

15

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Page : 1

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MUNGOOSE

31 August 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale
Subject: Phase II, Operation Mongoose

Pursuant to your instructions, transmitted herewith is a proposed projection of actions to be undertaken as Phase II, Operation Mongoose. This projection incorporates the suggestions of the operations team designated by the major departments and agencies charged with Mongoose planning and implementation.

The format employed is responsive to the 16 August 1962 guidelines for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, and to your comments at recent meetings. The projection is divided into each objective contained in the 16 August guidelines, and then lists proposed actions to attain that objective. The guideline objectives have been given short titles as follows:

- A. Discredit and isolate the regime
- B. Harass the economy
- C. Intensify intelligence collection
- D. Split regime leadership and relations with Bloc
- E. Assist Cuban exile groups and Latin American governments to take actions
- F. Be prepared to exploit a revolt

In preparing this projection of actions for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, an effort was made to restrict proposals to the "B plus" frame of reference provided and to assume that a broader frame of programming under the NSAM would supplement Mongoose by separate planning.

"Special Handling" number copies to:

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- 3. Mr. McNamara
- 4. Mr. Murrow

Operational Representatives (Series B)

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PHASE II
(1 August 1962 until _____)

MONGOOSE

OBJECTIVE A: DISCREDIT AND ISOLATE THE REGIME

ACTIVITY

Political

1. Encourage Latin American nations, bi-laterally and through the OAS Special Consultative Committee (SCCS), to establish controls over the travel of their nationals to Cuba. (State, with CIA support).

2. Encourage Latin American nations, bi-laterally and through the SCCS, to limit or prohibit entry of Cuban propaganda. (State, with CIA and USIA support).

3. Provide intelligence of arms smuggling from Cuba to other Hemisphere nations. (CIA, State, Defense).

4. As opportune, initiate action or support another nation's initiative in the OAS with respect to countering the Communist regime in Cuba. (State, with CIA support).

PURPOSE

To diminish travel by Latin American nationals to Cuba and to facilitate the collection of intelligence on persons travelling.

To diminish the influx of Cuban propaganda into Latin America.

To obtain and exploit hard evidence of Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere.

To maintain the multilateral hemispheric context of the Cuban problem.

CONSIDERATIONS

Most Latin American nations have constitutional provisions regarding freedom of travel.

Many Latin American countries have legal bars against admitting foreign publications.

Commanders requested to develop and encourage Latins to develop alerting systems, to include anti-infiltration training.

Deep division within the Hemisphere over the Cuban issue may be surfaced. As an example of this activity, the current Dominican initiative in the OAS should be supported and exploited.

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PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

ACTIVITY

5. Continue the program of excluding Cuba from Hemisphere organizations. (State, with CIA support).
6. Stimulate manifestations critical of the Castro/Communist regime by Latin American political, labor, religious, and student and other significant impact groups. (State, with CIA and USIA support).
7. Encourage and exploit the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials, and delegates abroad. (CIA)
8. Keep friendly nations fully informed of the nature of the Castro/Communist regime and of U. S. policy with respect to it. (State, with CIA and USIA support).

To strengthen the isolation of Cuba.

Possible exceptions, such as in public health, should be examined to determine U. S. national interest.

To demonstrate that Latin America has rejected Cuba as a model to be imitated.

To be productive, such demonstrations should stem naturally out of Cuban events, as they happen. "Events" could include Cuban refugee publication of substantive facts on what is happening to students, workers, etc. inside Cuba.

To make utmost political use of revelations by Cuban "insiders."

Although keeping defectors "in place" can be more valuable, it is not always so, and if they cannot be recruited in place, then exploiting the defection fully for propaganda is important. Note items 45 and 46.

To provide for coordinated action.

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ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

Psychological

9. Beamed to Cuba, initiate a planned series of statements by U. S. and other free world official and non-official spokesmen which support developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba. (USIA, with State and CIA support).

To maintain resistance morale within Cuba.

Moderation must be the keynote. Some unfavorable comment from Cuban refugee groups should be expected, demanding a harder line.

10. Continue Voice of America short-wave broadcasts to Cuba. (USIA)

To maintain regular, overt communication with the Cuban people.

The activity is based on nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish, with three hours daily specifically programmed for Cuba. Carefully documented programs of the failures of the Castro/Communist system will be increased, to maintain a subjective basis for Cuban disaffection. Emphasis will be given to repudiations of the Castro/Communist regime elsewhere, particularly the Western Hemisphere.

11. Continue U. S. broadcasting to the Western Hemisphere. (USIA)

To keep the people of the Hemisphere awake to the Cuban situation.

This activity now includes both VOA short-wave broadcasts. Renewed efforts will be made to enlist support from Inter-American Broadcasters Association members and other groups. "Soap operas" and special commentaries on anti-Castro themes will be included.

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ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

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| 12. Produce propaganda cartoon books.
(USIA). | To build and reinforce a negative image of Castro/Communism among youth, labor, and other groups in Latin America. | Themes can be updated quickly (agrarian reform problems, prisoner treatment, Soviet technicians, guerrillas, etc). Final Congressional action on USIA's FY 63 budget will determine if additional funds will have to be sought. |
| 13. Produce photo-novels carrying the propaganda story. (USIA). | Same as 12 above. | An anti-Castro pilot model is under development. These novels would complement the cartoon books (in 12 above), particularly in urban working groups. |
| 14. Supply TV outlets in Latin America with materials. (USIA). | Same as 12 above, plus impact on key leader audiences. | In addition to supplying documentaries and news clips, a series of one-minute puppet shorts will be tried. Commercial TV now covers all major cities in Latin America except Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile, and La Paz, Bolivia. |
| 15. Produce short films for commercial outlets and impact groups in Latin America. (USIA). | Same as 12 above. | Government censorship of all films in Latin America presents a potential problem. |
| 16. Produce propaganda exhibits ("before" and "after") for public and organizational display. (USIA). | Same as 12 above. | Three such exhibits are now being developed. The first one contrasts Castro's promises with his actions. An electric motor turns the slats on a venetian blind exhibit, changing the picture. |

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ACTIVITY

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PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

17. Publish books in Spanish and Portuguese, with distribution through commercial sales and presentation. (USIA and CIA).

Same as 12 above, plus impact on intellectuals and other opinion leaders.

Volume will depend in part on results of USIA's request for supplemental funds for the Latin American book program, now pending before Congress. Several new books are now in the pipeline.

18. Special propaganda exploitation of U. S. information about the agricultural, labor and public health situation in Cuba. (State, with CIA and USIA support).

To make full use of the factual basis for propaganda actions exposing true conditions inside Cuba.

Current research on Cuba by US departments and agencies, outside Mongoose, should be maintained and then be passed into Mongoose channels for use in the project. This includes Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and the Public Health Service.

19. Expand the delivery of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travellers, and controlled couriers. (CIA).

To disaffect the Cuban people and to help maintain the will to resist.

The "Gusano Libre" theme deserves much wider exploitation, since this is a theme created by resistance within Cuba itself.

20. Develop specific proposal for use of balloons to deliver propaganda. (CIA).

To provide a means of distributing propaganda inside Cuba.

This distribution technique must appear as a genuine Cuban refugee project. It must consider risks of injuring population or being exploited along that line by the Castro/Communist regime to the detriment of Mongoose objectives.

21. Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA)

To make them disaffected with their role in Cuba.

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