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the people until they understand the situation. When they once understand it they take a different view. But in my opinion, we have got to take a strong stand with the Communists, and I am afraid your thinking is more along the State Department's lines than I once thought it was.

From what I have learned about the policies over there now and some of the things you are advocating, I am afraid you are going along more with the line of the State Department which, of course, you have a right to do but with which I heartily disagree.

It is a pleasure to have you here and thank you for your testimony.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

I do want to emphasize my strong belief that we not only have a policy to win the cold war but I personally believe we are making progress in that direction.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith?

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have a very brief statement on my over-all impressions and one or two questions. I think you may have answered that in part but I would appreciate it if you would give me a brief answer for this part of the hearing.

Secretary McNamara. Surely.

Senator Smith. President Kennedy and General Taylor have said there would be no winner in a nuclear war. You and

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the President have stressed the growing power of Russia's nuclear forces. Under Secretary Gilpatric has publicly stated that he doesn't know how a war can be limited, and I quote, "Once you start using any kind of a nuclear bang."

It is reasonable to conclude that the over-all impression created by these statements is that the United States is afraid to use nuclear weapons for fear doing so would immediately and automatically escalate to a holocaust war, that is the impression I get and I think it is probably that it is the impression that Khrushchev gets.

Yet the world knows that the Communists have a vast superiority in combat forces for conventional warfare including first rate armoured units and the largest tactical air force in the world.

Coupled with this they have interior lines of supply and communication, and an aggressive attitude to conquer the world and some pretty weak opponents on their borders like Iran, Burma, India and Thailand.

If, in view of these facts, Khrushchev decides to challenge the United States and allied conventional forces on a broad scale, what do you intend to do about it?

Secretary McNamara. First, let me say that we have stated many, many times, I have stated on several different occasions, I stated it in Germany, I have stated it on three occasions I can recall in this country, that we will use whatever weapons

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are necessary to protect our interests, including nuclear weapons. Pravda has printed my statements because we have had them returned to us. There has been private conversation among the Soviets regarding such statements as I have made, and as the President has made about our willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of our interest.

Finally, it is perfectly clear that Khrushchev believed we would utilize nuclear weapons or any other weapons necessary to destroy the missiles which he deployed in Cuba. It is clear that he believed that by the action he took but it is also clear that he believed that based upon his comments in private conversation with foreign diplomats who have reported the conversations back to us, and it is clear that he was right in his belief because we would have used whatever weapons were necessary to destroy those missiles moved into Cuba.

So, I think that the premise on which the statement is made is incorrect.

We are neither afraid to utilize nuclear weapons to protect our interests nor is it correct to believe that the Soviets believe we are afraid, because there is ample evidence to the contrary.

Senator Smith. Would you say then that your long term objective to create large enough conventional forces in the Free World is to cope with major Communist aggressions without resort to nuclear weapons or would it be fair to say we are really

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much bolder about nuclear weapons than our public statements would indicate.

Secretary McNamara. I think it is unlikely that either today or at some time in the future our conventional forces would be so large as to allow us to oppose effectively a major Communist aggression, of the kinds you have suggested.

I think that the buildup in the conventional forces is, allows us to deter lesser forms of Soviet political and military aggression, actions that they would otherwise take were we not to build up our conventional forces because they might believe we would not respond to such lesser forms of aggression with the immediate use of nuclear weapons and they might believe they could, therefore, accomplish their objectives with very little cost to themselves.

Senator Smith. Are we programming sufficient tactical nuclear capabilities to win such a conflict without carrying it to the point of the ICBM exchange?

Secretary McNamara. Well, I don't want to say that a massive Soviet offensive action could be turned back without the use of ICBMs, but we are certainly building up substantially inventories of tactical nuclear weapons that could be used under those circumstances, inventories that we believe are far larger than the Soviet inventories of comparable weapons.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, we have read a great deal, and this has been referred to earlier in the Committee, about

the managed news policy in the operation of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, would you please explain that policy, the reasons for it and how it works?

Secretary McNamara. Well, I don't believe we have a managed news policy, but if we do it isn't managed very well. I think your comments would lead you to that conclusion and they certainly lead me to that conclusion. We spoke a moment ago about this B-47 withdrawals as an illustration. Whatever management of news we are doing is a very ineffective approach to the problem.

I think the term is an unfortunate one. It is applied, I think, without any real evidence that we are acting in that way.

What we are trying to do is to actually increase the exposure of the public to defense policies, and defense programs. There was a period in the week of October 15 when we did not respond fully to questions relating to the knowledge we had about Soviet weapons in Cuba. This because we were then formulating a course of action designed to insure the removal of the missile systems that have been introduced and to have disclosed publicly the extent of our knowledge of those systems would have compromised the action plans that were in the process of formulation, and for a period, therefore, of, perhaps it was, three days or so in that week to the point of the President's speech which, as I remember it, was October 22, we did not respond

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fully. I don't call that a managed news policy. But I think it is an action which all of you would support and agree with under the circumstances. It was very, very much in our national interests to withhold from Khrushchev any indication of how we were going to respond. He obviously thought we weren't going to respond at all or he wouldn't have taken the action. He was in error. We didn't wish to disclose the extent of his error to him until we were ready to respond with some force sufficient to force him to change his course of action.

This we disclosed to the nation on the 22nd of October, and in the days immediately prior to that we did not discuss publicly either our plans or the foundation for those plans.

I think this was very much in the national interest.

Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, I am not referring to that because you may have heard that I have commended the President very highly for the handling of that situation.

I had great admiration for all of you who had to do with it and I thought it was most necessary and I hope it may be done whenever the occasion arises, or similar occasion.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you.

Senator Smith. That is not what I am talking about.

What I am asking is is it not a fact that there is a policy, regulation, a firm practice in the Department of Defense that news information particularly notices to the members of Congress, has to be cleared through the Department of Defense by

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ever come to this stage, a matter of this type and character, since I have been in the Senate or in the Pentagon.

Mr. Secretary, the last question I would ask you is based on what I saw on the ticker about Malinovsky.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman Russell. I do not know what the background of that is, but I think it is significant that the statement was made by Malinovsky and not by Khrushchev.

Secretary McNamara. I think so too, Mr. Chairman. I think that Khrushchev is trying to ride both sides of the street with this kind of a statement.

Chairman Russell. Senator Thurmond.

Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask the Secretary about that, but I think what he has said expresses my views on that too. I think he has made a sound explanation.

The Communists, in my judgment, are not going to start any World War III until they are ready to start it. When they are ready, they will find some incident anyway.

Chairman Russell. If they are sure they will win, they won't care if they have an incident.

Senator Thurmond. If they are not ready to start it, they are not going to let an invasion of Cuba or anything else force them to start it. I agree with the Chairman, the fact that the statement was made by Malinovsky instead of Khrushchev

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carries some weight.

Although made by Khrushchev himself, I still don't think that it would start World War III if Cuba was invaded, unless they are ready to start it anyway. I am glad to see the Secretary express that view, and I am in thorough accord.

Secretary McNamara. I share that view.

Chairman Russell. We certainly will be a second rate power if we ever frame our foreign policy with respect to Cuba upon any threats that emanate from Moscow. I would be almost ashamed of my country if we framed our foreign policy on such a basis as that.

Mr. Secretary, some of the members of the committee wanted to hear from you about Cuba. I don't know exactly what they wanted. I suppose our policy is still one of watchful waiting and insisting that Premier Khrushchev live up to the commitments in his letter of November.

Senator Engle. Mr. Chairman, before the Secretary goes forward with that, may I say something. I am sorry that I could not be here yesterday. This morning I went down to the VFW to participate in a ceremony. I did not know you were going to meet this morning.

I hope a little later perhaps that I will get a chance to go through this record. I suppose the Secretary will be gone after that, but if I have any questions, I will get in touch with him personally. I want to say to him though that I

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was not here not because I was not interested but because I had some problems that I couldn't manage otherwise.

Chairman Russell. All right, Senator Engle. Of course I don't know, you have a very resourceful mind, and I am quite sure you will be able to figure up a few questions that have not been asked the Secretary, but I expect you will find it was there by implication if not by direction in one of the barrage.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, the President has stated our policy with respect to Cuba. I think it has two elements, two objectives.

One is the eventual change in government. The President has expressed it in various ways at various times, but I think it is quite clear that we continue to work for the overthrow of the Castro government and the elimination of the Communist control of Cuba.

Secondly, it is our objective to insure that Cuba is not used as a base for the export of aggression by force elsewhere in the hemisphere. We are taking steps to try to accomplish both of those objectives.

Chairman Russell. Just what steps are you taking? I can see the ones you would take to accomplish the first. Some of them have been manifest in the shipping and things of that kind, but what steps have you taken to prevent this export of communism from Cuba?

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Isn't it true that they have hundreds of young men from most of the Latin American countries in Cuba, and they are indoctrinating them in communism and teaching them rebellion and revolution?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I believe that is true that a substantial number of Latin Americans have been sent to Cuba for training of various kinds in Communist doctrine and potentially subversive activities.

We are working with the other Latin American nations to both restrict the travel of their nationals to Cuba, to follow their return to their own nation, and in particular to check the export if any of arms from Cuba to other countries in the hemisphere.

So far as the controls over the shipment of arms from Cuba to other nations in the hemisphere, it appears to be working very effectively. There is no substantial volume of such shipments that we know of, if there are any at all.

I think that as time goes by, we can develop even more effective controls against the use of Cuba as a training base for subversion in the hemisphere. It is certainly being used for that purpose today. But even in that sense, it does not appear to be the primary base for subversion in this hemisphere.

The Soviets are dealing directly with a large number of Latin Americans. You may have noticed very recently they

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entered into negotiations with Brazil for a trade contract under which they would supply oil to Brazil in return for Brazilian coffee, and in the course of the transaction would send into Brazil a substantial number of technicians.

This is but one of the whole series of illustrations of the extent of Soviet efforts to try to subvert the duly established governments in Latin America by means other than operating through Cuba.

In any case, we are working with the other Latin Americans to restrict the export of aggression by force from Cuba into those other nations.

Chairman Russell. What degree of cooperation are we receiving from other members of the OAS?

Secretary McNamara. Far more now than we were a year ago.

Chairman Russell. How about Mexico? A short while ago there was free passage and no restriction as to visa and things of that kind on airplanes between Mexico City and Havana. Isn't that still in effect?

Secretary McNamara. I believe that we have received far more cooperation from Mexico in recent months than we did a year ago.

I should say on this question of subversion as contrasted to the export of arms, that I think that other members of the government, particularly representatives of the State Department

