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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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Mr. Parrott

## OPERATION MONGOOSE

### Main Points to Consider

26 October 1962

1. What is the Policy Objective? We need a sharp focus on exactly what we hope to get from Mongoose now. This will determine how best to employ these unique U.S. resources -- either to support U.S. military operations or directly to commit against the Communist regime immediately.

Is the end objective the removal of the Castro/Communist regime or to bring it to its knees? Should Mongoose help generate a popular revolt with the probable need for overt U.S. military help as the regime moves in to crush it? Or, is the aim that of maximum harassment, to make Cuba a maximum burden for the Bloc?

Undoubtedly, most people in the world now expect us to move towards removing the Castro/Communist regime. Certainly the Cubans in exile and inside Cuba, who are the main covert assets of CIA, now expect this policy goal as the price of risking their lives.

## 2. Mongoose Actions

### a. Harassment of and resistance to Cuban regime.

Status: 3 teams (2- to 5-man) en route by small craft today. 6 teams by submarine, starting tomorrow. One more team being readied to go in by small craft. 10 more teams being readied to go by submarine shortly. One team now in Oriente and one team in Pinar del Rio. All teams have W/T, arms, explosives.

b. Cuban-owned shipping (22 ships). Sink in Cuban or Bloc ports, or high seas. Sabotage cargoes. Make crews inoperative.

Status: CIA has 11 assets aboard Cuban-owned ships. Action orders have gone to Hamburg, for action. Other action pending.

### c. Propaganda delivered to Cuba by balloon from ship.

Status: CIA does not have capability yet.

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d. Major acts of sabotage against listed targets of ore production, POL storage, power plants, transport, communications.

Status: Teams being trained for major sabotage were made part of teams now being sent in by submarine. (SAM sites or Soviet technicians are not targets.)

e. Minor acts of sabotage, by all Cuban people. Requires delivery of instructions, of how to do it, to Cuban people.

Status: No current capability indicated by CIA. Teams going in for any purpose at this time should have this assignment.

f. Sabotage of sugar production and delivery.

Status: No current capability. Now trying to act against shipments of jute bagging.

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g. Defect "name" personages of regime, to fraction the regime, to exploit for political and psychological ends.

Status: Minor diplomats being defected. Actions with major personages unsuccessful so far. Special effort is indicated.

h. Help the Cubans to help themselves. This means greater U.S. support of Cuban groups to take actions in Cuba.

Status: Under study. No firm plan yet for doing.

i. Demonstrations of workers and farmers in Cuba, in Latin America, against the Castro-Communist regime. Such demonstrations in Cuba would shake the regime to its core.

Status: International Longshoreman's Association now refusing work Cuban cargoes. No means yet for demonstrations inside Cuba. Special State/CIA action is indicated.

j. Expose responsible individuals in the Castro/Communist regime, as a means towards relaxing police-state controls. Indict "people's criminals" for justice after the government is returned to the people.

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Status: No activity on specific operation. However, CIA now completing "black list" of known Cuban intelligence and security officials, in support of possible U.S. military operation. About 5,000 names.

- k. Give Cuban resistance popular symbols. Songs. Visual.

Status: No song yet. Visual symbol is "gusano libre."

- l. Political planning for post-Castro period.

Status: No firm planning reported from State. The need for clear U.S. policy objectives is basic here.

- m. "Crusade" for human liberty, to make maximum use of spiritual appeal. Prayers, such as by Bishop Bosa Masvidal, widely publicized inside Cuba. Take use of memory of Marti away from Communists and give it to Cuban "freedom fighters."

Status: Sporadic activities, not a "crusade."

- n. U.S. or Free Cuban radio and TV broadcasts into Cuba.

Status: USIA making maximum use of medium and short wave radio facilities, including CIA and commercial resources. No "Voice of Free Cuba" short-wave broadcast scheduled immediately. New 50-kw radio transmitter expected to be operational in Florida Keys next week. TV broadcasts from aircraft now under development. (Being developed outside MongOOSE.)

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