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A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
INSIDE CUBA

PHASE I

(March, 1962)

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

MARCH

- a. Establish three "pathfinder" agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.

Explore operational conditions and requirements. Report on potential and active resistance elements and situation for exploitation by resistance teams. Lay groundwork for bringing in additional agents and teams as conditions warrant.

Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts and communicate securely with CIA. Risk to the personnel is substantial due to lack of intelligence, but mission is essential to planning and operations.

PHASE II  
(April-July 1962)

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

APRIL

- a. Establish up to five more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.

Report on resistance potential and lay groundwork for additional agent operations.

These additional teams should provide current reporting on major Cuban areas, so broad political action program can be planned. Risk to teams will continue high, but mission is essential.

etc

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
PHASE II (cont.)

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

APRIL (cont.)

b. "Voice" of Cuban movement goes on the air.

Establishes vital psychological assurance to people that a movement exists to overthrow the regime.

Preferably, the "voice" should be from mobile transmitter inside Cuba. Broadcasts can be brief ones at first: identifying music, slogan, and short news. News to include reports on "resistance" acts, taking credit for all sabotage. As daily broadcasts are established, "criminals against people" should be named and promised swift justice, two names per broadcast. If operational judgment dictates, transmitter can be aboard submarine for early broadcasts, as a strictly temporary measure. It is vital to take risks by having it inside Cuba; a second transmitter and crew should be moved in if the first is lost.

MAY

c. Re-supply agent operations as necessary.

Deliver supplies to satisfy needs developed by agent operations, if valid.

The agents will have to prove to local partisans that outside support is a reality. Thus, as arms, ammunition, and equipment, etc., are needed to equip resistance groups, we must be able to respond effectively to these needs. Maritime and, as feasible, air re-supply will be used. This capability will have to expand as resistance is developed.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
PHASE II (cont.)

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

20  
d. By June establish 12 more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.

Mission is the same as for previous "pathfinder" operations.

These will be the last agent operations infiltrated into key areas from the outside. Further expansion by "pathfinders," after these teams are in, can be done from groups inside. It is likely that some of these last "pathfinders" will be replacing casualties.

JUNE

e. By June, introduce three resistance teams in areas under initial "pathfinder" surveillance, if situation is favorable.

This will test acceptance and use of the more highly trained teams that must guide development of the popular revolution within Cuba. This also will check emphasis and timing of program from viewpoint of Cuban situation.

Very minor resistance actions by important population elements such as labor must be tried and groundwork laid for broader anti-regime program leading toward firm uprising program. Realism of political platform can be tested.

f. Establish bases for guerrilla operations.

To have focal points, with some viability to stockpile for defensive needs and for future attack operations.

These bases are to be selected after on-the-ground surveys by the teams inside Cuba. Some may exist already. These will also be logistical bases, for caches and stockpiling of arms and equipment to be used by the resistance. The p. a. teams will need not only supplies for active resistance, but also should be able to provide some welfare aid (such as to families of resistance members, families affected by plants shut-down by sabotage, etc.).

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
PHASE II (cont.)

JUNE (cont)

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

g. Establish clandestine leadership headquarters with means to communicate with all resistance elements.

Organize internal direction and control of the popular movement.

Leadership will have been emerging and this is about the earliest date possible to establish a clandestine headquarters. It should be of a bare, field type, in the securest area possible. This can become the meaningful source of political-psychological actions, to develop Cuban will to resist and fight.

h. Collection and use of psychological action material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of tyranny of regime to awaken world opinion and fan fire of revolt inside Cuba, for use by support operations and by resistance teams inside.

The resistance teams will use this material with timeliness inside and get it back outside so that it can be exploited fully in Latin America and elsewhere, building official and public opinion in support of the inside operation.

JULY

i. By July establish up to 5 more resistance teams in areas prepared by "pathfinder" operations, as operationally feasible.

Mission is the same as for the first resistance teams (A II e above).

Experience of first resistance teams must be considered in preparing these additional teams for operations. Security of personnel is very important at this point, as the operation expands.

j. Basic organization of underground in vicinity of airfields and communication centers.

To prepare the means for sabotage against military aircraft and key communication links of the regime's security forces.

This requires ground surveys, selection of sites for caching of sabotage supplies, and recruitment of local underground, including members of military and communications employees. Popular support must be prepared by resistance teams.

OPERATION IN CUBA

JULY (cont.)

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
PHASE II (cont.)

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

k. Expand infiltration points along coasts.

To obtain maximum security for stepped-up infiltration.

Original "rat-lines" need to be expanded into a functioning "underground railway" to pass more infiltrees into interior. Means of quick alerts to danger, delaying defenses, multiple routes, coastal watchers and receivers need to be organized and activated.

l. Low-key resistance sabotage, as a continuing and expanding program.

To demonstrate public disaffection with the regime and give examples which will prompt similar actions by many others. To build attitude and morale of the Cuban people to become activists for their cause against the Communist dictators.

Actions under resistance team guidance can include:

- "Runs" on State food and clothing stores and ransack where possible. (prompting similar acts by those who want to get enough to eat and wear).
- Sugar in gas tanks of public buses and local official cars and trucks.
- Ice-picking tires.
- Removing receivers from telephones.
- Harassing telephone calls to officials.
- Throwing stones with threatening notes into homes of officials.
- Disrupting rail switches and sand in gear boxes of trains.
- Swiping spark plugs and distributors from vehicles.
- Housewives complaints on shortages of food, medicine, doctors, etc.
- Public contempt campaign against Cubans in regime's puppet organizations, including effigy burning.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
PHASE III  
(1 August 1962)

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

AUGUST

m. Final check on resistance elements in Cuba.

To have a final look at the situation and at the means in place before giving the signal to initiate actions leading to full-scale revolt.

This is a last-minute pause, to be certain that the resistance has a possible organization in key places which will act when needed, that the significant portion of the Cuban people are in sympathy with the aims of the movement and will join in when given the chance, and that the movement will be able to gain an area of Cuba as its own against the regime's military forces, as a minimum

PHASE IV

(August - September 1962)

AUGUST

n. Symbolic work slow-down.

To give workers a feeling of participating in the popular movement, without immediate reprisal.

12 August is the anniversary of the overthrow of dictator Machado. The resistance should link the Castro-Communists with Machado and call on workers to lose one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug. to commemorate the overthrow of one dictator. Workers should be asked to give either one-hour by slow-down or one act of sabotage. The "Voice" of the movement should thank them the next day for their splendid response (to shame those who didn't participate by making them feel alone).

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
PHASE IV (cont.)

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

AUGUST (cont.)

o. Symbolic signs painted on walls:  
"Machado One"  
To commemorate the downfall of one remembered dictator and give a symbolic pace to the resistance.

Timed with the symbolic work slow-down (A IV n above). Spaced a few days apart, the signs should have lines added to them to read:

"Machado One  
Batista Two  
Castro Three."

p. By August, have actions to penetrate and subvert the regime.  
To weaken and frustrate organized actions against the popular movement.

These are actions on officials of the regime, including the military and the police. Some should be defected in place. Others should be defected and helped to escape to the outside world to tell the inside story of the regime's tyranny, to evoke world sympathy with the freedom fighters.

q. Cuban paramilitary teams infiltrated to bases in the hills.  
To provide a trained guerrilla cadre upon which to form guerrilla units.

The paramilitary teams must be capable of initiating minor harassment and reprisal actions, as well as organizing and training guerrilla units. Popular support is essential.

r. Guerrilla bands activated in key areas.  
To build a military striking force for the popular movement inside Cuba.

Recruits will be coming in after the symbolic harassment and reprisal actions. They will be screened, organized, and trained for guerrilla action. The regime's security forces can be expected to be very active. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft tactics are necessary. Increased popular support is a must in this phase.



A. BASIC ACTION PLAN  
PHASE IV (cont.)

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATION IN CUBA

SEPTEMBER

s. Commence expanding underground to every locality in Cuba.

To have a truly revolutionary organization throughout Cuba.

The guerrillas are the open arm, but the popular movement must have mass support, which requires intelligence collection and clandestine activists in cities and towns throughout. They will surface when the revolt needs open support.

t. Step-up of guerrilla actions.

To season the guerrilla forces with larger scale raids.

Actions will be to seize police files, kidnap officials as hostages, capture local militia arms stores, increase road ambushes, and destroy fuel supplies and transport by raid actions.

u. Activate larger-scale "black" operations on bureaucracy, as penetration assets permit.

To overburden the regime's administrative machinery by false orders, increase the amount of paper work by adding new forms, issue regulations to discredit superiors, and sow suspicion and friction between bureaus.

This will require intensive preparation, including defection in place of some personnel, intimate knowledge of current procedures within bureaus, and means of producing material which can pass as official.

v. Start entry of volunteer "freedom fighters" from Latin America and elsewhere.

To let the Cuban people know that they are not alone in their struggle against tyranny, by the physical presence of foreign "freedom fighters."

A "Marti Battalion" might be formed for foreign volunteers. Recruits from Latin America, from refugee groups (such as Hungarians, Poles, etc.), and Americans, need a controlled means of entering the good fight. Some veterans of the Huk campaign could be a gesture and a practical one.

