

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

299X THRU 300

2 - Mr. J. A. Whitcomb

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 18, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds in part to one of the requests contained in above SSC letter.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

MDR-16

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

62-116395

DATE 10/4/00 BY SP2ALM/ETH

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

KAM:sdjs sdjs
(9)

ENCLOSURE

REC-102

62-116375-300

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

June 18, 1975

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

Reference is made to letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Appendix B, Item I, number 2 of referenced appendices requested this Bureau to provide: "Committee staff access to all so-called "O" files or other general policy files with respect to each file classification routinely used by the Intelligence Division for the period 1930 to the present." It is believed this request actually refers to the "OO" files of the FBI which contain policy memoranda and other communications of a general nature pertaining to a particular classification.

At a conference held on May 30, 1975, between Messrs. John T. Elliff and Mark Gitenstein of the Senate Select Committee; Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of Justice; and Messrs. William O. Cregar and Elmer W. Larson of the FBI, it was agreed, in response to above request, that this Bureau would make available to appropriate personnel of the SSC staff, for review at FBIHQ, copies of pertinent policy memoranda and other communications representative of the type maintained in the "OO" file as it relates to one classification routinely investigated by the Intelligence Division. The classification chosen bears the caption "Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals" and instructions relating to investigations of individuals and organizations falling within this category are contained in Section 87 of this Bureau's Manual of

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
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- Spec. Inv. _____
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- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

KAM:sdjs sdjs
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

RE: Further Documents Pertaining to
the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

Instructions. Communications contained in this "00" file pertaining to Special Agent in Charge (SAC) memoranda and revisions to the Manual of Instructions are not being provided for review inasmuch as these items are being handled under a separate request.

Pertinent documents, believed responsive to above agreement, are now ready for review at FBIHQ by appropriate personnel of the SSC staff.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Section 87 of the MOI pertains to 100 classification matters. Memoranda and communications being made available to SSC staff members were extracted from 100-00-28 thru 100-00-32 which covers the period 1960 to the present. Request for SAC memoranda are being handled under Appendix B, part I, item 1a, attached to the SSC letter of May 14, 1975. Request for revisions to the MOI from 1960 to present are being handled under item 1 of the SSC memorandum dated April 30, 1975. Serial numbers of memoranda and communications being furnished SSC have been noted on our copies of these communications.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

LTR LHM Memo Report dated 6/18/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re; Further
Caption of Document: Documents Pertaining to the FBI
and Department of Justice; Policies and
Procedures. Appendix B, Item I, Number 2

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 6/20/75 ^{3:10} PM

Received by: [Signature]

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

MDR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/00 BY SP2ALM/CHC

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT BRIEFING INTERVIEW TESTIMONY OTHER

6/18/75

FOR REVIEW

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC
 HSC

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *10/4/00* BY *SP2ALM/EHC*

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part 1, Item 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

At the request of SSC, copies of policy memoranda and other communications of a general nature pertaining to specific classifications investigated by this Bureau are being made available at FBIHQ for review by SSC members.

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS

5-AM

62-116395

TJM:1hb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

LFS 7-2-75

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 6-6-60

FROM : J. F. Malone

SUBJECT: CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA
SECURITY-TYPE CASESMDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/00 BY SP2A/m/eh

The purpose of this memorandum is to call attention to the problem of retaining channelizing memoranda in field case files.

BACKGROUND: Under the present procedure, when data is received from security informants either their reports or a memorandum on data furnished is prepared and is placed in the subfile relating to the particular informant. A memorandum, which is called a channelizing memorandum, is then prepared setting forth the various items of information furnished and copies are designated for each file for which the contents of the memorandum relate. The original memorandum furnished by the informant is placed in the subfile of the informants file. Any memorandum which is prepared on the basis of oral information is placed in this file and also referred to as a channelizing memorandum.

Many suggestions have been received starting in September, 1952, and up to April 18, 1960, to destroy these memoranda in case files after the information has been incorporated into a report. In all instances, these suggestions have not been adopted. The Executive Conference on 7/6/53 considered this matter and was unanimously opposed. The Domestic Intelligence Division has consistently opposed these suggestions.

This matter was discussed at the Internal Security-Espionage conferences, January 12-13, 1959, and recommended study by the Training and Inspection Division during inspections of larger offices. On September 17, 1959, in a memorandum from Mr. Tamm to Mr. Tolson, (100-00-1481), it was recommended that the channelizing memorandum be retained in individual subject files.

The Inspection Staff has frequently been presented this problem during inspections. In discussing this matter with field representatives, there is a divergence of opinion.

100-00-1485

Memo to Mr. Mohr
Re: Channelizing Memoranda
Security-type Cases

ADVANTAGES: Saving of file cabinets, office space and prevent case files from becoming voluminous, particularly in larger offices. As an example, during the last New York inspection (completed 3-25-60) in four Internal Security case files, there was an increase since the last inspection of 17, 20, 16, and 12 volumes respectively. These files contained some reports, letters and airtels, but the bulk of the files was channelizing memoranda. These examples reflect the increase of storage space for these files.

DISADVANTAGES: The purpose of these memoranda is to insure that all information from informants pertaining to a particular subject is placed in the subject's file and readily available. Comparisons of channelizing memoranda against reports reflect all information from the memoranda is not incorporated into the report such as information of intelligence nature. Intelligence information available in channelizing memoranda is often needed in conducting surveillances and other investigation relating to a subject. If the memoranda were destroyed, the Agent would be required to review numerous informant subfiles to insure he had all information. It is a possibility he might miss some valuable intelligence information. Security reports are prepared for future prosecution. Should there be an emergency, it would be virtually impossible for all Agents involved to review the original reports or original channelizing memoranda due to the great demands which would be made for such material.

CONCLUSIONS: While this matter has always been decided in favor of retaining channelizing memoranda, we continue to receive suggestions from the field that consideration be given to destroying them once they have been incorporated into a report. It is obvious there would be a great amount of filing space saved if this were possible. However, in view of the objections set forth, it is believed this matter should again be considered by the members of the Internal Security Espionage Conference on June 9 - 10, 1960, in an endeavor to establish whether it is possible to overcome the enumerated objections. It is the consensus of the Inspection Staff that if the material objections can be overcome the destruction of channelizing memoranda after they have been incorporated in a report would be desirable.

RECOMMENDATION: That this matter be discussed at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference, June 9 - 10, 1960.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 12, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY REPORT WRITING -
THOROUGHNESSMDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/00 BY SP2 AM/EHL

From a review of investigative reports concerning security matters in recent months a tendency has been noted on the part of the field to report plans of a subversive group to take certain action, without a follow-up to report that the action did or did not take place. This is an undesirable practice as it may infer inadequate investigation and could prove embarrassing because of the fact that we disseminate information to many other agencies which rely on us for the full facts in given situations.

Examples of the foregoing may be found in the following: Bufiles 97-401-1291, 1292; 100-3-29-1162, 1163; 100-3-63-1037; 100-46808-820, 823. In all these instances the reporting period encompassed the dates when certain activities were to have taken place but the reports failed to resolve the actuality of the situation.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is basic that we are as much interested in actions taken by a subversive group or individual ^{as in} ~~than~~ what it or he may plan to do. To report only an intention or plan without the necessary follow-up is to leave the matter unresolved in the mind of the reader. It is believed that a reminder to the field in the form of an SAC letter would be desirable and is therefore recommended.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is an SAC letter reminding the field of the necessity for thoroughness in security report writing. Manual changes not necessary.

100-00-1494

November 17, 1964

Airtel

To: SAC, Los Angeles (100-00)

From: Director, FBI (100-00)

FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
SECURITY MATTER

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/4/00 BY SP2 ARM/ewl

Reurlet 11/3/64.

According to present Bureau policy, when security fraud cases are referred by the intelligence agencies, they are always accepted for investigation of the fraud violation with the understanding that any investigation which the interested agency desires to make pursuant to its responsibilities will not interfere with the investigative responsibilities of this Bureau. The Bureau's policy in these cases has never been to prohibit OSI from conducting an interview with the subject at any time it chooses to do so. It would be advisable, of course, for OSI to inform your office when it plans such an interview so that the two investigations could be coordinated.

It should be understood that OSI will furnish your office the results of any OSI investigation relating to a fraud violation within FBI jurisdiction.

100-00-1504

SAC, San Juan

Director, FBI

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP2 ALM/ETHC 3/24/66

FIELD SUPERVISION - INTERNAL SECURITY -
NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY MATTERS

During the period 11/10/65 to 3/18/66 in connection with work handled by your office regarding various nationalistic tendency matters it has been necessary for the Bureau to initiate correspondence with the San Juan Office on 41 separate occasions regarding nonsubstantive errors in communications, other than teletypes, prepared by the San Juan Office.

An analysis of the 41 communications sent to San Juan in this connection has revealed that 62 separate errors of form were involved. Fifteen of the errors related to incorrect description or insufficient concealment of sources. An additional 15 errors were of a typographical nature. In seven instances errors were made in classifying reports and letterhead memoranda prepared for dissemination. Remaining errors were in titles of communications (four); failure to submit evaluation memorandum (three); inclusion of incorrect references in communications (three); omission of character of cases (two); incorrect designations of copies (five); failure to submit material in form for dissemination (four); and one error each for omitting place of preparation of a letterhead memorandum; submitting partly illegible material for dissemination; failure to date a memorandum; and omitting leads from an investigative report.

In going over the types of errors committed, it will be noted that almost all of them could have been avoided by the exercise of more care in preparing the communications or in proofreading them.

Administrative correspondence to call the attention of your office to errors committed is time-consuming and must be reduced. The pattern shown here is indicative of a lack of proper attention to details and to accuracy of material prepared in the San Juan Office. Reports and letterhead memoranda are often given wide dissemination at the Seat of Government and you must assure that the material emanating from your office is closely scrutinized from a standpoint of quality and accuracy.

100-00-1506

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 28, 1967

FROM : C. D. Brennan

MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/5/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHC

SUBJECT: BLACK REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

The Summer of 1967 has shown a marked increase in racial tension and riots. The Bureau is now faced with the problem of dealing with revolutionary groups which are outside the civil rights movement. Leaders of these groups, such as [redacted] and [redacted] of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and [redacted] of the Revolutionary Action Movement, are calling for revolutions.

Several members of Congress have called for legislation to handle this problem. It appears that the statements and actions of such individuals as those mentioned above come within the purview of Title 18, Section 2385, United States Code (Smith Act of 1940) which makes it illegal to advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty or desirability of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States or of any State or political subdivision therein.

The Act also makes it illegal to print, publish, issue, or to distribute written or printed matter advocating such actions.

A membership provision of the Act makes it illegal to organize a group advocating such actions. It is also illegal to become a member of such group if the person who becomes a member knows the purpose of the group.

OBSERVATION:

We have furnished the Department voluminous material concerning such groups and individuals, including literature and statements which appear to fall squarely within this law. The Department has given us no indication that it is even considering action under Title 18, Section 2385. In view of the many inflammatory statements being made by leaders of these groups and the increasing pressure for action against them, it is felt that we should go on record

Enclosure

100-00-1507

Memo to Mr. Sullivan
RE: BLACK REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

with the Department concerning the possibility of prosecution under this law. There is enclosed a letter to the Attorney General asking whether the Department has considered prosecution under Title 18, Section 2385.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed letter to the Attorney General be approved.

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL
July 31, 1967

BLACK REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

This Bureau has furnished voluminous material to you concerning the statements and actions of officials of black revolutionary groups, such as ~~_____~~ and ~~_____~~ of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and ~~_____~~ of the Revolutionary Action Movement.

A review of their statements and actions indicates that they may fall within the purview of Title 18, Section 2385 of the United States Code. Please advise whether the Department has considered the possibility of proceeding against the individuals under this law.

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
- 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

100-00-1507

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/31/70

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

On 2/27/69, the Executives Conference approved a six-month suspension of investigations in selected Security Matter - Communist cases as well as report writing in cases involving Priority II and Priority III Security Index subjects. This moratorium was imposed as a matter of temporary expediency in order to make additional investigative personnel available for organized crime investigations in the field. At the conclusion of the above six-month period, the moratorium was evaluated and on 9/17/69, a letter was sent to the field advising that this moratorium would remain in effect for an additional six months.

Priority I of the Security Index includes those individuals considered to be hard core national and state leaders of subversive groups and individuals with no organizational affiliation who are believed to pose an imminent threat to the internal security. Verification of residence and employment of individuals in this category are conducted every three months and reports submitted annually. Cases in this category have not been affected by the moratorium.

Priority II of the Security Index includes those individuals considered to be the second level of leadership in subversive organizations and individuals believed to be dangerous but in less influential positions than those included in Priority I. Verification of residence and employment in this category and submission of reports are performed on an annual basis. Cases in this category have been affected by the moratorium.

All other individuals in the Security Index are tabbed Priority III. Cases in this category have likewise been affected by the moratorium. Prior to 12/69, verification of residence and employment of these individuals was conducted on a yearly basis and reports were submitted every two years. In 12/69, for the purpose of streamlining our procedures, the Bureau, with the concurrence of the Department, instructed the field that in the absence of unusual circumstances, annual reports no longer need be submitted regarding Priority III subjects.

100-358086-4022

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
100-358086

As of 3/13/70, the Security Index contained 696 Priority I subjects, 2065 Priority II subjects and 8286 Priority III subjects. In view of the above-stated changes in procedures, should the moratorium be lifted at this time, no reports need be submitted in the 8286 Priority III cases, and reports need only be submitted on a periodic basis in the 2065 Priority II cases. This represents an approximate 73 percent reduction in report writing in these categories.

As the Bureau has gone on record in placing the above moratorium into effect, it would be in the best interests of the Bureau to similarly go on record, notifying the field that the moratorium has been suspended. Additionally, it is imperative that the moratorium be suspended to help regulate the size of the Security Index. Manual of Instructions requires that subjects, after five years of inactivity in a basic revolutionary group or three years of inactivity in a front group, be considered for Security Index deletion. As a result of the moratorium, no action has been taken by the field in this respect in the past year, and the Security Index has continued to grow. From March, 1969, to March, 1970, the Security Index has increased by over 800 names, principally because the necessary process of attrition has been suspended.

It is recognized the moratorium was necessary when instituted. It is felt, however, that now is the appropriate time for the moratorium to be rescinded not only to enable the Bureau to fulfill its responsibilities in the vital internal security field, but because lifting of the moratorium at this time will not create the burdensome increase in the workload of the field that would have existed had not the previously-stated changes in procedures been placed into effect.

Attached is letter to all field offices advising that the above moratorium has been rescinded.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to all field offices, advising of the lifting of the moratorium, be approved and sent to the Mechanical Section in order that appropriate copies be made.

