

File #:

62-BA-2665

Serial Scope:

1B1 thru 2, 3, 3A, 4 thru 5A, 8 thru 15A, 17 thru 40,
42 thru 49, 50 thru 67, 69 thru 79, 81, 82

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44
USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 84368 Date: 11-16-2017

NR046 WA CODE

7:20PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH, SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENTS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

ESC FBI BU CLR AND TKS

62-2665-1

~~0-66-2183~~

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
MAR 24 1975
Jenkins

Date 12/31/75

Title and Character of Case

SENSTUDY

Date Property Acquired

12/31/75

Source From Which Property Acquired

Bureau

Location of Property or Bulky Exhibit

Bulky Exhibit Room

Reason for Retention of Property and Efforts Made to Dispose of Same

Description of Property or Exhibit and Identity of Agent Submitting Same

One copy of transcript of questions which were asked Director KELLEY during his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, 12/10/75.

*destroyed
2/25/81 gk/ms*

Submitted by SAC RICHARD D. ROGGE/db1

SEMIANNUAL INVENTORY CERTIFICATION TO JUSTIFY RETENTION OF PROPERTY (Initial and Date)

<u>2/26/77</u> <i>gk</i>	_____	_____	_____
<u>8/31/78</u> <i>gk</i>	_____	_____	_____
<u>3/9/79</u> <i>gk</i>	_____	_____	_____

Field File # 62-2665 1B1

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED..... <i>ms</i>
DEC 31 1975	
FBI-BUFFALO	

NR074 WA CODE

10:12PM NITEL 5-2-75 MSE

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

- 1. SAC _____
- 2. ASAC _____
- 3. Sec. Supvr _____
- 4. Desk 4 _____
- 5. Desk 5 _____
- 6. Desk 6 _____
- 7. LONG _____
- 8. LARGE *Done* _____

Be sure personnel advised!

62-2665-10

Dead

SAC(WAST)

cc SRA's

PAGE TWO

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

END

DMB FBI BUFFALO

ACK FOR TWO AND CLR

F B I

Date: 3/26/75

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BUFFALO

ATTN: BUDGET AND ^{ACCOUNTING} ~~ACCOUNT~~ SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:

	<u>INTERNAL SECURITY</u>	<u>COUNTERINTELLIGENCE</u>
SAC	0	0
ASAC	0	0
SUPERVISORS	0	0
SPECIAL AGENTS	6	0

62-2465-1B

~~66-2183~~

Searched..... Serialized.....
Indexed..... Filed.....

FBJ;lmw
(1)
FBJ lmw

~~File this~~ clearing file 3/26/85

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 4:04 P M Per WBR

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

BU

PAGE TWO

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME PERSONNEL:

	<u>INTERNAL SECURITY</u>	<u>COUNTERINTELLIGENCE</u>
SUPERVISORS	1	½
SPECIAL AGENTS	7½	5
GRAND TOTALS:		
SUPERVISORS	1	½
SPECIAL AGENTS	13½	5

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC (66-)

FROM : SUPV. FRANCIS B. JENKINS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DATE: 3/26/75

ReBUtel to Director, 3/26/75.

Information in retel was arrived at on the following basis:

As of 3/26/75, there are 1 Supervisor and 12 SAs assigned to Squad #3, and 1 Supervisor and 10 SAs assigned to Squad #4, which squads handle Internal Security and Counter-intelligence matters. In addition, 5 Resident Agents and 1 Road Trip Agent also devote a portion of their time to both of these matters.

Set forth below is the percentage of time spent on Internal Security and Counterintelligence by Agents of the #3 and #4 Squads, as well as Resident Agents:

INTERNAL SECURITY - AGENTS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Bercent</u>	<u>Total</u>
AHART	100%	
BAGDY	100%	
KASH	100%	
LASH	100%	
MC GUIGAN	100%	
THILL	100%	= 6 SAs
KING	75%	
COMFORT	5%	
ANGLE	2%	
BUCHER	2%	
RISON	2%	
PUCKETT	5%	= 1 SA (minus 9%)

FBJ:afe
(1)



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

66-2183 ✓

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FBI-BUFFALO	
DESK 3 1/2	

① SAC - (last)
② AFAC
③ [unclear]
④ [unclear]

INTERNAL SECURITY - AGENTS (Cont.)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Percent</u>		<u>Total</u>
CAIN	50%		
CORCORAN	50%	=	1 SA
THOMAS	50%		
PEARSON	50%	=	1 SA
SHAW	70%		
WAGNER	50%	=	1 SA (plus 20%)
CRAWFORD	95%	=	1 SA (minus 5%)
JENSON	95%	=	1 SA (minus 5%)
SIWULA	90%	=	1 SA (minus 10%)
SUNDERLAND	50%	=	$\frac{1}{2}$ SA
	TOTAL		13 $\frac{1}{2}$ SAs

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - AGENTS

HORAN	20%		
SHAW	30%		
WAGNER	50%	=	1 SA
SMITH	95%	=	1 SA (minus 5%)
SMALLDON	85%		
THOMAS	5%		
ANGLE	2%		
RUDY	5%		
RISDON	2%		
PUCKETT	2%	=	1 SA (plus 1%)
CAIN	50%		
CORCORAN	50%	=	1 SA
PEARSON	50%		
SUNDERLAND	50%	=	1 SA
	TOTAL		5 SAs

BU 66-

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISORS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Total</u>
JENKINS	80%	
UTZ	20%	= 1 Supervisor

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISORS

JENKINS	15%	
UTZ	20%	= 1/2 Supervisor (minus 15%)

Based on the above computations, the Bureau was advised in retel that there are 1 Supervisor and 13½ SAs assigned full-time to Internal Security, and ½ Supervisor and 5 SAs assigned to Counterintelligence.

The format utilized in preparation of retel was based on information received in a telephone conversation by ASAC JOHN F. SHANLEY with Section Chief L. CLYDE GROVER, Budget and Accounting Section, Administrative Division, FBIHQ, on 3/25/75.

The above is for information.

NR036 WA CODE

4:10PM NITEL 5-20-75 PAW

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.

UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE

CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY

INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL

INFORMATION FURNISHED.

END

1. SAC _____ (C)
2. ASAC _____ (B)
3. Sec. Supr. _____
4. Desk 4 _____
5. Desk 5 _____
6. Desk 6 _____

62-2163-2

SEARCHED _____	INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____	FILED _____
MAY 20 1975	
FBI - BUFFALO	
SAC (LAST) _____ (C)	

NR033 WA CODE

5:09PM 9/4/75 NITEL AJN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI; AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITORY INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR

- 1. SAC
- 2. ASAC
- 3. Sec. Supvr.
- 4. Desk 4
- 5. Desk 5
- 6. Desk 6

Copy routed to SRAs

STRIPACED 9-10-75 G.R.

SAC (last)

PAGE TWO

INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE, AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD (1) THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THESE AREAS ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.

HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE

PAGE THREE

ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. R. WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.

THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES.

FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD.

END

RFP FBI BU

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Prevent Illegal Surveillance

Continuing disclosures by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dramatize to the American people how excessive and illegal certain CIA and FBI surveillance practices became during the fading Cold War years.

Apparently the systematic opening of foreign mail to and from Americans by the CIA, as well as the FBI's burglary break-ins or "black bag jobs," had been stopped quite a while ago — as they certainly should have been.

But with Americans now well alerted to this threat to their own liberties, there can be no excuse for avoiding effective new restraints to correct past mistakes and prevent a recurrence of these abuses.

Earlier this year, the Rockefeller CIA panel disclosed the 20-year program of mail openings, which it branded as "unlawful" and raising "constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment" barring unreasonable search and seizure. But a Senate committee has now added such details as Sen. Church's discovery in his own CIA files of a copy of a letter he had sent from Russia to his mother-in-law in Idaho in 1971.

More disturbing is the disclosure that the FBI between 1942 and 1968 conducted 238 break-in burglaries against 14 unnamed "domestic security targets," not to mention uncounted others against

various other individuals and groups.

What this means is that the FBI, without benefit of any court warrant as required under the Fourth Amendment, broke into homes and offices and presumably rummaged through private files, letters and other belongings. To put it bluntly, the FBI in such cases, whether with or without the support of higher authority brazenly ignored the Bill of Rights.

We realize, of course, that attitudes and conditions have changed. The break-ins began in wartime. That they persisted long afterwards, however, documents the inadequacies of legal restraints, and the dangers of the irresponsible attitude of "go do it, but don't tell me about it."

More important than assessing blame or hooting at ironies is the imperative of preventing similar perils in the future. The country needs better laws, more effective accountability of these agencies to elected officials and a much greater alertness on their part to the dangers posed by surveillance excesses to American liberties.

The U. S. must have first-rate intelligence capability at home and abroad. It needs a strong and effective FBI and CIA in the national interest. But it must devise strict guidelines that confine this capability within lawful and constitutional boundaries.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

14

BUFFALO EVENING NEWS
Buffalo, New York

cc Bureau

1 - 80-1876

1 - 80-2122

9/29/75

Date: _____
Edition: City
Author: _____
Editor: Millard C. Browne
Title: SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
Character: _____
or
Classification: 66-2183
Submitting Office: Buffalo

Being Investigated

- 1. SAC
- 2. ASAC
- 3. Sec. Supvr.
- 4. Desk 4
- 5. Desk 5
- 6. Desk 6

LASH IV

SHAUGHNESSY Jms

*1/2/76
Consolidate 61-2183
into 62-2665 + put in
date order gms*

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
SEP 29 1975	
FBI - BUFFALO	
<i>SAC WAST</i>	

62-2665-30

SAC (67-369-K)

11/12/75

SAC RICHARD D. ROGGE

MARY JO COOK

This is to record that at 4:30 PM on 11/10/75 SAC was telephonically contacted by Supervisor EDWARD P. GRIGALUS of the Intelligence Division indicating that there is a possibility SA GARRY G. LASH may be called to testify before the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to intelligence activities and that he was calling to verify that SA LASH was the primary case Agent who handled MARY JO COOK. Mr. GRIGALUS stated that any further information that is developed, he will notify Buffalo.

① - 62-2665 (Senstudy, 75)
1 - SAC
1 - ASAC
1 - SA LASH

RDR:faf
(5)

C *62-2665-4*

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
NOV 13 1975	
FBI—BUFFALO	

[Signature]

SAC (67-369-K)

11/13/75

EDWARD P. GRIGALUS
FBIHQ, EXTENSION 4591

MARY JO COOK

Rememo of SAC RICHARD D. ROGGE, 11/12/75.

On 11/13/75 EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, FBIHQ,
Ext. 4591, telephonically advised as follows:

The U. S. Senate Select Committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities made the following request: "The following documents and materials relating to MARY JO COOK, in custody of the Buffalo, N. Y., Field Office or elsewhere:

- a. all documents and materials reflecting contacts and reports of contacts (and the substance thereof) between MARY JO COOK and FBI SAs from 7/73 to 12/74.
- b. all documents and materials reflecting information supplied by MARY JO COOK to FBI SAs (and Bureau Field or Headquarters summaries thereof), including all written reports prepared by MARY JO COOK from 7/73 to 12/74.
- c. all documents and materials relating to any guidance, directions, instructions or suggestions given to MARY JO COOK by FBI SAs from 7/73 to 12/74.
- d. all documents and materials relating to Bureau and Field Office supervision of the handling of MARY JO COOK by FBI SAs from 7/73 to 12/74.

Send above materials by cover airtel
captioned "SENSTUDY 75, ATTN: INTD
Mr. W. O. CREGAR."

① - 62-2665 (SENSTUDY, 75)
1 - SAC
1 - ASAC
1 - SA LASH
EPG/faf
(5)

62-1465-5

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
NOV 17 1975	
FBI-BUFFALO	

TO: SAC:

- Albany
- Albuquerque
- Alexandria
- Anchorage
- Atlanta
- Baltimore
- Birmingham
- Boston
- Buffalo
- Butte
- Charlotte
- Chicago
- Cincinnati
- Cleveland
- Columbia
- Dallas
- Denver
- Detroit
- El Paso
- Honolulu
- Houston
- Indianapolis
- Jackson
- Jacksonville
- Kansas City
- Knoxville
- Las Vegas
- Little Rock
- Los Angeles
- Louisville
- Memphis
- Miami
- Milwaukee
- Minneapolis
- Mobile
- Newark
- New Haven
- New Orleans
- New York City
- Norfolk

- Oklahoma City
- Omaha
- Philadelphia
- Phoenix
- Pittsburgh
- Portland
- Richmond
- Sacramento
- St. Louis
- Salt Lake City
- San Antonio
- San Diego
- San Francisco
- San Juan
- Savannah
- Seattle
- Springfield
- Tampa
- Washington Field
- Quantico

TO LEGAT:

- Beirut
- Bern
- Bonn
- Brasilia
- Buenos Aires
- Caracas
- Hong Kong
- London
- Madrid
- Manila
- Mexico City
- Ottawa
- Paris
- Rome
- Singapore
- Tel Aviv
- Tokyo

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Date 11/21/75


- For information Retention optional For appropriate action Surep, by _____
- The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, paraphrase contents.
- Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____

Remarks:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr. Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York Times."

65-551-5-5A
8

Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile

SAC (LAST) 

Mr. Church's Cover-Up

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Nov. 19—On Oct. 10, 1963, the then-Attorney General of the United States put his personal signature on a document that launched and legitimized one of the most horrendous abuses of Federal police power in this century.

In Senator Frank Church's subcommittee hearing room this week, the authorized wiretapping and subsequent unauthorized bugging and attempted blackmailing of Martin Luther King Jr. is being gingerly examined, with the "investigation" conducted in such a way as not to unduly embarrass officials of the Kennedy or Johnson Administrations.

With great care, the committee has focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, when the committee counsel first set forth the result of shuffling through press clips, it seemed as if no Justice Department had existed in 1962; today, an F.B.I. witness pointed out that it was Robert Kennedy who authorized the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the President of the United States and the Attorney General specifically discussed their concern of Communist influence with Dr. King."

But the Church committee showed no zest for getting further to the Kennedy root of this precedent to Watergate eavesdropping. If Senator Church were willing to let the chips fall where they may, he would call some knowledgeable witnesses into the glare of the camera lights and ask them some questions that have gone unasked for thirteen years.

For example, he could call Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Kennedy's deputy and successor, and ask what he knows of the Kennedy decision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at Justice concurred in the recommendation? How does the F.B.I. know the President was consulted or informed?

After Mr. Katzenbach assumed office, and the wiretapping continued, he was told by angry newsmen that the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous information about Dr. King. Why did he wait for four months, and for a thousand telephonic interceptions, to discontinue the officially approved tap?

Of course, this sort of testimony would erode Senator Church's political base. That is why we do not see former Assistant F.B.I. director Cartha (Duke) DeLoach, Lyndon Johnson's personal contact with the F.B.I. in the witness chair. What did President Johnson know about the character-assassination plot and when did he know it? What conversations took place between Mr. DeLoach and President Johnson on the tapping of Dr. King, or about the use of the F.B.I. in any other intrusions into the lives of political figures?

The committee is not asking embarrassing questions even when answers are readily available. A couple of weeks ago, at an open hearing, an F.B.I. man inadvertently started to blurt out an episode about newsmen who were wiretapping in 1962 with the apparent knowledge of Attorney General Kennedy. The too-willing witness was promptly shooshed into silence, and told that such information would be developed only in executive session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.

That pattern of containment by the Church committee is vividly shown by the handling of the buggings at the 1964 Republican and Democratic con-

ESSAY

ventions which were ordered by Lyndon Johnson. Such invasions of political headquarters were worse than the crime committed at Watergate, since they involved the use of the F.B.I., but the Church investigators seem to be determined not to probe too deeply.

If F.B.I. documents say that reports were made to specific Johnson aides, why are those men not given the same opportunity to publicly tell their story so avidly given the next President's men? If Lyndon Johnson committed this impeachable high crime of using the F.B.I. to spy on political opponents, who can be brought forward to tell us all about it?

But that would cause embarrassment to Democrats, and Senator Church wants to embarrass professional employees of investigatory agencies only. A new sense of Congressional decorum exists, far from the sense of outrage expressed in the Senate Watergate committee's hearing room. When it is revealed that the management of NBC News gave press credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964 convention, everybody blushes demurely—and nobody demands to know which network executive made what decision under what pressure.

I have been haranguing patient readers for years about the double standard applied to Democratic and Republican political crimes, and had hoped the day would come when the hardball precedents set by the Kennedy and Johnson men would be laid before the public in damning detail.

Obviously, Democrat Frank Church is not the man to do it. His jowl-shaking indignation is all too selective; the trail of high-level responsibility for the crimes committed against Dr. King and others is evidently going to be allowed to cool.

Pity. You'd think that after all the nation has been through in the past few years, our political leaders would have learned that the one thing that brings you down is the act of covering up.

1. SAC
2. ASAC
3. Sec. Supvr.
4. Desk 4
5. Desk 5
6. Desk 6
7. LASH

THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20th, 1975
PAGE C-41

Buffalo, New York
November 26, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL
AGENT CARRY G. LASH BY
SSC STAFF MEMBERS
ANDREW POSEAL AND JEFF KAYDEN
ON NOVEMBER 26, 1975

Interview of Special Agent LASH by SSC Staff
Committee members was conducted in SSC office space.
The interview lasted from approximately 11:15 AM until
1:15 PM.

Prior to the interview SA LASH was advised of
the identity of the interviewers and that he was free to
exercise his rights at any time as guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. SA LASH was advised that he
had the right to have an attorney present and the right
to have a United States Senator present, SA LASH waived
both of these rights. He was also advised that the scope
of the inquiry would concern the handling of MARY JO COON,
a former FBI informant, exclusively.

A court reporter was present who dictated into
a cassette recording machine during the interview.

SA LASH was not sworn.

As follows are the questions directed to SA LASH
and the answers that he provided according to the best
recollection of SA LASH:

1 - 62-665
GGL:dsm
(10)

P
ASAC *[Signature]*
HORDER *[Signature]*

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ANDREW POSTAL SA LASH, what is your present employment?

SA LASH Special Agent of the FBI

POSTAL Where are you assigned?

LASH Buffalo, New York

POSTAL Were you assigned there during the Summer of 1973?

LASH Yes

POSTAL Did you specialize in any type of investigations?

LASH Yes, Internal Security investigations

POSTAL Did you have occasion to recruit Mary Jo Cook as an informant in an organization known as Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) (Characterization of which is contained in appendix hereto)?

LASH Yes

POSTAL Would you state why the Buffalo Chapter of the VVAW was being investigated by the FBI?

LASH I do not feel that I can answer this question within the scope of the current interview.

POSTAL Who was your supervisor at the time you handled Mary Jo Cook?

LASH Francis Jenkins

POSTAL Who was your SAC at the time?

LASH Richard Ash

POSTAL Would you describe for us the methods of recruiting Mary Jo Cook.

LASH Upon discovering that Mary Jo Cook had attended some meetings of the Buffalo Chapter of the VVAW, I interviewed her concerning her attendance and indicated to her that I wished her to become an informant for the FBI.

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POSTAL Specifically, what instructions did you give her?

LASH I told her to become a member of the Buffalo Chapter of the VVAW in order that she might gather information concerning violent or radical activities engaged in by the organization.

POSTAL What specific area was Miss Cook assigned to work in?

LASH Initially she became a member of the women's group of the VVAW.

POSTAL Was this group of the VVAW engaged in any specific type of activity at the time?

LASH I believe at this point in time they were trying to develop various programs they could implement in the future.

POSTAL Did you tell her she was to obtain background information concerning individuals in the group?

LASH I told her to obtain information concerning members of the VVAW.

POSTAL What do you mean by "a member?"

LASH The VVAW did not have membership cards as such, however, I considered a person who attends meetings of the Chapter or gives financial or other support to be a member of the organization.

POSTAL What type of background information did she obtain?

LASH She obtained physical descriptions and other types of background information such as residences or employment which would allow me to differentiate between that individual and other individuals in the Buffalo area.