File #:

HQ 105-379908

Serial Scope:

75, 76

SCD SUSPICIONS CONCERNING IVAN YEFREMOV

Ivan YEFREMOV was one of the most prestigious and talented Russian science fiction writers. He was also a Soviet scientist and paleontologist. Nearly every Russian home has a book written by YEFREMOV.

The source heard a bizarre story about YEFREMOV from at least two different sources: Nikolai STEKLOV, former chief of the Second (British and Commonwealth) Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD); and his instructors from the Minsk Higher Counterintelligence School. The story is as follows.

Shortly after YEFREMOV's death in the 1980s, a man went to SCD Headquarters and asked for a meeting with KGB British specialists. The man claimed that he had been recruited by YEFREMOV to work for British intelligence against the USSR.

The source does not know whether the information was valid or not. After some investigation, however, the SCD concluded that YEFREMOV, although Russian, was acting as the British illegal resident in the USSR. The SCD believed that he may have been handling a network of Soviet agents. The SCD started to review his travels within the USSR and determined that his trips were always to closed areas of the country.

The source could not recall any additional details on this case.

REFERENCE:

1. January 11, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #1B. Counter #427-458.

119.3-10032-76

NW 54934 DocId:32989481 Page 3

The KGB believes that PENKOVSKIY's disclosures regarding nuclear missile silo shafts and their locations were the most damaging items of information he passed to the Americans and British. As a result of his disclosures, the Soviets were forced to destroy all equipment in the silos and fill them with water. The technical equipment and auxillary material were so heavy that the Soviets simply left them behind and buried them.

Ivan MARKELOV was one of the original SCD case officers in the PENKOVSKIY investigation. He received an Order of the Red Star for this operation. Everybody was promoted for working on the case. MARKELOV eventually replaced Gregoriy GRIGORENKO as Chief of the SCD in the early 1980s.

PENKOVSKIY was, of course, executed by firing squad for his treason. Before he was executed, he admitted that he had made many mistakes. He asked for leniency in the form of a prison sentence, but to no avail. PENKOVSKIY was quite brave during the entire judicial proceedings. Mr. WYNN, however, was not so brave, and he frequently cried. The SCD knew that Mr. WYNN was not a British intelligence officer, but was acting as a co-optee to handle PENKOVSKIY.

The source learned most of the above information from his review of the file, although STEKLOV told him some things about the operation, including the location of the dead drop under the radiator.

REFERENCES:

1. January 12, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #1A. Counter #392-525.

OLEG PENKOVSKIY CASE

When the source first joined the Second (British and Commonwealth) Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD) in 1982, he was allowed to read the original SCD files of the PENKOVSKIY case. The Second Department was directly responsible for investigating PENKOVSKIY, and they encourage new case officers to read the file to enhance their knowledge and expertise. The source was required to get the permission of the Chief of the Second Department (at that time Nikolai STEKLOV) to review the file.

The PENKOVSKIY file consists of twelve or more thick volumes. Much of the file consists of rather tedious technical and physical surveillance reports on PENKOVSKIY.

PENKOVSKIY first came under suspicion in 1960 during a period of time when the SCD decided to place total surveillance on all British Embassy personnel and their families. The file did not indicate why the SCD made this decision, and the source does not know the reason. According to the source, there was nothing in the file to suggest that information about PENKOVSKIY had leaked to the KGB, thereby prompting the SCD to initiate full surveillance of all British nationals in the Embassy.

The full surveillance of British Embassy personnel lasted for several days. Finally, one of the surveillance teams observed the wife of a British diplomat, who was not an intelligence officer, coming out of the entrance of a shabby Russian building. It appeared strange to the surveillance team, particularly because she was pregnant. They continued to watch the building. A few minutes later, a man emerged from the house. The KGB followed him with five or six men in two cars.

They followed the man to an office building of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT). His entry into this office building fueled their suspicions. They subsequently identified the man as Oleg PENKOVSKIY.

The SCD then thoroughly checked the entrance of the shabby Russian house and discovered a likely dead drop under a radiator. Investigation of PENKOVSKIY rapidly escalated.

The SCD and KGB surveillance used a camera to film PENKOVSKIY's movements and activities. They observed that he acted in a very suspicious manner.

NW 54934 DocId:32989481 Page 5

The SCD also equipped his living areas with cameras. The source does not know what types of cameras, but he was certain they were primitive at that time.

On one occasion, they observed him photographing or making a picture of an artillery guidance system. At that point, the SCD realized that they had to intercede, and he was arrested. The SCD had some thoughts about using him in a controlled double agent manner to entrap British or American intelligence personnel, but it was thought to be too risky in this case. From his review of the file, the source estimated that the entire investigation took about 6-8 months.

After his arrest, PENKOVSKIY immediately informed the SCD of his contacts with Greville WYNNE and how he was handled by the CIA and British intelligence. He told the SCD that he first went to British intelligence, but they didn't believe him and thought he was a provocation. He then went to the Americans who accepted him. Later, the British also jointed the operation. During one of his foreign trips, the British made him an "honorary" Army Colonel and gave him his choice of uniforms. The SCD did not find any espionage paraphernalia at PENKOVSKIY's workplace, probably because he was too experienced to make that mistake.

KGB security officials in the First Chief Directorate (FCD) had previously noted that PENKOVSKIY exhibited behavior of possible security concern (e.g., too many girls and too much money), particularly during his tour in Turkey. The KGB's Third Chief Directorate, which was normally responsible for the investigations of GRU officers who are suspected of treason, never seriously suspected PENKOVSKIY, however. PENKOVSKIY had excellent connections in the Soviet military through his wife's father, who was a highly-placed General in the Russian Army. These connections probably protected him.

Following his arrest, PENKOVSKIY fully disclosed the extent of information he had passed to the Americans and British. He admitted passing vital information on the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons and air defense systems. He also admitted passing information on GRU operations.

The KGB believes that PENKOVSKIY's disclosures regarding nuclear missile silo shafts and their locations were the most damaging items of information he passed to the Americans and British. As a result of his disclosures, the Soviets were forced to destroy all equipment in the silos and fill them with water. The technical equipment and auxillary material were so heavy that the Soviets simply left them behind and buried them.

Ivan MARKELOV was one of the original SCD case officers in the PENKOVSKIY investigation. He received an Order of the Red Star for this operation. Everybody was promoted for working on the case. MARKELOV eventually replaced Gregoriy GRIGORENKO as Chief of the SCD in the early 1980s.

PENKOVSKIY was, of course, executed by firing squad for his treason. Before he was executed, he admitted that he had made many mistakes. He asked for leniency in the form of a prison sentence, but to no avail. PENKOVSKIY was quite brave during the entire judicial proceedings. Mr. WYNN, however, was not so brave, and he frequently cried. The SCD knew that Mr. WYNN was not a British intelligence officer, but was acting as a co-optee to handle PENKOVSKIY.

The source learned most of the above information from his review of the file, although STEKLOV told him some things about the operation, including the location of the dead drop under the radiator.

REFERENCES:

1. January 12, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #1A. Counter #392-525.

KGB PENETRATION OF MI-5

Even before the publication of Peter Wright's book, "Spy Catcher," the source heard that the KGB previously had a mole in the high circles of British Counterintelligence (i.e., MI-5). The source heard about this KGB success from four separate sources.

First, the source heard about this success from his instuctors in the Minsk Higher Counterintelligence School in 1981. These instructors were all retired intelligence and counterintelligence officers. Some of them dealt very closely with the British intelligence target. The only instructor the source could recall at this time was Colonel (first name unknown) TORCHUK, who spent 10-12 years in East Germany and was responsible for the flood of illegals from East Berlin into West Berlin.

The source did not believe these instructors at first. He assumed they were exaggerating such accomplishments for their own aggrandizement.

Subsequently, however, the source had a conversation with his boss Nikolai STEKLOV, then chief of the Second (British and Commonwealth) Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. STEKLOV told the source that the KGB did have a very good success in MI-5 at a certain period.

The conversation with STEKLOV took place in the early 1980s, perhaps 1983. During this conversation, STEKLOV was recalling old cases and a personal meeting he once had with British defector Kim PHILBY. STEKLOV told the source, "Don't you know, there was a third man they couldn't detect. It was a guy who passed all information he could and was as reliable as PHILBY." According to STEKLOV's account, the man was still in place after PHILBY's defection, and he continued to provide reliable information to the KGB. PHILBY's defection did not interfere in the case.

Aleksey Victorovich KOZLOV was a third source who told the source about this previous penetration of MI-5. KOZLOV was a long-time KGB officer who served in Britain during the 1950s as a member of the KGB residency's counterintelligence branch. KOZLOV had started his KGB career in 1945, right after the war. He retired from the KGB in 1986.

KOZLOV, of course, knew many important KGB operations, and he told many anecdotes. Once, in the early or mid-1980s, he said to the source, "Do you know what we did in the 1950s? We had a very, very high man in British counterintelligence." The source asked KOZLOV who it was. KOZLOV said that it was either the chief or one of his deputies.

More recently, following the publication of "Spy Catcher," the source heard about this previous penetration of MI-5 from Nikolai ZHUKOV, a Directorate K Officer who was stationed in Britain in the mid-1980s, and may have been expelled. ZHUKOV is the KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) counterpart of the officers in the Second Department, SCD. He is responsible for the Russian Colony in Britain and for all cypher reports from the KGB residency in London. He is a frequent visitor to SCD Headquarters.

During a conversation between ZHUKOV and Second Department case officers (including the source) on such cases as EMERSON and PATTERSON (see previous reports on these cases), ZHUKOV boasted that these cases were not so significant. A discussion then ensued about "the boys in blue," the SCD slang term for MI-5. According to ZHUKOV, the KGB had a very high penetration of MI-5 in the past.

In all four cases mentioned above, the subsources did not tell our source the name of the MI-5 penetration. The source is not certain whether it was Roger HOLLIS, former chief of MI-5, or one of his deputies. Based on the above accounts, however, the source is certain it was a man in the top circles of MI-5. He is also certain that his subsources were not referring to BURGESS, MACLEAN, or BLUNT. None of his subsources mentioned the name of the KGB case officer who handled the MI-5 penetration or how the penetration was handled.

DEBRIEFER'S COMMENTS:

Needless to say, we will continue to debrief the source on his knowledge of the above matter with the hope of acquiring any additional information he may possess.

REFERENCES:

1. January 11, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #1B. Counter #356-426.
2. January 12, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #1A. Counter #550-560 and #534.

SCD PHYSICAL ENTRIES INTO THE IRISH EMBASSY IN THE USSR

SCD staff officers conduct successful physical entries into the Irish Embassy in Moscow. As a result of these entries, the SCD has acquired some sensitive political documents. The base for this operation is the Soviet militia station opposite the Irish Embassy in the suburbs of Moscow.

The source knows about this operation because he was brought to the operational base to review documents which were acquired from the operation. He was selected for this assignment because of his English language and translation skills.

The KGB codename for this operation is "LITTLE WEDDING."

The source could not recall any additional information on this operation. He believes it is still ongoing, but does not know how long the entries have been taking place. He does not know how the SCD officers in this operation bypass the locks, security alarms, and guards at the Irish Embassy to make the physical entries.

SCD TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF U.S. EMBASSY

The source previously reported on SCD operations against U.S. Marine Guards in Moscow (see debriefing document prepared by the CI-1C Unit). In the earlier debriefings, the source reported that the Marine Guards took a Second Chief Directorate (SCD) female Russian agent by the name of Raisa into secure areas of the U.S. Embassy to engage in sexual intercourse. The source said that the SCD was unsuccessful, however, in gaining physical access by KGB staff officers or placing any technical devices in the secure areas. The source also said that the SCD was unable to remove documents from the Embassy.

In our most recent debriefings on December 27-28, 1989, the source modified the above statements to some extent. He now reports that the SCD female agent was able to place an audio device in a secure area of the U.S. Embassy and later remove it during those times when the Marines took them into the secure area for sexual intercourse.

The source learned about this success from Aleksey YEGOROV, an SCD officer in the First (American) Department, SCD, who directed the operation to recruit the Marine Guards, and from some of his other colleagues in the First Department. Based on these coversations, the source believes the SCD acquired some useful information from the audio devices, although he could not provide any specifics.

The source does not know what type of audio devices were used or where they were placed. We repeatedly questioned him for more specific information on which secure areas in the Embassy were penetrated, but he only repeated "the closed areas, the referentura." We do not believe he knows any additional details on the precise location(s) of the penetration(s) or on the operation in general.

SCD TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF BRITISH EMBASSY

The Second (Britain and Commonwealth) Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD) in conjunction with the Fifteenth (Intrusive Measures) Department of the SCD operates a successful technical penetration of the Left Annex (facing the front) of the British Embassy in Moscow. Through this technical operation, the SCD acquires all of the conversations between British Military Attaches. The British Military Attaches treat this area as a "referentura" and believe their conversations are safe. They are however, seriously mistaken.

The KGB codename for placing audio devices in foreign embassies and housing areas in the USSR is "TATYANA." The source referred to this particular SCD operation to penetrate the Left Annex of the British Embassy as "SPECIAL TATYANA."

Through this operation, the SCD has acquired some useful information on the main targets and interests of the British Military Attaches in the USSR, as well as some of their techniques or methods of operation. In addition, the SCD has acquired useful assessment information on the British Military Attaches and other British nationals in the Embassy.

This operation has been conducted for at least the past ten years. The SCD becomes extremely concerned when special British technical sweep teams and engineers arrive to inspect the Embassy. The source believes the British send these teams to Moscow approximately every other month and the inspections last from two to four weeks. Because of their concern that this operation will be uncovered, the Second Department, SCD, in concert with the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, follow the members of these inspection teams no matter where they go in Moscow or the USSR.

The Second Department, SCD, only has two technicians. These technicians direct the operation and work in concert with a special section in the Fifteenth Department, SCD, which is responsible for technical penetrations of embassies.

~~SECRET~~

12/1/89

FLASH RUN

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

The results of NK T-1's 12/1/89 debriefing are as follows:

USR

I. VIKTOR IVANOVICH PAPUSHIN

VIKTOR IVANOVICH PAPUSHIN, born 2/25/~~89~~ 31 in Moscow, USSR, was until his retirement a line X KGB officer. He is a graduate of the Baumanskiy High Technical School (Uchilishche) in Moscow. His specialty was electronics and radar equipment. Circa 1959 he joined the Ministry of Foreign Trade and attended the Academy of Foreign Trade of the USSR for three years. After that he attended School 101 of the KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) at Yurlova. He kept his cover job with the Ministry of Foreign Trade but became an operative in Directorate T.

In 1966 PAPUSHIN was assigned to Great Britain where he served as a Senior Engineer with the Soviet Trade Mission at Highgate Westhill 32, London. In 1969 he and his family were expelled from the United Kingdom because, the source believes, PAPUSHIN was too active in intelligence gathering among the research establishments in Cornwall. In addition, he was involved in a operation with line KR in which they kidnapped the daughter of a member of a visiting Soviet trade delegation when she tried to request political asylum in the U. K. From Great Britain, PAPUSHIN was assigned to FCD headquarters in Moscow.

In approximately 1975 PAPUSHIN was assigned to Japan as an Advisor to the Soviet Trade Mission. He was in Japan three years and served as the Deputy Resident for line X, a colonel's slot. After returning to the USSR in 1978 he was appointed chief of the 5th Department, Directorate T, FCD, which was responsible for scientific and technical intelligence about China, Japan, Malaysia, India, etc.

In 1984 PAPUSHIN was assigned as First Deputy Trade Representative in Sofia, Bulgaria. His intelligence mission was

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

193-10031-75

to maintain liaison with the Bulgarian Intelligence Service and to asses western businessmen.

Natalya Vianorovna

At present PAPUSHIN is suffering from cardiac arrythmia. He is described by the source as a good chekist, honest, and old-fashioned. He is married to NATALYA VIANOROVNA PAPUSHINA, nee CHERNENKO (no relation to General Secretary CHERNENKO), born 3/14/32 at Moscow. She is a dentist who has worked at the special Kremlin clinic (Kremlevka). They have only one child. USSR

II. ALEKSANDR ALEKSANDROVICH BENIAMINOV

ALEKSANDR ALEKSANDROVICH BENIAMINOV was born in 1932 at Vladivostok. He is a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Nuclear Physics. After graduation he joined the KGB and attended the FCD's School 101. After graduation he was assigned to Directorate T of the FCD.

BENIAMINOV served the Soviet Embassy in London in the late 1950's and again in the mid 1960's. In Vienna in the mid 1970's he served for three to four years with the United Nations International Nuclear Agency. While in Vienna he became embroiled in a feud with the KGB resident (FNU) TROFIMOV. TROFIMOV was hated by all his subordinates and was jealous of BENIAMINOV for having a higher salary at the U. N. TROFIMOV had good contacts in Moscow, so after BENIAMINOV was transferred back home he was given an unappealing job as an analyst in the Fourth Department of Directorate T, FCD. BENIAMINOV's troubles continued with TROFIMOV, who had since returned to Moscow and became number two in Directorate T, and in the early 1980's found himself kicked out of the FCD and assigned as an instructor at the Red Banner Institute (Krasnoznamenyy Institut - KI), formerly School 101.

In the mid 1980's BENIAMINOV began suffering mental deterioration and retired. He has since gotten worse. His family is very bitter about his treatment in the KGB and the lack of good medical care. He is married to NINA NIKOLAEVNA BENIAMINOVA, nee DENSHCHIKOVA, born 1932 at Ryazan. USSR

Nina Nikolaevna

III. Uncovered CIA Agent

Source has heard that the Communist Party boss at the Red Banner Institute was discovered to be an agent for the CIA four or five years ago. This is all he knows.

IV. KGB Relations with Other Socialist Intelligence Services

The Twentieth Department of the FCD handles liaison with third world socialist intelligence services. The Eleventh Department of the FCD handles liaison with eastern european intelligence services. In the Second Chief Directorate the Twentieth Department handles liaison with all socialist intelligence services.

In recent years the KGB's relations with other Soviet-Bloc intelligence agencies have deteriorated. Whereas before the KGB exerted defacto control over these services, now relations and cooperation between them and the KGB depends on the personal relationships between the respective officials. Now when a KGB officer enters, for example, the Polish SB's office, the working papers are covered up.

In the Polish SB there has been a purge of hard line communists, and only people more sympathetic to reform remain. Officers from the Romanian and North Korean services are treated as enemies when they are in the Soviet Union and surveilled.

V. Directorate S Clothing Shop

Directorate S maintains a clothing shop in which it keeps up to date western clothes for use by its illegals. Operatives from the SCD involved in false flag operations, including the source and First Department operative ALEKSEY EGOROV, also use it. It used to be located on Olimpiskiy Prospekt, but now it is on Leninskiy Prospekt in a famous house with statues of muscular farmers in front of it. The door to the shop, the third one, is obvious as a standard KGB door to any one experienced with them. Its outside is made of vertical thin wooden slats and there is a peephole at eye level. KGB officers in western countries regularly buy the latest clothes in all

sizes in order to stock the shop.

VI. Foreign Students

Patrice Lumumba University is known as a Field of Wonders (pole chudes) for recruiting foreign students, especially from the third world. The pickings are so easy that any KGB directorate is allowed to recruit there. At the Pushkin Institute, a language school in Moscow for foreign, especially western, students, the SCD case officer is PASHA MOLCHANOV from the Eleventh Department. (How the SCD's Eleventh Department, which handles terrorism matters, got the responsibility for the institute is not known by the source.)

USR

SECRET

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

December 18, 1989

KGB SCHOOLS

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY. DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE.

WARNING: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY. IT'S ORIGIN MUST BE SUITABLY DISGUISED TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

WARNING: NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY.

On December 12, 1989 NK T-1, a source with whom there has been limited contact, but who is in a position to know the type of information which follows, and who is believed to be reliable, provided the following information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concerning the KGB training apparatus:

Dzerzhinskiy KGB Higher School, Moscow USSR

The Moscow school is at two locations - on Leningradskiy Prospekt across from the Moscow Watch Factory, and near the Olympic Village. Except for the two-year course in the

SECRET

Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

This document contains neither the recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

NW 54934 DocId:32989481 Page 19

Eighth faculty, it is as four-year institution. Its faculties are:

First	-	Military (for officers for the Third Chief Directorate)
Second	-	European languages
Third	-	Asian and African languages
Fourth	-	Technical (for officers for the Eighth, Sixteenth, and Operational-Technical Directorates)
Fifth	-	Unknown
Sixth	-	Unknown
Seventh	-	Unknown
Eighth	-	Two-year short course

The instructors at the Moscow school are for the most part retires KGB officers. The language instructors are women from various institutes. They are prime marriage candidates for the cadets because they are Moscow residents.

For the first six months the cadets learn basic military subjects. After that they learn "special disciplines", or SDs. SD-1 is intelligence, SD-5 is internal security/ dissident work, SD-6 is counterintelligence, SD-7 is surveillance, and other SD's include photography, KGB paperwork, dealing with criminals, national psychology of foreign nations, counter-paratroop operations, legal topics, and others, for a total of twelve SD's. In the legal SD the cadets are told what measures they can take on their own and which they need authority from their superiors for (which is most everything, including wire tapping, recruitment pitches, and interrogations.)

Graduates of this and all KGB Higher Schools are usually assigned to counter-intelligence work unless they have a "hook" or influence to get an assignment to the First Chief Directorate (FCD).

KGB Higher School, Minsk USSR

This information is valid for 1982, when the source attended the school.

The KGB Higher School in Minsk accepts basic KGB recruits who already have a mastery of a foreign language and

have graduated received a degree in a humanities discipline from a university or college. It also accepts trainees for the republican or territorial KGBs. Its course of study lasts for one year.

The Minsk school is located on Vayskavyy Proezd near Victory Square. It was founded in Gomel in 1945 or 1946 to train NKVD agents to fight national resistance movements in the USSR. It is a three or four story building with dark grey walls inside. The cadets sleep four or five to a room.

When a new recruit arrives at the KGB Higher School in Minsk, he is given a thorough medical and psychological exam. Then he must answer a questionnaire about himself, and say why he wants to join the KGB. After this is done, the new cadet is issued an Soviet Army officer's field uniform. University graduates and those with formal military training are lieutenants (two stars), and cadets without this are sergeants. All civilian clothing except for a jogging suit are taken away.

For the first month the cadets are under strict discipline and cannot leave the school grounds. They are given basic military training: they are taught to shoot, march, fight hand-to-hand, etc. After the first month they may leave the post for a few hours at a time and go into town. They are also fitted with Army causal dress uniforms. In 1982 the cadets all wore signal corps insignia, making it easy for the locals to identify them. Now, with the worsening reputation of the KGB, the cadets are allowed to wear the insignia of any military branch.

In 1982 the cadet corps was divided into 30-man squads with five squads making up a "course" or platoon. Four courses were at the school at any one time: two started every six months. Currently the source believes that there are only fifteen men in each squads. Each course has a cadet commander, an assistant commander, and a cipher clerk for control of secret documents. Each course also has a chief instructor or "papa" who is a senior KGB officer, usually from the Border Guards.

The training week at the school runs for six days. The training day starts at 7 AM with a wake up by the papa. This is done in traditional military style with lots of shouting and

banging. Then the cadets go for a six kilometer run around the school. Then come physical exercises.

At 8:30 AM breakfast is served. It often consists of fish, rice, and weak tea.

At 9:00 lecture/seminars begin, and last until 1 PM. This training is divided up into the same special disciplines as at the Moscow school.

At 1 PM lunch is served, then there is a break of two hours. From 2 PM to 7 PM is self study time. Sometimes classes are held. Supper is at 7 PM and usually consists of fish and rice. From 8 PM until lights out at 10:30 is free time.

A lot of training time at the Minsk school is taken up with military subjects such as rifle shooting, map reading, etc. This school is more military oriented than the Moscow school.

Minsk school graduates are made KGB Senior Lieutenants.

When cadets enter the KGB, they have to sign a paper saying that they will accept assignment anywhere in the USSR. However, cadets from Moscow and Leningrad usually are returned to those areas. In the source's squad, twenty-five men were assigned to the Second Chief Directorate (SCD), and five to the FCD. Those five all had "hooks" or connections that enabled them to secure those desirable jobs.

USSR

Andropov Red Banner Institute (KI)

This institute is run by the FCD and is located at Yurlova, in the northern region of Moscow. The course of study is one to three years, depending on prior education/experience. Cadets come from the best Soviet universities and institutes, such as the International Relations Institute (MGIMO), the Oriental Studies Institute, the Military Foreign Languages Institute, the Maurice Thorez Institute for Foreign Languages, etc. Most of the students have "hooks" or influence.

KI cadets receive the same SDs as at the Dzerzhinskiy school above. They also receive parachute jump training at the airborne division in Pskov. Most of the instructors are former FCD officers; approximately five percent are former SCD

instructors.

Surveillance, which is emphasized at KI, is taught at the Seventh Directorate's surveillance school in Leningrad.

Newly assigned FCD officers with prior intelligence skill, from the SCD for example, receive an abbreviated six-month course at the FCD headquarters.

Surveillance School, Leningrad USSR

Surveillants and FCD officers learn their surveillance skills at this school. The instructors are senior Seventh Directorate officers.

KGB Higher School, Novosibirsk USSR

This school has a one or two-year course of study. It teaches military counterintelligence to military officers who wish to enter the Third Chief Directorate. After graduation the officers go to units, unless they have hooks and can get an assignment to Moscow.

KGB Higher School, Alma Ata

Provides basic KGB instruction for the local KGB.

KGB Higher School, Kiev USSR

Provides basic KGB instruction for the Ukrainian KGB.

Moscow KGB Retraining Course

USSR Located on Kiselnyy Pereulok, this course is given to students who already have several years with the KGB. Lessons are taught in the evening. In addition, some KGB personnel who were assigned to Afghanistan received special training in conditions particular to that country. Prospective department heads receive managerial training here.

KGB Spetsnaz School, Balashikha USSR

This school provides commando-type training to KGB Spetsnaz troops. There is also a course here for regular KGB officers who are in a type of Spetsnaz reserve. It lasts for two to four weeks and in repeated annually.

KGB Higher School for Communications, Orel USSR

This school provides four years of instruction for troops of the KGB Government Communications Directorate (UPS). Some graduates go to the Sixteenth Directorate.

School for "Friends"

This school is for students from other socialist countries' security services. It is located at Shablovka in Moscow near the old TV tower.

The number two officer at this school is GEORGY ALEKSANDROVICH PINKO, who was once expelled from Britain.

USSR

SECRET

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

December 18, 1989

KGB ACTING RESERVE OFFICERS

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY. DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE.

WARNING: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY. IT'S ORIGIN MUST BE SUITABLY DISGUISED TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

WARNING: NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY.

On December 12, 1989 NK T-1, a source with whom there has been limited contact, but who is in a position to know the type of information which follows, and who is believed to be reliable, advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the following information:

The position of acting reserve KGB officer is a prestigious one. It is held by KGB case officers who occupy posts in various ministries and institutions. These officers are still in the employ of the KGB, but their offices are at the ministries, not at the KGB office. Some examples of these posts are:

SECRET

Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

This document contains neither the recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Novosti Press Agency (APN)

APN is divided up into geographical departments headed by editors. The deputies in these departments are all from the Seventh Department (Correspondents) of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD).

Intourist

Intourist is divided up into departments in the same way that Novosti is. The deputy department heads used to be undercover KGB case officers from the Sixth Department, SCD. Now they are more overt, calling themselves representitives of the "security service". These KGB officers run every guide and translator that has dealings with foreigners.

~~Ministry of Foreign Affairs~~, Moscow State Institute of International Relations USSR

KGB officers from the Twelfth Department, SCD occupy many posts in the ministry and the institute. They run checks of officals serving abroad, on delegation members, and provide a KGB presence in delegations travelling abroad.

Union of Friendship Societies (SOD)

The Fifth Department, SCD officially has responsibility for the SOD. The case officer is Major LARISSA BARINOVA, one of the few female KGB officers. The Thirteenth Department, SCD and the First Chief Directorate also have representatives in the SOD.

SECRET

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

December 12, 1989

SECOND CHIEF DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION

This entire communication is classified "SECRET".

WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY. DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE.

WARNING: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY. IT'S ORIGIN MUST BE SUITABLY DISGUISED TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

WARNING: NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY.

On December 11, 1989 NK T-1, a source with whom there has been limited contact, but who is in a position to know the type of intormation which follows, and who is believed to be reliable, provided the following information on the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD) organization (subordinate entities are indented):

Second Chief Directorate (GRUSHKO)

First Department (United States)

First Deputy (V. N. AKLISHIN)
Second Department (UK, Canada, Ireland, Austral. ,etc.)
Third Department (W. Germany, Austria, Rumania)
Ninth Department (Other European countries and Israel)
Twelfth Department (For. Min., Int'l Relations Inst.)

SECRET
Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

This document contains neither the recommendations no conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

4

Deputy
- Fourth Department (Non-communist Asia, Middle East)
- Fifth Department (Africa)
- Sixth Department (Tourists)
- Eighth Department (Latin America)
- Sixteenth Department (China, N. Korea., Vietnam)

Deputy
- Seventh Department (Correspondents)
- Tenth Department (Customs, narcotics traffickers)
- Thirteenth Department (Soviets travelling abroad)

Deputy (G. V. PIPIYA)
- Directorate N (Analysis)

Deputy (Personnel) (ERMAKOV)
- Group 33 (also directly subordinate to SCD)
- Personnel Department
  - Mobilization Department

Deputy (Technical) (SOKOLOV)
- Fifteenth Department (Embassy Penetrations)
- Liaison with Eight and Sixteenth Directorates

Secretariat
- Group 25 (gifts, safe houses)
- Financial Department
- Duty Officers
- Twenty-first Department (TsPOIS - operations center)
- Typing Pool

Party Committee (ZHOGA)
- Komsomol Committee

Unknown subordination:

- Eleventh Department (Terrorism, Pushkin Institute)
- Fourteenth Department (Active Measures)
- Seventeenth Department*
- Eighteenth Department*
- Nineteenth Department*
- Twentieth Department (Liason with friendly security services)
- Research Institute of Prognosis

*The 17th, 18th, and 19th Departments formerly made up the old Directorate A. Their responsibilities include: search for illegals, territorial KGB liaison, anti-agent communications (dust, bloodhounds), families of traitors.