

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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SEC 3.3(b) SIXS

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 DEC 2037
OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED W/ CIA CONCURRENCE

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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c. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other countries.

d. Voice Radio Broadcast from a Submarine. DOD made a submarine available to CIA for the conduct of voice radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIA.

e. Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the CIA.

f. Utilization of AVON-PARK, Florida, by CIA as a Base for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the feasibility of using certain facilities at AVON-PARK for the training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare.

g. Oil Drum Mines. DOD transferred 40 oil drum mines to CIA.

h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer to duty with CIA to be in charge of small boat operations at Miami, Florida.

i. Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANT's regular contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are being made to reduce the reaction time required for implementation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US forces.

j. Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piecemeal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk inherent in such an operation CINCLANT is seeking means for reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment.

k. Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has been developed for the purpose of covering the repositioning of forces allocated to the contingency plans for overt military intervention in Cuba.

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It also includes means designed to provoke Cuban reaction and thus act as a triggering device for US intervention.

l. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision, to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execution of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal revolt.

m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been developed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours after decision.

n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared.

o. DOD's Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished without leading to general war and without serious offense to public opinion.

p. BW/CW Capabilities. A paper was prepared listing the things that can be done against Cuba in BW/CW field.

q. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba.

r. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba.

s. Manufacture of Soviet Aircraft. A survey was made concerning the US capability for the covert production of facsimiles of Soviet aircraft.

t. Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the requirements of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols, [electronic collection] and special operations were implemented. Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political

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e. Summary - Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off considerably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organization itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with specific targets, this situation will probably continue.

4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba - Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the U.S. could:

a. ~~With~~ 18 days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne-
amphibious assault which it is anticipated would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

b. Should the situation demand, a piecemeal commitment of US forces could be made with reaction times approximately as follows:

2 Airborne Divisions	-	5 days (para-drop units only)
4 Marine BLTS	-	7 - 8 days
Following Forces	-	15 - 18 days

(This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk.)

c. In conjunction with either of the actions described in a and b, above, cover and deception plans have been developed which, if executed, would result in repositioning of forces assigned to the invasion of Cuba and could thereby result in an over-all reaction time of approximately 12 days for a coordinated assault.

d. Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in Cuba within 6, 12 or 24 hours; the time dependent upon aircraft availability and desired intensity of attack.

e. Air-sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours with effectiveness increasing to a complete blockade within approximately 48 hours.

5. Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.

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
h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer to duty with CIA



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
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


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
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US forces could be made



c. In conjunction with either of the actions described in a and b,
above, cover and deception plans have been developed which, if executed,
would result in prepositioning of forces assigned to the invasion of Cuba
and could thereby result in an over-all reaction time of approximately
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