JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10009-10084
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO : NSC'S STANDING GROUP
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S STANDING GROUP
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 19
SUBJECTS : CUBAN SUBVERSION

ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS - CUBA
CUBAN EXILES
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
MILITARY TRAINING OF CUBAN NATIONALS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/05/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Califano Papers. Memo for NSC Standing Group re: threat of Cuban hemispheric subversion and an associated action plan. Attached memos concerning economic restrictions, exile problems and military training and planning.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S STANDING GROUP

Annex 5

CUBAN HEMISPHERE SUBVERSION

We are concerned about Cuba's effectiveness as a base for subversion in the hemisphere. We are giving the highest priority to this problem and can report progress in countering Cuba's subversive efforts. While we can never insure that Cuba will not be able to help subvert another Latin American country, effective action on our part can considerably reduce Cuba's capability to do so.

Krulak Sub-Committee: Following the February 25 submission of a report on subversion by an interdepartmental working group headed by Ambassador Thurston, the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs on February 27 appointed a Sub-committee on Subversion headed by Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC. The sub-committee in quick order produced useful action papers on: 1) control of movement of persons to Cuba for subversive training; 2) control of movement of propaganda material; 3) control of movement of arms; 4) establishment of a surveillance system in the Caribbean; 5) exchange of intelligence information and, 6) control of movement of funds for subversive purposes. Another paper, on training of Latin Americans, is under preparation.

Central America - Managua Team: These papers were used in preparing talking points for the Meeting of Presidents at San Jose where it was decided to hold the Managua Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior or Security, to discuss measures to counter Castro-Communist subversion in the especially vulnerable Isthmian area. In preparing for this latter meeting the Krulak papers were again drawn upon heavily. At Managua the Ministers agree to recommend to their
governments that they undertake the following steps designed
to limit Cuba's potential for subversion in the Central
American area:

A. Adopt, within the limitation of their respective con-
istitutional provisions, measures to be put into effect
immediately to prohibit, restrict and discourage the
movement of their nationals to and from Cuba. To
this end, they propose the adoption of the following
measures:

1) Provide, as a general rule, that every
passport or other travel document which may be
issued carry a stamp which indicates that said
passport is not valid for travel to Cuba.

2) Declare officially that nationals who are
permitted to travel to Cuba should have the per-
mission duly inscribed in their official travel
document.

3) Promulgate regulations restricting the
granting of visas to foreigners who have travelled
to Cuba within a stipulated period of time.

4) Notify travel agencies and transport com-
panies of these measures for due compliance; and
inform the government of other countries through
the most appropriate means.

5) Request the Governments of the Hemisphere:

   a) not to allow the nationals of signatory
countries to travel to Cuba unless they possess a
valid passport or other document issued by their
country of origin valid for such travel;

   b) not to accept visas, tourist cards or
other documents issued to their nationals for travel
to Cuba which do not form an integral (non-detachable)
part of their passports or other travel documents;
c) to observe the limitations placed in the passports or other travel documents of the nationals of signatory governments and not allow them to depart for Cuba;

d) to inform the signatory countries through appropriate channels of refusals to allow one of their nationals to depart for Cuba; and

e) to provide the signatory governments the names of their nationals which may appear on the passenger list of any airplane or ship going to or coming from Cuba.

B. Enlist the cooperation of financial institutions to report on the transfer of funds which persons or groups catalogued as Communist subversive elements make, within their respective countries, for subversive purposes; and to establish surveillance of Communist-controlled businesses and other activities to identify the transfer of funds through such establishments for subversive purposes or activities; and impound such funds, or take preventive measures, compatible with each country's legislation, so that they may not be used for purposes that would tend to destroy democratic governments.

C. Take action to impede the clandestine movement of arms into the Isthmian countries, including specific instructions to border control forces to intensify port, airfield and border inspection of incoming and outgoing cargo in order to prevent contraband traffic in arms; and establish strict security and accountability with respect to arms and ammunition issued to their armed forces and law enforcement agencies.

D. Take action to prevent the introduction of subversive Communist propaganda materials into the Isthmian countries from abroad; adopting laws as necessary to provide severe penalties for persons knowingly engaged in the introduction or dissemination of such propaganda;
and report to the diplomatic missions of the signatory countries the identity of any person discovered introducing or disseminating such propaganda material in the country.

E. Adopt as soon as possible for immediate implementation effective measures to prevent subversive activities that may be instigated by Castro-communist propaganda or agents in each of the Central American countries and Panama.

F. Establish a cooperative system to impede the clandestine movement of persons, propaganda materials and arms for subversive purposes involving:

a. surveillance by each country of its own coastal area, and interception of suspicious craft within its territorial waters; and

b. cooperation of the Central American States, Panama and the United States to carry out such surveillance and interception, upon the request of any of the governments concerned.

G. Establish, as soon as possible, an organization in each State, with the sole purpose of counteracting Communist subversion in the Central America-Panama area. This organization will be staffed by specialized personnel to whom privileges will be extended for travel in the above-mentioned area. These organizations will be primarily responsible for:

a) detecting, controlling and counteracting actions and objectives of the members, instrumentalities, sympathizers and collaborators of the Communist Party; and

b) lending mutual support to each other and constantly exchanging information regarding movements of persons or groups, propaganda, funds and arms for Communist subversive purposes.
H. Agree to:

1. Recommend that their Governments:

   a) hold periodic meetings of representatives of Isthmian countries and the United States to review progress made and problems remaining in the control of movements of persons, arms, funds and propaganda, for subversive Communist purposes;

   b) hold bilateral discussions among the signatory countries regarding requirements for technical, materiel assistance and training support; and

   c) furnish information on a continuing basis to the Council of the Organization of American States on Communist subversive activities in their respective countries.

2. Inform the Organization of American States of the agreements taken at the present meeting requesting of that Organization and the Member Governments the indispensable backing and support required to achieve their effective implementation, thereby strengthening the inter-American system.

To encourage implementation of these recommendations and to discuss possible requirements for U.S. assistance a delegation will spend several days in each Isthmian country beginning April 23.

The other hemisphere governments have been advised of the progress being made by the Central Americans and informed that we consider their actions to be worthy of emulation. Telegrams to each of the other hemisphere posts, instructing them to seek appropriate counter-subversion actions by host governments, are now being prepared in the Department.

Bilateral Approaches: Mexico is now the only western hemisphere transit point for scheduled air travel to Cuba, and the cooperation of the Mexican Government is essential if Cuba's potential for subversion is to be lessened. We have requested Mexican assistance and the GOM has taken several measures to curb traffic of Latin Americans through Mexico to and from Cuba. Mexico has been delaying granting permission
for the Cuban airline to substitute Russian-built IL-18's for the older Britannias which it is now using on the Habana-Mexico City run. Mexico also is requiring that Cuban visas be placed in passports rather than on separate sheets of paper and is stamping passports to show exit and entry from Mexico. The prospects are that Mexico will go further to assist the Isthmian countries in control measures.

Following our approaches on this matter, other countries have also shown an increased awareness of the need to take counter-subversion measures. Prime Minister Bustamante of Jamaica told Assistant Secretary Martin he had no intention of permitting travel to Cuba and that he had turned down requests from both KLM airlines and the Cuban Government to resume flights between Cuba and Jamaica. The Bolivian Government has also indicated it is finally becoming concerned about the large number of its citizens who are traveling to Cuba and is willing to take steps to reduce this travel.

Some success has also been achieved in undercutting specific Cuban propaganda efforts in the hemisphere. Partially because of our efforts to make it difficult for Latin Americans to attend the recent "Solidarity with Cuba" meeting in Brazil, this event was far from successful.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S STANDING GROUP

Annex 6

ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS

a) **Shipping**

The results of our demarches to cut down Free World shipping to Cuba are best explained by figures. During the period January 1 to March 31, 1962 a total of 337 Free World vessels entered Cuban ports. During the same period in 1963, only 62 Free World vessels entered Cuban ports. A proposal is presently before the President to expand NSAM No. 220 to bar U. S.-financed cargoes to all vessels owned or controlled by persons owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade. Such a measure will affect several hundred vessels and we anticipate it will result in a further decline in Free World shipping to Cuba.

Other measures being considered include closing OAS ports to all vessels engaged in the Cuban trade on continuous voyage, requesting U. S.-owned oil companies to voluntarily deny bunkers in the Western Hemisphere to ships known to be engaged in the Cuban trade, reassessment of the definitions within the terms of Section 107 (B) of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1963 and closing United States ports completely to certain classes of vessels.

b) **Civil Aviation**

Before the missile crisis, five international airlines served Cuba with about 20 frequencies weekly. Through our efforts, all Free World international airlines except IBERIA (Spain) have ceased operations to the island. IBERIA has one-to-two flights per month.

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SECRET
CUBANA (Cuba) has a bi-weekly service to Mexico City. The Mexicans have taken several measures to tighten the controls on this service.

These are the only scheduled links Cuba now has with the Free World.

Continued efforts by CSA (Czechoslovakia) and CUBANA to obtain servicing and/or passenger rights in other Free World cities have been thus far successfully blocked by Departmental efforts.

Any requests for transit, servicing or passenger privileges by CUBANA, CSA or AEROFLOR at any point are strenuously opposed on a continuing basis.

c) Trade

The decline in Free World trade with Cuba has materially affected her ability to maintain the former relatively high standard of living enjoyed before the Castro take-over. The 4th quarter 1959 GNP of $2,391 billion pesos has declined an estimated 25% to about $1,790 billion pesos (Est. 1962) while the population has increased roughly 6% from 6,661,000 to 7,068,000 in 1962. From these data it appears that the per capita GNP has declined from about 360 pesos in 1959 to 253 pesos per annum in 1962. This decrease in income and the rise in prices caused by the increasing shortage of consumer goods has further reduced the average Cuban standard of living, causing widespread discontent. Some selected trade figures may be illustrative of the effects of the United States efforts.
Trade with Cuba
(Millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1962 (Est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed. Rep. of Germany</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographic Areas
(Millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1962 (Est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near and Far East</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d) **Strategic Commodities**

We are continually endeavoring to halt the flow of strategic commodities which formerly were supplied to a great extent by the United States to Cuba. We have recently through the combined efforts of State, Commerce and private industry successfully blocked the exportation of 500 small tractors from Britain to Spain to Cuba and the sale of 2.5 million tons of Egyptian oil.

Additionally, several shipments of bright stock (oil additive) have been denied Cuba. In several instances export sales of Cuban sugar were blocked.

Efforts to further disrupt Cuba’s economy through cutting off needed imports and prevent the earning of badly needed foreign exchange by reducing sales of sugar, tobacco, molasses and other products are being carried forward on a continuing basis.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STANDING GROUP

Annex 7
EXILE PROBLEMS

1. **The Cuban Revolutionary Council and Dr. Miro Cardona**

   The Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), headed by Dr. Miro Cardona, has, since March 1961, covertly received about $3,000,000 from the United States. The Council is composed of about a dozen exile groups which represent the main anti-Castro non-Batista political stream in the exile community. It should be noted that at last count there were estimated to be over 400 exile groups, the great majority of which are splintered groups consisting of a "leader" and a few of his friends. The United States has regarded the CRC as its main point of contact with the exile community. The CRC and a few important exile groups outside the CRC (also financially assisted by us) have engaged in propaganda and other activities with our support.

   We have refused Miro's demands that we form an alliance with him for the purpose of military action against Cuba, and he has resigned. His resignation will probably be accompanied by that of most of the Council members and the Council may well disappear. We currently think the Council's disappearance would be a desirable development. We shall be evolving policy recommendations regarding our future relations with the exile groups. Attached is a copy of the Department's press statement regarding Dr. Miro's resignation.

2. **Alpha 66 and Similar Pin-Pricked Raids**

   There is attached a copy of the joint State-Justice press release on this subject.

   We are currently considering what if any fruitful anti-Castro activities such groups may be persuaded to undertake.
3. The Cuban Brigade

We have established a program of military and civilian opportunities for the members of the Bay of Pigs invasion brigade. Some 400 members of the Brigade have enlisted in the military program (22 week training, or officer training, or an eight week training course for those over 35). The civilian aspect of the program is, after several obstacles have been overcome, now getting underway. This portion of the program offers qualified Brigade members loans for full academic expenses at the university level, a vocational training program including English, and special employment counseling. The monthly compensation for Brigade members is scheduled to terminate with a check for the month of May.

4. Resettlement of Cuban Exiles

We have pursued a policy of voluntary resettlement of Cuban exiles out of the Miami area. To date somewhat over 50,000 refugees have been resettled through the HEW-Voluntary Agency Program. An estimated 125,000 refugees remain in the Miami area. Even before the current Miro resignation, tensions between the local Miami population and the Cuban exiles had arisen. Congressional representatives from Florida expressed concern that further influx of refugees to Miami could result in unpleasant incidents. At the present time refugees inflow has been reduced to a trickle due to the absence of transportation between Cuba and United States. HEW is redoubling its efforts to persuade refugees to leave the Miami area. After the Miro Cardona affair dies down, many Cuban refugees may be more favorably disposed toward the resettlement program.
U. S. MILITARY TRAINING FOR CUBANS

On April 17, 1963, there were 2343 Cuban volunteers participating in a 22-week enlisted training program at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The first training company (composed of 207 enlisted men) completed training on April 10. These men are now being returned to civilian status. On April 26, two additional companies will complete training. Thereafter approximately 200 men will complete their training and return to civilian life each week. It is estimated that approximately 10 or 15 enlisted men from each of the 12 companies will volunteer and qualify for two years service in the U. S. Army. By mid-July 1963, less than 100 enlisted men will be participating in the 22-week program.

Prior to the initiation of the training program for members of the 2506th Cuban Brigade, five Cuban officer volunteers were placed in training programs. Three of this group are in training at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and two are in training at Fort Benning, Georgia.

A special program for former members of the 2506th Cuban Brigade was initiated in March 1963. Eighty-nine enlisted men (age 18-34) and 93 enlisted men (age 35-50) are now in training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The older age groups will complete an eight week training program in early June 1963; the younger age group will complete a 22-week program in early September 1963.

An officer training program of 15 weeks duration for former members of the 2506th Cuban Brigade is underway at Fort Benning, Georgia. There are 209 officers in this program (Army, 145; Navy, 24; Marine Corps, 16; Air Force, 24).

Enlisted Brigade members in the 18-34 age group and Brigade members in the officer program may volunteer for advanced training in a wide variety of specialities.
Plains approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. CINCLANT OPLAN 308-62 [A]

2. CINCLANT OPLAN 312-63 - This plan provides for the rapid application of air power against Cuba. [A]

3. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63 - Provides for simultaneous coordinated amphibious airborne assault of Cuba, designed to eliminate the Castro/Communist regime. Planned reaction time from no-warning status is 18 days. [A]
4. CINCLANT OPLAN 322-62

5. Reconnaissance Plans:
   a. "BRASS KNOBS" - U-2 (high level) reconnaissance.
   b. "PEG LEG" - Low level reconnaissance.
   c. "GREY WOLF" - Armed reconnaissance to search for missing PEG LEG aircraft.
   d. "BLUE MOON" - Reconnaissance to support surface blockade/quarantine.

Plans or Studies under Review and Development.

1. CINCLANT OPLAN 380-62.

2. Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case I - Spontaneous Revolt).

3. Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case II - Contrived Incident).

4. Consideration of the Use of Latin American Forces in Connection with U. S. Contingency Plans to Assist Latin American Nations Which May be Seriously Threatened by a Communist Takeover.