
Agency Information

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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ORGANIZED CRIME

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM FOR DESIGNEES

Assassination Hearings

Annexed are the following which relate to this week's hearings.

(This material should be treated with extreme sensitivity.)

- (1) Schedule of Full Committee Witnesses;*
- (2) Draft of Summary Chronology and issues/questions concerning General Lansdale (a witness for July 8);*
- (3) The same for Gordon Gray (a witness for July 9); and
- (4) Summary Chronology of the actions taken in connection with Castro.

* * *

The Senators will be receiving similar material for all this week's witnesses.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Curtis Smothers

* We will be taking, in addition, some proof from middle level personnel related to the Trujillo case. This will be summarized in writing for the Committee.

Copies to William G. Miller
David Aaron
William Bader

July 7, 1975

EXPECTED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FOR THE WEEK OF JULY 7 - 11, 1975

<u>ROOM</u>	<u>DATE & HOUR</u>	<u>TO HEAR TESTIMONY BY</u>
S-407	July 8 10:00 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ Roswell GILPATRIC General E. G. LANSDALE
S-407	July 9 10:00 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ Walt ROSTOW General Maxwell TAYLOR Gordon GRAY
S-128	July 10 10:00 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ Thomas PARROTT Dean RUSK Richard GOODWIN
S-407	July 11 8:30 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ William HARVEY Robert MC NAMARA McGeorge BUNDY

This schedule is subject to change on very short notice

This is NOT for public announcement

TO: Fritz O Schwarz and Curt Smothers
FROM: Joseph E. Digenova
DATE: July 6, 1975
SUBJECT: Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale Summary Chronology

Biographical Background

1941- U.S. Air Force
1945

1945-1963 Became regular officer in the Air Force (ultimately retired as Major General)

Eisenhower Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Administration (Secretary Thomas Gates)

1960-1961 In Vietnam doing a survey for the Secretary of Defense.

1961 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
(Secretary Robert McNamara)

1965 Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam
(Lodge)

Chronology of Events

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

1960
November 3 Lansdale present at Special Group meeting when Merchant prompted discussion of "taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara." (SG Minutes)
Cabell said that kind of program not practical and group decides not to adopt such a plan.

Yet CIA had already made contact with the Mafia. Was Cabell not informed or was he being disingenuous?

1961
Oct 6 SGA told by Parrott of 2 "other contingency plans in connection with possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene..." (Minutes of SGA).

November 3 Lansdale memo discusses major sabotage action. Indicates that present means NOT likely to cause overthrow of Cuban regime.

Before the Rockefeller Commission Lansdale denies that he was involved in sabotage and said that he and JFK and RFK tried to stop sabotage. Clearly not the case.

TOP SECRET

R42:

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

November 31 President Kennedy in memo to Special Group summarizes major decisions re Cuba Project and appoints General Lansdale as acting Chief of Operations.

December 1 R. Kennedy tells SG that "Higher authority" *i.e., the President) has given priority to Cuba project and Lansdale is to develop long range plan to be reviewed by SG and submitted to higher authority for approval.

December 8 Lansdale presents outline of program designed to overthrow Castro regime. Uses Cubans as nucleus.

1962
January 18 Lansdale sends R. Kennedy a copy of his program review of same day and notes on an attached paper: "My review does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you. I felt that you preferred informing the President privately.

January 20 Lansdale memo reflecting on 1/19/62 meeting with AG. Reflects L's own view of the severity and the importance of the remarks of the AG re pushing forward vigorously with Cuba Project. "We are in a combat situation -- where we have been given full command."

January 24 Lansdale memo for Special Group notes it is difficult to control indigenous nationals if the movement develops its own impetus.

What was the nature of this sensitive work? All plans were supposed to go to the SG-2hy not these? Was there a separate secret plan that only Lansdale, the President, and AG and a few others knew of? Was this a manner of avoiding a "reporting" requirement?

Did this reflect the pressure that Helms testified to that created what he called a feeling that "anything goes?" Yet McCone continually complained not enough being done, why?

Was there concern that these nationals if armed would assassinate Cuban leaders? Were they concerned that they could unleash something they could not control? Was this dangerous because we couldn't control what followed assassination?

- 2A -

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Jan. 24

Lansdale briefs the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Memo for record says "From the outset, General Lansdale has emphasized paramilitary operations in connection with this project."

These are inconsistent with his claim to Rockefeller Commission that he tried to stop sabotage operations.

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

- 3 -

January 27 Lansdale memo to AG stating need for strong decisions and evidence of his support. Efforts of Agency so far have accomplished goal re Cuba, "and I still feel that we might uncork the touchdown play, independently of the institutional program we are spurring." (emphasis added)

January 30 Lansdale memo Craig re "Operation Bountyy" which establishes system of financial reward commensurate with position and stature of victim, for killing or delivering alive known Communists in Cuba.

February 20 Lansdale program review. Proposed plans for September will include "an attack on the cadre of the regime including key leaders. Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police -- G2 officials...CW agents should be fully considered."

" Lansdale memo to SGA with basic plan of action notes "any inference that this plan exists could place the President of the United States in a most damaging position."

March 2 General Taylor's guidelines will be reviewed and shown to higher authority, "but in the context of information rather than a request for specific approval." Rusk notes that "once the agents are within the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S."

March 5 Taylor guidelines for Moggoose sent to Lansdale in draft form. "Are responsible for performance through normal command channels to the President." (The word "President" is crossed out and "higher authority" is put in its place.)

Was this genuine concern for lack of control? Was what Harvey had done a known example? (poison pills) Was what Harvey did inconsistent with control

Is this another example of attempts to isolate the President on the record from the project?

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

March 5 Lansdale memo to Goodwin asking for alternate tracks Rusk sees open to achieve Cuban objectives; plus list of pretexts Rusk sees as desirable in connection with any direct military intervention.

Is this part of "plausible deniability"

March 12

Lansdale tells SGA CIA urgently needs policy determination "on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface...there is a need for defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self defense, for training, for purposes shor of open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers."

What were the guns to be used for? Were the limits" concerned with control of what was done with the guns, or with the timing of their delivery (CIA was setting up new contacts with Mafia in late March)

March 13

Lansdale memo to SGA says many agents infiltrated into Cuba "will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection...however, the CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively outside Cuba."

" Craig reports to SGA that use of BW/CW to incapacitate Cuban sugar workers "infeasible and it was cancelled."

March 16

Taylor memo re meeting of SGA with President discussing Taylor's guidelines notes "General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." Footnote says: "...group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise was given by higher authority." Footnote added one week later.

Isolating the President once again? Plausible deniability? If so why such a clumsy attempt?

April 5

SGA meeting. McCone impatient. Group consensus is that time has come to reexamine basic philosophy of project with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early overt intervention.

TOP SECRET QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

April 10 Harvey memo to McCone.cites need for less restrictive and less stultifying controls by SGA. Harvey considers Lansdale insistence to be given details improper.

April 11 At SGA meeting McCone urges speed-up of covert action schedule. "General Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than restricting them to intelligence missions."

Does McCone's statement show pressure or lack of it? Lansdale's comments are inconsistent with his Rockefeller testimony.

April 12 Three pages marked alternatives I, II, III, with no attribution note: "hence, our covert activities should be directed at the...attrition of the leadership of the government, through bribery and related means, and at all other disavowable courses of action detrimental to the local regimes." (00270-00272)

" Lansdale tells Taylor "Under revised plan for Operation Mongoose, proposal for supplying arms and equipment to these (one team in place plus 7 local groups identified) will be submitted to the SG for decision, ad hoc. No proposals have been received."

May 3 SGA meeting. Harvey reports on his infiltration teams. Three are in place.

Did Harvey mention the poison pills, and other attempts on the life of Castro? If he did not why would Taylor make a special report to the President on May 7 of Harvey's report?

May 7 Lansdale memo to SGA complains of breakdown of communication with Chief of Operations. He requests that "all plans and actions with operational aspects hereafter be made known to the Chief of Operations..." If this is not done, "we invite the danger of matters falling between the chairs."

Was this an allusion to recent discovery of unknown Harvey activities? Or was it complaint that Harvey had simply not kept him informed in greater detail? Did it have to do with Harvey at all?

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

May 7 Taylor reports to President on Harvey's report to the Special Group pointing out "the very limited progress that has been made."

What limited projects?
Was this an allusion to assassination?

June 20 Harvey memo to Lansdale requesting permission from SGA for aerial resupply of infiltrated agents.

Were arms involved in the request?

July 11 Parrott memo to a superior re air resupply operations. "Exactly what supplies is it intended to provide?... This sort of thing gets us pretty close to the moment of truth."

What is the moment of truth?
Why such concern for the nature of the supplies?

July 23 DOD working group tells Lansdale electronic intelligence should improve and provide increases information in areas such as: "plots against prominent figures."

Where does DOD get this idea?
What plots are they referring to?

July 24 Harvey memo to Lansdale outlining CIA participation in phase one. states reason they haven't done more in area of infiltration has been lack of decisiveness by "higher authority" on use of military force.

Was Harvey frustration put into action by disobeying orders?

August 8 Lansdale memo to SGA states "the major difference from phase one of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines, which kept our actions 'short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area.'"

August 8 Lansdale memo to SGA concerning Harvey request for authority for major sabotage against industry and public utilities. Lansdale requested this stepped-up plan from Harvey.

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

August 10 Special group meeting at which McNamara raises issue of assassination of Castro. Lansdale is present.

What was the extent of the discussion? Were people told to present plans?

August 13 Harvey memo relating to August 10 meeting states "we will

produce an outline for an alternate course B for sub-mission. Papers required from individuals for Tuesday meeting include 'Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, liquidation of leaders)'".

Lansdale understood from August 10 meeting that plans were to be prepared. Did everyone else get this impression?

August 14

McCone calls McNamara after receiving Lansdale memo insisting that it be withdrawn because no decision had been made on the subject of liquidation and Lansdale was out of order in asking CIA to consider the matter. McCone testified that McNamara agreed memo should be withdrawn.

Was this the first time McNamara was aware of the Lansdale memo? Had he himself made an effort to have Lansdale withdraw the memo independent of McCone's request?

" Harvey memo to McCone reporting he called Lansdale's office and told Frank Hand of the "stupidity" of including in the Lansdale memo as a topic to be considered "liquidation of leaders." CIA would not participate in preparation of such documents pertaining to liquidation and urged that Hand recommend to Lansdale that phrase be excised. Lansdale called back to say that it had been done.

Why was Harvey so concerned? He had carried out full-scale operation against Castro in April of 1962. Was it simply the fear of having something in writing?

" Harvey memo to DDP (CIA) notes that matter of assassination brought up in Rusk's office by McNamara. "I took careful note from the comments...and the SGA is not expecting any written comments or study on this point."

Were they expecting unwritten comments or studies on this point?

August 20

Taylor memo to SGA received by Lansdale which notes "attached papers were read and approved by higher authority today." Papers were Taylor guidelines for phase two. President told SGA favors more aggressive program. Sabotage was to be employed on selective basis under guidelines.

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

August 30 SGA requests CIA to submit list of possible sabotage targets. "The group by reacting to this list could define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative."

Was this an abdication of control?

September 6 At SGA meeting where Lansdale was present Bundy notes re agricultural sabotage that release of chemicals must be avoided unless it could be completely covered up.

October 4 Lansdale present at SGA meeting when AG questioned whether we were going down the right road or whether "more direct action" is not indicated. AG says President dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field.

October 11 Lansdale recommends early approval of CIA plans for sabotaging Cuban shipping vessels.

October 26 Lansdale disavows any responsibility or support for the proposed infiltration of 9 teams into Cuba. "Mr. Harvey's defense of the plan was not conclusive." All teams were to be withheld. This is the Matahambre copper mine sabotage operation.

Was Lansdale kept in the dark about these operations? Numerous Harvey memos have marked as a footnote on them re Matahambre "not in Lansdale's memo." What does this mean?

October 30 McCone tells Lansdale President has decided to hold back Operation Mongoose during negotiations on Soviet missile crisis. No more sabotage of any form.

November 21 Harvey memo says that Lansdale's statement that Operation Mongoose "had had no information on this operation (Matahambre) since early October was patently false."

This was part of an escalating debate over how much Lansdale either knew or did not know about that operation. Was Harvey covering his tracks?

1975

- 9 -

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

May 16

Lansdale tells Rockefeller Commission he tried to stop sabotage. Admits, however, that there were discussions in the SGA concerning the possibility of plans to assassinate foreign leaders. He denies, however, that any such plans were ever actually formulated.

May

Washington Post story says Lansdale "hinted strongly, but refused to confirm, that the orders to draw up plans (that may have included Fidel Castro's assassination) came from the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy." Lansdale insisted however, that "neither President Kennedy or any other Kennedy ever gave me any orders to plan the assassination of Castro."

May 31

In a New York Times story Horrock reports that "yesterday General Lansdale said that in November, 1961, AG Robert F. Kennedy ordered him to prepare a secret contingency plan to depose Mr. Castro. General Lansdale confirmed that Robert Kennedy was acting on behalf of President Kennedy." Assassination may have been considered as one of the means of removing Castro. He never received specific orders from JFK or RFK to prepare a plan to assassinate Castro.

July 3

Washington Star story by O'Leary reports that Lansdale "has named Robert F. Kennedy as the Administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to work out all feasible plans for 'getting rid of' Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro." The word assassination was never used by anyone Lansdale said, but there was no doubt that the plans envisioned this as one of the means. Lansdale relayed the orders directly to William Harvey.

Lansdale gives statement to Select Committee stating that Washington Star story is a distortion of his remarks. "I can say that I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from the Attorney General...no order about taking action against Castro personally."

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: UNDERWORLD CONTACTS ESTABLISHED

Early September, 1960

EDWARDS contacted MAHEU, who agreed to contact the gambling syndicate under the guise of representing international business interests opposed to Castro. In early September, MAHEU met JOHN ROSELLI in Beverly Hills and told him that "high Government sources" desired his assistance. On September 14, O'CONNELL and MAHEU met ROSELLI in New York, and ROSELLI agreed to introduce MAHEU to "SAM GOLD" (SAM GIANCANA) who could arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba. \$150,000 was offered for successful completion of the assassination. ROSELLI declined to accept payment.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DULLES BRIEFED ON OPERATION

Mid September, 1960

EDWARDS and BISSELL briefed DCI DULLES and GENERAL CABELL on the gambling syndicate operation. EDWARDS implied that the plan would be put into effect unless DULLES subsequently told him to stop. BISSELL left the meeting certain that DULLES knew the nature of the operation.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: GIANCANA JOINS THE OPERATION

Late September, 1960

During the week of September 24, MAHEU, ROSELLI, and GIANCANA met at the Fontainbleau and Kennilworth hotels in Miami. GIANCANA was to be a "contact man", although ROSELLI did not use GIANCANA to locate Cubans employed in the operation.

GIANCANA told MAHEU that TRAFFICANTE would serve as courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. O'CONNELL never met GIANCANA or TRAFFICANTE, but recognized them as gangsters from a newspaper article on prominent Cosa Nostra members, and reported this fact to EDWARDS.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ROMAN WIRETAP

October 1960(?)

MAHEU informed O'CONNELL that GIANCANA believed his girlfriend, PHYLLIS MCGUIRE, was having an affair with DAN ROMAN, and that GIANCANA wanted MAHEU to bug ROMAN'S room in Los Vegas. MAHEU warned that if the tap were not installed, GIANCANA would leave Miami, disrupting the operation.

O'CONNELL contacted someone at CIA, presumably EDWARDS, and received approval for having MAHEU arrange a tap (EDWARDS denies he was consulted). MAHEU passed the matter to EDWARD DUBOIS, a private investigator, who arranged for ARTHUR J. BALLETTI and J.W. HARRISON to install the tap.

SECRET

Comments

BALLETTI and HARRISON were arrested after a maid discovered the listening device. BALLETTI called MAHEU, and ROSELLI provided MAHEU with the bail money. MAHEU told EDWARDS that the FBI was investigating his association with ROSELLI and GIANCANA. EDWARDS told MAHEU that if he was formally approached by the FBI, he should refer the FBI to EDWARDS.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: WHITE HOUSE AUTHORIZATION

January, 1961

During luncheon meetings at the White House in January, BISSELL was requested (probably by BUNDY and ROSTOW) to establish an executive action capacity. The program was to develop the capability to remove foreign political leaders through the clandestine service. BISSELL assumed the mandate included assassination capability.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: PROGRAM ESTABLISHED

Late January, 1961

In late January, BISSELL asked HARVEY to establish an executive action capability. HARVEY understood the mandate to include assassination, but no specific leaders were targeted.

HARVEY expressed doubts about the feasibility of assassinations to BISSELL and HELMS. The DCI was not advised of the program at this time, and it is uncertain whether he was ever advised.

Comments

On January 26, HARVEY discussed the operation with ARNOLD SILVER. The project was named ZRRIFFILE, and operated under the cover of procuring code decipher materials. Agent QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by SILVER for an operation against Lumumba, was salaried as the principle agent.

On January 26, HARVEY discussed assassination techniques with SYD GOTTLIEB of the TSD.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ORTA OPERATION

January-February, 1961

GIANCANA suggested the use of poison pills. EDWARDS and O'CONNELL discussed the pills with TREICHLER of TSD, and by February 10, the pills had been tested for their effectiveness. Shortly thereafter they were supplied to O'CONNELL, who gave them to ROSELLI. ROSELLI reported that the pills had been delivered to JUAN ORTA in Cuba. ORTA kept the pills for a few weeks, and then returned them.

POISONED CIGARS DELIVERED

February 13, 1961

TREICHLER notes reveal poisoned cigars delivered to unidentified person on February 13.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: VERONA OPERATION

March-April, 1961

Following ORTA's failure, ROSELLI told O'CONNELL that TRAFFICANTE had approached TONY VERONA, head of a Cuban exile movement fronted by the CIA. VERONA claimed to have a contact inside Cuba who worked at a restaurant frequented by Castro. \$10,000 in cash and \$1,000 in communications equipment were delivered to O'CONNELL to cover operational expenses.

MAHEU, ROSELLI, TRAFFICANTE, and VERONA met at the Fontainbleau Hotel in Miami, and MAHEU delivered the cash and capsules to VERONA. When the operation failed to materialize, VERONA returned the cash.

AMLASH: INITIAL CONTACT

March 9, 1961

JACK STEWART, of the Mexico City station of the CIA, met with AMLASH-1, a major in the Cuban army who was disaffected with Castro, in Mexico City on March 9. AMLASH-1 requested arms for use in operations against Castro.

AMLASH: REQUEST FOR AID IN DEFECTING

March 28, 1961

AMLASH-1 decided to defect and requested aid from STEWART. No assistance was given because of report that Cuban police aware of AMLASH-1's defection plans.

EARLY APRIL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Early April, 1961

During early April, 1961, CIA cables reveal that an unidentified Cuban working with the agency volunteered to assassinate Castro, but was unable to enter Cuba.

BAY OF PIGS: APRIL 16-19, 1961

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: OPERATION TERMINATED

Late April, 1961

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, EDWARDS sent word to ROSELLI through O'CONNELL that the Syndicate operation was terminated, and that even if someone succeeded in assassinating Castro, there would be no payoff. The pills were retrieved.

MCCONE BRIEFING RE: ASSASSINATIONS

September, 1961

Between his nomination and confirmation, MCCONE was briefed about the Cuban operations. He was apparently not told about any assassination plans, either past or ongoing, nor about Executive Action or the Gambling Syndicate operation.

MCCONE BECOMES DCI

October, 1961

TASK FORCE W: INCEPTION

October, 1961

In October, SAM HALPERN of the Caribbean Division attended a meeting with BISSELL and GHOSE ZOGBEY, Branch Chief. BISSELL stated that he had been reprimanded by RFK and JFK for not "getting rid of" the Castro regime. He ordered HALPERN and ZOGBEY to plan an operation to get rid of Castro, placing no limitation on the means.

Shortly after the meeting, HALPERN was introduced to GENERAL LANSDALE. HALPERN looked to LANSDALE for guidance and reported to him.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: DECISION TO APPLY PROGRAM TO CASTRO

November 15, 1961

On November 15, HARVEY and BISSELL discussed applying the ZRRIFLE capability against Castro. BISSELL also instructed HARVEY to take over EDWARDS' gambling syndicate operation.

TASK FORCE W: HARVEY TAKES COMMAND

January, 1962

HARVEY was put in charge of Task Force W in January, 1962.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: EDWARDS-HARVEY BRIEFING

February 1962

Edwards briefed HARVEY on the gambling syndicate operation in February. Details for his taking over the operation were worked out during the following month.

SECRET

HELMS BECOMES DDP AND BRIEFED BY BISSELL

February, 1962

HELMS replaced BISSELL as DDP in February. BISSELL, either himself or through HARVEY, briefed HELMS on the gambling syndicate assassination plot, telling him it had been deactivated.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: AUTHORIZATION BY HELMS

February 19, 1962

On February 19, HELMS issued a memorandum authorizing HARVEY to retain QJWIN and other agents he felt necessary for ZRRIFLE; accounting for funds was to be by general category by HARVEY's certification.

