AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: JCS
RECORD NUMBER: 202-10001-10171
RECORDS SERIES: FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: DOC 172

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: OSD
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY
DATE: 00/00/00
PAGES: 24
SUBJECTS: OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS: 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Reviewed by CIA, State, OSD.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
STATE
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED POSTPONED IN PART
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Remainder of document requires review from CIA, State, OSD.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
The Department of State releases this document in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526).

Reviewed on 2/30/98
Portion(s) Postponed Under 6.1 (C)

Concerning the status of DOD plans as to the military's stake and proposed activities to date - our first completed action was to obtain a DOD/JCS position.

Meeting the status of DOD plans.

The military's stake and proposed activities to date - our first completed action was to obtain a DOD/JCS position.
order within Cuba;

b. If we announced incident to going in; that we were moving in to restore order and hold free elections; and that we would withdraw from Cuba as soon as the new government advised that they had the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations;

c. If the operation was conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures was reduced to the minimum.

We feel very strongly that without damage to their international position and simply by making the decision to do so, the Soviets can take a page from our book and establish an overseas military base or bases in Cuba. This would greatly increase our national vulnerability and our defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted
to meet this threat from the south. It would also provide the Communists with a secure base for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.

The Soviets have an option on which they can foreclose at any time. They can make the decision to establish military bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure and if they exercise this option, we would likely be unable to remove them without initiating World War III. Consequently, we feel it is mandatory that face the facts squarely now, and determine as early as possible whether we can rid Cuba of Communism by covert support of Cubans within Cuba; and it is equally mandatory, for logistic and planning purposes, that we have an early decision as to whether we definitely intend to use military force, if covert means fail.

We also feel strongly that the United States should intervene to preserve Cuban nationals identified as being
essential to the establishment of a
friendly Cuban government if they are
in danger of being exterminated by a
widespread Hungarian type blood purge.

In furtherance of the DOD/JCS policy
that any military intervention should be
conducted as quickly as possible, and
with sufficient force to minimize the
Communist Bloc's capability to react, we
are working with CINCLANT in attempting
to reduce the reaction time of his con-
tingency plans for moving into Cuba,
and at the same time to beef up his capa-
bility so that there will be no doubt
as to the US ability to move in and
take over rapidly regardless of the
opposition we may meet.

Our primary plan can be activated
from a condition of no warning in 18 days
and provides for confronting Cuban force
with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life.

A secondary plan can be activated from a condition of no warning although this plan involves a degree of risk by a piecemeal commitment of forces. CINCLANT is planning to reduce these reaction times through prepositioning of forces and materiel. This planning effort should soon provide us a basis for decision concerning the extent we wish to go in prepositioning without endangering security and the element of surprise to an unacceptable degree.

We feel that there is an alarming lack of appreciation that time is running out that we cannot let this operation drag on for an indefinite number of years, hoping to develop a massive resistance capability within Cuba. We are concerned that the new proposal de-emphasizes the time factor by waiting until July before
a decision is made as to what to do next. This would permit the Soviets (Communist regime in Cuba) additional time to foreclose on the options open to them, viz., entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/or the establishment of Soviet bases in Cuba. Either one of these actions would add new dimensions to our problem, and introduce considerations which would postpone positive action indefinitely not preclude for the foreseeable future the elimination of the Communist regime.

In the event that the coming months may disprove the feasibility of initiating an internal revolt in Cuba, it is suggested that Phase II might be marked with the execution of a Cover and Deception Plan. Normal training of US forces would be the primary cover; the deception would be concurrent efforts to convince the Communist Cuban government that we were in fact invading Cuba. This course of action could provide adequate provocation for US intervention depending, of course...
on Cuban rashness in their reaction.

If successful, we might not have to engage in the more difficult and dangerous game of developing pretexts; although we should include this requirement as a final resort to assure successful initiation of Phase II.

As I previously mentioned, one of our primary responsibilities is supporting CIA. To date, CIA has submitted several requests for support. In each case, action was initiated immediately and the request processed expeditiously. These requests included:


(DOD has approved this request provided national policy permitted training of Cubans on US military bases).

b. Assignment of a Navy Commander experienced in small boat operations to handle their maritime small boat activities. (The following day, the

[Handwritten notes:]

- [Notes on page 7]
Chief of Naval Operations approved the request and directed the Navy Bureau of Personnel to procure and assign a qualified officer without delay.

C. Advice and assistance from BJ Unit No. 2 in testing certain simulation devices. (Direct contact with BJ No. 2 and appropriate CIA personne was authorized)

D. CIA has informally requested the Navy to obtain 6 PT boats for their use. (Staffing to date indicates that the Navy does not have 6 PT boats in their inventory. They have 2 in mothballs, 1 designated as a Presidential escape boat, and 1 hull without a mooring. The lead-time required to place mothballed PT boats in operation is 30 days at the minimum, at a cost of $200,000 each. The purchase of additional PTs requires an estimated 3 to 6 months after signing the contract. The cost per unit for new PT boats is estimated at $1 million.
(3) Whether, and/or to what extent US bases and facilities should be utilized for training Cuban refugees.

(2) Whether, and/or to what extent the Government will apply to project a policy of non-attribution to the US armed forces and bases in connection with the activities necessary to permit fulfillment of the request. These policies decisions are:

Whether, and/or to what extent the use of US Armed Forces to furnish air and sea cover for CIA sponsored activities. This request raise several national policy decisions.
employed on CSG projects and if so, whether, and/or to what extent they will be non-attributable.

(4) Whether, and/or to what extent US Armed Forces personnel will be employed within the territorial boundaries of Cuba.

(5) Whether, and/or to what extent overflights of Cuba for purposes of leaflet drops, resupply and divers will be permitted.

(6) Whether, and/or to what extent Guantanamo will be used as a base for agents, black flights and black broadcasts.

(7) Whether, and/or to what extent use of British-controlled and other foreign areas for staging areas will be permitted.

(8) What is the priority of Operation Mongoose, as compared to other projects and operations.

We have also prepared an assessment of the risk involved in air resupply missions over Cuba. We are readying two USAF
sanitized aircraft and "sheep-dipped"
crews for air resupply missions to
agents within Cuba, and we are assisting
CIA with its maritime needs, including
help in obtaining PT type boats from
foreign sources, readying "sheep-dipped"
crews and equipment as deemed necessary
and providing operational concepts on
disrupting or destroying Cuban capabilit
of maritime coastal patrols.

In order to accomplish our assigned
tasks, I have a working group with full-
time representatives from J-1, J-2, J-3,
and J-5, J-6, CIA, P-2B and DIA who serve,
as representatives of their respective
Directors, and as action officers in
dealing directly with their respective
Directorates.

Further, I have representatives of
each of the Services who also serve full
time on the working group. They work
directly with three people on the Service
staffs; the Operations Deputy, the
Deputy for Plans, and one action
officer.
Obviously, my working group cannot staff all the tasks placed upon us; consequently, whenever possible, we sanitize the tasks and have them accomplished by the Joint Staff or the regular Service staffs.