

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan.

(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary [but maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fail.] In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military Reaction.

(a) With no prior warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack in support of the rebel Cubans with little delay from the time a decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within eight (8) hours, an airborne assault could be initiated within five (5) days and a Navy/Marine amphibious force could be committed three (3) days later.

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4. Department of Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tanks, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.

(a) In western Cuba airborne and amphibious assaults will be conducted by a Joint Task Force with the initial objective of seizing the city of Havana and obtaining control over the seat of government. Army airborne units will secure the major airfields in the area as well as major port areas required for follow-on forces and logistic resupply. Navy/Marine amphibious forces will secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Havana and designated Army units will follow the Marines over the beach. The Marine amphibious forces will be prepared to re-embark for further operations as directed.

(b) In eastern Cuba, Guantanamo will be reinforced by air- and sea-lifted Marines for defense

[ of the base. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious forces will be employed in operations against Cuban forces in the Santiago de Cuba complex or in other operations in eastern Cuba as directed.

(4) Subsequent to the seizure of Havana and Santiago and the successful defense of Guantanamo, operations will be conducted to defeat remaining pockets of resistance. Additional amphibious and airborne operations may be required. The most likely areas for such operations are: Matanzas, Nuevitas, Micaro, Trinidad, Bahia de Cochinos, and the Isle of Pines. ]

(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations. ]

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States in as broad a multilateral context as possible.

(a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

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