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JFK Review

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the people until they understand the situation. When they once understand it they take a different view. But in my opinion, we have got to take a strong stand with the Communists, and I am afraid your thinking is more along the State Department's lines than I once thought it was.

From what I have learned about the policies over there now and some of the things you are advocating, I am afraid you are going along more with the line of the State Department which, of course, you have a right to do but with which I heartily disagree.

It is a pleasure to have you here and thank you for your testimony.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

I do want to emphasize my strong belief that we not only have a policy to win the cold war but I personally believe we are making progress in that direction.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith?

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have a very brief statement on my over-all impressions and one or two questions. I think you may have answered that in part but I would appreciate it if you would give me a brief answer for this part of the hearing.

Secretary McNamara. Surely.

Senator Smith. President Kennedy and General Taylor have said there would be no winner in a nuclear war. You and
the President have stressed the growing power of Russia's nuclear forces. Under Secretary Gilpatric has publicly stated that he doesn't know how a war can be limited, and I quote, "Once you start using any kind of a nuclear bang."

It is reasonable to conclude that the over-all impression created by these statements is that the United States is afraid to use nuclear weapons for fear doing so would immediately and automatically escalate to a holocaust war, that is the impression I get and I think it is probably that it is the impression that Khrushchev gets.

Yet the world knows that the Communists have a vast superiority in combat forces for conventional warfare including first-rate armoured units and the largest tactical air force in the world.

Coupled with this they have interior lines of supply and communication, and an aggressive attitude to conquer the world and some pretty weak opponents on their borders like Iran, Burma, India and Thailand.

If, in view of these facts, Khrushchev decides to challenge the United States and allied conventional forces on a broad scale, what do you intend to do about it?

Secretary McNamara. First, let me say that we have stated many, many times, I have stated on several different occasions, I stated it in Germany, I have stated it on three occasions I can recall in this country, that we will use whatever weapons
are necessary to protect our interests, including nuclear weapons. Pravda has printed my statements because we have had them returned to us. There has been private conversation among the Soviets regarding such statements as I have made, and as the president has made about our willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of our interest.

Finally, it is perfectly clear that Khrushchev believed we would utilize nuclear weapons or any other weapons necessary to destroy the missiles which he deployed in Cuba. It is clear that he believed that by the action he took but it is also clear that he believed that based upon his comments in private conversation with foreign diplomats who have reported the conversations back to us, and it is clear that he was right in his belief because we would have used whatever weapons were necessary to destroy those missiles moved into Cuba.

So, I think that the premise on which the statement is made is incorrect.

We are neither afraid to utilize nuclear weapons to protect our interests nor is it correct to believe that the Soviets believe we are afraid, because there is ample evidence to the contrary.

Senator Smith. Would you say then that your long term objective to create large enough conventional forces in the Free World is to cope with major Communist aggressions without resort to nuclear weapons or would it be fair to say we are really
much bolder about nuclear weapons than our public statements
would indicate.

Secretary McNamara. I think it is unlikely that either to-
day or at some time in the future our conventional forces would
be so large as to allow us to oppose effectively a major
Communist aggression, of the kinds you have suggested.

I think that the buildup in the conventional forces
is, allows us to deter lesser forms of Soviet political and
military aggression, actions that they would otherwise take
were we not to build up our conventional forces because they
might believe we would not respond to such lesser forms of aggres-
sion with the immediate use of nuclear weapons and they might
believe they could, therefore, accomplish their objectives with
very little cost to themselves.

Senator Smith. Are we programming sufficient tactical
nuclear capabilities to win such a conflict without carrying it
to the point of the ICBM exchange?

Secretary McNamara. Well, I don't want to say that a
massive Soviet offensive action could be turned back without the
use of ICBMs, but we are certainly building up substantially
inventories of tactical nuclear weapons that could be used
under those circumstances, inventories that we believe are
far larger than the Soviet inventories of comparable weapons.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, we have read a great deal,
and this has been referred to earlier in the Committee, about
the managed news policy in the operation of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, would you please explain that policy, the reasons for it and how it works?

Secretary McNamara. Well, I don't believe we have a managed news policy, but if we do it isn't managed very well. I think your comments would lead you to that conclusion and they certainly lead me to that conclusion. We spoke a moment ago about this B-47 withdrawals as an illustration. Whatever management of news we are doing is a very ineffective approach to the problem.

I think the term is an unfortunate one. It is applied, I think, without any real evidence that we are acting in that way.

What we are trying to do is to actually increase the exposure of the public to defense policies, and defense programs. There was a period in the week of October 15 when we did not respond fully to questions relating to the knowledge we had about Soviet weapons in Cuba. This because we were then formulating a course of action designed to insure the removal of the missile systems that have been introduced and to have disclosed publicly the extent of our knowledge of those systems would have compromised the action plans that were in the process of formulation, and for a period, therefore, of, perhaps it was, three days or so in that week to the point of the President's speech which, as I remember it, was October 22, we did not respond
fully. I don't call that a managed news policy. But I think it is an action which all of you would support and agree with under the circumstances. It was very, very much in our national interests to withhold from Khrushchev any indication of how we were going to respond. He obviously thought we weren't going to respond at all or he wouldn't have taken the action. He was in error. We didn't wish to disclose the extent of his error to him until we were ready to respond with some force sufficient to force him to change his course of action.

This we disclosed to the nation on the 22nd of October, and in the days immediately prior to that we did not discuss publicly either our plans or the foundation for those plans.

I think this was very much in the national interest.

Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, I am not referring to that because you may have heard that I have commended the President very highly for the handling of that situation.

I had great admiration for all of you who had to do with it and I thought it was most necessary and I hope it may be done whenever the occasion arises, or similar occasion.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you.

Senator Smith. That is not what I am talking about.

What I am asking is is it not a fact that there is a policy, regulation, a firm practice in the Department of Defense that news information particularly notices to the members of Congress, has to be cleared through the Department of Defense by
ever come to this stage, a matter of this type and character, since I have been in the Senate or in the Pentagon.

Mr. Secretary, the last question I would ask you is based on what I saw on the ticker about Malinovsky.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman Russell. I do not know what the background of that is, but I think it is significant that the statement was made by Malinovsky and not by Khrushchev.

Secretary McNamara. I think so too, Mr. Chairman. I think that Khrushchev is trying to ride both sides of the street with this kind of a statement.

Chairman Russell. Senator Thurmond.

Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask the Secretary about that, but I think what he has said expresses my views on that too. I think he has made a sound explanation.

The Communists, in my judgment, are not going to start any World War III until they are ready to start it. When they are ready, they will find some incident anyway.

Chairman Russell. If they are sure they will win, they won't care if they have an incident.

Senator Thurmond. If they are not ready to start it, they are not going to let an invasion of Cuba or anything else force them to start it. I agree with the Chairman, the fact that the statement was made by Malinovsky instead of Khrushchev
carries some weight.

Although made by Khrushchev himself, I still don't think that it would start World War III if Cuba was invaded, unless they are ready to start it anyway. I am glad to see the Secretary express that view, and I am in thorough accord.

Secretary McNamara. I share that view.

Chairman Russell. We certainly will be a second rate power if we ever frame our foreign policy with respect to Cuba upon any threats that emanate from Moscow. I would be almost ashamed of my country if we framed our foreign policy on such a basis as that.

Mr. Secretary, some of the members of the committee wanted to hear from you about Cuba. I don't know exactly what they wanted. I suppose our policy is still one of watchful waiting and insisting that Premier Khrushchev live up to the commitments in his letter of November.

Senator Engle. Mr. Chairman, before the Secretary goes forward with that, may I say something. I am sorry that I could not be here yesterday. This morning I went down to the VFW to participate in a ceremony. I did not know you were going to meet this morning.

I hope a little later perhaps that I will get a chance to go through this record. I suppose the Secretary will be gone after that, but if I have any questions, I will get in touch with him personally. I want to say to him though that I
was not here not because I was not interested but because I had some problems that I couldn't manage otherwise.

Chairman Russell. All right, Senator Engle. Of course I don't know, you have a very resourceful mind, and I am quite sure you will be able to figure up a few questions that have not been asked the Secretary, but I expect you will find it was there by implication if not by direction in one of the barrage.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, the President has stated our policy with respect to Cuba. I think it has two elements, two objectives.

One is the eventual change in government. The President has expressed it in various ways at various times, but I think it is quite clear that we continue to work for the overthrow of the Castro government and the elimination of the Communist control of Cuba.

Secondly, it is our objective to insure that Cuba is not used as a base for the export of aggression by force elsewhere in the hemisphere. We are taking steps to try to accomplish both of those objectives.

Chairman Russell. Just what steps are you taking? I can see the ones you would take to accomplish the first. Some of them have been manifest in the shipping and things of that kind, but what steps have you taken to prevent this export of communism from Cuba?
Isn't it true that they have hundreds of young men from most of the Latin American countries in Cuba, and they are indoctrinating them in communism and teaching them rebellion and revolution?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I believe that is true that a substantial number of Latin Americans have been sent to Cuba for training of various kinds in Communist doctrine and potentially subversive activities.

We are working with the other Latin American nations to both restrict the travel of their nationals to Cuba, to follow their return to their own nation, and in particular to check the export if any of arms from Cuba to other countries in the hemisphere.

So far as the controls over the shipment of arms from Cuba to other nations in the hemisphere, it appears to be working very effectively. There is no substantial volume of such shipments that we know of, if there are any at all.

I think that as time goes by, we can develop even more effective controls against the use of Cuba as a training base for subversion in the hemisphere. It is certainly being used for that purpose today. But even in that sense, it does not appear to be the primary base for subversion in this hemisphere.

The Soviets are dealing directly with a large number of Latin Americans. You may have noticed very recently they
entered into negotiations with Brazil for a trade contract under which they would supply oil to Brazil in return for Brazilian coffee, and in the course of the transaction would sent into Brazil a substantial number of technicians.

This is but one of the whole series of illustrations of the extent of Soviet efforts to try to subvert the duly established governments in Latin America by means other than operating through Cuba.

In any case, we are working with the other Latin Americans to restrict the export of aggression by force from Cuba into those other nations.

Chairman Russell. What degree of cooperation are we receiving from other members of the OAS?

Secretary McNamara. Far more now than we were a year ago.

Chairman Russell. How about Mexico? A short while ago there was free passage and no restriction as to visa and things of that kind on airplanes between Mexico City and Havana. Isn't that still in effect?

Secretary McNamara. I believe that we have received far more cooperation from Mexico in recent months than we did a year ago.

I should say on this question of subversion as contrasted to the export of arms, that I think that other members of the government, particularly representatives of the State Department
who are responsible for this, could speak with more authority than I.

But it is my strong impression that in the case of Mexico, they are cooperating much more fully today in imposing travel restrictions of various types than was the case a year ago.

Chairman Russell. Of course so far as the first part of it is concerned, you would have to enforce that. The State Department would have no means of watching the export of arms.

Secretary McNamara. That is true. We maintain a careful surveillance of a movement of vessels, and any other traffic.

In any case, where we have even the slightest suspicion, we work with the country to which the traffic is directed to insure that proper inspection of it is made before it moves into the interior of that nation.

Chairman Russell. Is there any communication by air now, airplanes from Russia to Cuba?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, there is, but it is very sporadic indeed.

If I recall correctly, they were establishing a once a week service direct from the Soviet Union to Cuba in each direction, but the last time I saw a report on that, which was just a few days ago, it had operated very sporadically. There had been a number of breakdowns en route, and they had missed their schedules in a high percentage of the cases.

Chairman Russell. Do they undertake to make that a one-
way flight or do they stop, any of them?

Secretary McNamara. I was trying to think. Up until last fall they were flying them with stops in Africa. I think that recently they have been flying non-stop.

Chairman Russell. That is a pretty good hop.

Secretary McNamara. When they could fly it non-stop, and it is a very long non-stop flight. This is one of the reasons why mechanical difficulties and other difficulties have so interrupted the schedule. As I remember it, it is something on the order of I believe 5,000 miles.

Chairman Russell. I was in Mexico about two years ago, and I talked to the representatives of the CIA there, and they were very concerned because they had been reporting the existence of paper corporations there to buy parts to supply to Cuban industry in this country and trans-shipping it to Cuba.

Of course we know that our good friends from Canada were not willing to let us even store atomic weapons there for us to use in defending them, that they carried on a very extensive trade in parts with Cuba for some time. Have we made any progress in diminishing that?

Secretary McNamara. I believe that in both instances we have. You mentioned this to me about a year ago, and I looked into it at the time, although it does not fall within the responsibilities of the Defense Department. I was curious,
based on what you had said. You were speaking I think particularly of Mexico at that time.

Chairman Russell. Yes, I was speaking about Mexico. I did not know anything about Canada at that time.
Secretary McNamara. I think there was evidence that fictitious corporations were being used as facades behind which the parts that were of value to Cuba were being shipped into Cuba.

That traffic has been reduced materially since that time, and as far as the Canadian shipments of spares are concerned, I think the same thing applies. I think we have made quite a bit of progress toward isolating Cuba from the free world in so far as trade is concerned.

For example, the free world shipping to Cuba has dropped precipitously in the last 10 or 12 months, most of it in the last several months. I think it is off in terms of tonnage and in terms of numbers of ships moving to Cuba by about 80 to 90 per cent. This is a major step forward.

I did not mean to imply that Cuba is now receiving a major portion of those goods through substitute channels, because of course it is. Instead of receiving them from the free world and in free world bottoms, it is now receiving them from the Communist bloc and in Communist bloc bottoms to a considerable degree, not to the same degree as previously.

But this is an added cost to the Soviet Union, and this again is one of our objectives, to increase the cost to the Soviet Union in sustaining Cuba.

Chairman Russell. Though Cuba has essentially an agricultural economy, I had understood that they did not produce near enough
food to provide for their population in Cuba itself. Is that correct?

Secretary McNamara. I think that is right, but I really can't speak with authority on that as to the volume of their food imports.

Chairman Russell. Do we know where they are coming from, such as there are?

Secretary McNamara. I think from the bloc countries, because at the present time the number of free world ships coming into Cuba has dropped to the point where I believe in the month of January there were only 12, if I recall correctly, compared to many times that number a year ago.

Chairman Russell. Is there still any active movement in Cuba to overthrow Castro? Are there any guerrillas still in being there or do we know?

Secretary McNamara. Oh, there is evidence of discontent, and there is evidence that some of this discontent takes the form of guerrilla operations, but I think they are very, very small and relatively ineffective. The government has a very tight control over the people.

Again, I think you could get a more complete story on this subject from Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, but I believe I am right in saying that the government has about 100,000 agents out of a population of 6 million, including the very young and the very old, and that these 100,000 agents have
the right to deny food ration books to those they believe are operating in a disloyal way.

So when you think of the possibility that there is one government agent with such an authority for every 60 people, infant and aged as well, you can see the kind of control that is exercised by the government over the population. Under those circumstances it would be extremely difficult for any guerrilla movement to obtain any size.

Chairman Russell. Do we have any information as to whether the Soviet forces that are about to be moved from Cuba represent technicians or are they organized units such as a tank battalion?

Secretary McNamara. The implication was that there would be organized units as well as what you might call technicians or advisors.

But I think it is far too early to say whether the organized units of which the four so-called combat units, each containing roughly 1200 men, and of a size equivalent to a reinforced battalion, will be units which move out.

Those are the major Soviet combat units in Cuba, and it is those that we are paying particular attention to during this possible movement period.

Senator Engle. May I ask why do you think they are in there? What are they doing there?

Secretary McNamara. It would be sheer speculation for me to respond to the question. I have some opinions of my own,
Senator Engle, but I have no definite indication of the Soviet intentions.

My own opinion is that they were there to protect the nuclear equipment that was moved into Cuba by the Soviet Union.

We had many indications, for example, that the Soviets placed such a tight security, control, around the areas in which this nuclear equipment was deployed, they would not even allow the governor of the province in which the area existed to penetrate that area.

I cite this simply to show the kind of control they maintained, and I think these combat forces were there primarily for that purpose. But this is sheer speculation on my part, and I do not advance it with any real authority.

Senator Engle. If we take all of the alternatives that are available, that is what they could do with those forces, and you go right through them and finally you get down to that, don't you?

Secretary McNamara. I believe so.

Senator Engle. That is what I would think.

Chairman Russell. Either that or a bodyguard for Castro.

Senator Engle. Yes.

Chairman Russell. Do we have any information or theory as to whether the warhead in the missile that shot down the U-2 was conventional or whether it had any nuclear matter in it?

Secretary McNamara. We do not have any direct evidence that the U-2 was even shot down by a warhead. Everything points in that
direction, but we lack any real evidence of exactly how it was shot down.

We have no evidence whatsoever that a nuclear weapon was used. We think it quite unlikely that that was the case.

Chairman Russell. Didn't we recover the body of the pilot? Was it not sent back to the states?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, and there was no evidence from inspection of the body that nuclear weapons were used. The U-2 is very sensitive to detonation of explosive devices near the airplane, and such devices need not even hit the airplane.

A conventional non-nuclear device need not hit the airplane in order to cause destruction of the airplane, loss of control and subsequent destruction. This is what we think happened in this particular case, but we really had no clear evidence of the exact circumstances.

Chairman Russell. You would think that an explosion of any kind that was great enough to knock the plane down would have left some marks on the body of the pilot.

Secretary McNamara. Not necessarily, Mr. Chairman. We have seen evidence before that the U-2 is so sensitive to changes in the environment in which it is functioning that the pilot can lose control of it, and it can get into a condition such that it is ultimately destroyed. This is caused by a near miss, for example, of a conventional warhead.

Chairman Russell. Is there anything about the body of the
pilot to indicate whether he came down in the wreckage of the plane or by parachute?

You would think if he came down from that height, there certainly would be some mark or some indication on the man's body as to how far he fell.

Secretary McNamara. I had better not answer. I don't know for sure. I don't recall. I did go over the report at the time, but I have forgotten the answer to that question. I will put it in the record.

Chairman Russell. All right. Senator Symington, do you have any questions?

Senator Symington. I have just been very interested in this, Mr. Chairman. The Chair suggested that it might be a bodyguard for Castro. It also might be a dagger pointed at him, might it not?

In other words, he might be misbehaving a little bit as far as what Mr. Mikoyan and Mr. Khrushchev thought, and keeping those troops there might be there to keep him in line a bit, might they not?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I think they could have fulfilled a number of different purposes. I suspect the primary purpose was the one I outlined. They could have both fulfilled that primary purpose and also accomplished other objectives as well.

Senator Symington. It occurred to me that if they were there to protect what, in effect, most of what in effect they had taken
out, that they might have also taken them out when they took it
out, and the fact that they did not was that they wanted to be
sure that Castro did some things that they wanted him to do.
Secretary McNamara. That might possibly have been the case.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Engle. Will the Senator yield there?
Chairman Russell. That could be, but even with a Russian
who is ten feet tall, I don't think that would have been enough
Russians to whip all of Castro's forces.
Senator Symington. The reason it appealed to me was I heard
there were a lot of people in Cuba who, if they could get a little
support, might go after Castro.
Chairman Russell. We were disillusioned about that, I don't
know if you remember that or not, at the Bay of Pigs.
Senator Symington. The Bay of Pigs? No, I don't think I
ever heard of that.
Senator Engle. Will the Senator yield so I can ask a
question on that very same point?
Chairman Russell. Yes.
Senator Engle. This is a matter it seems to me of very
great interest, because the American people are extremely upset
about these 17,000 Russians in Cuba. And yet their presence there
is an equivocal matter.
If you divide them into technicians and there combat troops,
you can say that the technicians are there to train people. But
when you take a look at the combat situation, they have tanks there, and the kind of equipment that would normally operate in a land operation.

They have no transports to take those troops out anyway. They certainly wouldn't invade us. And if they were going any place else, they would have to have transport, and we would detect it immediately.

So it is a matter of great puzzlement to me as to why they are there. For instance, let me ask this question.

We are flying air reconnaissance over Cuba now at very low levels. It is my belief, and I may be wrong about this, and if I am you may correct me, that those planes could be shot down. I think they could get at a few of them anyway. But they haven't done it.

Now this is a strange situation, that we in effect violate the air over Cuba, and we are doing it and we know we are doing it and the television program that you put on proved that we are doing it, in my opinion proved it to a point beyond what I would like to have seen revealed to everybody in the world. But if they want to shoot those planes down, they could shoot them down.

Now isn't it possible that those troops are being maintained there to be sure that those anti-aircraft batteries do not get in the hands of these irresponsible Cubans who would shoot us down, and if they shoot one or two of our planes down, we are going to go in there. The American people will not stand for it, isn't
that right?

Secretary McNamara. I think this is a very reasonable hypothesis. I think that it is almost certainly the explanation of why we are able to fly frequent, literally daily, when weather is suitable, surveillance flights over Cuba, without being destroyed by the anti-aircraft batteries that we know are there and that have the capability to destroy us. Now what this implies for the future, I can't say.

Senator Engle. Do they have SAM III's in there to you knowledge?

Secretary McNamara. Not what we call SAM III's, low altitude defense systems of the type similar to the SAM II's. The only high effective air defense system they have are the SAM II's, and those are highly effective at high altitudes.

Senator Engle. I understand that, but they could get some of those, if they knew about where they were coming and waited for them.

Secretary McNamara. There is no question but what the SAM II's in Cuba today could destroy everyone of our U-2 flights, of which we have several, as I say, on each day when the weather is good, and yet they are not destroyed. Frankly, the only explanation that I have for this situation is exactly the one you have outlined.

Senator Engle. Of course, here is the thing that creates the dilemma for us in public office. We hear this clamor to get
troops out, and the American people are very sensitive about it, as you know. It creates a difficult political problem for us at home. They just raise cane about it.

Yet it seems to me that what Khrushchev is doing is keeping his own people in control of those batteries, so they do not stir up an incident that will bring instant American retaliation.

Now how in the world do you handle that kind of problem? I asked my very wise Chairman, who has been in this business a long time, how do you get around that.

I just have the suspicion, and that is why I asked the Secretary, if it is true that those people are being maintained there to maintain control of weapons which would otherwise be in irresponsible hands, and Khrushchev says, "You sit on them", then what do we do? It gets pretty sticky, doesn't it?

Secretary McNamara. Sir, I think there is an answer to it.

In the first place, I believe he can take out the combat troops without turning control of the surface-to-air missile systems over to the Cubans. He certainly ought to insist on that.

Senator Engle. Provided the Cuban military would not exercise that power to throw them out and take them over.

Secretary McNamara. Secondly, I believe he can avoid that situation and also probably remove the Soviet personnel we believe that are now manning the surface-to-air missiles, by saying to Castro in effect, "You either give us a guarantee that you will not use these surface-to-air missile systems against the U-2
aircraft or we will say to you that we will take out the systems. Furthermore, if you give us a guarantee, we leave the systems in and you use them against the aircraft, we want to make it perfectly clear we are not going to come to your assistance in the event of further attack by the United States."

This is the way I answer the dilemma you pose, the dilemma being how can we as a nation and the United States both pressure the Soviets to withdraw all their troops and technicians and at the same time be assured that after they do so, we will be able to carry on surveillance.

I think we can accomplish both those objectives by the approach I have outlined. I think this is in effect the President's approach.

Senator Engle. In other words, to summarize it, you would say, "Listen, you take them out, but if they use them, we will go in and get them," is that it?

Secretary McNamara. That is exactly what I would say, and I think this is in effect what we have said many, many times to the Soviet Union. We absolutely insist upon continued surveillance of the Island of Cuba.

Senator Engle. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. That is really in substitution for the on-site inspection that Khrushchev couldn't deliver.

Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir, it is in substitution for it.

Chairman Russell. Or didn't deliver it. I don't know whether
he could have delivered it if he tried hard enough.

Secretary McNamara. It is in substitution for it, but I must say that I personally -- and this is simply a personal opinion -- would rather rely upon you as controlled surveillance from the air than upon some internationally controlled on-site inspection.

Chairman Russell. I think we could have stood a little of both. Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of more questions. Mr. Secretary, again hindsight is always better than foresight, but in this country you have a good many military men who have had military experience, and they talk with their neighbors and their friends, and I think one thing that they have gotten mixed up about, and I agree with the Senator from California that there is a lot of tension about this problem in the country, and that is this question of what is offensive or defensive weapons.

As you know, in the battle of the bulge we used every strategic bomber we had as a tactical airplane, and a fighter taking off from Iwo Jima out where you were working in the war that destroyed a Japanese plant was a strategic bomber.

It is very hard for the people to see, based on their actual experience, many of them. For example, I would rather see IL-28's personally stay in Cuba, than I would MIG 21's. That would be especially true if I lived in Atlanta or Miami. And so I think
that you have that problem.

Now it is going to continue. For example, there is going to be a buildup problem perhaps of this harbor, whatever it is going to be, and what are you going to do?

They say you have got Guantanamo. "We will build a harbor for submarines, maybe for destroyers, maybe for anything that we want."

That part worries me, the clear cut effort to make a demarcation between an offensive and a defensive weapon. I would hope that we can avoid that in some way in the future.

For example, what would we do today if Russian submarines openly docked and berthed them in Havana or new harbor or any other harbor except Guantanamo? What could we do?

Secretary McNamara. I think we have indicated that we would not tolerate the use of Cuba as a Soviet submarine base.

Senator Symington. The we would tolerate it as a Soviet fighter base.

Secretary McNamara. I think the difference is that the submarines have potential for substantial attack on this country, whereas the fighter aircraft there at the present time do not.

Senator Symington. Thank you, sir. Now one final point. You had tried to figure what you would do. Of all the stories I have heard, the one that would appeal to me the most, if I wanted to destroy this country I think, would be to put a freighter under different flags in the various harbors around,
say 20 or 30 of our leading cities, and drop a bomb all timed
to go off together with a megaton weapon coming out of a false
bottom, et cetera.

Do we analyze that from the standpoint of possibility, and
what we would do in case it happened?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir, we do. We have a specific
exercise of that kind as a matter of fact.

Even though that would cause serious damage, if it were
undetected, we have a force that would respond in such a way as
to destroy the Soviet Union, and this should deter such action.

But we don't rest on the fact that our superior force should deter
it. We also maintain a careful watch to detect such an operation,
if it occurs.

Senator Symington. Could we sometime on this Committee,
Mr. Chairman, if it met with your approval, I would hope we
might have a briefing as to what plans we would have against
that type in character of an attack.

Chairman Russell. Very well. We will see as to that.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith.

Senator Smith. I am sorry I was called out of the Committee
when you started talking about Cuba. I have only one question,
Mr. Secretary.

That is, what is the United States policy with respect to
Cuba. If you gave a positive statement on that and it is

[Signature]
satisfactory to the Committee, I will not ask you to repeat it.

If it was not asked, then I would like you to.

Secretary McNamara. The question was asked, Senator Smith.

I hope my answer was satisfactory. I will be happy to repeat it if the Committee wishes me to do so.

I can say simply very quickly the policy has two objectives. One is to overthrow Castro and eliminate communist control of the Island of Cuba, and the other is to prevent the export of aggression by force from Cuba into other parts of the hemisphere.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman Russell. Senator Ervin.

Senator Ervin. Well, I would just like to say I haven't had a chance to read my mail for a week but my staff tells me I get more letters about Cuba, people are more concerned about Cuba, than any other subject to come into my office, and I want to associate myself with what Senator Symington said a while ago, I think that the Cuba in the present situation fulfills one of the desires of Russia. It gives them a base where they have got plenty of weapons which I think are immaterial what you call them, that can be exported to other countries in South America and have got a base for subversion.

Of course, I am probably a little reckless but if I was running it all by myself I think I would just put a blockade there and stop everything coming into Cuba myself because I believe you have to take a chance. Those are observations.

Chairman Russell. Senator Thurmond.

Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I have any questions.

For the record I just want to make this point clear, coming from me, that in my judgment we have got to set up a policy on this matter and it has got to be a policy to eliminate Communism from the Western Hemisphere. Once that decision is made I think everything else will fall in place. There are various ways this can be brought about. We can establish a naval
and economic blockade of Cuba.

If that doesn't work we can cancel diplomatic, commercial and all relations with Russia and with her satellites, and if that don't work we may have to use the military, but I think we have got first to decide we are going to eliminate Communism from the Western Hemisphere. I don't think it makes any difference whether Castro is removed or not. If Communists are running Cuba, Castro is a mere figurehead, and if he is removed, as long as the Communists are running Cuba, somebody else will be just there in his place, and in fact, might be tougher than Castro is, with what little power he has.

The Communists are running Cuba and we have got to remove Communism from Cuba. Those are my thoughts, Mr. Secretary for what they are worth.

Chairman Russell. Castro says he is a Communist, so we have got to remove him, too.

Senator Thurmond. How is that?

Chairman Russell. Castro says he is a Communist.

Senator Thurmond. Of course, he ought to be removed. I mean the point is the Communists are running Cuba.

Chairman Russell. You think he is being directed outside from the Kremlin rather than the government in the capital in Havana?

Senator Thurmond. He is just a figurehead.

Chairman Russell. Any further questions?
Senator Symington. Just one more, about this offensive and defensive weapons. Senator Ervin was saying they have got all these missiles into Cuba without our knowing it until we took pictures.

Now, suppose they took tanks in quantity and put them into Venezuela, as we know tanks without proper resistance equipment are devastatingly effective today, and then they moved those tanks under the hatches of freighters, you say that the Free World shipping is down but Communist shipping is up, and that they put those in Venezuela and with those tanks the Communists in Venezuela started moving in and capturing the capital, what would we consider that to be?

Secretary McNamara. Export of aggression by force which is contrary to the stated policy of this government and which would be met by some forceful action by this government.

Senator Symington. Would it be met in Venezuela or Cuba?

Secretary McNamara. We would have to face the circumstances. I frankly think it would be met in both areas. But I would like to say, first, that it is extremely unlikely that the Cubans or the Soviets could accomplish that task given the type of surveillance that we have over Cuba at the present time, over the international waters between Cuba and the other nations in Latin America, and at the ports in the other Latin American nations.

But in any event, if they did accomplish it I think it is
quite clearly contrary to the stated policy of this Government
and would require action by this Government.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary.

Senator Engle. Mr. Chairman, --

Chairman Russell. Senator Engle.

Senator Engle. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the
unanimous consent that given the opportunity to look over the
record I missed here during these hearings, that I be permitted
to submit questions in writing to the Secretary which I assure
you will not be repetitious, in case I discover any --

Chairman Russell. You will have that opportunity, Senator.

Senator Engle. I will do that over the weekend.

Chairman Russell. All right, sir.

Senator Engle. I would like to say this, Mr. Secretary,
I looked over this document which was submitted, which showed
the difference between the classified information and the unclas-
sified information.

Now, it was extensive, and we have difficult problems in
differentiating sometimes when we are speaking in the public
or on television or anything else, and it makes it very, very
difficult for us because they get confused and they get fuzzed
over and eventually you can't be sure whether you are talking
in a classified area or not and it seems to me that it would
be wise to devise some way to manage that situation a little.

I would rather have it all classified or at least a state-
ment made to the public which we get, Mrs. Smith read it as I did, the whole business that you sent around, or that we got from the Committee, and yet after you listen to the classified part of it, eventually, when somebody asks you a question on a television program or radio program or something like that we are all getting shot at every five minutes, it is very, very difficult for us to be sure we are not on classified grounds and I would hope there would be some way to manage that.

I don't know how you are going to do it. It may be necessary to release somewhat less than you do and keep the rest all classified so at least we know where we are, and I mentioned this business of corridors the other day. I can't remember where I heard that or saw it, but I wouldn't mention it in public, except to me it was so obvious from what you said that there couldn't be any other thing you were talking about, you see.

I would hope that some consideration would be given to that. In my opinion, we just give away too much. Sometimes I think that it would be better, Mr. Chairman, if we just gave it all away and then nobody would believe us rather than hedge the case.

But what I am suggesting is that perhaps in future briefings we have a clear delineation in the beginning in the statement itself as to what is classified, what has been taken out, and that has been left in in order that we are not put in this position -- I took the document, Mr. Chairman, that came in here
the other day and I looked it over very carefully, and there
are extensive pages of it where changes have been made, and
where classified information has been indicated.

Now, I don't want to give away classified information and
nobody else on this Committee does.

On the other hand, I am sure the Chairman faces more prob-
lems than I do because I am only a junior member of this Committee,
but so help me, you get on a television program and somebody
asks you something and you may divulge it and not know it.

So, it seems to me it would be helpful to us if the
delineation was clear and more precise so that we could be sure
and be on clear notice when we are stepping into the area of
classified information.

We had a little discussion here the other day, you may
recall, Senator Thurmond brought it up, about this business
of what we know about their anti-missile missiles, and we know
a good deal, and I could detect immediately the Secretary's
apprehension on this point, and that is that where you have a
narrow area in which information can come from, then if you re-
veal it you know it, it is perfectly obvious that they are
going to put a complete surveillance on it and eventually they
will find out what it is.

What I am saying is that this briefing has been magnificent,
but it would seem to me it would be helpful if when we get one
we know precisely what is in the classified area and what is
not, because when a book comes in here like this one, and we have had a book already delivered to us, and I take it home and spend half the night reading it, and I think I know what is in it that is unclassified and yet when I take the next book that comes along and lines have been changed, lines have been added, and matters have been stricken out, it gets a little tight for us.

Chairman Russell. Senator Engle, of course, they could bring it in here and have that which they released printed in black and that which is classified printed in red, but unless you are a great deal smarter than I am that won't help you much on the television programs because you will get confused about what is printed in red and what is in black, and you can't bring it in a television program and find it when you are asked the question.

That is one of the worst problems, I have never been able to solve. I solve it by if I have any doubt I don't say, that is the only rule of thumb I can think of.

Senator Engle. That is the way I do it, too. But it seems to me if we had a clear delineation, at least we would have some guidelines.

There are a couple of questions I would like to ask. The first is with reference to these Soviet people down there in Cuba. Can't we get harder intelligence on what they are there for?

This seems to me to be a matter of great importance.
people of the country are aggravated beyond belief that, as Senator Ervin has indicated, we get, I get a thousand letters a day and I suspect a third of them are on this one subject.

If we could know what they were really up to, it would help us a lot, it seems to me, in making an intelligent decision about what we wanted to do, and it puts us in between a rock and the hard place when people say we have to get them out, and it may not be in our interest to get them all out. That is what I am saying. I just don’t know.

Senator Thurmond. You won’t be able to tell the people that.

Senator Engle. Of course not, you can’t, unless you know exactly what you are talking about and we might not be able to reveal it. Sometimes we have to stand up and just take it. But is there any way to improve our intelligence on that score?

Secretary McNamara. Senator Engle, I doubt very much that in the near future we are going to learn much more than we now know about what the Soviet military personnel are there for.

Senator Engle. Can’t we tell by looking at who they are?

Secretary McNamara. We have looked at them in terms of the kind of equipment they have, the kinds of units they are formed in, whether they are in temporary or permanent housing, which gives some indication of their intention, and we, based on all this, have arrived at certain tentative conclusions as to
why they are there. But I think the strong opinion that is held
by most of us is that whatever they are there for makes very little
difference we ought to get them out and this is the President's
position I believe, and we think that it is to our advantage
to get them out and, therefore, the fact that we don't know
precisely why they are there isn't affecting our actions at the
present time.

I personally believe that you are correct in saying that
you believe at the present time the Soviets are manning the
anti-aircraft system in Cuba. I think that is true.

I also believe that the reason they are manning it is to
insure that irresponsible Cubans don't attack our surveillance
aircraft and thereby bring on some incident that presumably the
Soviets wish to avoid.

But I also believe that we can continue to maintain our
surveillance of that island without the Soviets there and that
this is the position we ought to take with the Soviets. So it
doesn't make any difference what their intention is they ought to
get out from our point of view and we ought to continue to put
pressure on the Soviet government to force them out. I am
certain this is the way the President looks at the problem.

Senator Engle. All right. I will take that.

Now, the last question and this reoccurs to what the Chair-
man brought up on the first day of this session, and it involves
the question of the force structure of the Defense establishment
of this nation. The best constitutional lawyer in the Senate is sitting right here today, Senator Ervin. If my reading of the Constitution is correct, and I would ask to be corrected by Senator Ervin if I am wrong.

Senator Ervin. Might I interrupt? I appreciate the compliment. I believe the Supreme Court has reversed about everything I knew about Constitutional law.

(Laughter)

Senator Engle. I still think you are the best constitutional lawyer in the Senate, and the Constitution says that the Congress has the power to raise armies and to implement the national defense. That is not the precise language. But let's assume that we disagree with the Executive Department with reference to the kind of force structure we ought to have in the Defense Department. That is, we say to you that we believe that manned bombers or manned aircraft are being faced out too rapidly, that we are placing too much reliance on missiles, and that we indicate a different policy for this nation with reference to the force structures that we expect to have in the military establishment of this country.

Who is going to prevail, that is what I want to know. Are you going to sit there and say to us, "We are not going to spend the money," even if we give it to you? Is that the way it is going to be?

Secretary McNamara. Well, sir, I am not a constitutional
lawyer myself and I really believe we have to rely in matters such as this on other than perhaps the law because I think that it is the tradition and the precedents of our Government which perhaps have the character of law in situations of this kind, but even more important than that, I think we must rely upon continued probing of each others views to try to understand them better and in hope they can be reconciled in that case.

I don't think that the Congress objectives are any different from those of the Executive Branch. We are both trying to develop the strongest possible foundation for our national security, and, therefore, I think that it is in exploration of the views of the other party, continued reexamination of one's own views, willingness to adjust the force structure as circumstances change that guarantees our safety and assurance that the force structure is adequate.

Senator Engle. You know that Congressman Vinson last year put in the bill the words "the Defense Department is mandated and required" to do certain things.

Now, he took it out finally, and I think advisedly, but the basic question still troubles me. I think maybe an accommodation can be arrived at, and this may be a problem that has to be decided by the President himself.

But do you have any views with reference to whether or not the ultimate power lies in the Congress to establish the force structure of the Armed Services or does it lie down in the
Executive Department, in the Pentagon or in the White House.

Secretary McNamara. I think the powers are symmetrical in the sense that the Congress can refuse to accept proposals as they have in many cases of the Executive Branch relating to the force structure and, in turn, the Executive Branch can be given within the limits of the authority, authorization of Congress, build a force structure that it believes suits the national objective or fits the national objective, and in that sense the powers of the two branches are symmetrical. But I really think that reliance on a legalistic approach to the problem is not the proper way to strengthen and maximize our national security.

I think the proper way to do it is in effect as you have done it here. You have spent four days with me, the House Appropriations Committee spent six days with me, and the House Armed Services Committee spent five days with me. Each of the three Committees will spend a long period of time with others in the Department, and through this extensive exchange of views, I hope we can come out with a near unanimous view as to what action is required. I think that on 99 per cent of the force structure that would be the case, and the remaining one percent, while it remains perhaps in controversy, is not by itself so serious a matter in either direction as to substantially affect our national security.
I personally believe that this is the proper way for the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch of our Government to operate one with the other.

Senator Engle. Well, I suppose that is the most practical answer you can give and probably the one that we ought to try to work with.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. That has been a question which has troubled us for a long time, just where the power lies. The Constitution is very clear in one point but in many administrations dealing with many different problems the Executive Branch has not seen fit to spend the money that the Congress has appropriated.

I don't think you can mandate the Executive Branch in an authorization bill. I don't know just what good it would do to put in their "Mandated and required" rather than just regular language in an authorization bill.

I think if we could get a two-thirds vote from the Appropriations bills, suspend the rules, put language in there to tie up the Department they would almost be compelled to do it but that is not a pleasant prospect and it certainly would be, I would only engage in it as a last resort.

Anything further?

Senator Ervin. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to express again my appreciation of the effort the Secretary has made to inform us of these matters that are of such vital concern to the
nation.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Ervin. And to say that I think one of the most refreshing, inspiring things that has been said in the United States lately was the President's statement that, in connection with the Cuban crisis that, if a missile was fired from Cuba on any American state that the United States would regard that as a missile fired from Moscow and retaliate accordingly.

I think that is such a contrast with the situation we had in Korea where we tried to pretend all the time we were really not at war with Red China.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you very much, sir.

Chairman Russell. I think it was a very fine presentation, Mr. Secretary, but I said that before and I don't want to be redundant.

I would advise the members of the Committee that General Taylor will be here Monday morning at 10:00 o'clock to brief the Committee and he will be followed by Dr. Brown.

Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much for this fine presentation and we will now stand in recess until ten o'clock Monday.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Committee stood in recess to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Monday, February 25, 1963.)
group headed by Dr. Alexander Flax, who was assisted by
Dr. Frye of M.I.T., Mr. Sucro of Purdue, and Mr. Klein of
the Aerospace Corporation.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Bates. What is this?

The Chairman. Mr. Hebert's questions.

Mr. Arends. Skybolt.

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Secretary, I just have a few
questions. I want to compliment you on your statement,
it is a good statement. It is very constructive and will be
of great help, to point out the highlights, on matters that
the Committee no doubt are deeply concerned about.

And before the hearing is over, we will have some perti-

Now this is not in your statement.

At lunch I was informed by a newspaper reporter
that some NIG-Cuban airplane had fired on some ship, or
fisherman, in the Florida Straits.

Of course, I made no comment, because I did not know
anything about it. Even if I had known about it, I may not
have made any comment.

But I would like for you, if you are in position
to do so, inform the committee what information you have.

Secretary Zuckert. General, you are familiar with

it.
I know of the incident but I think the General is more familiar with it than I am.

The Chairman. All right.

General, proceed.

General LeMay. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. General, talk just a little bit louder. I am a little hard of hearing, as age creeps along.

Mr. Bates. Creeps?

Mr. Arends. Creeps; yes.

General LeMay. About 5:35 p.m. yesterday 20 February, two Cuba-based MIG fighter aircraft executed rocket attacks against a United States privately owned and operated shrimp boat in the Florida Straits.
The incident occurred in international waters at 24 degrees on 5 minutes north latitude, 80 degrees 20 minutes west longitude, which was 60 nautical miles north of the Cuban mainland, and 78 nautical miles east southeast of Key West.

The shrimp boat was not hit and the crew of two sustained no injuries.

About 5:24 p.m., the radar station at Key West observed an unidentified target on their screen, proceeding at sixty degrees, at an altitude of 10,000 feet at 500 knots.

When the targets crossed the 24th parallel two airborne fighters were dispatched to investigate the unidentified targets from Key West and to make an intercept.

This is the normal reaction by the Air Defense System in the Southern Florida area.

Shortly after the dispatch of the Air Defense fighters, the Key West radar operator observed the targets to be turning southward.

The interceptor fighters reported visual contact with four MiGs on a southwest material heading and reported two MiGs firing rockets at a surface vessel.

At this time four additional F4Bs were dispatched to the scene of the incident. There was no engagement between the MiGs and the U.S. Interceptors.
As a result of reports from the interceptors telling of the rocket attack, the commander, Key West force, ordered a rescue effort. Three aircraft were dispatched to the area to maintain surveillance.

A radar picket ship on station approximately 20 miles away was ordered to the scene. And a destroyer escort was dispatched from Key West to return any survivors picked up by the picket ship.

By 8:45 p.m. Eastern Standard Time two men had been taken off the shrimp boat, which was identified as the ALA -- from Fort Myers, Florida, and the two crew men of the ALA, Paris Jackson and Benjamin Washington, are employed by the Seafood Packing Company of Fort Myers.

Both Jackson and Washington state that they had been drifting about three days because of engine failure when attacked.

The ALA with a partial hatch of six shrimp had been away from Fort Myers since February 10 and had sustained its engine failure the afternoon of the 17th.

When rescued, both men expressed a request for help in saving their shrimp catch. The Coast Guard has pumped the water from the ALA's bilge and have her anchored just to the north of where she was attacked. Two Coast Guardsmen are aboard as guards.

Initially in reporting the event at sea it was stated
Rivers.

Mr. Rivers. Other than your 104.

General LeMay. We have the 106 and the 102 that will take care of most of the airplanes that could get in against us.

Now it is true we have a special situation down in the southeast United States now.

Mr. Rivers. You certainly do.

General LeMay. Where there are some 60 MIGS across in Cuba that have a Mach 2 performance too.

Mr. Rivers. That is what I am coming to.

General LeMay. But the 104's will take care of those.

Mr. Rivers. It will not take care of them at altitude.

General LeMay. Yes, I think so.

Mr. Rivers. I don't think so, when they got them at Mach 2.

Now here is my point: Don't you think this is a critical area in our interceptor system?

General LeMay. We must have a new follow-on manned interceptor, yes, sir.

Mr. Rivers. Is there any program on foot looking into this problem?

General LeMay. We have proposed one, which was not accepted.

We are studying others now to present to the Secretary of Defense.
(Further remarks directed off the record.)

Mr. Stratton. General, could I switch to just one other subject briefly?

The Air Force selected obviously a good deal of the intelligence that has been used in the DIA's presentation with regard to the situation in Cuba.

I asked this question of the Navy, and I would like to ask it of you as well.

Is the Air Force intelligence branch in agreement with the presentation that the Secretary of Defense gave to this committee and to the nation over television a little bit later with regard to the situation in Cuba?

General LeMay. Generally, yes.

The Air Force has had an input into that presentation and the facts that were brought out there. And we agreed with them.

The only thing that I would say on that is that none of us are happy with the amount of intelligence that we are getting.

We always want more. And we would like to have more intelligence.

Mr. Stratton. I mean you, you are not -- the Air Force doesn't hold, for example, that there are X number of missiles in various spots that the Secretary is covering up or hasn't discovered or anything of that kind.

General LeMay. If there are any missiles there, we don't know about them.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Stratton --

Mr. Stratton. I remember we have had differences in the estimates in the past.

I just wondered whether there was any difference with regard to Cuba.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Stratton. I want to compliment you. You developed fine questions.

Secretary Zuckert. There is no difference in substance that I have been able to discover between the conclusions of our intelligence people and what the Secretary of Defense has said.

Mr. Stratton. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Mr. Pimkie.

Mr. Pimkie. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Just pursuing that question, General and Mr. Secretary. The intelligence that was available didn't disclose the arrival of those missiles, and it could be very well possible that the number is inaccurate.

Secretary Zuckert. That is true.

We counted 42 missiles, I believe, in Cuba, or something less than that -- counted 42 leaving.

It is entirely possible that there are a few missiles left around some place in there. But we haven't been able to find them.

And I think it is generally agreed by all of the intelligence people that there probably are none there.
But we can't say definitely. Only an on-site, very careful on-site inspection in Cuba would prove that.

Mr. Pirnie. That was the point that I was leading up to. Because it is an obvious trick that has been employed in all military operations to let the enemy see what you want it to see.

And therefore while nobody would quarrel with the deductions that might be made from the type of surveillance that was represented by these excellent photographs, it must be admitted that that only gives limited disclosure, isn't that correct?

Secretary Zuckert. That is correct.

And that is the reason I said we would all like to have more intelligence, because we can't definitely prove that there are no more missiles there.

I think the odds are very greatly in favor of there not being any there, but we can't definitely say there aren't.

All we can say is that we haven't been able to find any.

Mr. Pirnie. That is right.

And it would be true also in regard to mobile launchers, that it would be possible for capabilities to be concealed there, too?

Secretary Zuckert. It is possible, yes, sir.

Mr. Pirnie. General, I was very much interested in the line of questioning that has just been developed because I have been puzzled as we have been studying our weapons system, to determine
Secretary McNamara. I agree. But the fighter aircraft would not deliver the weapons with such accuracy as to preclude the probability that some would land off the air bases.

Senator Goldwater. Why do you feel that? Their accuracy is rather good.

Secretary McNamara. No, I think the history of all fighter bomber attacks has been that many explosives have been landed other than on the target.

Senator Goldwater. I agree with you in the past, but that was when we, during World War II, we didn't even have a unified sighting device for rockets. But we do today, and for instance, in the Cuban buildup, I was, I happened to be, on duty at that time and I was very impressed with the degree of accuracy that these men felt they had in the event they had to attack their targets, and I think it was reflected in the rather limited number of sorties that were planned on rather difficult targets. I don't buy the idea.

Secretary McNamara. In the case of Cuba we were planning a substantial number of sorties, and I think the Air Force would agree that it is extremely unlikely that, very unlikely that, 100 per cent of the weapons would be landed on the target, in this case the air fields. I think we must recognize the high probability that a substantial percentage of those weapons would not be landed on the target. In any event, even if they were landed on the target, the damage would be so large and the
approach, while economizing on manpower, still requires that airlift be available to move the men to where the materiel is prepositioned, but men are much easier to move by air than large units of equipment.

We believe an appropriate blend of all four methods would produce the best results, and that is what we have attempted to achieve in the proposed program. We already have large general purpose forces deployed abroad, particularly in Europe and Korea. We have prepositioned substantial amounts of equipment and supplies in Europe and in the Far East. We have initiated a limited program of forward floating bases. Finally, we are maintaining a large central reserve of General Purpose Forces in the continental United States, and are building the airlift required to move these forces promptly to wherever they might be needed.

A. AIRLIFT

Last year I outlined to the Committee the manner in which we computed our airlift requirements and the forces programmed to fulfill them. Problems encountered during the Cuban crisis, however, have led us to the conclusion that some increase in these forces is necessary. Our standby plans for the invasion of Cuba, for example, called for the simultaneous air drop of the assault elements of 2 airborne divisions, totaling in all about 10,000 men and their equipment. When the airlift force requirements were computed, however, we found that we did not have enough suitable aircraft in the active forces to carry out that operation.
together with the other missions requiring airlift aircraft. Therefore, we had to activate 24 squadrons of Air Force Reserve C-119's, and C-123's, totaling 439 aircraft and about 14,000 men.

I might say, by the way, the Air Force did an absolutely magnificent job in an activation. We issued the order at 10:00 o'clock one Saturday night, and within 30 hours those men and planes were available for combat operations ready to take-off if necessary on an airlift move.

The old C-119, while specifically designed for airborne operations, is small and slow and has but a fraction of the range of the new C-130. While it is useful to have in reserve, we cannot rely upon this aircraft for airlift to areas more distant than Cuba. We therefore propose to acquire an additional 6 squadrons of C-130E's which are not only good transport aircraft but are also efficient troop carriers. We plan to acquire the additional aircraft by increasing the production rate from 12 to 15 per month, thus raising the C-130 force to 34 squadrons by early 1965, instead of the 28 squadrons which we had previously programmed. This force will be continued at least through 1968, as shown on Table 13.

You might wish to turn here to page 197 and see the airlift forces outlined in Table 13. In Table 13 there is shown for each of the years of the five-year program period, '64 to '68, the planned force structure. We have also shown the actual force structure for '61, '62 and '63. These cover both the active forces...
of fire while others go down to land troops. We are utilizing the Air Force airplanes to give air cover and, in other words, have developed all the tactics and techniques we know of in order to improve the safety of our helicopters and our personnel engaged in other kinds of tests.

Senator Stennis. You don't lack modern equipment now. You have plenty of modern equipment to do the very things you have described, is that right?

General Taylor. I don't know of any kind of equipment that anyone has asked for or suggested as being useful that is not available in South Viet Nam.

Senator Stennis. And you give them as good as you have?

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

Secretary McNamara. I think, Senator, it is fair to say that we have said to our commanders in South Viet Nam that we are spending $52 billion a year, and they have first claim on the whole $52 billion, meaning all of our resources.

Senator Stennis. That is very good. Those assurances sound good. I won't labor that any further, but I believe it needs to be publicized some more.

Now one question here about the Navy, and this is my last question. I was very much impressed really in going down to Guantanamo Bay after the crisis was over. Mrs. Smith and I went down there, and I was very much pleased to see what had happened with reference to bringing this force, this
tremendous force, together so quickly at the President's command right after October 22d.

But I did get the idea that the Navy, particularly the conventional part of the Navy, that is what you used, was stretched out considerably just for that nearby mission only a few miles away.

The thought occurred to me suppose you had had something else happen somewhere else in the world far removed at about the same time. You said yesterday as I understood, maybe it was today, that you figured that for limited war requirements the Navy was capable in size and composition and so forth.

I would like for you to respond, to enlarge on that statement and respond to the impression I got about the Navy being pretty much absorbed.

Secretary McNamara. Well, sir, I don't believe that it was.

Senator Stennis. I don't mean the carriers were all taken up, but more conventional ships.

Secretary McNamara. We did not redeploy any substantial number of naval craft, either surface or air for that operation. We utilized the naval craft assigned to this particular area.

We did not deplete the naval forces elsewhere in the world therefore during that period. I think that many of the crews were on an extended duty. We did as a matter of fact as I remember extend the tours of enlistment of certain naval
personnel to assist us during that period. But I don't believe that it demonstrated shortages of naval forces.

Senator Stennis. What about your landing teams and units of that kind? Did you have them to spare, in addition to what you called in?

Secretary McNamara. I think we had ample forces, and that the readiness measures of the last two years demonstrated their effect by the rapidity with which --

Senator Stennis. I know you had plenty there, Mr. Secretary, as I said in my original statement, but how much did you have should you had been called on far away?

Secretary McNamara. We did not redeploy forces from other theaters into this theater. Perhaps General Taylor would like to comment though on the adequacy of the forces as he appraised them during that period.

General Taylor. This was a very valuable exercise for all the Services engaged, because we checked out many factors that we had only computed more or less in theory.

I would say the naval forces were thoroughly adequate, although certainly in some sectors they became thin.

For example, in amphibiious craft we committed just about all we could lay our hands on in the Atlantic. LST's were short, as a matter of fact we are going to bring out about 11 additional LST's into the regular Navy, in order to have them available.
So we developed shortages in narrow segments, but in the whole I would say the naval forces are thoroughly adequate.

Senator Stennis. Well those you named though are very vital and very necessary. You did not have enough to have taken care of that operation should it develop?

General Taylor. It would have been hard to duplicate an amphibious landing at the same time. That I would concede. But we did this without reducing the strength in the Pacific or our general war readiness. I thought it was quite a good demonstration of adequacy.

Senator Stennis. You did not have any casualties or replacements to deal with or anything like that either, fortunately.

Secretary McNamara. In all of our Services, Senator, as you know well, if we go for prolonged periods of time we will have to have some kind of mobilization at home.

Senator Stennis. You feel satisfied, then, Mr. Secretary, about the situation.

Secretary McNamara. I felt very pleased with the degree of readiness that was exhibited in October of last year compared to the degree of readiness that we saw a year before.

I think there was a tremendous improvement and one that was amply demonstrated. I think there were some serious shortages that were exhibited as well.

These we knew about, particularly the airlift, because in
order to have a combat capability, we actually had to call up from the Reserves before entering into combat 400 aircraft and 14,000 men.

Now fortunately the Air Reserves had been so organized and maintained at such a high state of readiness that we were able to do this, but it was also fortunate that the requirement was for a short transport, because the aircraft that those Reserves were equipped with did not have a capability to move any substantial distance.

Senator Stennis. So if it had been 3,000 miles, you would have been out of business?

Secretary McNamara. We would have been in very serious difficulty in airlift, and I think that was our most important shortage. I think it is probably the most important shortage today, the one we are seeking to correct by the airlift procurement program put before you.

Senator Stennis. Is there any other you want to mention there before we leave that subject?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir, I don't believe so. I mentioned other shortages.

Senator Stennis. Yes. All right.

Secretary McNamara. That we are aware of that were not particularly demonstrated.

Senator Stennis. We will pass on. Others are waiting.

Mrs. Smith, you are next.
IN TERMS OF WORLD TONNAGE, THE SOVIET PROGRAM OF OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IS SECOND TO NONE, AND HAS, IN FACT, PROVIDED AN IMPETUS TO OUR OWN RECENTLY EXPANDED EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD.

THE SOVIETS HAVE FURNISHED SUBSTANTIAL NAVAL FORCES TO INDONESIA AND TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. THE COMMUNISTS ARE ALERT TO THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF VITAL SHIPPING PASSAGES BETWEEN THE OCEANS. CUBA FLANKS THE ATLANTIC APPROACHES TO THE PANAMA CANAL. HOWEVER, AT PRESENT, THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT CONTROL THE IMPORTANT NARROW WATERS OF THE WORLD SUCH AS THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR, SINGAPORE, SUEZ AND OTHERS. WE MUST NOT LET THEM DO SO.

WITHOUT POTENTIAL ENEMIES MOVING FORWARD TO EXPAND THEIR SYSTEM ON THE WORLD MARITIME FRONT, THE MEANS TO USE AND CONTROL THE SEAS ARE GOING TO BE MORE IMPORTANT TO AMERICANS IN THE 1970S THAN EVER BEFORE. CUBA FURNISHED A PREVIEW OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD THIS COUNTRY NOT HAD THE GRADUATED, FULLY Responsive NAVAL STRENGTH TO APPLY TO THIS SITUATION.

THE KEY TO SEAPower IN THE NUCLEAR AGE LIES IN THE ABILITY OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TO EXERT MILITARY FORCE ON A GRADUATED, CONTROLLED SELECTIVE SCALE WHEREVER AND WHENEVER IT MAY BE REQUIRED. WE IN THE NAVY ARE FOND OF USING THE WORDS MOBILITY, FLEXIBILITY AND VERSATILITY TO DESCRIBE OUR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ATTRIBUTES, BUT IF WE ARE GUILTY OF OVER- USING THESE WORDS, IT IS BECAUSE NO OTHERS HAVE YET BEEN FOUND ADEQUATELY TO CHARACTERIZE THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION WHICH NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FORCES MAKE TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE. WITH SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND MARINE UNITS AS BASIC "BUILDING BLOCKS", WE CAN PUT
OF HUNDREDS OF MILES FROM THEIR MOVING AND UNPREDICTABLE LAUNCH POINTS.

IT MAY BE SAID WITH ASSURANCE THAT BECAUSE OF THIS MOBILITY CHARACTERISTIC,
NAVAL FORCES AT SEA ARE MOST LIKELY TO PROVIDE THE MAJOR RESIDUAL STRIKE
CAPABILITY WHICH WILL BOTH HELP TO DETER AN ENEMY ATTACK AND INSURE AN
EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-ON STRIKE CAPACITY SURVIVING THE IMPACT OF AN INITIAL
NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

TO PROTECT OUR SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TO INSURE CONTROL OF
VITAL SEA AREAS, THE NAVY MUST BE ABLE TO CONTAIN AND DEFEAT THE SUB-
MARINE THREAT. THIS CALLS FOR VIGOROUS EFFORTS ACROSS THE WHOLE SPECTRUM
OF NAVAL ACTIVITY. CONTRARY TO POPULAR CONCEPTION, ANTI-SUBMARINE WAR-
FARE CANNOT BE BROKEN OUT OR ISOLATED SO THAT IT CAN BE IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY
FROM OTHER NAVAL OPERATIONS. IT IS AN ORGANIC, INTEGRAL PART OF VIRT-
UALLY ALL OPERATIONS. IT IS AN ELEMENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE THAT GOES ON
AT SEA. THE ANTI-SUBMARINE BATTLE WILL BE WON BY UNREMITTING EFFORT IN
ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF NAVAL OPERATIONS - FORCES, WEAPONS, TRAINING,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. WE ARE GIVING THIS PROBLEM TOP PRIORITY IN
OUR PROGRAMS.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ARE AND ALWAYS HAVE BEEN
PRE-EMINENT IN THE WORLD IN THE FIELD OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE. THE NAVY'S
ABILITY TO TRANSPORT, LAND AND SUPPORT MARINE ASSAULT TROOPS ON ENEMY HELD
COASTS HAS PROVED ITS VALUE TO OUR NATION TIME AND AGAIN. THE UNITED STATES
NEEDS THE ASSURANCE THAT FAST, COMBAT-READY AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ARE AT HAND
TO COPE WITH ANY FORESEEABLE SITUATION, FROM A LEBANON TO A CUBA.

THE FUTURE HOLDS LITTLE PROSPECT OF ANY REDUCTION IN OUR WORLD-WIDE
NAVAL COMMITMENTS. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT THESE COMMITMENTS WILL INCREASE AS THE SOVIET BLOC TURNS ITS
The Navy has taken positive steps to implement this restriction in our shipwork program. We now fully expect to comply with this requirement, and have firm plans to allocate 35% of the funds made available in FY 1963 for repair, alteration, and conversion of naval ships to private shipyards. Execution of this provision has by no means been easy. It has been responsible for a reduction of approximately 3,800 in naval shipyard employment during FY 1963, and the transfer of several destroyer conversions from the West to the East Coast to maintain balanced naval shipyard work forces. Naval operations during the Cuban crisis resulted in numerous changes to planned shipwork schedules. It is quite probable that had the Cuban crisis continued for a longer period, invocation of the permissive provisions of the law in exception to the 35% requirement would have been required.

In addition to these problems and the extra administrative burden of segregating and controlling the private yard portion of shipwork, the effect of this work assignment has been felt by the Fleet. The Navy has consistently held that military requirements should be the prime determinant in allocating this work. While our experience in FY 1963 resulting from the assignment of a larger number of Active Fleet ships to private yards has not degraded Fleet readiness to a measurable degree, we must be very careful that our future actions insure that we continue to maintain the best possible posture of Fleet readiness. It should be noted that we have only had a little over six months experience with this requirement and it is still too early to evaluate its full effect.

Allocation of Highly Technical and Complicated Work

To date it has been the practice to assign auxiliary and smaller type ships to private shipyards for conversion, alteration and repair. From an industrial point of view alone, this has been feasible and the private shipyards have generally performed up to expectations. However, there is no assurance that the private shipyards can satisfactorily accomplish overhaul.
The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Rivers. Now they have gone so far as to not support our buildup of two more attack submarines?

The Chairman. We are not talking about that.

Secretary Korth. No, sir. We have definitely put ourselves on record with the committee I think and with the Chairman also.

The Chairman. Keep your questions on the Polaris.

Now the next one --

Mr. Stratton. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in connection with that?

My recollection was that Admiral Burke said only that he recommended 45 submarines in order that thirty might be on station at all times. And it was his estimate that 45 total were needed in order to get thirty operational.

Could you give us an idea, Admiral, what your estimate would be if you have 41 boats how many are going to be available on station at all times?

Admiral Anderson. We can count on approximately two-thirds of these boats being on station at all times.

We also have the option of increasing the number of boats on station, if, for example, we feel that there is a particular period of tension, such as we did during the Cuban operation.

I would say -- off the record --
There are 32 ballistic missiles more than what we have.

The theory of this war -- or battle -- if it comes, would be the idea of mass destruction on the enemy.

This submarine would not give that mass destruction on the enemy. I mean, it seems to me I detect a change, deep change, to a political, let's say, instead of military philosophy.

Admiral Anderson. I do not feel it does constitute a change. I think that the addition of 32 additional Polaris missiles, for example, or more, would not make a quantum difference in the knowledge of the Russians that if they start a thermonuclear war their destruction is inevitable. It is.

However, I think that we are moving into an era where it is far more likely than ever before -- and we could have seen a case arising right out of the Cuban situation, where we might indeed have been engaged in warfare with the Russians direct without a thermonuclear exchange.

Mr. Bray. Is that why we are cutting down and going out of the long distance bomber business?

Admiral Anderson. No, sir.

I don't believe that that is related to this particular matter.

Mr. Bray. It seems to me it is. I will not
The paper that I file goes in minute detail to all the conversion and the construction.

It gives the yard, every Navy yard that is participating in this building program on the program and construction.

Put all that in the record.

Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Then next one is the tank landing ship. You requested one and the department approved it. The cost of it is 29 million.

Give the committee the information about that ship.

Admiral Griffin. This is the first of a new class of LSTs designed for a sustained speed of 20 knots. It will be able to lift 400 troops, with a full load capacity of 2100 tons and a normal beaching load of 500 tons. The 22 previously authorized post-world war II LSTs vary in speed from 14.5 to 17 knots.

Mr. Rivers. Aren't you deficient in this area?

Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir, we are.

Mr. Rivers. Didn't the Cuban crisis point up this deficiency?

Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir. As a consequence of the Cuban crisis we were forced to, as Admiral Anderson I think testified yesterday, forced to bring some -- to hire some ships -- that were in commercial use -- and
have them stand by for the purpose of transporting heavy equipment to Cuba in case we had to go in, sir.

Mr. Rivers. What priority would you attach to this deficiency, Admiral Anderson?

You attached a priority to the two submarines?

Admiral Anderson. We are very anxious, Mr. Rivers, to build up both our antisubmarine warfare capability and our amphibious capability.

We necessarily have to place our antisubmarine warfare capability at the higher priority.

But we feel that the amphibious force, the modernization of the amphibious force, is most important, not just for the Navy and the Marine Corps but also for the Army as well.
no draft. I don't understand it. You know what I mean.

Secretary Korth. No propeller. It is merely an ejection.

Admiral James. This is a standard gas turbine. It is a developmental application for Marine use with propellers and it is a displacement type craft.

Mr. Bray. This is not what you are working on --

Admiral James. This is not the hydrofoil type of craft.

Mr. Bray. That is what I was thinking of.

Admiral James. I thought you were.

The hydrofoil is in our program in previous years and the first of these will fly for the Navy -- hopefully -- on the 16th of March and will come into service this year.

Mr. Bray. It uses the jet principle and has slight draft.

Admiral James. It has zero draft. It flies above the surface of the water with only the foil submerged where instead of jets we are using gear drive mechanism.

Secretary Korth. Looks like it is standing on stilts, in other words.

The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson. I know this has conventional armament. How does this compare with the Russian Comar gun boats such as the Russians have put into Cuba.

Mr. Rivers. For defensive purposes only.

Admiral Griffin. It is better than the Comar for defensive purposes only, sir.
Of course, Comar has two surface -- relatively short range -- surface-to-surface missiles.

Mr. Wilson. We don't see any really offensive capability for this type of boat, then?

Admiral Griffin. We have a three inch gun on this.

Mr. Wilson. We have a three inch gun and the Russians have missiles.

Can't we upgrade the armament on our gun boat to be at least superior to the Russians, or do we have to keep building three inch pop guns?

Admiral Griffin. We don't feel we need that particular application at this time. We have other means.

Secretary Korth. It isn't designed to carry the Comar.

Mr. Wilson. I know.

Admiral Griffin. We have other means of doing this.

Mr. Wilson. The Comar is designed for the same purpose. I am wondering.

Admiral Griffin. Not the same purpose, no, sir.

They don't have control of the seas, for example, over here, which was a very significant characteristic in connection with the Russian endeavor.

Mr. Wilson. Do you think the Comar is a defensive gun boat or offensive gun boat?

Admiral Griffin. I think it is offensive.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. Chamberlain. What is the range that I read on that chart?

Admiral Griffin. 1700 miles.

Mr. Chamberlain. What is the range --

Admiral Griffin. That is at 16 knots.

Mr. Chamberlain. Capability of 1700 miles.

Admiral Griffin. At 16 knots.

Mr. Chamberlain. What is the range of the Comar that we have been told of?

Admiral James. I would speculate it is under 500 miles, without having full knowledge.

Mr. Chamberlain. Is there anyone here that knows?

Admiral Anderson. 655 at 20 knots.

Let me put the Comar in proper context.

I think that the Russians put the Comar boats into Cuba, and the Russians have put Comar boats into Indonesia, and will probably put them in other areas, to be able to use them against any of our ships, particularly our amphibious ships, which might come into the area.

So in that respect, I would say their idea of putting them in is defensive.

But actually we know that they would be used against our ships, and they could be used, recognizing the range to lob missiles against shore installations or anything else.
unclassified advance copy of the Secretary's advance statement on Latin America, B-1, Latin American and I shall ask two of the 11 questions, Mr. Secretary.

There are those who contend that the lesson of Cuba was that we won that showdown because of our superior conventional forces. Yet there are those who contend the lesson of Cuba was that we won that showdown because it turned on being a nuclear confrontation, and we had the nuclear superiority, and sensing that, Khrushchev backed down.

Was there a nuclear confrontation? Did the crisis turn on our nuclear superiority or on our conventional superiority?
SECRET

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ROBERT S. MC NAMARA,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF -- resumed

Secretary McNamara. Senator Smith, Khruschev did back
down but he backed down in my opinion because we had both,
because we had both a nuclear superiority and a conventional
superiority in that particular instance.

Senator Smith. Had Khrushchev had superior conventional
forces in Cuba what would have been the outcome of an eyeball
to eyeball showdown?

Secretary McNamara. It is difficult for me to speculate on
an iffy situation such as that, but I believe that our position
would have been substantially weaker had we been limited to
nuclear superiority and faced Soviet superiority in Cuba.

Of course, it is very difficult to conceive of how they
could have had conventional superiority in that situation but
assuming for the minute they did, I am confident that our total
power position would have been much, much weaker.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I will have here the balance
of my questions on that subdivision for the Secretary to
take and I will go on to my second group of questions on the
introduction, B-7, NATO, and I will ask from that group two of
the 13 questions.

If there is an assault by the Soviet bloc against western
Europe, and if our conventional forces fail under that assault,
Senator Young. Then you do not believe an all-out war is inevitable, and, of course, you are not at all in favor of pre-emptive war by us.

Secretary McNamara. I do not favor pre-emptive war. I believe we can reduce the risks of all-out war by, one, maintaining and strengthening our national military forces, and two, by appropriate actions over the period of time to protect against the further proliferation and indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons.

Senator Young. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Mr. Secretary, as a practical matter you and General Taylor are talking about the use of atomic weapons; I was of the opinion that there is some provision of the law that no one could use any of those without direct order from the President of the United States, is that correct?

Secretary McNamara. That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman.

I assume our answers --

Chairman Russell. That is what you would advise the President?

Secretary McNamara. Exactly so, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Yes. Just one other thing in connection with that, you were discussing Cuba. I have been called a warmonger and all because I advocate a much firmer policy than we actually employed. You didn't mention the question of geography. Don't you think that plays quite a larger part in
Mr. Khrushchev's agreement to remove the missiles, the fact that they were so far away from him and the Russians traditionally and historically have not liked to fight wars that were far away from where they had their land masses.

Secretary McNamara. It was geography, Mr. Chairman, which gave us such a clear favorable margin of conventional power, and this played a major role in his decision, I am certain.

Chairman Russell. I would certainly have taken a different position on missiles that had been stationed 50 miles from Berlin than I would have from those that were being erected in Cuba itself.

Senator Saltonstall, Senator Stennis agreed to yield.

Senator Saltonstall. I thank Senator Stennis.

Mr. Secretary, this is just one question that I would like to ask. I will ask it at this time. This is really a question that you -- I talked over with you when you were good enough to come to my office, but I would like to get it on the record because I think it is awfully difficult, an awfully difficult problem.

Several times over the years there have been deep differences of opinion on procurement problems. I have in mind since I have been on this Committee the B-36, the number of Marines, and I think one other question.

Now, I have felt that where it is difficult for a Senator like myself, not an expert, to know which is right, that it is
Senator Stennis. I know we don’t have the percentage. But now I don’t want to take up too much time. You have a fine knowledge of all this Cuban complex and everything, the complex questions about it. My argument about it is mainly one of priority and preference and emphasis, but you haven’t testified mainly on that, have you?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir, I have not.

Senator Stennis. I should think we ought to pass questions on that then until you have given your statement about it.

Chairman Russell. Permit me to say that the Secretary offered to go into that first and that I first thought that would be the better procedure. Later I decided it would be better to conclude the hearing and then proceed to that.

Senator Stennis. I think you are right. That is correct.

There is one thing on this Skybolt now. I just had this idea of my own when newspaper reporters told me in the lobby of a hotel in Memphis that the Skybolt program had been changed and more or less abandoned, I just couldn’t believe it at first, and then my next thought was well, it must be a diplomatic reason or something in view of all the proof that we had about it in the years before.

May I ask you that question, if it is proper. To what extent was this a diplomatic decision?

Secretary McNamara. Absolutely not at all, Senator Stennis. The manner of handling it was effected by the agreement
about the British.

Senator Stennis. No.

Chairman Russell. I yesterday expressed to you my concern about the relationship between the Cuban withdrawals and the test ban negotiations, and everything that happens increases my suspicion that there is some connection between them.

Yesterday we got the notice that Khrushchev was going to take these soldiers out of Cuba. This morning I hear on the radio that our negotiators are approaching the two or three on-side inspections for the test ban agreement.

Now, I don't know whether Congress will have anything to say on that or not, but speaking as one member of the Senate if we come in here with some test ban that represents a long series of complete surrenders and submissions to the demands of the Russians on this test ban business I for one am going to oppose it as vigorously as we can. It seems to me we are walking right in that direction now.

I raised that question yesterday. In view of what is intervening in between I thought I ought to make that statement here today. I may be the only one, but to me it has been one step has followed the other, Cuba here, we retreat on test ban there. It may be just a series of coincidences, but I would be opposed to this present test ban that we are about to accept, if there wasn't any Cuba, because I don't think we afford adequate protection. I am sure, I am not challenging your good
faith, please understand, Mr. Secretary, when you said there was no connection between them, but it has happened on three or four occasions that when the Russians have grudgingly lived up to their promises of last November then we have given something on the test ban.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, may I speak to that?

Chairman Russell. Yes, I wish you would.

Secretary McNamara. This is a subject that undoubtedly Secretary Rusk can speak to more authoritatively than I. But I have been a party to, I believe, all of the discussions on the question of the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba as well as the test ban negotiations.

I have seen the documents, the cables and letters that have passed between our two governments. I participated in the discussions that led to the final decisions relating to our Government's position, and at no time has there been any link whatsoever between our actions with respect to Cuba or the Soviet's withdrawal of missiles and now personnel from Cuba and any other action by that government of this Government, and specifically no link between those actions and the test ban negotiations.

As a matter of fact, to be quite frank about it, our Government's position on the test ban was determined before we received the Soviet information the day before yesterday, and without any regard to it, and it has not yet been communicated
I want to read one of the letters and one of the telegrams that is typical, and get your comment on it, please.

This letter is from Shreveport, Louisiana. The man gives his address and street number:

"I have just heard that the United States Engineers in Georgia had leased some 2,500 square miles of south Georgia land to train United Nations troops on. I also heard that 3,500 United Nations troops would arrive there on March 4 to train through March 27, and that in June some 17,000 Congolese troops of the United Nations would be coming in for an indefinite stay and training.

"I want to know if this is true, since my mother lives in south Georgia. I would also like to know where such land was rented and if we are actually going to let the Congolese troops train there and what you intend to do about it. Please let me have your answer by return mail as I am very much concerned about this piece of news that has evidently been kept well guarded.

"P.S. If such news is true, what can we do about it?"

Here is a telegram from a gentleman in Houston, Texas:

"Understand U Thant of United Nations is establishing a command post in Georgia bringing United Nations Congolese troops from Africa to protect the United States from Cuban attack. Movement known as Operation Water Moccasin. Is this information true? If so by what right and whose authority
to the Soviets.

Moreover, the information that was received the day before yesterday, was in accordance with Khrushchev's statement to the President made last November.

Chairman Russell. I understand that. But he still hasn't done what he said he would last November and he didn't do it yesterday.

Secretary McNamara. No, sir, I didn't mean to imply that all the troops will be pulled out or he said that all the troops will be pulled out in his statement of yesterday, but I do wish to state insofar as I have knowledge of the situation, and I believe I have complete knowledge of it, there has been no linkage between test ban negotiations and Cuba negotiations.

Chairman Russell. I accept that, but evidently our negotiators have gotten tired and frustrated because we have conceded and conceded. I am a simple-minded person myself. To me if Russia is in good faith about suspending atomic tests there is no reason why they shouldn't allow teams to come into Russia. Russia is just overrun with tourists and there is nothing new. It wouldn't generate any particular ideas in the mind of Russians to see strange people walking around because tourists are on every corner in Russia, and if they are in good faith on this test ban, I can't escape, to me, the conclusion that they would be willing to permit some inspection other than this black box business. I am all in favor of progress in technology and all
the whole world, and I am sure they must laugh at us, saying "Well, all we have to do is sit there", the Soviets, they just sit there, and if they wait long enough we will keep giving in, giving in, giving in.

This is not my idea of a good Yankee trader who is in there to drive a hard bargain. I think we hurt our position and seriously impair it, not only as it affects nuclear test bans but it affects our whole diplomatic arm, whether we are talking about being tough in Cuba or about doing something elsewhere.

They get the impression that they can push us around, and that if they just wait long enough, they will get what they want. I must say that we are naive.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator will yield for one question.

Mr. Secretary, you disturbed me very much just now in answer to a question by Senator Jackson. We were discussing looking forward ten years.

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. And as I visualize the attitude of the Chinese as we know it, is it not very dangerous for us to agree with any tests with the Soviets now and what they may do after we agree with them as to what they may give to the Chinese and let them go forward?

Secretary McNamara. Right.
as far as you know now that there is no submarine bases at all in Cuba, nor under construction?

Now let's get a positive answer.

Admiral Anderson. I can advise the committee that to the best of my knowledge there have been no Russian submarines in Cuba.

I could also say that there are harbors, there are facilities in Cuba, which could be used for servicing submarines.

The Chairman. That is what you said yesterday.

Now the question is: Are there any bases being established there now?

Admiral Anderson. We have seen nothing which can be identified specifically as a submarine base in Cuba.

The Chairman. Is there any evidence that anything unusual is taking place in any of these bases where it would be possible to establish a submarine base?

Any unusual activity which might cause you to be concerned that it is going beyond the mere normal harbor development?

Admiral Anderson. Nothing to the point where at this stage of the game, Mr. Chairman, we could say that this is being developed as a submarine base, no, sir.

The Chairman. Well, is there any unusual development taking place?

Is there any unusual activity taking place, out of the ordinary upkeep of a harbor?
Admiral Anderson. There is nothing which would lead me to believe that specifically there is a submarine base development.

The Chairman. Well, then, I am warranted in stating to the Floor, if anyone asks me the question, that Admiral Anderson said that as far as the information he has and the Navy Department has, that there are no activities in any of these available harbors that is being utilized for the purpose of building submarine bases.

Admiral Anderson. To the best of our knowledge at this time.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Rivers. Could I ask this?

Are you doing any reconnaissance yourself, or is the present reconnaissance being conducted by another agency of the Government?

Admiral Anderson. Off the record.

Mr. Smart. Off the record.

"Admiral Anderson. Off the record.

(Further statement off the record.)

(Further discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Now members of the committee, this includes the posture briefing by the Secretary, the Admiral and the General.

I want to thank you on behalf of the committee.
Admiral Anderson. Eight.

Mr. Bates. They just cut you two.

Admiral Anderson. That is right.

Secretary Korth. What?

Mr. Bates. They just cut you two?

Secretary Korth. That is right.

Admiral Anderson. I would also like to see if the funds were available for a nuclear propelled frigate with perhaps a terrier missile.

I would like to see some of our LST's, fast LSTs.

We have need for improved amphibious lift.

During the course of the Cuban operation we saw that we had need for lift, not only for the Marines but also for the Army.

I would like also to continue in the field of modernizing our fleet replenishment ships, AOR. I would include two of those ships. Because this means the difference of a ship that has to be re-supplied. It comes to one ship to get its resupply rather than to two or three.

I would increase by maybe a couple of more destroyer escorts.

Then I would accelerate some of the ships which are in next year's program or the program in the following year for auxiliary purposes.

Mr. Bates. Now what would that total up?
our people meet and we endeavor to reconcile them.

Mr. Stratton. Now, may I ask another question that would extend from that, Admiral.

How is the defense intelligence agency functioning in your judgment?

My impression is that this agency which started out to coordinate the evaluation and dissemination of intelligence collected by the separate services is now gradually moving into the collection as well as the evaluation of intelligence.

I would like a frank estimate as to whether the Navy and the Navy's intelligence services felt that the coordinate job that DIA is doing is an effective one?

Secretary Korth. Well, I can say without any hesitation that I believe that the Defense Intelligence Agency under General Carroll has done an exceptionally fine job.

They have put themselves together quickly. During the recent Cuban crisis they relied heavily upon the Navy for certain elements of intelligence, which we made as an input to the total effort.

We thought that that worked very well.

Now, I would be frank to say, however, that as we transfer more activities to the Defense Intelligence Agency from the services, we feel at times somewhat
Mr. Stratton. One further question, Admiral.

I noticed Admiral Read in the room today, and I recall our naval reserve group going down with him a couple of years ago and having a brief part of this Unitas operation that he was conducting down there so ably.

I am just wondering whether as a result of the political upheavals that have been taking place since 1960 in Latin America, the capability of the Latin American Navies to operate with our own and provide anti-submarine defense and so on has improved or has declined.

Admiral Anderson. It has improved.

And I think that the operation of UNITAS last fall in connection with the outbreak of the Cuban trouble was a good example of the effectiveness of our UNITAS operation.

The task force was in Peru at the time, and when they came on up to operate in the Caribbean the fact that they had been operating with the Latin American Navies I think contributed greatly to the response that the Latin American countries made first to the resolution in the organization of American States politically, and second, from the offers that were made of naval forces and air forces to assist us in the quarantine.

Mr. Gavin. Mr. Chairman --

Mr. Stratton. May I ask one further question in that
Mr. Gavin. And bring in the tankers, from the pipeline.

Mr. Rivers. Anything.

Now I want to ask you something that I am sure must concern General Shoup.

Is your sealift -- now I have had it brought to me that we have the airlift on the track.

And in the Cuban crisis I think you had to charter some sealift commitments.

Did it cause you any concern about our sealift, as to the present capabilities, or did the Cuban situation bring out any deficiencies in this area.

Secretary Korth. I think Admiral Anderson perhaps can answer that -- unless you experienced difficulty yourself.

Mr. Rivers. I would like for something to tell me something about it.

Admiral Anderson. I would like to say this.

We had several problems.

The first thing was getting enough amphibious lift for all of the amphibious forces in the right spot at the right time.

To do this, we used amphibious forces from the Pacific to come around to join up with the Amphibious forces from the Atlantic. This was in our plan. This was carried out.
The second problem was getting enough lift for the follow-up forces. We had a plan that was developed which involved first the utilization of MSTS ships, and second, the chartering of ships.

This was an increasing problem because as we planned, we found that we needed more forces, Army forces, and follow-up Marine forces, so we had to arrange for more lift.

This is commercial type lift, or administrative lift.

The third problem we had was getting enough over the beach lift to provide for the Army tanks to go in, and heavy vehicles.

As you know, the airborne forces, while they have a capability of going in, they want to have their heavy equipment get in as quickly as they can thereafter.

They can't lift that in airplanes. They have to get it in in amphibious type shipping.

So we are taking out of moth balls some of our old LST's, in anticipation of a future requirement for this type of lift. And I think -- I hope that we will be able to meet the Army's requirement.

Mr. Rivers. Yes.

Admiral Anderson. Now the problem that we ran into was not one of being able to line up ships, but rather the cost of retaining ships for an indefinite period.

So we watched this very carefully. We kept it
under control. And I am satisfied that we would have met the commitments we had to meet.

Mr. Rivers. Well, now, why don't you have in being or in your future program -- while these are not combatant ships or craft, we should have in being as a part of the fleet available craft of this character.

Now whether it is the responsibility of the MSTS or Admiral Dennison or whomever it may be, there is a deficiency there.

And you ought to be mindful of it.

It is not only the Marines, but you have the responsibility for the Army.

Admiral Anderson. That is what I am thinking of.

Mr. Rivers. The Cuban situation has given you a breathing spell now.

And you ought to take this into consideration.

Admiral Anderson. We are bringing --

Mr. Rivers. I heard all kinds of stories about it.

Admiral Anderson. We are bringing out of moth balls eleven LSTs, and we will have them in a condition where they can be used for this purpose if they are required. We will have minimum crews.

Mr. Rivers. Are these moth ball ships adequate for modern day striking?

Admiral Anderson. For lift of the Army tanks, they
Now members of the committee --

Mr. Hebert. May I ask one question?

The Chairman. Mr. Hebert.

Mr. Hebert. Admiral Anderson, I just want to ask one question in connection with the announcement made on the news this morning on a television show.

It was announced that four Russian technicians had arrived in Cuba to assist in the building of the so-called fishing harbor.

Now is there any possibility that these Russians could install a submarine base there without our knowledge, in view of our reconnaissance?

Admiral Anderson. I did not see that particular announcement this morning.

But I would say that with the reconnaissance that we have, we are keeping very close track of all developments in Cuba. And if there was any construction of a base there, it would come to our attention very quickly.

Mr. Hebert. That is the reason I asked that.

Because I don't want to wake up one morning and find out they installed missile bases again like they did overnight.

We would know now what they are doing?

Admiral Anderson. I have every confidence that we would, sir.

The Chairman. Are you in position to advise the committee
authority.

Senator Symington. I understand.

Secretary McNamara. I did not wish to dwell on this page other than to indicate that it is here, and particularly to call your attention to footnote b. Perhaps I should read it without discussing it at the moment, but I know this Committee is particularly interested in the subject:

"In addition to this budgeted expenditure" -- meaning in addition to the expenditure of $52.4 billion -- "the government's 'unfunded' cost of military retirement for 'current' Service, i.e. Service performed in FY '64, is approximately $600 million on the basis of existing pay rates and $830 million on the basis of proposed pay rates. The total 'unfunded past Service cost' of the military retirement program would amount to approximately $49.9 billion at July 1, 1963 on the basis of existing pay rates and $55.2 billion on the basis of the proposed rates."

I mention this at this time only because the Committee has inquired in the past relating to this subject.

Chairman Russell. It is not directly pertinent to this hearing, Mr. Secretary, but were any additional expenses incurred in the mobilization when the Cuban crisis was on or was that absorbed in your current budget?

Secretary McNamara. Incremental costs approximating $200 million, Mr. Chairman, were incurred, we believe, during the Cuban crisis. We are endeavoring to absorb that in our approved budget.
Whether we will be able to do so or not I cannot say at the moment.

Chairman Russell. If you do not, you will have to ask for a supplemental?

Secretary McNamara. That is correct, sir.

If I may go back to --

Senator Thurmond. What was the amount?

Secretary McNamara. About $200 million.

If I may go back to page four, gentlemen, and refer to the second paragraph on page four, admittedly, the President's budget does not include every program desired by the various elements of the Defense establishment. Many of the items deleted during the budget review, although important perhaps from the viewpoint of one Department, were redundant in terms of the Defense program as a whole. This type of overlapping of proposed programs is inherent in the way the Defense is organized, and it is not necessarily undesirable. It does assist in presenting to the top management of the Department of Defense a wider range of alternatives from which to choose, but it also requires some hard-headed decisions in the program and budget reviews in order to prevent uneconomical duplication of effort.

Then, there are a large number of desirable, though marginal or postponable, programs and activities which are always left to be screened out by the Secretary. Although this, too, increases the workload in my office, I believe we can adequately cope with
opponents have greatly extended the range of conflict to cover virtually every aspect of human activity. And we, together with our allies, must carefully allocate our defense effort to ensure that we can meet the challenge on every front and at every level. An assessment of the present and prospective international situation and the military programs of our principal opponents is therefore highly pertinent to any discussion of the Defense program and budget.

B. ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS IT BEARS ON MILITARY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Last year, when our attention was focused particularly on the Berlin crisis, I pointed out that the Defense program we were recommending was geared to our global requirements over the long-term, and not simply to the immediate situation as it then obtained. Since that time, the Nation and, indeed, the whole world has gone through another crisis, precipitated again by the Soviet Union, this time in Cuba. I believe it is clear from the actions taken by the President last October that the United States Government viewed with the greatest concern the sudden intrusion of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, only 90 miles from our own shores. However, as acute as this crisis was, and the after-effects have yet to be fully liquidated, it did not then and should not now distract our attention from the more fundamental and far-reaching challenge which Communism poses to the Free World. Without in any way minimizing the grave threat to our national security which would have been posed by Soviet nuclear armed ballistic missiles in Cuba, or, for that matter, the Soviet military presence in that country, those missiles represented but a small part of the total Communist threat to Freedom.

Even while the Soviet Union was attempting to extend its offensive military power directly into Cuba, the undeclared war against the Government of South Vietnam continued and a new overt military aggression was launched against India by the Chinese Communists. In Europe, Soviet pressure on the Allied position in Berlin continued unabated. In the Near East, the Communists were seeking to make inroads in the Arabian peninsula. In Africa, their efforts to exploit dissension and unrest in the Congo had been temporarily thwarted by the actions of the United Nations. All of these crises or probing actions are simply the more obvious manifestations of the Communist drive toward their basic objective of world domination.

This objective is held by both the Soviet Union and Communist China, but very distinct differences in tactics have become apparent. And, indeed, there is increasing evidence that the apparent monolithic structure of world Communism has been fractured, perhaps irreparably. There is emerging a bi-polarization of power in the Communist camp, the Chinese Communists trying to capture control of the Communist revolution and the Soviet Communists seeking to retain their present leadership.
Although we may draw some comfort from this futility out between the Communist giants, the world situation remains perilous, nevertheless. The destruction of freedom and free nations is still the ultimate objective of both countries, but each is seeking to attain the objective in its own way, and to capture the spoils for itself.

Oddly enough, in this struggle for power in the Communist camp, the weaker of the two rivals is by far the more belligerent and the more reckless, and therefore, very dangerous to the peace of the world. The reason for this difference is not hard to find. The Soviet Union, after 45 years of unrelenting sacrifice and deprivation, is finally emerging from its status as a "have not" nation. Mainland China, however, after 13 years of Communist rule, has barely, if at all, made a start toward self-sufficiency. Her economic condition is desperate. The Soviet Union today has a great deal to lose in a nuclear war -- material wealth as well as human life. The economically impoverished Chinese Communists, to whom human life has little value, believe they have much less to lose. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Red Chinese are much more ready than the Soviet leadership to risk even nuclear war. And, indeed, the Chinese Communists have been quick to take the road of active belligerency in Korea, in Tibet and now in India.

But while war and the threat of war have rightly occupied most of our attention, we must not neglect the fact that the struggle with Communism is continuing through other means. As long as serious political and economic instability exists in any part of the world, the Communists will have an opportunity to enlarge the area of the struggle. Even now they continue to demonstrate their ability to take quick advantage of any breakdown of law and order in any part of the world and to identify themselves with any change in the status quo or with any emerging threat to existing authority.

In this regard, there has been no change in the policy of the Soviet Union to encourage what Mr. Khrushchev calls "wars of national liberation" or "popular revolts", and which we know as covert armed aggression, guerrilla warfare and subversion. And the Soviet Union has not diminished its efforts through the more subtle means of economic and military aid, political intrigue and propaganda to win over the neutral and emerging nations of the world to the cause of Communism. From Africa to the Near East, from Southeast Asia to Latin America, the pattern is the same. We may expect that the struggle in this area will intensify and we must be prepared to meet the challenge.

1. Latin America

Although the Cuban crisis has greatly solidified the unity and cohesion of the American states, the threat of Communism has by no means abated, and a Communist government still rules in Cuba. Our forceful
response to the threat of armed aggression from Cuba has diminished for the present the military aspect of the threat. But this simply means that Communist efforts will be shifted to other areas, and the Castroist Communist sabotage last fall in Venezuela is but one of the more violent examples of this danger. More important from the longer term point of view is the fundamental instability engendered by the widespread lack of adequate economic progress. So long as hunger and economic instability persist in Latin America, the danger of Communism will be ever present. Indeed, it is not an overt-armed Communist attack that is the real danger in this part of the world, or even Communist sabotage and subversion -- the real danger lies in the discouragement, disillusionment and despair of the people as a result of the relatively slow rate of economic and social progress.

Prior to fiscal year 1962, U.S. military assistance to Latin America was geared to a concept of hemispheric defense which envisaged the direct participation by Latin American forces in any large-scale conflict. A thorough review of the program convinced us that, except for specific cases where properly equipped naval and air forces could make a significant contribution to the solution of the anti-submarine warfare problem, this concept of hemispheric defense was becoming increasingly unrealistic. The main threat in Latin America today is that of Communist subversion and indirect attack, and not overt military aggression from outside the hemisphere. Accordingly, about one-half of the approximately $75 million per year of military assistance which the United States is presently providing for Latin America is devoted to equipment and training for internal security purposes, with special emphasis on counterinsurgency training. The major portion of the balance is directed to the support of selected ASW forces. Although we fully recognize that the problem is essentially political and economic, the maintenance of law and order is an essential prerequisite to social and economic progress.

In addition to internal security, our program is also designed to contribute to economic and social development through what we call "civic action" projects. These projects, in such fields as agriculture, transportation, communications, health and sanitation, are beneficial to the people generally. Outstandingly successful programs of this sort have been conducted in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Honduras. More recently we have instituted a similar program in Equador and we are currently developing projects for other Latin American countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. Civic action projects are jointly funded by the Military Assistance Program and AID, with MAP providing the military equipment and related training.

But the Military Assistance Program will not in itself solve the problem of political instability which arises from the continued economic difficulties in much of Latin America, and herein lies the real danger of future Communist penetration. It was to meet this more fundamental problem
submarines on station within reach of most of our bomber bases. In addition, by that time the Soviets could have operational ICBM's with ranges long enough to attack the United States from the south, where we presently have no warning system, or with power enough to carry very high yield warheads. Such warheads, if detonated at high altitudes above the bomber bases, could catch the B-52 bombers before they have time to clear the destructive area of the burst. I will discuss in the next section of my statement the measures we are taking to improve our defenses against such attacks.

The increasing missile threat underscores both the importance of maintaining our on-the-shelf airborne alert capability and the value of the special provisions contained in the Section 512b of the Fiscal Year 1963 Defense Appropriation Act. This is the section which authorizes the Secretary of Defense, upon determination by the President that such action is necessary, to provide for the cost of an airborne alert as an excepted expense. This provision, we believe, should be retained in the law.

Although we are planning to continue the present limited airborne alert program of 12 training sorties per day (plus maintaining an on-the-shelf capability to fly one-eighth of the force for one year), we must always be ready to increase promptly the scale of this operation. Indeed, during the early phases of the Cuban crisis last year, we did just that. We may be able to finance the additional cost of that action from our current
headquarters for SAC, that it won't be long before we will have to have one for the rest of the Department of Defense.

Secretary McNamara. I think that is a bare assumption, Mr. Chairman. I doubt very much that we would be justified in expending these funds for a hardened communications and command center for SAC unless we had a hardened communications and command center in Washington at the other end of the line.

We have this in mind. As General Taylor said, we are carrying on a series of borings at the present time to determine the soil conditions in this area. It was our experience during the Cuban crisis, and I think that we anticipate that future crises would take the same form, that it was impossible for the key decision makers to move out of the Washington area.

Chairman Russell. That was I believe in consideration of some mass of stone mountains, like the Black Hills, where it seems to me if you built under some miles of rock, it would save a good deal.

Secretary McNamara. I think it is an undesirable accommodation for the Washington personnel, but it is not prohibitive from consideration for SAC. As a matter of fact, one of the alternative sites being considered for this SAC underground at the present time is a deep mine in Colorado. It has two great advantages.
year's appropriations, in which case we may not have to resort to Section 512b this year; provided, of course, that no new crisis again forces us to expand our airborne alert operations.

Senator Symington. May I ask what the amount of money involved in that Section 512b is, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNamara. It is an unlimited authorization to carry out a one-eighth airborne alert.

Senator Symington. There is no limitation on the money?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir; I do not believe there is.

Senator Stennis. That was put in the appropriation bill, was it not?

Secretary McNamara. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. That was a compromise on the way the argument was met there about the unforeseen possibilities and need for an alert.

Secretary McNamara. Although we did put a one-eighth alert in effect in the Cuban crisis, as I mentioned earlier, we hoped to be able to cover the cost of all the incremental costs associated with the Cuban crisis in our regular budget without a deficiency appropriation.

Senator Symington. I understood that, and I remember when it came up before the Appropriations Subcommittee. But it said "incurred deficiencies, and I was wondering if there was any limitation on the deficiencies you are allowed to handle unless there was some formal recognition of trouble."
examination of this.

Senator Goldwater. I have a very open mind on this. It has not been completely filled with two or three questions. I will not belabor the point here. You can supply us with a proper briefing on it. I still have questions that I have raised and have had communications, and I think we ought to put into the record the proper information.

Secretary McNamara. We will be quite happy to discuss it.

Chairman Russell. Since apparently we will not get through here, I have a question or two on this SOSUS while we are at it. We have these stations at the present time scattered throughout the Atlantic all around Cuba. Just what part do these stations play in locating Russian submarines and shipping in to Cuba? Just what part, how were they utilized to keep up with the Russian ships and the Russian submarines?

Secretary McNamara. Perhaps General Taylor would like to reply, Mr. Chairman.

General Taylor. I did not hear the question.

Secretary McNamara. What part did the SOSUS stations play in locating the Russian submarines during the Cuban crisis?

General Taylor. I really do not have the details on that. Senator. I think Admiral Anderson should answer it. I think
it was as usual a combination of the many detection systems which we apply in trailing the submarines.

Chairman Russell. The men who operate them claimed at those stations they can detect a ship and tell whether it is a submarine or a tanker or something even by its size.

General Taylor. My impression is --

Chairman Russell. That has been challenged a number of times. It has been extreme. But they say they can, and they have all of these people watching these things like cardiograms, continually making notes on a little piece of paper, and some chap is reading them, and he will say, "Here is a ship at this point," and he will wire into Norfolk where all the information is channeled for analysis.

We know that the Russians were sending a great many surface ships down there of various sizes, we know that. We claim we saw, located, a number of submarines, Russian submarines during the Cuban crisis. Just what part did all this SOSUS outfit have in that. Did they help in locating the submarines? Did we locate them from devices on other submarines or from helicopters or destroyers? We have got all kinds of electronic devices.

General Taylor. I think most of them were located outside of the range of SOSUS. We knew about them before they came in range of SOSUS. I have no doubt that SOSUS gave verification on these boats once they came in range. But these
were non-nuclear submarines, they had to come up on surface. We saw them.

Secretary McNamara. SOSUS was not the primary source of detection of the Cuban crisis submarines.

Chairman Russell. I was rather sold on the SOSUS last year. I talked to you, and you indicated then you thought it was very erratic, a very erratic system, and left very much to be desired.

Secretary McNamara. I believe that today, Mr. Chairman, and I do not wish in any way to deemphasize the importance of the problem, but simply to indicate that we have not solved it by any means nor have the Soviets.

Chairman Russell. These people who operate them think they do pretty well. They say there are certain places in the ocean, for example, one is down at the Bahamas, maybe it is Barbadoes, and they say that this place on Cape Race, which must be two or three thousand miles off from there, where they can pick up anything, but there are a number of areas inbetween where they draw blanks and cannot locate these ships.

It seems that the shelves and mountains there that reflect sound almost like an echo in some places that are very far removed from the location of the devices, and in other cases they cannot tell at all.

Secretary McNamara. And the water temperatures, I think they will agree, play a very important part in affecting the
Dear Secretary Vance:

At the request of McGeorge Bundy, I am sending you a copy of my statement on subversion in Latin America, which I gave yesterday to the House Committee.

Sincerely,

Edwin M. Martin
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Statement on Subversion in Latin America.

The Honorable
Cyrus R. Vance,
Secretary of the Army.
INTRODUCTION

I welcome this opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee to testify on the important problem of communist subversion in the hemisphere. In recent months public attention has focused to such a degree on the Soviets' arms buildup in Cuba that it has tended to overshadow communist subversive activities throughout Latin America, aided in many ways by Cuba and other bloc countries.

The problem of extra-continental totalitarian powers trying to subvert established governments in this hemisphere is not new. During World War II the American Republics faced the challenge of fascist subversion sponsored by the Axis powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the inter-American community has been dealing with the problem of communist subversion promoted by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba.

I mention this at the outset to point out that the American Governments were confronting this issue long before there was a communist Cuba, and I expect they will be doing so after Cuba is free again.

DEVELOPMENT
The establishment of the communist parties in Latin America has taken place in at least five waves or phases. During the first of these, from 1918 to 1922, parties were formed in the five countries where the industrial revolution had made the most headway and where the labor movement had begun to acquire national prominence. While the five original communist parties were building on socialist or anarchist foundations during the 1920's, entirely new communist and communist-oriented groups were emerging in a majority of the other Latin American republics. In each case, the communist organizations in the second wave had to contend with more serious obstacles than their predecessors had initially faced. These handicaps included the almost complete absence of labor organizations, little or no tradition of radical political movements, and suppression of opposition groups by regimes that were either highly authoritarian or outright dictatorships.

At the sixth congress in 1928, the Comintern adopted the line that Soviet historians have since identified with the so-called "third period" of the Communist International. This line called for communists everywhere to declare themselves as such, to cease cooperation with "bourgeois" and "leftists reformist" elements, and to establish purely communist organizations which should strive to foment and seize the leadership of proletarian revolutions.
revolutions. Repercussions were felt in every phase of communist activities in Latin America. With respect to their political apparatus, the Comintern directives made it clear that in countries where communists operated within other parties every effort should be made to convert these parties to full-fledged communist organizations. During 1929-1931, three new parties were also organized, bringing the number of countries with communist parties to seventeen.

The fourth wave of communist organizational activity in Latin America, from the mid-1930's to the mid-1940's, can be subdivided into three periods, each corresponding to a distinct episode in the annals of the international communist movement. These were the periods of the Popular Front, which had begun in Latin America by 1935, the Hitler-Stalin pact, from August 1939 to June 1941, and the remaining years of the Second World War. During these same years, half a dozen parties abandoned the communist label without changing their political orientation, while communist parties were also established in the remaining three Latin American countries which did not already have them.

The fifth and current phase deserves a fuller treatment, including a discussion of Soviet bloc activities, of some real importance for the first time.

Soviet
Soviet Bloc Offensive in Latin America in the 1950's

During this post-war and pre-Castro period, Soviet relations with Latin America, which seemed to be entering a period of expansion in the aftermath of World War II, were cut back sharply from 1947-52 as one country after another suspended relations with the Soviets at the same time that they were taking strong measures against the local communist parties. Soviet operations in the area entered on the present period of expansion beginning in 1953 with overtures to the Perón Government for increased trade. The post-1953 Soviet offensive in the area was part of a worldwide operation keyed to the underdeveloped countries, and spearheaded by trade and aid programs. As of December 31, 1958, the European communist bloc countries had 20-odd trade and payments agreements with five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and Mexico). One or more of the bloc governments at this time had resident diplomatic missions in these same Latin American countries and also in Bolivia. Soviet bloc trade with Latin America rose from $70 million in 1953, only 0.6% of Latin America's trade with the world, to $275 million in 1958, or 1.7% of Latin American trade. The peak was reached in 1955, reflecting trade with Argentina under the Perón regime - $340 million or 2.5% of Latin American trade. During the period 1955-57, fourteen Latin American countries were visited by bloc trade missions, and seven of these
these countries sent missions to the bloc. In addition, during the 1950's travel between Latin America and the bloc reached a fairly high level, and bloc radio broadcasts allotted more and more time to Latin American audiences.

But the Soviets failed to gain any secure foothold through their diplomatic and economic offensive in these years. What apparent trade successes they achieved were based on the need of various Latin American countries to sell surplus raw materials and their willingness to take Soviet goods in exchange. In Argentina and Uruguay, the main theaters of Soviet operation during this period, the Soviets made no lasting political gains. In general, this first phase of Soviet operations in the area was primarily one of probing for opportunities.

**Latin American Communist Parties in the 1950's**

The outstanding success of the post-war period before the Castro takeover was in Guatemala in the period 1950-54, where the communists came to dominate the Arbenz Government and establish effective control over the country's labor and peasant organizations. As the Soviets' power and status reached new high levels in the late 1950's, the communist leadership in Latin America gained new confidence, but the area was still isolated from the centers of international communism and the local parties were unable to translate this growth of Soviet power into greater capabilities for influence and penetration in the national societies.
societies of Latin America. The membership strength of the communist parties and their ability to influence the political system was largely confined to their continued hold in labor organizations and among intellectual and student groups. Seldom were they able to make common cause with non-communist parties commanding a mass following. They, therefore, generally remained on the defensive.

As of the end of 1958 just before Castro seized power in Cuba, it appeared that the climate for communist activities in Latin America was improving. The swollen, ill-paid urban populations seemed to offer an especially promising field for radical agitation of all kinds. Reacting to periods of dictatorial rule in various countries, leftists party leaders, students, journalists, and other intellectuals were voicing an insistent, but uncritical, demand for the extension of liberties that promised to remove from the communist parties the legal impediments placed in their way by more conservative governments of the past. The communists, by their energetic denunciations of economic and social injustice, were in the eyes of many of the superficially educated intellectuals and leaders of the left proving themselves the true champions of democracy.

In terms of communist party membership, the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, Cuban and Venezuelan parties represented in 1958 all but a small part of the total, or about 215,000 of an estimated 250,000 party members in the area. These parties had sizeable non-party followings and substantial influence among other political groups in their countries.
COMMUNIST EFFORTS SINCE THE ADVENT OF CASTRO

Since 1959 the general pattern of communist subversion in the hemisphere shows a continuation, though on a much stepped-up scale, of the tactics of infiltration, popular front action and insurgency, but with a marked shift toward more violence. Local groups have greatly benefitted from the receipt of far more outside help, especially from Cuba, than heretofore. This has coincided with the advent of Castro and the sharpening of differences between Moscow and Peking on the tactics to be followed in pressing forward the communist campaign of world domination. The Soviets undoubtedly regard Latin America as an area offering unusual possibilities, but they themselves have been cautious in their tactics, except where special opportunities have developed, as in the case of Cuba. On the other hand, there is no evidence that they have in any way restrained Cuba or local communist parties from violence of many forms.

The Strategy and Tactics of the Castro Regime

The strategy of the Castro regime from the beginning, despite all the disclaimers, has remained one of exporting its revolution--of converting the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the Americas, as Castro stated in 1959. In its tactics the Castro regime has been changeable. During the first six month of 1959 in the flush of victory it sponsored armed expeditions against several Caribbean countries. None of these was successful. They served only to arouse
arouse suspicions and generate action by the OAS. Castro then shifted tactics, following a more subtle, indirect approach. The Cuban efforts have been channelled in four main directions:

1. The formation of front organizations in the United States and the Latin American countries in the form of friendship societies or committees for the defense of the Cuban Revolution.

2. An intensive propaganda campaign using printed materials, news services provided by Prensa Latina, and newly constructed, powerful radio facilities.

3. Covert material support, largely financial, to subversive groups.

4. Indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin Americans in Cuba, including training in sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla tactics.

I believe some specific examples of activities in these four categories would be of interest to members of the Subcommittee.

On the formation of front organizations, we do not have to go far afield. All of you are familiar with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and its pro-Castro activities in this country. I would like to read the following excerpt from the annual report for the fiscal year 1961 of the FBI:

"The Fair
"The Fair Play for Cuba Committee is one of the main outlets in this country for pro-Castro propaganda. Many of its members are United States nationals. This Bureau during the 1961 fiscal year determined that certain funds used by the Committee to pay for a newspaper advertisement had come from a Cuban official assigned to the United Nations, a fact later admitted by a Committee member in testimony before a congressional committee. FBI investigations also have shown that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party, and that these Parties have actually organized some chapters of the Committee."

Similar groups have been established in practically every other country of the hemisphere, such as the "Legion of Volunteers for the Defense of Cuba" in Peru, the "Movement for Solidarity with and Defense of the Cuban Revolution" in Chile, the "Society of Friends of Cuba" in Brazil, and the "Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution" in Costa Rica, to name only a few. Their function has been to propagandize and whip up enthusiasm for the Castro regime and repetitions of its revolution through rallies, demonstrations, propaganda and all the paraphernalia of communist front groups.

As part of its propaganda campaign, the Cuban Government uses its news service Agencia Prensa Latina to spread its distortion of news events throughout the world. There are four Prensa Latina offices in Latin America. These offices serve not only as news gathering centers for Cuban propaganda network, but as a means of contact with subversive groups throughout the hemisphere.

The Cuban
The Cuban Government places great emphasis on radio propaganda to further its subversive ends. It beams to the United States two English language programs, Radio Free Dixie and The Friendly Voice of Cuba, intended particularly to arouse racial antagonisms in Negro audiences.

Radio Habana is the chief propaganda vehicle of the Cuban Government for other countries. In May of 1961, Radio Habana produced a modest 42 hours a week for Europe and the Americas. Now it puts out some 188 hours a week, with almost 60 per cent of that time devoted to Spanish language broadcasts to the Americas. In good part, these broadcasts contain the usual virulent attacks against specific democratic governments and their leading personages, such as that of President Betancourt, and call on listeners to follow the Cuban example of revolution. Radio Habana also makes its facilities available to such Cuba-based groups as the Dominican Liberation Movement, the Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movement and the Guatemalan Information Committee, to broadcast systematic and hostile propaganda designed to bring about the downfall of the governments in those countries.

To estimate the amount of Cuban printed material that is smuggled into the other countries of the hemisphere is impossible. But we can point to a few glaring examples where they have been caught red-handed. Last October in Chile, a large crate weighing 1800 pounds, and sent by the Cuban Government to its
to its Embassy at Santiago, was documented as "samples of Cuban products and cultural and commercial material". Upon being opened by Chilean authorities, the packages found inside the box contained Cuban propaganda addressed to various Chileans who a few months before had visited Cuba. The Chilean Government addressed a stern protest to the Cuban Embassy in the face of this outrageous effort to introduce Castro propaganda into Chile surreptitiously. Similarly, in Mexico in February 1962, Mexican customs authorities seized a large quantity of Castro-communist propaganda that the Cuban Minister of Education, Armando HART Dávalos, brought with him to Mexico and tried to introduce into the country during an official visit.

Another form of support of subversive activities - and one which is difficult to trace - is the furnishing of funds to subversive groups. Castro reportedly donated recently $15,000 to a violent, extremist group in Colombia called the United Front for Revolutionary Action. The Cuban Government has also given financial aid to the leftist subversive activities of the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), which has been involved in guerrilla activities in Ecuador. The Quito radio on January 29 broadcast a letter sent to them by Pablo PAEZ, a young member of URJE who had recently been expelled from the group, in which he publicly acknowledged that two other individuals of the group, whom he named,
he named, made several trips to Cuba and returned with money for the support of the Ecuadorean guerrilla movement. One of these same individuals, he said, also received funds directly from the Cuban Embassy at Quito.

It is estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 persons from other Latin American countries travelled to Cuba in 1962 for ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Most of these trainees are young, mostly in their teens or twenties. Ostensibly in Cuba to pursue normal studies of agricultural, industrial, or other techniques, students also receive heavy doses of indoctrination in Castro-communist ideology and guerrilla warfare. Returning young men from Cuba have stated that they go through simulated offensive and defensive guerrilla exercises, are taught how to survive in the jungles, are given map and weapons instruction, as well as other training every good guerrilla should have. They are also told how to penetrate student, labor and other groups in their own countries. Venezuelans seems to be the most numerous national group among these trainees, and we do not consider it sheer coincidence that Venezuela's democratic government and the Venezuelan people are being subjected most heavily to the terrorist and guerrilla activities of the Castro-communists in that country.

In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, the Castro regime has shifted the emphasis of its campaign in Latin America to one of open encouragement of terror as a principal weapon, a move
a move dictated by the loss of popular support as a result of the crisis and the futility of continuing popular front, mass movement tactics. Violence has been the only refuge of the very small minority throughout history.

On November 21, 1962, in a speech closing the so-called "Week of Solidarity with the Venezuelan People", Cuban Minister of Education, Armando Hart, said that it had become evident that "in Latin America the conquest of revolutionary power has to be achieved necessarily - at least in a great number of the countries - through class struggle carried to the level of armed insurrection by the proletariat and peasant classes". A week later in an interview with the Habana correspondent of the London Daily Worker, Cuban Minister of Industries Ernesto Guevara is quoted as saying: "The Cuban revolution has shown that in conditions of imperialist domination such as exist in Latin America, there is no solution but armed struggle". Castro himself on January 16 of this year stated that "what is needed in Latin America are experts on changing the situation, experts on leading peoples in revolutions". Criticizing those who shrink from violence, he said let the imperialist theoreticians preach conformism, but let the revolutionary theoreticians preach revolution without fear.

Significantly,
Significantly, the "old" communists have recently also picked up this theme. Veteran Communist Party leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, now President of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute, in a speech on January 23 said: "Following the example of David, they are realizing in time, that revolution is the road--revolution which represents the definite change from the decayed structures which imperialism maintains in our America: revolution, which means the expulsion of imperialist and monopolistic wealth, supported by the traitor latifundists and by the cowardly, timid representatives of a bourgeoisie which feels the blows of imperialism without trying to divert them to realize that this revolution is possible, that this revolution is achievable, that this revolution may have different roads for achievement but that there is only one road on which it can advance with confidence: the determination to struggle, to resist, to fight." Another veteran communist, Blas Roca, on January 24 praised the Venezuelan terrorists, saboteurs and guerrillas for their activities during the missile crisis, calling this "proletarian internationalism" and promising "We shall continue to give our support, each day in greater proportions, to the Venezuelan people." Earlier Fidel Castro himself in a speech marking the fourth anniversary of the Cuban revolution had this to say about the tactics of violence in Venezuela during the missile crisis:

"...the
"...the Venezuelan people struggled and gave extraordinary evidence of revolutionary spirit, led by the glorious Communist Party of Venezuela and by the valiant militants of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement. The imperialists were given evidence of what revolutionary solidarity is, and active solidarity of revolutionaries who do not sit in their doorways to wait for the corpse of their enemy to pass by, of revolutionaries who understand that the duty of all revolutionaries is to create the revolution."

These statements are a clear indication of the continuing interventionist purposes of the Castro regime and point to the direction in which we can expect it to channel its subversive activity in the hemisphere in the months to come.

Soviet
Soviet Bloc Efforts in Latin America since 1959

Over the past three years, efforts by the Soviet bloc countries, other than through Cuba, to establish further their presence in Latin America and promote the fortunes of local communist parties have not generally met with any outstanding successes. Only the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Brazil and the promise of increased trade between them may be said to represent a clear plus for the bloc. Otherwise, diplomatic relations continue to be maintained with the same few countries in Latin America as before (Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico) and no significant expansion of trade has taken place. One may cite as a clear setback the case of Argentina, where little use has been made of the $100 million credit extended by the USSR in 1957 (because of the unavailability or inadequacy of merchandise) and where the Soviet and other bloc embassies have been forced to reduce the size of their staffs at Argentine demand.

They have succeeded in attracting more students and other persons for training and indoctrination of all kinds. Attempts on the part of the bloc to introduce propaganda into the various Latin American countries continue to have varying degrees of success. Some governments (e.g. Mexico, Uruguay) seem lately to have tightened
tightened control over the importation of such materials, but the amounts distributed in certain countries remains a most disturbing fact.

Implications of the Sino-Soviet Quarrel in Latin America

To date the Latin American communist parties seem to have been reluctant either to admit the existence of basic differences between the USSR and Communist China or to take sides even when the differences are admitted. Castro has clearly played both sides while appealing for a reconciliation. One might suggest that his heart is in Peking but his stomach is in Moscow.

Castro's tactics in winning power in Cuba have nevertheless provoked among those parties sharp discussion very similar in its subject matter to the discourse between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. Principally involved is the question of the right strategy to the successful conquest of political power. In virtually all Latin American communist movements there is a deep division of opinion as to whether to take the violent path to power--similar to that allegedly followed by the Chinese and the Cubans--or the slower, "united front" path of alliance with leftist forces which is called the "via pacifica." In general, the Soviets appear to favor the latter course of action as one surer of success in the long run and less liable to result in debilitating defeat
defeat for communist forces. However, the Soviet attitude toward the violent path, which involves in most cases the use of a guerrilla movement, is shrouded in ambivalence.

The Chinese communists on the other hand are urging this path on the Latin American communist movement through all the avenues open to them. There is a coincidence of strategic views between much Latin American dissident communist thinking and that of the Chinese communists. Our evidence suggests that the older communist leaders in the area tend to favor the Moscow viewpoint, while the younger, hotter-headed elements in the communist movement find themselves leaning toward the Cuban-Chinese communist strategy. As time brings less and less prospects of success via the "peaceful path" there seems good reason to think that more and more Latin American communists will incline toward violent overthrow as their only possible means to gain power. This does not necessarily mean capture of the Latin American parties by the Chinese; they do not appear to have the capability to provide the necessary material support.

It would appear that on balance the Soviet and Cuban images and effectiveness, as distinguished from those of local parties, have suffered a setback largely as a result of the crisis of October 1962, but also/increasingly effects of disorienting / the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Conditions in certain
certain areas of Latin America, however, continue to be conducive to the growth of communist influence and consequently to penetration by Soviet bloc states and parties. The lack of spectacular successes in recent years should not be taken as a sign that either external or internal communist forces in Latin America have given up their attempts to overturn the existing order or are unable to do so.

Balance Sheet on Communism in Latin American since 1959

So far I have been talking primarily about activities or influences brought to bear by the Soviet bloc and Cuba on Latin America. But the Communist parties there have a life and force of their own and are not wholly dependent on outside nourishment or guidance by any means. Their strength and activities are matters of major interest and must now be analyzed in some detail.

The communist apparatus in Latin American made significant progress during 1959, 1960 and 1961 and came to have greater self-confidence and optimism than at any time since the end of the war. Rather than in terms of membership or electoral success, this progress appeared in better linkage with the international communist movement, partly through Cuba, and in the improved atmosphere for operations in many countries. Especially during 1959 and early 1960, this was closely related to the appeal of the Cuban revolution. Even after disillusionment with Castro began to set in among
many Latin American leftists, Cuba provided an important regional headquarters which continued to provide valuable support and services to the Latin American communists.

During this three-year period the communists made headway in finding indigenous leftist and nationalist groups disposed to make common cause with them. Up until 1962 they made significant gains among students and intellectuals and to a lesser degree in urban trade unions. With heavy bloc support, propaganda activities were sustained at a higher level than ever before.

Although 1962 was one of the most active and eventful years in the history of the Latin American communist movement, it closed with little if any net overall further gain for the communist parties in terms of numbers or influence. In fact in some countries there were some at least temporary losses. The highlights of a year-end balance sheet look something like this:

In the climate of change and crisis that prevailed during 1962, the noncommunist forces of the revolutionary left rather than the communist parties themselves appeared to be the main gainers. The communists had little to show in terms of gains in party membership or vote following, and internal factionalism increased sharply, in part because many old line leaders responded only feebly to their opportunities. Nevertheless in an overall situation
situation not unfavorable to revolutionary appeals, the communists in 1962 were pursuing vigorously with some success all three of their standard tactical lines, adapted to the local situations in which each seemed to offer most promise of success: infiltration, popular fronts and terror.

Infiltration succeeded best in Brazil. Communist-backed candidates in the October 1962 elections, while they did not fare exceptionally well in the country as a whole, won important victories in certain key states. On the other hand the outstanding division in a communist party in Latin America during 1962 took place in Brazil where the Communist Party (PCB), was confronted by an organized rival party. Luiz Carlos Prestes has for the last eight years led the PCB on a "soft" line and concentrated upon the quest for legality. During 1961 leftist dissidents, led by three ex-members of the PCB presidium and five other former central committee members, accused Prestes and his associates of revisionism and rightist deviation. Expelled as divisionists, the dissidents organized early in 1962, taking the name Communist Party of Brazil and claiming to be the legitimate PCB. Dedicated revolutionaries who are convinced that they will come to lead the communist movement in Brazil, the dissidents, who so far are relatively
relatively small in number, have actively sought recognition from other communist parties and the Castro regime. Unlike the Prestes PCB, they are actively preparing for guerrilla warfare.

The peaceful, popular front road to power has been followed by the communist movement in Chile more faithfully than by any other party. The well-established Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) had good reason for this policy because its prospects for coming to power through success at the polls by popular front groups to which it belongs remain considerably brighter than those of any other Latin American Communist Party. Allied for years with the Socialist Party and other leftist elements in the Popular Action Front (FRAP), which narrowly missed electing its Socialist candidate president in 1958, the PCCh obtained nearly 12 per cent of the vote in the March 1961 congressional elections. With their eyes fixed upon the 1964 presidential elections, again with a socialist candidate, the Chilean communists give top priority to maintaining the FRAP and avoiding any actions which might jeopardize the legal status which the PCCh regained in 1958.

Even so, during the past year ideological and tactical differences between the communists and the socialists became more evident than in the past, and
strains within the FRAP became acute. At the same time voices within the PCCh advocated developing guerrilla capabilities against the eventuality that force might be used to keep the communists from enjoying the fruits of electoral victory. Thus the PCCh, like most other Latin American communist parties, is confronting the choice between the peaceful road and violent revolution or guerrilla warfare, and tries to make its choice in the light of relative prospects for success. The ambivalence in many parties stems from disagreement among party leaders over just this point.

The choice of violent action showed most dramatically in Venezuela, but also in Peru and to some extent in Brazil. I will discuss this increasingly important trend more fully later on.

In Bolivia the orthodox Communist Party (PCB) so far sees its road to power through continued successful infiltration of the Left Sector of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). The Guatemalan Labor (communist) Party (PGT) has officially adopted a policy of preparing for any form of struggle. In El Salvador the party undertook some guerrilla training on a minor scale during 1962. In Ecuador there has been a shift in tactics following the diplomatic break with Cuba in April. It became apparent
apparent that further gains through peaceful political means were unlikely, and at the 7th Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE) Congress strong sentiment in favor of early violent revolution became part of the official PCE line.

In Mexico the communist movement was already fragmented. Dissension over activism was only one of the divisive factors which worked during 1962 to split the communist movement in Mexico into half a dozen feuding factions, none of major consequence.

On the labor front in Latin America there were few major changes in the political orientation of the leadership in 1962. Those which took place were mixed in character with gains for democratic trade unionism somewhat outweighing losses. On the positive side, we note the failure of the communist unions to form a "neutralist" Latin American Confederation of Workers in Chile in September 1962. We may also cite the elimination of communist influence from important unions in Venezuela and Mexico, defections from communist-controlled union organizations in Bolivia, the launching of a democratic national confederation of labor in Ecuador and the emergence of a strong anti-communist federation as the dominant factor in Dominican labor.

The appeal of communism for Latin American university students as a shortcut to the solution of all problems seems
seems on balance to have declined during the year. In several important universities a reaction appears to have set in, reflecting disillusionment with communist excesses at home and abroad by extreme leftists formerly disposed to accept communist views and actions uncritically, and greater activity and unity by the noncommunists, everywhere the great majority numerically. For example, in Mexico a liberal-moderate slate was elected in the November student elections at the huge National University, which has been a prime communist target ever since the Communist Party found it could not capture the labor movement. For the first time in recent history, the communist candidate was defeated in student elections at Mexico City's important National Polytechnic Institute. The Communist Party was reported to be "extremely unhappy" over these developments. At the University of Buenos Aires almost half of the communist dominated "Reformist" student organization defected to form the "Independent Reformists", depriving communists of their claim to be sole champions of reform. As a result of this split, the moderate "Humanists" won three of the five student seats on the University Council. In the University of Cordoba, Argentina, the moderate student organization tripled in size in six years to more than 6000, while the leftist Reformists split almost exactly in half,
as in Buenos Aires, and maintained a static combined membership of about 4000 over the same period. In Colombia, progressive Catholic groups have won strong followings in provincial university centers, especially in Barranquilla, Medellin and Santander. In Chile all the major student federations are now controlled by the Christian Democrats. On the other hand most of the Peruvian student groups are dominated by communist-supported groups. Among both student and faculty groups some real gains have been made in Venezuela.
Increased Trend Toward Violence

As I noted earlier, there is a marked trend toward violence in certain areas in Latin America, reflecting Cuban urging as well as the necessities of local movements which find themselves more and more isolated. Nowhere is it more evident than in Venezuela where, since January of last year, the communists have made a determined, but unsuccessful effort to overthrow the Betancourt Government. During 1962, under communist leadership, the terrorist and guerrilla units were reorganized into the "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN). In the interior they have attempted to establish guerrilla bands with not much success, largely because of the vigilance of the Venezuelan armed forces and the cooperation of the rural population in whose welfare President Betancourt has taken so much interest. In the cities - especially Caracas - they are waging a campaign of sabotage and terrorism. Homemade pipe bombs are placed about the city; hit and run raids have been perpetrated in which houses and sometimes policemen are shot with submachine guns from speeding cars. Attempts have been made, some successfully, to burn warehouses of foreign enterprises. In these activities, police and law enforcement officials have been killed or wounded and bystanders have been frequently wounded.
wounded in crossfire or by bomb fragments. Foreign-owned oil installations in the interior have been constant targets. The extremists carried out their most spectacular act of sabotage in October 1962 when they blew up four strategic transformer stations belonging to the Standard Oil of New Jersey Lake Maracaibo complex. Testimony taken by the Venezuelan Government from two of the saboteurs who were captured clearly demonstrates that it was done on orders of the Communist Party in Maracaibo. And this week we had the spectacular boat highjacking by several communists, a publicity stunt, pure and simple.

Throughout this campaign the democratic government of President Betancourt has demonstrated determination and an ability to deal with the situation. Press accounts have perhaps given outsiders an exaggerated impression of the Caracas scene, where life goes on pretty calmly. I am reminded of the popular impression of Chicago in the early '30's, an impression greatly exaggerated for I lived there and like millions of others never came close to a shooting.

In Peru we have another dramatic example of the increasing tempo of communist-inspired subversion and violence. For the past several months, in an agricultural area of the Andean Department of Cuzco, communist agitators, many of whom were trained in Cuba, have been able to foment an armed peasant
peasant dissident movement that has been responsible for the
forceful seizure of lands, armed attacks, and considerable
bloodshed. Last December, Castro-communist agitators sub-
verted a strike at the smelter of the American-owned Cerro
Corporation at La Oroya in the central Andes, seized control
of the installation, and caused about $4 million worth of
damage. Early in January, following a strike that had been
settled between the management and the legitimate trade union
leaders, communist agitators persuaded workers on two Peru-
vian-owned sugar plantations near Chiclayo on the north
coast, to damage installations and fire cane fields – about a
million dollars of damage in all. These were the most
dramatic cases, but there were many other instances of Castro-
communist-fomented incidents by workers, peasants, and
students.

In the face of this growing pattern of communist-inspired
violence and subversion, the Peruvian Government on January 5
cracked down on the communists and Castroists, arresting about
a thousand of them. The Government announced at the same
time the discovery of a Castro-communist plot, master-minded
from abroad, of which these incidents were only the first
steps in what was to be an increasing rhythm of disorder,
terrorism, and revolutionary activity. After screening those
arrested
arrested, the authorities have announced that they plan to bring to trial 212 persons.

In Brazil there have been periodic instances of violence in the Northeast during the past year or so, several of which have been directly or indirectly linked to the Peasant Leagues led by Francisco Juliao. Communist involvement in this activity has been indicated. Among other things local police officials discovered a large number of pamphlet translations of Che Guevara's booklet on guerrilla warfare.

Persistent reports of smuggling and stocking of arms have also been received. In one recent instance, a cache of arms was reportedly seized at Dianopolis in a remote region of the State of Goias and some 26 persons arrested for alleged subversive activity. In another instance, Rio de Janeiro police arrested one Clodomir Santos do Morais, a lawyer for the Peasant Leagues, while he was transporting a clandestine shipment of arms from Rio to the interior. Morais was also in possession of the calling card of a Soviet diplomat assigned to Brazil -- which card reportedly bore an inscription from the diplomat to Juliao. Finally, there is the well-publicized instance of the documents found in the crashed Varig airliner outside Lima -- documents which are said to contain detailed reports of activities in Brazil.
Brazil to give guerrilla training in connection with peasant violence. The documents reportedly reveal that these activities, although relatively small scale and inefficiently executed, received the help and guidance of Cuba.

In Colombia we witness a continuation of the violence which has plagued that country for a decade. I mention this only to point out that this violence is not primarily communist inspired or directed, although there is reason to believe they are attempting to take advantage of the situation. Violence in Colombia is banditry rather than insurgency.
STEPS WE ARE TAKING TO COMBAT COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

In the face of the communist subversive offensive in the hemisphere, there arises the question of what the U.S. and the other American Republics are doing to meet it. Success in combatting this offensive will, of course, depend greatly on the will and ability of the American governments to act and to coordinate their efforts with each other. It is important to keep in mind that what we are concerned with are problems and situations which exist in nineteen independent nations, as properly jealous of their independence as we are. Although we are inter-dependent and allied by geography, common origins and the regional security system of the OAS, we are all also firmly committed in inter-American treaties to the principle of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs. Indeed, the violation of this principle by the Soviet and Castro-directed communists creates the problem we are talking about.

From this it is evident that, so far as the US is concerned, neither the problem nor the remedies are entirely within our control. It means that the steps the US take must be in full agreement, free cooperation and partnership with our Latin American allies. While promoting increasing cooperation, the US, in all its efforts, continues to respect the principle of sovereign independence. We cannot and will not ourselves, in combating violation of this principle by others, destroy the very principle we are trying to preserve.

We
We are channelling our direct attack on the problem of communist subversion in two directions. One is to isolate Cuba from the hemisphere and discredit the image of the Cuban revolution in the hemisphere. The other is to improve the internal security capabilities of the countries concerned.

Even more important over the long term, will be the achievement of our goals under the Alliance for Progress, a partnership of twenty countries of the inter-American system.

Inter-Agency Program Coordination

A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in implementing programs designed to assist the governments of Latin America to deal with this insidious threat. Their individual activities are carried on as a part of an integrated US effort to strengthen country internal security capabilities and to promote sound political, economic and social structures through democratic processes. Each of the representatives of the other agencies at this hearing will be able to furnish you in more detail information about their efforts and the achievement of these objectives.

Coordination of all of these activities takes place in the weekly meetings of the Latin American Policy Committee. In these meetings, senior policy officials of all the concerned agencies meet with me to discuss their programs on the basis of prepared staff papers. We examine in some detail the activities of each of the agencies in the area
at each weekly meeting and agree on a program for periods in the future ranging from six months to a number of years, depending on our ability to foresee what is needed.

If the conclusions of the Latin American Policy Committee are such as to require higher level decisions, they are promptly submitted to higher authority for review and approval, including, where appropriate, the President.

These policy and program decisions are then carried out as an integrated effort by the country team in the field and by day-to-day dialogue between the country desk officers of the various agencies here in Washington.

Between meetings, there is, of course, continuing and frequent informal contact at all levels between the concerned agencies.

Activities to Weaken and Discredit the Cuban Regime

While subversion has been, as we have seen, a long-term effort, its strength is unquestionably affected by the position, prestige and stability of Castro and his regime in Cuba. We have had a considerable measure of success from our efforts to isolate Cuba and discredit the Castro Government. In this regard, the missile crisis proved to be of inestimable value in unmasking the Castro regime, previously regarded as a model for a new Latin American-type revolution, as just one more tool of Moscow. The ineptitude of Cuban leaders, coupled with the success of our efforts to deprive

Cuba
Cuba of access to the industrialized markets of the free world, has brought about serious economic deterioration in the island.

In the political field a major reduction in the influence of fidelismo in the hemisphere has been achieved. The Castro Government has been suspended from participation in the OAS. Fifteen American Republics no longer have diplomatic relations with Cuba. Last October during the missile crisis the American Republics achieved complete hemispheric solidarity on OAS action to protect the peace and security of the continent. As a result of economic deterioration, Soviet domination and political ostracism, the Cuban example has become increasingly less attractive to Latin American peoples.

The facts about what Castro has done to Cuba and its people need only to be known in order to convince. Our copy is readymade for us, but it must be gotten to the millions in every Latin American country, nearly half of them illiterate. USIA is waging a battle for men's minds in telling this story of the betrayal of the Cuban revolution and what conditions in Cuba and other communist countries are like today. Through radio, press, books, television and films, this message is being carried daily to the Latin American public. To cite a few examples: (a) 4,500 hours of USIA-
of USIA-furnished radio programs are being broadcast over some 1,500 Latin American stations per week; (b) some 10,000 words of news and commentary are being sent daily via teletype to all Latin American posts to be made available to the local press; and (c) a weekly fifteen-minute video taped show is being televised regularly in forty-two cities of eighteen Latin American countries, with an estimated 10 million viewers.

In addition to this mass approach, USIA has greatly expanded its efforts to make contact with special groups such as labor, student bodies, and intellectual and cultural elite who are the priority targets of the communist efforts. The Department of Defense is also making anti-Castro and anti-communist material available to the armed forces in these countries for use in troop information and education programs.

A gauge of the success of our efforts to discredit and isolate the Cuban regime is to be found in the inability of the extreme left to organize anti-American public demonstrations of any significant proportions during the critical days of the missile crisis. One is reminded of the oft-repeated boast of the regime of how the hemisphere would rise in defense of Cuba if measures were taken against it. The record shows otherwise. Only in Bolivia and Uruguay were popular demonstrations of any size mounted and only in Venezuela
Venezuela were there any effective sabotage efforts. Minor protest meetings, student marches, and bombings were reported from other countries, but were regarded even by the communists themselves as failures in terms of generating popular opposition to the action of the United States.

In Colombia it appeared that the immediate reaction of the communist party and other extremists was defensive, and, rather than attempting to organize demonstrations, they avoided hostile action. In Chile there were only small, limited demonstrations, despite much propaganda and planning action by the extreme left during the preceding months calling for demonstrations and strikes if the United States were to act against Cuba.

Pro-Cuban elements in Ecuador made a major, though somewhat uncoordinated, effort to protest United States and OAS actions. These efforts were almost totally unsuccessful. Despite vitriolic attacks by extreme leftist publications and the exhortations of party leaders, there were only minor demonstrations in Guayaquil and Quito. In Peru, front organizations organized anti-United States rallies. Other than one at the University of Ica, which degenerated into a bloody brawl, these rallies were notable for the small attendance.

In Montevideo, Uruguay, a communist-organized demonstration was attended by some 7,000 students and workers. The demonstration was peaceful and broke up after a few anti-United States speeches. The organizers considered the demonstration disappointing. The Central of Uruguayan Workers
Workers twice failed in efforts to stage demonstrations.

In Bolivia, the pro-Castro demonstrators were met by an equal number of pro-United States demonstrators who did not hesitate to clash with the extreme left mobs.

In Mexico and the Dominican Republic there were only minor demonstrations. In Brazil, Haiti, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras and Paraguay there were no demonstrations.

This was not a record of which Havana or Moscow, let alone Peking, could be very proud. But we would be unwise to count on this as a permanent decline in influence and relax our vigilance.
United States Internal Security Programs

United States internal security programs, it should be made clear at the outset, are only undertaken at the request of the Latin American governments and can only be a modest addition to their own efforts. They and their peoples must decide what to do and do it, must sometimes kill and be killed, for this is a battle to the death.

Whereas the problem for the United States in strengthening Latin American cooperation towards hemispheric security had, until the advent of the Castro movement, been largely one of developing the capability of the Latin American countries to make a contribution to collective defense, the primary problem has now become the maintenance of internal law and order against communist-inspired violence.

It became apparent in 1960 with the avowed intention of the Castro regime to promote the overthrow of Latin American governments by indirect aggression and subversion, that the security of nearly every government in the hemisphere would be jeopardized, in varying degrees.

In anticipation that many countries would be confronted with communist-inspired disorders, terrorism, sabotage, and possibly guerrilla operations, a careful and intensive assessment was made by the United States, in cooperation with the countries, of the potential security threat to each country with the
with the view to the immediate development and implementation of the United States military assistance and training programs reoriented to this new danger. Where critical deficiencies in the capability of local security forces were found, we thus were able to respond rapidly to requests to provide appropriate materiel, training, and services under our military assistance and public safety programs to make up such deficiencies.

This assistance is being provided for the control of communist-inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance and control of movements of subversive and arms inside those countries and across their borders, and for the maintenance of observation and patrol of rural areas for detection and dispersion of guerrilla movements.

During the past two years increased emphasis has been placed on training selected Latin American military personnel in riot control, counter-guerrilla operations and tactics, intelligence and counter-intelligence, public information, psychological warfare, counter-insurgency and other subjects which will contribute to the maintenance of public order and the support of constitutional governments. These courses are given at United States military schools at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In assessing the internal security situation in Latin America, we found that the civil police forces in many of the countries wanted assistance in police administration, training
training and operational techniques and particularly required
greater mobility and more adequate systems of communications,
largely related to riot control and other threats to public
order. Consequently, the public safety program which is an
integral part of the AID Program is designed to meet these
requests.

In this connection, a regional Inter-American Police
Academy was established last year in the Canal Zone to which we
invite selected members of Latin American civil police forces
for training in organization, administration, riot control,
records, and investigations.

Closely allied to and an integral part of our internal
security programs are civic action programs which are designed
to contribute to economic and social development and to establish
a better rapport between the forces of order and the civilian
population. If the Latin American military and public safety
forces are to win popular support for the measures that may be
necessary to curb such violence, they must establish themselves
in the public mind as a constructive, economically responsible
element in the national life.

In essence, our programs are designed to assist the Latin
American countries to develop the capability to insure the
stability and internal security which are necessary for carry-
ing the Alliance for Progress forward.
STEPS BEING TAKEN IN THE OAS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

As I noted at the outset, the struggle against extra-continental subversion is not a new experience for the inter-American system. The problem arose during World War II with the activities of Axis agents. To help the governments deal with it, the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Rio de Janeiro, 1942) established the "Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense." This Committee functioned until the end of the war, rendering a most useful service to the inter-American community by assisting the member governments to identify centers of Axis propaganda, espionage and subversive activities and to develop suitable control measures.

The danger of international communism has been a topic of discussion and action in major inter-American forums from the outset of the Cold War. Beginning with the Ninth Inter-American Conference in 1948 to the present, the OAS has demonstrated a steadily growing preoccupation over this threat and readiness to assist the governments to deal with it.

I shall not attempt in this presentation to trace the history of OAS action against the subversive activities of international communism. A good resume is contained in the Initial General Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS), a copy of which was given to your staff last week.
At Punta del Este last year the Foreign Ministers verified, to use the wording of Resolution I, "that the subversive offensive of communist governments, their agents and the organizations which they control has increased in intensity."

Concerning this offensive they said:

"The purpose of this offensive is the destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified offensive are the declarations set forth in official documents of the directing bodies of the international communist movement, that one of its principal objectives is the establishment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped countries and in Latin America; and the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the communist powers."

I want to note that this assessment was unanimously approved, with the sole exception of the Cuban delegation.

Based on this finding the Foreign Ministers established OAS procedures for assisting the governments to meet the challenge. They directed the Council of the OAS:

"...to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with regard thereto."

At the same time they made provision for the establishment of the SCCS, composed of experts on security matters, to
to advise the Council and the member governments, upon request, on technical problems in this field.

The SCCS was organized last spring and has formally met in three series of sessions since that time: to prepare an initial general report on communist subversive activities, to advise the Dominican Government on how to deal with communist subversion, and to assist in the preparation of studies on subversion for the Council. The Council meanwhile has established a special committee of its own, composed of governmental representatives, to carry out its vigilance responsibilities. Both groups in recent weeks have been working together on special studies requested by the Foreign Ministers at their informal meeting in Washington last October 2-3.

At the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers, considerable time was devoted to the problem of subversion, as is reflected in the communique issued at the end of the meeting. The Foreign Ministers found that at the present juncture the most urgent of the problems confronting the hemisphere was "the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of democratic institutions." They expressed the desire that in the ideological struggle against communism "the resources and methods inherent in
the democratic system should be mobilized to bring the peoples to realize fully the differences between totalitarianism and democracy". They also agreed "that it is necessary for the countries, in accordance with their laws and constitutional precepts, to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their activities of a subversive nature." In this connection they asked that studies be made in the three areas where Cuba appeared to be concentrating its effort: the transfer of funds to other American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive activities. I have earlier described in some detail the scope of Cuban activities in these fields. The SCCS has just completed its preliminary study of these three topics, setting forth its conclusions and making specific recommendations for individual and cooperative action by governments.

The Council's Special Committee received the report in Spanish last Monday. After it has been translated and circulated among all the members of the Council, the United States hopes it will be made public. The Special Committee is scheduled to meet this afternoon to consider this point.
I should add that the SCCS report is a technical study prepared by experts acting in their individual capacity. It is to be used by the Special Committee composed of governmental representatives in the preparation of a report to the Council setting forth recommendations for measures which governments may wish to adopt to strengthen their capacity to counter subversive activities in these three fields.

I also want to mention the fact that the Inter-American Defense Board has established an Inter-American Defense College which began its first course for senior officers from the armed forces of the various American Republics in October 1962. The College is located at Fort McNair. The purpose of the College is to conduct courses of study on the inter-American system and the military, economic, political and social factors that are essential components to the defense of our free societies.

**Problems of control of subversive action**

Before leaving this aspect of the problem I would like to say something about the difficulties in curbing subversive activities. The very nature of clandestine action makes it difficult to deal with. In free societies where subversive elements take advantage of...
the safeguards of democratic processes and where governments feel themselves inhibited by respect for constitutional norms, the problem is even more complicated. Add to this the lack of adequate administrative machinery and internal security capabilities which exists in many Latin American countries, and you can see the dimensions of the problem. For example, coastlines are extensive and thinly populated and frontiers for the most part run through rugged terrain difficult to patrol. Effective control of clandestine shipments of arms and men becomes a most difficult task under these conditions. Besides, there are plenty of arms available in most countries for a price and no need for special efforts to ship them in. The ease with which money can be transmitted poses a serious problem even for governments with the most elaborate security machinery. Propaganda which comes over the radio can be jammed but only at great expense and effort and even then without complete success. The control of the entry and departure of travellers and surveillance while they are in the country is another task requiring large numbers of trained personnel and substantial funds. I mention this solely to give you some idea of what we and our sister republics are up against in trying to develop our capacity to deal with the problem of subversion through individual and collective effort.
At the same time I don't want to leave the impression we have given up. The training in Cuba of party members is a particularly important contribution about which it should be possible to do something. A number of suggestions are made on this matter in the recent SCCS report. While the actions must be taken by our Latin American associates, we will certainly wish to be helpful in any way we can.
ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN THE HEMISPHERE'S SECURITY EFFORT

So far I have talked about US and OAS programs to deal directly with the subversive effort. It would be a mistake to close without a few words on the Alliance for Progress.

In the critical last week of October, when we confronted the Soviet Union bluntly and directly over the missiles in Cuba, the Finance Ministers of the 20 member countries of the Alliance for Progress met in Mexico City. President Kennedy sent a message to that conference which established the clear and direct relationship of their work to our and the hemisphere's security. He said to the Alliance conferees: "Your meeting is a vital reminder that the central task of this generation of Americans is not merely the avoidance of conflict. It is the construction of a new community of American nations in which all our citizens can live not only free from fear but full of hope... Just as the unyielding determination of today is essential if we are to realize the future promise of the Alliance for Progress, the future success of the Alliance for Progress will be the final vindication of the resolute course we are taking today."

The Alliance was not undertaken as a response to Castro. But I do not think there is any doubt that the threat of Castroism gave us a sense of urgency about the economic and social underdevelopment of Latin America and the resultant political tensions and dangers that
that we did not have before. We have engaged in this program because it is right and because it is in our national interest to live in a world of independent and secure countries. By doing so, however, we also seek to provide for Latin America a democratic alternative to Castro-communism, reflecting another statement by President Kennedy -- "If peaceful evolution proves impossible, violent revolutions will be inevitable."

Theoretically, we could put vast amounts of arms and riot equipment into Latin American hands today to stamp out rebellion and to shoot down the Communist leaders and followers. But in whose hands would we put these arms? How can we be sure that the riot quellers of today will not be the rioters tomorrow? What good are arms and security controls in a permanently unstable society?

In practice, we are providing aid to our sister republics in public safety and anti-subversion efforts, conscious of the fact that these efforts are meaningful only in the framework of a longer-term program. That program is the Alliance. We are helping our sister republics to maintain order and strengthen democratic institutions so the fruits of the Alliance may have a chance to ripen. Some of them ripen fast - schools, health centers, pure water systems, low income homes, school feeding, farm-to-market roads. Others take time to produce results: new industries, road and rail networks, modernized agricultural economies. We do the first kind,
kind, again, to make possible the second kind. What we aim at is, over the next ten years, to develop skills, attitudes and material foundations on the basis of which Latin America can go forward to self-sustaining growth. What we aim at, simultaneously, is the production of sufficient evidence for a large enough number of people that our way works so as to deter them from following the false but alluring promises of the Castroites and Communists.

Are we succeeding? We cannot answer this question with certainty. What we do know is that we are getting under the Castroites' and the Communists' skin. The Alliance for Progress is a constant object of their scorn and their attacks. If that be a measure of the threat it poses to their goals, then we have reason to be hopeful about its appeal to the peoples of Latin America and its chances of success. Let me quote just a few examples.

Peking Radio on August 25th last year quoted the Mexican Communist organization which calls itself the National Liberation Movement as follows: "The Alliance for Progress is nothing but a hoax which could not deceive the people". It goes on to say: "Nobody can arrest the advance of history, whether by violence or threat, propaganda
propaganda or the 20 billion dollars, a United States promise connected with the Alliance for Progres program."

Cuban Communist leader Blas Roca in an article in Cuba Socialista in May of last year mentioned the Alliance no less than six times in two pages. He says the Alliance "gives no adequate or effective answer to the cry of the peoples of Latin America." The reason for this, says the Cuban Communist chief, is that it will not - and I quote again "liberate Latin America from Yankee rule, but...strengthen it." The burden of his article, translated into plain language, is that the Alliance would create a satisfactory and healthy relationship between the United States and Latin America and thus must be fought like poison by the Communists.

Castro's hope for the defeat of the Alliance was expressed in an interview with some Western reporters on June first, when he said that the American economy cannot afford the Alliance. He said, hopefully no doubt, and I quote from a Reuters dispatch in the New York Times: "They (the Americans) have neither the gold reserves nor the organization nor the men to make it work."

We do not need to concern ourselves too much with challenges thrown out by Fidel Castro.
The challenge we face is self-imposed, not only by us in the United States but by all 20 Alliance members. It is to end hunger, disease and illiteracy in Latin America, to make these republics a better place to live for their people and thus to make the hemisphere a better place to live for the United States. And it is a point to remember that Castro, Khrushchev and Mao Tse-Tung would rejoice if we gave up on the premise of the Alliance for Progress. They are right, of course, in being concerned about the Alliance, not only for the long-term future, but more immediately.

For one factor in the unanimous agreement in the Hemisphere on what to do about the missiles and in the failure of the Communist program of protests was the new hope of peaceful change brought by the Alliance and the new view of the US resulting from our leadership in this effort.

We see the Alliance as much more than a program of economic and social progress. We see it as a political and ideological program as well, depending on its success as much on the development of Latin America's human resources, the reshaping of public and leadership attitudes and institutions as on the building of roads, factories and hospitals.

The Charter of Punta del Este calls for more than a collection of separate projects paid for by American public funds. It envisages the modernization of society throughout
throughout Latin America. This includes the harnessing of the intensive craving for a national renaissance to the constructive goals set forth in the Charter. It means the development of wise and responsible political leadership; the broadening of opportunities for the increasingly frustrated and impatient young generation, particularly in the universities, and the channeling of vast intellectual and physical energies into the pursuit of national strength and independence in each member country of the Alliance.

The building of a stronger and broader economic base must go hand in hand with the development of an open and vigorous society in which there is room at the top and near the top for all those whose talents and dedication entitles them to play a more meaningful and self-fulfilling role in the conduct of their nation's affairs. If Latin American succeeds in this quest, if its youth finds the opportunity to plot solutions instead of revolutions, to demonstrate results instead of just demonstrating, the death knell will have sounded for the pessimism and the nihilism that are Castro's most valuable assets.

The pursuit of these objectives also entails a new dimension for our own Latin American policy and the resetting of sights on the part of all Americans, official
official and private, active in the region and in hemisphere affairs. This reorientation of our own attitudes is not an intellectual exercise. It is a requirement for the successful conduct of our new Latin American policy. Our own destiny is inextricably bound up with the development of a hemisphere-wide renewal which is long overdue. The alternative is a series of convulsions whose consequences cannot be foreseen but which are more likely to serve the objectives of our adversaries than the interests of Latin America and the United States.

In this sense, the Alliance for Progress is a policy of both national and hemispheric security which, regardless of the frustrations and disappointments we may experience, must be pursued steadfastly until the common goal is achieved.
CONCLUSIONS

In concluding this presentation I want to draw a few tentative conclusions, tentative because we are dealing with unusually unpredictable forces:

1. The peoples and governments of the Americas face a serious problem in communist subversion. Assessments of the degree of danger to particular countries will vary, though no country now seems likely to succumb in the foreseeable future. No one can deny, however, that it is a real and continuing problem as far as the peace and security of the hemisphere as a whole is concerned. Further, we cannot disregard the fact that terror and violence create conditions which make it far more difficult for public or private enterprise to achieve the economic and social progress essential to the ultimate defeat of subversion by the success of the Alliance for Progress.

2. During the months ahead we may well witness a step-up of the tactics of violence as the communists, impatient to score successes to recoup their prestige in Cuba and in the hemisphere, resort to terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla activities in an attempt to get publicity, unseat governments and seize power.

3. The nature of subversive action places the primary responsibility on each country to adopt necessary legislation
tion, establish required administrative machinery, and develop sufficient internal security forces to meet any situation which may arise. But such formal steps are not enough. Will and skill and courage are also required. And ultimately governments can only succeed if by their policies for promoting political, economic and social development they are able to command the active support of the great majority of their peoples.

4. It is no less true, however, that the effectiveness of the measures taken individually can be measurably increased or decreased by the degree to which the governments, including the United States, cooperate with one another, bilaterally or in larger groups like the OAS, sharing resources, experience and intelligence.

5. Without being complacent, we in the United States can derive certain satisfaction that as a result of actions of the United States and other American governments, working individually and collectively, some headway is being made to reduce the influence and capabilities of Cuba and the bloc and in controlling local subversive activities of all kinds in each country. Current United States actions may be summarized as reducing the appeal and capabilities of the Cuban regime, spreading knowledge of what a Castro-communist regime does for a people's freedom and well-being, providing equipment
equipment and training to Latin American military and police forces to deal with riots and guerrilla actions, working through the OAS to stimulate individual and collective action on the problem, and through the Alliance for Progress helping our partners attack the basic discontent on which subversion feeds.

6. The activities of all U.S. agencies must continue to be vigorous and be closely integrated into a single program which, in turn, is appropriately related to the particular problems and programs of each country on the one hand, and the OAS on the other.

7. Further deterioration of the prestige and influence of the present regime in Cuba, and its eventual replacement by a government freely chosen by the Cuban people, will contribute materially to reducing the threat but will not eliminate it. To do this, we must all work continuously on many fronts, positive and negative, individually and together, until the strength of our free democratic system to meet the highest needs and aspirations of the peoples is unmistakably proven to all and the Alliance for Progress has achieved its goals.