - what significance  
 875 KGB officers (Soviet list -  
 probably 2000) 2000 + 300 agents  
 250 current FCD + 500 officers

(Tape off - Zechin - Mikhail  
 Solovtchik photo, Brussels - connection Belitskiy  
 not Yuri - lecture KGB school)

Assessment of info - repeat identities KGB  
 Parkovskiy did this -  
 Golitsyn did even less -  
 Substance - what this means -  
 How many known CIA or others services  
 subtract this from N's figures -  
~~total~~ minus reserves - teachers -  
 evaluate op value remaining -  
 extent (what he gave) info about each

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how does he characterize them -  
categorize them - just wants - nothing to do,

TAKCHIANOV travelling - suspicious

How N's info fits into what G told <sup>me</sup> personnel  
Necessary reduce N info vs what G's identification

Not analysis - as in paper - explain which ones  
known - how explain confirm other sources?

Analysis of what 300 agents mean -  
may be very superficial - lacking significance of  
agents - 100 3rd countries - some cases leads not agents  
agents in tourist field - ? of value.

G says - only 5% tourists cooperative per KGB policy

How many real agents did he identify?

- Johnson defense ministry procedures

Analyze overall - then even particular cases

Vassall - analyze in depth

Operations - value & significance

Thibos in Embassy - Soviet mistake  
means American -

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On record analyze later that he  
identified Belitskiy -

Important his info allegedly Soviet intel  
reorganized in '62

SUSLOV + VAKRUSHEV leads to  
recruitment - what significance - analyze -  
Solic questions if names S+V  
fed of the Nos volunteers - (check this  
important re CIA penetration in SB)  
Solic hazards guess Nos did not  
volunteer names.

Coincide strange example same time  
as defection V gives evidence like to drink  
Vakrushev's actions supported validity  
Nos' statement.

Value of his political info -  
only one with mentioned (by Solic)  
OSWALD -

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If genuine defector would have immediately spoke about KGB policies - May '59 meeting - Shelepin app' - obligatory read report. did not come - only relevant was new task KGB -

RUMANTSEV - shot in '59 for contact with Americans - tried to give secret report of Shelepin - order - reports everyone read - SCD didn't explain how Rumantsev exposed - who agent, who exposed - Soviet assets

Judgements - errors, inconsistencies - omissions conclusion info

JA <sup>62-64</sup> One fact kept from SR, was info re May 59 - Shelepin to see if defector would disclose - important

McClure - Khrushchev dismissed, act 64 to explain -

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