Date: 08/06/95

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10044

RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-02

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM : EISENHOWER, JOHN S.D.

TO:

DATE: 07/18/75

PAGES: 24

SUBJECTS : EISENHOWER, JOHN S.D.

U2

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/21/98

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Box 2

Released under the John'

7. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 53244 Date:

þ6-14-2017

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RATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate

R561

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIEDS

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Priday, July 18, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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EXECUTIVE SESSION Friday, July 18, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:05 p.m., in Room S. 407, the Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Huddleston, Tower and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief
Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow,
Elliot Maxwell, Michael Madigan, Frederick Baron, John Bayly,
and Elizabeth Culbreth, Professional Staff Members.

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To the contra

ر د د The Chairman. The hearing will come back to order.

Mr. Eisenhower, would you please stand and take the oath?

Do you swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Eisenhower. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Eisenhower, I understand from your conversations that you want to make a statement, and as I told you, we always go through a procedural matter in the first place, which is, first would you just state your full name and address for the record.

Mr. Eisenhower. John S. D. Eisenhower, 111 White House Road, Phoenixville, Pennsylvania.

Mr. Schwarz. And then the second thing is, as I told you, we always ask all our witnesses if they know that they have a right to counsel, and so forth.

Mr. Eisenhower. I am aware of that, sir.

Mr. Chairman, my opening statement or my whole statement is first of all to say how delighted I am and how complimented I am that you all allowed me to come here.

My motivation, of course, is that I understand that a lot of the testimony that is before this Committee is getting into matters of a somewhat conjectural nature, and perhaps

I could throw a little bit of light and make a consideration to it.

I am most appreciative to have the opportunity to come, as I know you all are busy.

I realize that in a situation like this the only problem that I am addressing, of course, is the possible Presidential involvement in any planning, say, the latter part of 1960, planning for the assassination of any individuals, not only thinking in terms of heads of states or governments, but any individual at all, Presidential involvement.

I realize that I would be somewhat of a suspect witness in a case like this, being the son of the President at that time. But I would justlike to give a couple of facts that might have a bearing.

The facts are that to a very lagge extent throughout our adult years my father -- is that the correct terminology? -- confided in me to a very large degree. As an example, in July of 1945, the evening he returned from the Pottsdam Conference to Frankfurt, he told me about a new bomb they had invented that might shorten the war but which might have some terrible consequences, namely, the atomic bomb, which was dropped sometime after that.

Of course, you realize that this was secret. Whether no was correct in telling me things like that or not I don't know. But it is factual.

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You have seen Mr. Gordon Gray, you have seen General Goodpaster. And when you have me as a third of the trilogy, you will have all of the witnesses who were staff officers who had access to the President in the latter half of 1960 on national security affairs.

As such, I was told by my father of the U-2 in 1956. This is four years before it went down. From the time of reporting to the White House in 1958, as General Goodpaster's assistant I was shown the flight plans of the U-2 up until the time that the U-2 went down May 1 of 1960.

I say all this only to establish that the relationship between my father and I in confidences was very close, particularly during that period. And that is my first point.

And the second is pure and simple, thatnothing -- and, of course, my exposure to the White House -- can be construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans. I wouldn't say for one moment that there weren't plenty of plans being dreamed up in various agencies. I was a member of the Joint War Plans in the Army Staff, Army General Staff we made contingency plans for all sorts of things. Like the umpire said, they ain't nothing until I call them. And to the very best of my knowledge absolutely nothing came to the White House.

And I said in a letter to Senator Schweiker when I was

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contemplating requesting this opportunity that I would trust that I haven't gotten so blase over the years that something like an assassination plan would have slipped my memory.

That is the end of my statement, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, do you have any questions?

Mr. Schwarz. Your opinion is that if your father had
been told about any CIA activity with respect to Mr. Castro,
and specifically with respect to Mr. Castro and the Mafia,
that he would have told you, and that your testimony is that
he did not tell you?

Mr. Eisenhower. My testimony is that he did not.

My conjecture, based on the other things he has told me, is that in all likelihood he would have. But that is only conjecture.

Mr. Schwarz. I think when we talked on the phone you said something further in support of that conclusion, unless I am mixing up something that General Goodpaster said, which had to do with your father's attitude toward the control of the Central Intelligence Agency after the U-2 incident.

Mr. Eisenhower. My guess is that you got that from General Goodpaster. But General Paster and I -- after all, I sat as far away from him as I am from you for two and a half years, or 27 months, going in -- either he or I went in to see the President when we were buzzed for on those things. So, quite logically I think that General Goodpaster's

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and my thinking might be very much the same. And, of course, after the U-2, when you have something like that, I think it is only natural that you keep a little bit of a jaundiced eye on the organization which has done this.

So we made a real point, never to let anyone, even the Secretary of State, get in to see the President unless one of us were there.

We were not according this privilege with Secretary John Foster Dulles.

Mr. Schwarz. In the earlier years?

Mr. Eisenhower. But those are earlier years than the years we are covering here.

When Secretary Herter took over in the spring of 1959, General Goodpaster and I tried an experiment. We tiptoed in behind the Secretary of State when he went into the Oval office and we got away with it. And from that time on we monitored everything.

I saw the document we talked about on the telephone,

I saw the document that indicated 10 minutes where the President was alone with Allen Dulles on the 25th of November

1960. If I had not been made aware of that, or discovered it myself going through those same black books that you have, if I had not been aware of that, I would have testified to the best of my knowledge and belief that the President never saw Allen Dulles alone.

Mr. Schwarz. We also talked on the telephone about -I told you the nature of the testimony. We have heard from
an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency who said that
he had no knowledge of such a meeting, but that he assumed
that Allen Dulles would have spoken to your father about the
Mafia activity, and that the nature of that conversation
would have been speaking in riddles or circumlocutious form.

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And I believe we discussed your opinion as to whether your father would tolerate a discussion which was circumlocutious. It is a confusing question, because your opinion is that no such conversation occurred. But getting down to testing the way in which the person who has testified described it, and the elements he has put into it, can you cast any light on that?

Mr. Eisenhower. Now, we are getting into an area of conjecture in which my testimony would be suspect.

It is very much conjecture. And I would like to point out that if I were in the position of anybody in this type of operation, I would certainly have assumed, rightly or wrongly, that I had some sort of authority from above before I went ahead and did such a thing. I think it is only logical that this gentleman who was testifying would assume that he had some authority. That is a pretty big burden to take on yourself. You say, look, it was my idea, and I just went ahead and did it.

That is one part of the conjecture.

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The other part of the conjecture having to do with my father's way of doing things, I think I could say with a certain amount of assurance that he was never cute, cute was one thing he was not. And being circumlocutious and saying one thing and winking at you was not his way of doing it. Something might get past him. But that is not the way you make decisions to mount assassination plots, and especially the details of it, no way.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have an opinion from your knowledge of your father as to how he would react to any suggestion that the U.S. ought to employ the Mafia?

Mr. Eisenhower. Well, highly negative. I would say this, that his viceral reaction to the Mafia -- he didn't care for that kind of thing.

Now, if you have to do something -- I don't know whether that would stand in the way ornot. I have in mind -- look at Darlan in November of 1941. There was nobody more despised in the Western World than Darlan was. But Dad had to deal with him for a short period of time in order to get the French to stop fighting in North Africa.

I don't think I could really contribute much to that question.

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

We have been wrestling with certain language in minutes.

And this is one minute of -- were you shown this minute?

Mr. Eisenhower. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. -- of a minute of a meeting on September 2, 1960 of the National Security Council. And you were present in your capacity as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, I think.

Mr. Eisenhower. That is listed here, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, on the 15-page of the memo there is a discussion of Mr. Lumumba in the Congo, in fact it starts on the 14th page. And at the end of the first paragraph of page 15 there is this language:

"Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of".

I suppose you don't have any recollection of that meeting?

Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't have a direct recollection.

I remember in general terms that the U.S. position was very much anti-Lumumba, there is no question about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Focussing on those words, do you take the words "disposed of" as intended to mean an assassination?

Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't. And I wouldn't be too surprised -- in other words, I have no quarrel with this document. This document fits in pretty much with any recollection of the atmosphere.

Now, I would not be surprised if the words "disposed of"

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