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FROM : CYRUS R. VANCE
TO : CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TITLE : PROVISION OF SUITABLE RADAR EQUIPMENT FOR TEMPORARY INSTALLATION AT THE
BREAKWATER ENTRANCE TO THE PORT OF COLON, PANAMA
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"Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of Use of
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JFK Reviews

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~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



IN REPLY REFER TO:

*Not used
Joint Staff
msg
Instead*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Provision of Suitable Radar Equipment for Temporary Installation at the Breakwater Entrance to the Port of Colon, Panama

The recent reports of possible contraband shipments to Venezuela-Colombia originating from the Panama Free Zone were discussed at the Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council on December 13, 1963. As a result of these reports and as part of an intensified effort to confirm and eliminate such traffic, I request that immediate action be taken to install a suitable radar capability at the harbor entrance to Colon. Contact with the Joint Staff confirms that CINCLANT has appropriate portable radar equipment for this purpose. It is desired that this equipment together with necessary operating personnel be situated in such a manner that day and night coverage is provided of shipping, entering and leaving the Breakwater north of Port of Colon. Present plans contemplate that this requirement may extend for a period of up to 120 days.

Appropriate coordination between CINCLANT and USCINCSO should be accomplished by the Joint Staff. USCINCSO is authorized to coordinate this matter with the Governor of the Panama Canal Zone and CAS Panama. In view of the urgency of this matter the equipment and operators should be in place not later than December 22, 1963. Major General Krulak, who participated as your representative at the December 13, 1963 meeting of the NSC Standing Group, is familiar with this requirement.

Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of the Army

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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UNILATERAL ACTION A

CIA View

CIA will propose authority be granted to conduct CIA or autonomous air strikes.

Comment

Advantages outweigh disadvantages provided "plausible denial" can be assured. CIA (US) personnel would risk this denial factor.

Used in book -
NSC Standing
Group Meetings

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. All technical services of the NSC shall be provided by the NSC Group Meetings.

2. The NSC Group Meetings shall be held on a regular basis, and shall be held in the NSC Group Meetings.

3. The NSC Group Meetings shall be held in the NSC Group Meetings.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document consists of 10 pages
No. 1 of 3 Copies; Series B

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

POSSIBLE FURTHER UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL
ACTIONS TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON CUBA
(SHORT OF USE OF FORCE)

I. Unilateral

A. Air attacks against carefully selected, important
economic installations by autonomous Cuban exile
group(s) operating from bases outside the United
States.

(Capability to be provided to autonomous group(s)
by CIA on "plausible denial" basis. Authorization
for such operations has been requested in past but
not granted.)

1. Advantages

- Possible substantial direct economic effects
- Indirect economic effects (maintenance of
military alert with consequent partial tying up
of labor force)
- Positive effects on morale of anti-Castro ele-
ments and waverers within Cuba
- Clear demonstration to Castro of determination
of opposition

2. Disadvantages

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UNILATERAL ACTION B

CIA View

CIA will recommend complete relaxation of present policy banning all independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against targets in Cuba from US and urge the British to do likewise for Bahama territory.

Comment

State course of action is preferable. Only selected reliable exile groups should be utilized for this purpose. The British would likely recoil from CIA proposal. Exile air attacks should not be authorized.

2. Disadvantages

- Technical difficulties and cost of providing capability
- Uncertainty of successful execution
- Risk of attributability
- Direct conflict with our well-known, public opposition to air attacks
- Marked raising of noise level
- Possible Soviet reaction, including negative effect on troop withdrawals
- Possible reaction against air surveillance

B. Selective covert relaxation of U.S. controls against Cuban exile groups in Florida wishing to undertake sabotage and infiltration activities.

(Involves discreet neutralization of obstacles to the operations of such groups established by United States enforcement agencies).

1. Advantages

- Possible additional (but minor) direct economic damage
- Possible indirect economic effects
- Provision of some screen for CIA's own operations

Possible

UNILATERAL ACTION C

CIA View

CIA will concur in this course of action.

Comment

This course of action should only be undertaken if a US policy decision to do away with Castro by all means short of invasion is forthcoming. Otherwise it constitutes a costly and marginally effective course of action.

- Possible dilution of Cuban defenses of benefit to CIA operations
- Positive effects on Cuban exile morale
- Some positive effects on morale of anti-Castro elements and waverers within Cuba
- Method of signalling to Castro change to "harder" U/S. policy

2. Disadvantages

- U.S. acquiescence quite evident
- Direct conflict with our statements and actions concerning U.S.-based exile raids
- Uncertainty of control over choice of targets (e.g., Soviet vessels)
- Raising of noise level
- Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal of military personnel

C. Military Feints

(Movement of U.S. air and surface units over and in international waters near Cuba in manner designed to keep Cuban military force in state of alert and uncertainty. To be effective, movements would have to be extended over time)

1. Advantages

UNILATERAL ACTION D

CIA View

CIA will concur for both intelligence and psychological effect.

Comment

Flights can and should be resumed particularly if reports of stepped up Soviet Arms deliveries continue. In addition consideration should be given to initiating night photography missions in areas of suspected military activity.

1. Advantages

- Indirect economic effects of maintenance of military alert
- Psychological harassment of Castro and other leaders
- Opportunities for escalation, if desired

2. Disadvantages

- Risk of reaction by Castro, with consequent danger of escalation
- Investment of U.S. forces over time in essentially psychological exercise
- Possible negative effects on morale of anti-Castro elements and waverers within Cuba when nothing substantial happens
- Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal of military personnel

D. Occasional, selected low-level "reconnaissance" overflights by U.S. aircraft

(Flight paths would be designed to reduce to a minimum the possibility of effective Cuban counter-action against aircraft)

1. Advantages

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UNILATERAL ACTION E

CIA View

CIA will support this action and seek additional US sanctions against Canada, the UK, Spain and Japan.

Comment

NASM 220 provides that a ship that engages in the Cuban trade on or after January 1, 1963 is proscribed from carrying US government cargoes. This ship can be removed only if the owner contracts to remove it and all other ships owned by his firm from the Cuban trade. The State course of action is a fairly significant step which should increase pressure on Cuba. The State paper appears to underplay somewhat the effects of this action.

