
Agency Information

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-139

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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
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FPCC

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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

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Book V, p. 12-13

The cast of characters surrounding the seizure of anti-Castro hardware as outlined on these pages is particularly interesting. The raw material cited in the footnote is attached. Note reference to Briniuer and Oswald. Below that McLaney brothers and Victor Espinosa and Frank Sturgis. Not attached is a critical New Orleans field office memo to FBI headquarters linking Briniuer to the McClaney/Sturgis operation.

sonally as a traitor if he doing something wrong in the debate. When he saw the guidebook for Marines, he smiled to me, and he told me, "Well, listen, Carlos, don't try to do an invasion with that guidebook for Marines, because that is an old one and that will be a failure." That was his joke in that moment.

After that we went to the debate, and I think that you have the whole history of the debate, you have the transcription and everything, [so] that I don't have to go inside that, because that is subjective, not objective. You have the objective, and that is the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. That is right. We do have a transcript and we listened to it on the tape last night over at the television station too.

Mr. BRINGUIER. And there is something that I want to show you too. I told to you about the training camp that were across the Lake Pontchartrain.

Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Producing newspaper.] At the beginning of August in the Diario Las Americas from Miami for September 4—

Mr. LIEBELER. For September 4, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right. [Indicating photograph.] This is the spy who was inside the training camp. The Christian Democratic Movement turned him over to the FBI, and the FBI was questioning him in Miami. The Christian Democratic Movement found a letter, according to this information, from this guy directed to Carlos Lechuga, former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. In that letter the spy, Fernando Fernandez, was warning Lechuga that they have to be alert from that date to August 8, and the day that Oswald came trying to infiltrate my organization was on August 5. This sounds for me strange in all this matter.

[Indicating.] Here is another interview from Fernandez here 3 days later.

Mr. LIEBELER. You are referring to a copy of the same newspaper but for the date of September 6, 1963, on the front page of which—

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Indicating.] Here. "Fernando Fernandez is in favor of coexistence with the Communist regime of Castro." That is the title in Spanish.

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me see if I can understand what you are saying. You say that Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga in Mexico.

Mr. LIEBELER. Lechuga is a member of the Castro government?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. He is now Ambassador to the United Nations?

Mr. BRINGUIER. In New York; right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Fernandez is the person who was the Castro spy who had infiltrated the training camp in Louisiana?

Mr. BRINGUIER. For the Christian Democratic Movement here in Louisiana.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now the Christian Democratic Movement is—what? Pro-Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Anti-Castro.

Mr. LIEBELER. It is an anti-Castro organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes; they were training Cubans over here to make a commando action against Castro, but they find out that there was a Castro spy inside the training camp, and they went back to Miami with the people and with him, and they turn him over to the FBI. I think that after that the leader for the Christian Democratic Movement—or that the FBI didn't found nothing, because was not against the law to spy inside an anti-Castro organization. It was against the law to spy inside the U.S. Government but not inside the anti-Castro organization. And my feeling—and this is the question that I am asking myself—in New Orleans we are about 900 miles from Miami. In Miami is where the headquarters of all the anti-Castro groups. I could not find any reason for Oswald to come to me and offer me his service to train Cubans in guerrilla warfare at the same moment when there was a secret anti-Castro training camp in New Orleans and a Castro spy was inside that training camp. That for me is—because, if he was willing to infiltrate one active organization, he will go directly to Miami and he will offer his service over there in Miami, but not in New Orleans where it is not publicly known that there was something going on at that moment. I believe that that was the only time here in New Orleans that

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there was something like that, and it was a coincidence. And there is another coincidence too for me, and that is that when Oswald left the city he went to Mexico, and the letter from Fernandez that was intercepted here was to Mexico too, and Oswald visit the Cuban consulate in Mexico, and the Fernández letter was to the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. For me, that is a big doubt.

Mr. LIEBELER. Go ahead.

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, after the debate, the same night of the debate, I went to the radio station here in New Orleans and the local papers and the United Press International office, and I gave a press release. If you want a copy, I could give you a copy. I gave a copy to the Secret Service.

The most interesting thing is the four things that I asked to the Secret Service of New Orleans. I think that this is the second one where I said, "Write to your Congressman asking for a full investigation of Mr. Lee H. Oswald, a confessed Marxist" [producing document]. And that was 3 months before the assassination.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you have another copy of this?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I have the original of that. You can have that.

Mr. LIEBELER. I have marked a copy of the press release distributed to the various communications media here in New Orleans, on August 16, 1963—

Mr. BRINGUIER. No, August 21.

Mr. LIEBELER. August 21, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 21, the night of the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. I mark it as "Exhibit No. 3" to your deposition, and I have initialed it. Would you initial it?
[The witness complied.]

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me go over some of this testimony that you have just given to see if I understand. Mr. Fernandez wrote to Mr. Lechuga a letter in which Fernandez said that we—meaning the Castro people?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes.

Mr. LIEBELER. Must be on guard up until August 8?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 8, that is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Of 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. You indicated that Oswald had come to your store or offices on August 5, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Oswald came to you offering to assist in the military training of Cubans?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. At that time, there was, in fact, a training camp near New Orleans—

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. For the training of people for military action against Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that was not public knowledge at that time?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. So you are tying this up in your mind by considering the possibility that Oswald was, in fact, a Castro agent?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And did know about the existence of this training camp, because Mr. Fernandez had already himself infiltrated that training camp?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that Fernandez had told Oswald about the existence of this camp and had asked Oswald himself to try to infiltrate that camp for your organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Excuse me.

Mr. LIEBELER. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, the only thing that I don't believe is that Fernandez had told directly to Oswald. What I believe is that Fernandez had informed some people outside the United States, and these people had informed Oswald and had gave to Oswald the order to try to infiltrate the Cuban group here in New Orleans.

Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand, it relates to the fact that Fernandez will be in danger,"—up until about anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUER. Well, what I think on August 5 Oswald came to me at the same period of time. Something in New Orleans, that there was a secret of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans. Those are the facts I am not sure about. I just want to show the connection.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't seem like handing out literature in the street to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement.

Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that after I told him that I don't have that here there is nothing, and that I went openly to do that before that, he went openly to do that after he was

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of any information in the pro-Castro movement and any information to Oswald—conducted

Mr. BRINGUIER. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have a
as a result of your anti-Castro ac-
person as this, do you think you

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon.

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were such a Castro movement who had been with us would have had access to that information and find out about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is have a lot of persons. There are who are anti-Castro. Even among agents here in the city and you c-

But there is something else: The bar is located in 117 Decatur Street, just across the street from the owner of the Havana Bar is the man who gave the information before—that Oswald went to the bar to get a lemonade. He was with one Mexican man. While drinking the lemonade, he started to feel bad. He was telling that at that moment, he felt bad as though he was going to throw up. He went out to the sidewalk to vomit outside. The owner of the Havana Bar told me that the man was the same one that one time the FBI arrested him immediately because that was a prearranged date. August 15 and August 30 was the date because I start to find out all these things before, because before I did not know anything of this before to me. But the owner of the Havana Bar cannot tell me because he already saw one automobile with the name of one of them the one who had been

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernandez was, on this theory, aware of that and was aware of approximately the time Oswald would make this attempt, and, therefore, indicated to Lechuga that there would be some danger of Oswald being discovered as an attempted infiltrator?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon? I don't understand the words.

Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand, part of the hypothesis here, the theory, relates to the fact that Fernandez said to Lechuga, "We must be careful, or we will be in danger,"—up until about August 8. Now does that statement have anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I think is this: He sent that letter to Lechuga, and on August 5 Oswald came to me offering his service to train Cubans, all in the same period of time. Something that never was happening here in New Orleans, that there was a secret anti-Castro training camp, and the chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee trying to join the Cuban group here in New Orleans. Those are the facts. I don't want to tell something that I am not sure about. I just want to show you that tremendous coincidence or that connection.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't seem likely, does it, that Oswald would go around handing out literature in the streets like he did if he was actually attempting to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that that was after I turned down his offer and after I told him that I don't have nothing to do with military activities and that here there is nothing, and that I turned down completely him. He didn't went openly to do that before the attempt to infiltrate the training camp; he went openly to do that after he was turned down.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of any conceivable association between anybody in the pro-Castro movement and Oswald that could have acted as a source of information to Oswald—conducted the orders to him?

Mr. BRINGUIER. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have any way of obtaining information of that sort as a result of your anti-Castro activities and contacts? If there were such a person as this, do you think you would be likely to know about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon?

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were such a person, that is to say, some agent of the Castro movement who had been working with Oswald, do you think that you would have had access to that information or you would have been likely to find out about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is a hard question, because here in the city you have a lot of persons. There are some who are pro-Castro, there are many who are anti-Castro. Even among the Cubans you could have some Castro agents here in the city and you could not have control of everybody.

But there is something else: The owner of the Havana Bar—the Havana Bar is located in 117 Decatur Street, just two door or three door from my store—the owner of the Havana Bar is a Cuban, and he and one of the employees over there, gave the information to me after Kennedy's assassination—not before—that Oswald went to the Havana Bar one time. He asked for some lemonade. He was with one Mexican at that moment, and when Oswald was drinking the lemonade, he start to say that, sure, the owner of that place had to be a Cuban capitalistic, and that he argue about the price of the lemonade. He was telling that that was too much for a lemonade, and he feel bad at that moment, Oswald feel bad at that moment—he had some vomits and he went out to the sidewalk to vomit outside on the sidewalk. These persons here from the Havana Bar told me that the guy, the Mexican, who was with Oswald, was the same one that one time the FBI told them that if they will see him, call them immediately because that was a pro-Communist. I remember that was between August 15 and August 30 was that period of time. I could not locate that because I start to find out all these things after the Kennedy assassination, not before, because before I did not found any connection. They did not told nothing of this before to me. Between the 15th and the 30th the brother of the owner of the Havana Bar came to my store asking me to call the FBI, because he already saw one automobile passing by the street with two Mexicans, one of them the one who had been with Oswald in the bar, and he told me

Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials on one uneventful occasion in Dallas sometime during the period April 6-24, 1963,³¹⁶ Oswald's first public identification with that cause was in New Orleans. There, in late May and early June of 1963, under the name Lee Osborne, he had printed a handbill headed in large letters "Hands Off Cuba," an application form for, and a membership card in, the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.³¹⁷ He first distributed his handbills and other material uneventfully in the vicinity of the U.S.S. *Wasp*, which was berthed at the Dumaine Street wharf in New Orleans, on June 16, 1963.³¹⁸ He distributed literature in downtown New Orleans on August 9, 1963, and was arrested because of a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and again on August 16, 1963.³¹⁹ Following his arrest, he was interviewed by the police, and at his own request, by an agent of the FBI.³²⁰ On August 17, 1963, he appeared briefly on a radio program³²¹ and on August 21, 1963, he debated over radio station WDSU, New Orleans, with Carlos Bringuier, one of the Cuban exiles who had been arrested with him on August 9.³²² Bringuier claimed that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had attempted to infiltrate an anti-Castro organization with which he was associated.³²³

While Oswald publicly engaged in the activities described above, his "organization" was a product of his imagination.³²⁴ The imaginary president of the nonexistent chapter was named A. J. Hidell,³²⁵ the name that Oswald used when he purchased the assassination weapon.³²⁶ Marina Oswald said she signed that name, apparently chosen because it rhymed with "Fidel,"³²⁷ to her husband's membership card in the New Orleans chapter. She testified that he threatened to beat her if she did not do so.³²⁸ The chapter had never been chartered by the national FPCC organization.³²⁹ It appears to have been a solitary operation on Oswald's part in spite of his misstatements to the New Orleans police that it had 35 members, 5 of which were usually present at meetings which were held once a month.³³⁰

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities may be viewed as a very shrewd political operation in which one man single handedly created publicity for his cause or for himself. It is also evidence of Oswald's reluctance to describe events accurately and of his need to present himself to others as well as to himself in a light more favorable than was justified by reality. This is suggested by his misleading and sometime untruthful statements in his letters to Mr. V. T. Lee, then national director of FPCC. In one of those letters, dated August 1, 1963, Oswald wrote that an office which he had previously claimed to have rented for FPCC activities had been "promptly closed 3 days later for some obscure reasons by the renters, they said something about remodeling ect., I'm sure you understand."³³¹ He wrote that "thousands of circulars were distrubed"³³² and that he continued to receive inquiries through his post office box which he endeavored "to keep ansewering to the best of my ability."³³³ In his letter to V. T. Lee, he stated that he was then alone in his efforts on behalf of FPCC, but he attributed his lack of support to an attack by Cuban

exiles in a street demonstration and being "officially cautioned" by the police, events which "robbed me of what support I had leaving me alone."³³⁴

In spite of those claims, the Commission has not been able to uncover any evidence that anyone ever attacked any street demonstration in which Oswald was involved, except for the Bringuier incident mentioned above, which occurred 8 days after Oswald wrote the above letter to V. T. Lee.³³⁵ Bringuier, who seemed to be familiar with many anti-Castro activities in New Orleans, was not aware of any such incident.³³⁶ Police reports also fail to reflect any activity on Oswald's part prior to August 9, 1963, except for the uneventful distribution of literature at the Dumaine Street wharf in June.³³⁷ Furthermore, the general tenor of Oswald's next letter to V. T. Lee, in which he supported his report on the Bringuier incident with a copy of the charges made against him and a newspaper clipping reporting the event, suggests that his previous story of an attack by Cuban exiles was at least greatly exaggerated.³³⁸ While the legend "FPCC 544 Camp St. NEW ORLEANS, LA." was stamped on some literature that Oswald had in his possession at the time of his arrest in New Orleans, extensive investigation was not able to connect Oswald with that address, although it did develop the fact that an anti-Castro organization had maintained offices there for a period ending early in 1962.³³⁹ The Commission has not been able to find any other indication that Oswald had rented an office in New Orleans. In view of the limited amount of public activity on Oswald's part before August 9, 1963, there also seems to be no basis for his claim that he had distributed "thousands" of circulars, especially since he had claimed to have printed only 2,000 and actually had only 1,000 printed. In addition, there is no evidence that he received any substantial amount of materials from the national headquarters.³⁴⁰

In another letter to V. T. Lee, dated August 17, 1963, Oswald wrote that he had appeared on Mr. William Stuckey's 15-minute television program over WDSU-TV called "Latin American Focus" as a result of which he was "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect. as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans branch."³⁴¹ WDSU has no program of any kind called "Latin American Focus."³⁴² Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening Post," on which Oswald was heard for less than 5 minutes on August 17, 1963.³⁴³ It appears that Oswald had only one caller in response to all of his FPCC activities, an agent of Bringuier's attempting to learn more about the true nature of the alleged FPCC "organization" in New Orleans.³⁴⁴

Oswald's statements suggest that he hoped to be flooded with callers and invitations to debate. This would have made him a real center of attention as he must have been when he first arrived in the Soviet Union and as he was to some extent when he returned to the United States. The limited notoriety that Oswald received as a result of the street fracas and in the subsequent radio debate was apparently not enough to satisfy him. He exaggerated in his letters to V. T. Lee in an appar-

OSWALD DISTRIBUTING FAIR
ORLEANS, AUGUST 16, 1963 --
BILLS ON WHICH HE HAD ST.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2966 A

**HANDS
OFF
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Join the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee

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MEMBER BRANCH

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GARNER DE

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<input type="checkbox"/> ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE ON OR BEFORE _____		
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REMARKS

Can you help us identify these loose pgs 35-37, pls.

Thank You

FROM:	NAME	BUILDING, ROOM, EXT.	DATE
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	<i>for</i>		
	<i>B D Bennett</i>	<i>6330 Main Justice</i>	

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MAY 7 1976

DOJ

MM 105-1742

10/3/63
Robert J. Sawyer
Report

information concerning the Comandos Mambises or their spokesman, RAFAEL MARTINEZ PUPO, who made a statement in Guatemala claiming credit for the August 17, 1963 attack.

BOSCH stated that the MIRR will promote other attacks in the future, as opportunities and availability of equipment permit, without compromising the United States.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

On June 14, 1963, information was received that a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery in Cuba.

On June 15, 1963, United States Customs Agents seized a twin Beechcraft airplane on the outskirts of Miami, Florida, along with a quantity of explosives.

MIGUEL ALVAREZ, EVELIO ALPIZAR, RENE ESPINOSA, VICTOR ESPINOSA and CARLOS HERNANDEZ, along with American SAM BENFON, were involved and detained, but not arrested, by United States Customs Agents. It was ascertained that MICHAEL MC LANEY supplied the money and explosives for this operation. MC LANEY is well known as a former gambling concession operator in Havana, Cuba, and presently resides at Miami Beach, Florida.

On July 19, 1963, ACELO PEDROSO advised there was another plan to bomb Cuba, using bomb casings and dynamite located on the outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana.

On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at New Orleans, Louisiana, obtained a

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INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION

NOV 1 1967

MM 105-1742

search warrant and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and 20 bomb casings near Lacombe, Louisiana. This material was located on the property of WILLIAM J. MC LANEY, brother of MICHAEL J. MC LANEY, a Miami Beach gambler and former operator of a casino in the Nacional Hotel, Havana, Cuba.

Investigation determined that this dynamite was purchased at Collinsville, Illinois, by RICH LAUCHLI for VICTOR ESPINOSA, who was involved in the June 14, 1963 seizures at Miami. ESPINOSA transported the dynamite to New Orleans in a rented trailer. Also involved in this bomb plot were CARLOS HERNANDEZ, MIGUEL ALVAREZ and SAM BENTON, a Miami, Florida private detective.

MM T-3, who is personally acquainted with SAM BENTON and RICH LAUCHLI, advised that SAM BENTON has been involved, in the past, with Cuban revolutionary groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance, arms deals and collection of funds for personal use.

MM T-3 advised on June 14, 1963, RICH ALBERT LAUCHLI of Collinsville, Illinois recently arrived in Miami, Florida in a Ford station wagon with a load of arms for sale. American adventurers and mercenaries, GERALD PATRICK HEWING, JR., and FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS, took LAUCHLI around to meet the different Cuban exile leaders in Miami. LAUCHLI subsequently sold a .57 mm recoilless rifle to the SNFE, a Japanese machine gun to American mercenary BILL GARMAN, two automatic rifles and two French guns to RAMON FONT of Comandos L, and miscellaneous other equipment to other organizations.

MM T-3 explained that when LAUCHLI arrived in Miami in June of 1963, his station wagon contained .50 caliber

36.

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machine guns, nine sub-machine guns, automatic rifles and a number of foreign-made weapons. LAUCHLI sold nearly all of these arms, and at reasonable prices.

MM T-3 explained that LAUCHLI is more interested in arms sales as a gun dealer, and has no emotional feeling about the Cuban exile cause of trying to overthrow the present Government in Cuba.

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
Book V, p. 10 FBI informant during missile crisis suggested that Castro could be assassinated through underworld channels inside Cuba and that the informant would fund this if U.S. government would assure such endeavor would not adversely effect the national security. See attached Hoover memo. We need to identify and interview informant.

TO : The Attorney General

DATE: October 29, 1962

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: FIDEL CASTRO
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA



We have an informant who furnishes data concerning criminal matters and who is close to high officials of the Teamsters Union. He has many contacts with hoodlum and gambling elements throughout the United States. He is most concerned that his relationship with the FBI not be revealed since he feels certain that, if his cooperation becomes known, he will be killed immediately.

On October 22, 1962, the informant volunteered to our Los Angeles, California, Office that he believes he could arrange to have Fidel Castro assassinated. He explained that some of his underworld acquaintances, such as Meyer Lansky, in the past have had close connections in Cuba whereby they were able to "buy" practically any Cuban official or to accomplish almost anything they wanted to do in Cuba. He believes some of these underworld figures still have channels inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be successfully arranged.

He COULD IDENTIFY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

He said that, in the event the United States Government is interested in having the attempt made, he would raise the necessary money and would want nothing from the Government except assurance that such an undertaking would in no way adversely affect the national security. He expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission without any additional contact with Government representatives and with a minimum of contacts with private individuals.

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE		RECORD
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RECORDS BRANCH		
ATTORNEY GENERAL		

Book V, p. 13 Intelligence files in mid-1963 documenting series of meetings among major leaders of anti-Castro movement. Such a report is attached. Attention to the cast of characters: i.e., Arttime, Maceo, Somoza, Carlos Prio.

MM 105-1742

On August 23, 1963, ALFREDO BORJAS, Intelligence Chief of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) anti-CASTRO organization of MANUEL ARTINE, advised that the MRR-Comandos of CARLOS BANDIN is a dissident group. BORJAS said that through his contacts in the latter organization, he had ascertained that only about five members of BANDIN's organization landed in Cuba at the time of the June 20, 1963 invasion hoax.

BORJAS said the CRC press releases were a publicity stunt which backfired and destroyed any credibility and activity the CRC may have had up to that time. When the press found out it was a hoax, ANTONIO MACEO and CARLOS BANDIN resigned, blaming the CRC for the scandal which they both helped to create.

II. THE SOMOZA PLAN

On July 16, 1963, MIGUEL GARCIA, in charge of public relations for the CRC, announced that LUIS SOMOZA, former President of Nicaragua, had recently been in Washington, D. C.; reportedly conferred with United States Government officials, and about ten days ago arrived in Miami, Florida.

GARCIA said that SOMOZA conducted a series of meetings, in which nearly all of the well-known Cuban exile political and action group leaders attended. At these meetings, SOMOZA claimed he had talked to all the Presidents of the Central American Republics, and these Presidents are willing to help Cuban exiles in the form of training camps, military equipment, and bases of operation from which to attack the present government of Cuba. SOMOZA indicated that his meetings with the

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Presidents of the several Central American Republics and the leading figures among the Cuban exiles in Miami, New York and Washington, were known to have the sanction of the United States Government. On July 16, 1963, SOMOZA left Miami and returned to Nicaragua.

On July 15, 1963, the "Miami News" contained an article stating that there is growing speculation in Miami that Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY is quietly backing certain Cuban exiles, such as MANUEL ARTIME BUESA and the so-called SOMOZA Plan. It is noted that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA is the head of the MRR, an anti-CASTRO organization.

On July 15, 1963, MM T-3, who has been active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, advised that the below-listed persons are some of the better-known Cuban exile leaders who met with SOMOZA during his recent visit to the United States:

SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Comandos L

LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC)

ANTONIO VECIANA, Alpha 66

SIXTO MESA, MRR

JOSE MORELL ROMERO, Cuban Committee of Liberation

CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba

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MANUEL ARTIME, MRR

EUSEBIO NUJAL, labor leader

JOSE BOSCH, Cuban industrialist

On July 26, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised he had talked with LUIS SOMOZA about four hours while SOMOZA was in Miami during the middle of July, 1963. ALVAREZ said that it is his opinion SOMOZA was acting as an intermediary between the United States Government and the Cuban exiles.

On August 20, 1963, ALVAREZ advised that nothing has yet developed concerning the SOMOZA plan; it is now not clear what SOMOZA is offering, or what the United States Government's position or attitude is in this matter. ALVAREZ said it is obvious SOMOZA cannot afford, either as a private individual or a representative of the Nicaraguan Government, to back such a military program by Cuban exiles, and will have to have the backing and support of the United States Government to go on with his plan.

On July 30, 1963, FERMIN FLEITES, member of the Executive Committee of the MDC, advised that about a week ago, a Nicaraguan Army officer visited the MDC Headquarters, and in the name of SOMOZA, offered camps, military equipment and bases in Nicaragua. This individual also offered to pay the expenses of moving the MDC operations to Nicaragua.

FLEITES explained that the MDC had taken no positive action concerning this matter, and had adopted a "wait and see" policy to ascertain what attitude the United States Government would take concerning this matter.

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On August 7, 1963, MARIO DEL CANAL, Executive Secretary of Rescate Democratico Revolucionario, advised that when SOMOZA was in the United States during July of 1963, MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA, head of the Rescate Democratico Revolucionario (RDR), conferred with SOMOZA in Miami and New York. At the invitation of SOMOZA, VARONA left for Nicaragua on August 1, 1963, to again confer with SOMOZA, and is expected to return to Miami in about a week.

On September 10, 1963, CANAL advised that nothing definite had been established as a result of VARONA's visit to Nicaragua, and that the future of the proposed SOMOZA Plan is uncertain.

On August 13, 1963, LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, military leader of the MDC, advised that he had recently returned from Nicaragua, where he had conferred with SOMOZA, who made no commitments or indicated any definite plan existed. SOMOZA showed great interest in the Cuban problem, but offered no positive help or aid in the way of arms or training camps.

BATISTA FALLA said that CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba, was in Nicaragua at the same time, conferred with SOMOZA, but did not receive any offers of positive aid. BATISTA explained that PRIO had just previously returned from the Dominican Republic (DR), and although PRIO and JUAN BOSCH, President of the DR, had been friends for many years, PRIO was unable to obtain any military bases in the DR.

On August 22, 1963, RUBEN DE LEON, former Cuban Minister of Defense and Co-Ordinator of the anti-CASTRO

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organization Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile, stated that about a month ago, LUIS SOMOZA told EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, former Cuban delegate to the United Nations (UN), that he (SOMOZA) had talked to United States Attorney General (AG) ROBERT KENNEDY.

AG KENNEDY reportedly said it was necessary for SOMOZA to work out the Cuban problem and to unite Cuban exiles. SOMOZA recommended that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA be designated as the leader of the Cuban exiles.

DE LEON advised that there was later a meeting in Miami at the home of Nicaraguan Army Captain JOSE ALEGRETT between SOMOZA and a number of Cuban exile leaders. At this meeting, SOMOZA said there was a possibility of Nicaraguan support for the Cuban exile anti-CASTRO movement, but first the exiles would have to accept ARTIME as their leader. There was considerable opposition to this suggestion by the exile leaders attending the meeting.

On September 12, 1963, PAULINO SIERRA MARTINEZ, former attorney and textile mill operator in Cuba, advised he had recently visited Nicaragua and conferred with LUIS SOMOZA concerning help to Cuban exiles.

SIERRA said there are no training camps in Nicaragua or Central America for Cuban exiles, and all the proposed aid and backing has progressed no further than the talking stage. SIERRA said it seems to him that everyone is waiting for the United States Government to give the "green light".

On September 12, 1963, MM T-3 advised that nearly all top political leaders among Cuban exiles have conferred with SOMOZA and now agree that the SOMOZA Plan is too big for

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SOMOZA and the Central American Republics to put into effect without United States military and political support.

MM T-3 said that the different Cuban military and political leaders now feel that SOMOZA has not yet obtained a positive commitment from the United States Government, because after two and a half months of conferences, there are not any Cuban exile military training camps in Central America, and the SOMOZA Plan has not progressed beyond the talking stage.

III. ORGANIZATIONS

Comandos L

MM T-3 advised that Comandos L is one of the leading anti-CASTRO organizations and action groups. It is headed by SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO CUESTA and RAMON FONT. The organization maintains no office as such, but continues to use Post Office Box 66, Riverside Station, Miami, Florida, to collect money donations.

On July 29, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised the organization has had no military activity since March of 1963. The leadership is now building the organization to increase membership, establish different sections, such as a Women's Section, a Publicity Section, and committees to raise funds. The organization recently put out a thirty-page booklet, setting forth the aims and purposes of the organization, along with information concerning previous military operations of the organization.

ALVAREZ admitted his group has two boats in the Miami River, which will be used in the future for military

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Book V, p. 25 Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cabled the names of known contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela) was included on that list. Nonetheless neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or Angleton advised the desk officer of significance of this name.

Book V, p. 25 On November 23, 1963, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico Station to stop the planned arrest of Sylvia Duran. Karamessinis speculated that this was because CIA feared Cuba responsible for assassination.

p. 29 Headquarters equally concerned with Duran on November 27 and warned Mexico City station chief that U.S. Ambassador pushing Cuban theory too hard.

Book V, p. 27 AMLASH's case officer omitted reference to the poison pen in his November 25 contact report of his November 22 AMLASH meeting on instruction from Fitzgerald.

Book V, p. 28 "D" tells his story in Mexico City on November 25. On November 26, Mexico City cables details of "D" interrogation to CIA Headquarters. On December 1, CIA Headquarters cables Mexico City that the White House has been told that D's story is a fabrication.

Book V, p. 30 On December 1, 1963, CIA Headquarters cabled Mexico City that a sensitive source () has advised that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana was delayed in Mexico City on November 22 to pick up a passenger who rode in the cockpit without going through customs. This cable was found in Mexico City file with no CIA headquarters record of follow-up being found.

Book V, p. 35 In December, 1963, Sullivan prepared a memo for Hoover's aid in briefing the President that stated that no evidence had been developed which would indicate Oswald's assassination was inspired or directed by Pro Castro organizations or by any foreign country.

Book V, p. 40-41

FBI Legat in Mexico City cabled FBI Headquarters on November 24 that U.S. Ambassador felt Cubans participated in assassination effort. "Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in US in effort to confirm or refute this theory." FBI Headquarter's supervisor determined this was not desirable and would only promote rumors.

Book V; P. 58 The CIA investigation reflected a Soviet orientation, with exhaustive studies of Oswald's activities in re Soviet Union. There is no corresponding CIA analysis of Oswald's contacts with pro and anti Castro groups in U.S.

Book V, p. 61-
63

In December, 1963, the CIA learned that a Cuban American had crossed the border from Texas into Mexico, on November 23 and arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed in a hotel until the evening of November 27, when he departed on a regularly scheduled Cubana airlines flight to Havana using a Cuban courtesy visa and an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on the flight. In March, 1964 the Agency received a report from a source which alleged that the same Cuban American had received a permit to enter Mexico City on November 20 in Tampa, Florida. The same source said the Cuban American was somehow involved in the assassination.

The Agency did not follow up on this report other than to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban American's activities. The FBI did investigate the reported unusual travel but did not fully report the results of their investigation to their Warren Commission. Their investigation showed that this individual had lived in Tampa and Key West and was pro-Castro. He had traveled to Cuba in May of 1962 and had a brother in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union. On November 17, 1963, the Cuban American was at a get-together at the home of a member of the Tampa chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This was the same Fair Play for Cuba Committee that Oswald had possibly contacted in May of 1963.

Book V, p. 63-64

In March of 1964, the Warren Commission requested from Director Hoover information on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro organizations which were active in the U.S. including the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and Alpha 66, among others. The Bureau furnished less than a full and satisfactory response and did not disclose the fact that the CIA had operational interests in certain of the entities inquired about.

Book V, p. 65 The FBI reports on Alpha 66 furnished the Warren Commission noted the attack on the Soviet vessel in March of 1963 but did not detail that group's continued activity in planning and carrying out their military operations against Cuba. The FBI reports did not show that Alpha 66 had been involved with the New Orleans anti-Castro training camp.

Book V, p. 65 It is known that the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee with which Oswald was associated. According to Bureau documents, the Agency advised the Bureau that they were considering the use of disinformation that might embarrass the Committee in areas where the Committee had support.

Book V, p. 72 In late July 1964, an FBI informant reported that the CIA was meeting with AMLASH for the purpose of assassinating Castro. Informant also reported that AMLASH was unhappy with the CIA's efforts and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan but that the plan had not been completely put to rest. This information was not disseminated outside the Bureau at the request of the informant. But the Bureau notations indicate that the Bureau was looking into an underworld plot against Castro that might be coincidental with the AMLASH plan. The Bureau had first been informed of AMLASH-CIA meetings in October 1963. That information did not indicate assassination involvement.

Book V, p. 74-75

The AMLASH operation was insecure prior to the Fitzgerald meeting with AMLASH, a meeting that Fitzgerald was urged not to undertake by several in the Agency.

Book V, pp. 77-78

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Individuals outside the CIA had been brought into the operation, and the Agency learned that one of these individuals was in clandestine contact with Cuban intelligence (Cable from European station to CIA Headquarters, 3/18/65).