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PLANS TO ASSIST CUBANS IN OVERTHROWING THE COMMUNITIS
REGIME

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Presented by
Eden Young 21 Mar 62

BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

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Concerning the status of DOD plans and activities to date - our first completed action was to obtain a DOD/JCS position as to the military's stake and proposed role in the ousting of the Castro Communist regime. Basically, the policy reflected in this paper establishes that the military will support State and CIA as necessary during the preparatory phase of Operation Mongoose in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases. It also establishes the point that the military believe the continued existence of the Castro Communist regime is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere. It further makes the point that the military could intervene overtly in Cuba without serious offense to national or world public opinion if:

3(10)
a. We moved in response to a humanitarian requirement to restore

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order within Cuba;

3b b. If we announced incident to going in; that we were moving in to restore order and hold free elections; and that we would withdraw from Cuba as soon as the new government advised that they had the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations;

3c c. If the operation was conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures was reduced to the minimum.

4. We feel very strongly that without damage to their international position and simply by making the decision to do so, the Soviets can take a page from our book and establish an overseas military base or bases in Cuba. This would greatly increase our national vulnerability and our defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted

to meet this threat from the south. It would also provide the Communists with a secure base for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.

5 The Soviets have an option on which they can foreclose at any time. They can make the decision to establish military bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure, and if they exercise this option, we would likely be unable to remove them without initiating World War III. Consequently, we feel it is mandatory that we face the facts squarely now, and determine as early as possible whether we can rid Cuba of Communism by covert support of Cubans within Cuba; and it is equally mandatory, for logistic and planning purposes, that we have an early decision as to whether we definitely intend to use military force, if covert means fail.

6 We also feel strongly that the United States should intervene to preserve Cuban nationals identified as being

essential to the establishment of a friendly Cuban government if they are in danger of being exterminated by a widespread Hungarian type blood purge.

8 In furtherance of the DOD/JCS policy that any military intervention should be conducted as quickly as possible, and with sufficient force to minimize the Communist Bloc's capability to react, we are working with CINCLANT in attempting to reduce the reaction time of his contingency plans for moving into Cuba, and at the same time to beef up his capability so that there will be no doubt as to the US ability to move in and take over rapidly regardless of the opposition we may meet.

Our primary plan can be activated from a condition of no warning in 18 days, and provides for confronting Cuban forces 16

with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life.

8b A secondary plan can be activated [from a condition of no warning in 5 days] although this plan involves a degree of risk [by a piecemeal commitment of forces.] 16

8c CINCLANT is planning to reduce these reaction times through prepositioning of forces and materiel. This planning effort should soon provide us a basis for decision [concerning the extent we wish to go in prepositioning without endangering security and the element of surprise to an unacceptable degree.] 16

9 We feel that there is an alarming lack of appreciation that time is running out - that we cannot let this operation drag on for an indefinite number of years, hoping to develop a massive resistance capability within Cuba. We are concerned that the new proposal de-emphasizes the time factor by waiting until July before

a decision is made as to what to do next.
This would permit the Soviets (Communist regime in Cuba) additional time to fore-
close on the options open to them, viz.,
entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/
or the establishment of Soviet bases in
Cuba. Either one of these actions would
9(b) add new dimensions to our problem, and
introduce considerations which would
postpone positive action indefinitely if
not preclude for the foreseeable future
the elimination of the Communist regime.

10 In the event that the coming months
may disprove the feasibility of initiating
an internal revolt in Cuba, it is suggest-
ed that Phase II might be sparked with
the execution of a Cover and Deception
Plan. Normal training of US forces would
be the primary cover; the deception would
be concurrent efforts to convince the
Communist Cuban government that we were
in fact invading Cuba. This course of
10a action could provide adequate provocation
for US intervention depending, of course,

on Cuban rashness in their reaction.

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If successful, we might not have to engage in the more difficult and dangerous game of developing pretexts, although we should include this requirement as a final resort to assure successful initiation of Phase II.

11
As I previously mentioned, one of our primary responsibilities is supporting CIA. To date, CIA has submitted several requests for support. In each case, action was initiated immediately and the request processed expeditiously. These requests included:

11a
a. [Use of Avon Park, USAF Bombing Range in Southern Florida, as an exercise area for training agents.] 16
(DOD has approved this request provided national policy permitted training of Cubans on US military bases).

11b
b. [Assignment of a Navy Commander experienced in small boat operations to handle their maritime small boat activities.] 16
(The following day, the

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Chief of Naval Operations approved the request and directed the Navy Bureau of Personnel to procure and assign a qualified officer without delay.] 16

11c c. Advice and assistance from BJ Unit No. 2 in testing certain simulation devices. (Direct contact with BJ No. 2 and appropriate CIA personnel was authorized)

11d d. CIA has informally requested the Navy to obtain 6 PT boats for their use. (Staffing to date indicates that the Navy does not have 6 PT boats in their inventory. They have 2 in moth balls, 1 designated as a Presidential escape boat, and 1 hull without a motor. The lead-time required to place moth-balled PT boats in operation is 30 days at the minimum, at a cost of \$200,000 each. The purchase of additional PTs requires an estimated 3 to 6 months after signing the contract. The cost per unit for new PT boats is estimated at \$1 million.] 16

The Navy is currently waiting CIA's formal request.)

11 e e. CIA submitted a request to DOD for use of certain personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities and bases including but not limited to aircraft, boats, submarines and landing ships dock (LSDs), plus the use of US Armed Forces to furnish air and sea cover for CIA sponsored activities. This request raised several national policy decisions necessary to permit fulfillment of the request. These policy decisions are:

(1) Whether, and/or to what extent a policy of non-attribution to the US Government will apply to projects in connection with the activities of the CSG.

(2) Whether, and/or to what extent US bases and facilities should be utilized for training Cuban refugees.

(3) Whether, and/or to what extent US Armed Forces personnel will be

