

**File #:**

62-116395

**Serial Scope:**

386 ONLY

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 *AM/2/8*

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (Enc. 76)  
(J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
July 10, 1975
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,  
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and  
other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6, requested all  
memoranda and other materials pertaining to FBI policies,  
practices, and procedures for liaison with the CIA from 1960  
to May, 1970. General instructions concerning liaison with  
other agencies, including CIA, are set forth in Section 102  
of the Manual of Instructions, a copy of which has been  
furnished to the SSC.

Item number 9 requested all memoranda and other  
materials reflecting conversations or communications, during  
1970, between Agents of the FBI and the FBI Director on the  
subject of liaison or contact between personnel of the FBI  
and personnel of the CIA, including, but not limited to, all  
memoranda and other materials written by former Special Agent  
Sam Papich. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed  
copies of 19 FBI communications.

In addition to the documents being furnished, there  
are a number of internal memoranda, dated March 6-9, 1970,  
prepared by the Intelligence Division in response to the Sam J.  
Papich memorandum to the Director, March 5, 1970, which because  
of their sensitive nature are being made available for review  
by SSC staff personnel at FBI Headquarters. These memoranda  
are amplifications of the possible CIA grievances listed by  
Mr. Papich.

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

RLM:mam  
(8) mam

*YBA*  
*PLM*

ORIGINAL AND COPY TO ATTORNEY GEN'L  
SEE NOTE PAGES TWO AND THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395-  
ENCLOSURE

*386*  
*wrb*  
*LFS*  
*TJM*

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

In response to Item number 9, it has been necessary to excise numerous names, dates, places, and other material in order to protect sensitive operations, sources, and methods and to protect the privacy of individuals. In some instances, to protect privacy, it was also necessary to remove information which could lead to an individual's identity. At the end of numerous paragraphs administrative details, such as file numbers, were deleted.

Enclosures (19)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

All documents responsive to Item number 9 being furnished to SSC were previously furnished to the Rockefeller Commission (see W. R. Wannall memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 4/16/75). Originally the Rockefeller Commission was to review the material in FBI space but the Commission obtained possession of the documents.

The documents being made available for review by SSC staff personnel are the cover memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 3/9/70, and enclosed 37 memoranda. These memoranda have been classified Secret and have been appropriately excised.

Enclosed for the Office of the Legal Counsel are one unexcised and one excised copy of the memoranda being made available for review.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

The Papich letter and memoranda, and the review of the 38 possible grievances, contain comments and other information which could have an adverse effect on our current relationship with CIA.

While numerous dates have been excised to protect the identity of individuals, any reader can extrapolate the approximate time of an event since Papich wrote his 3/13/70 letter following a chronological scheme from 1951 to 1970. There is some chronological variance in the 3/5/70 letter.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

LTR  LHM  Memo  Report dated 7/10/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Huston  
Caption of Document: Plan and Related Developments  
Appendix C, Part I, Items 6 and 9.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Kelly Date: 7/15/75

Received by: Robert E. Kelly

Title: Joint Issue Reader

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#mde16  
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DATE 1-3-01 BY SP2 AM/116

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- Tab A - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6.
- Tab B - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item number 9.
- Tab C - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in response to request in Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6.
- Tab D - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in response to request in Appendix C, Part I, Item number 9.
- Tab E - Excised version of 38 memoranda being held at FBIHQ for review by SSC.
- Tab F - Unexcised version of 38 memoranda being held at FBIHQ for review by SSC.

#MDR 16  
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 AZM/176

62-116395-386

ENCLOSURE

Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I,  
Item number 6

#MDR/16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP2 AEM/16

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

#mDR16

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 ALM/16SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past several years by SA Sam Papich, who also handles liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with INS in order to devote full time to CIA.

## INFORMATION RELATING TO INS

CIA continues to be one of the most important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time consuming. Proper handling of this assignment now requires the full time and attention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order to devote his entire attention to CIA.

INFORMATION RELATING TO AGENT TO BE  
ASSIGNED TO HANDLE LIAISON WITH INS.ACTION:

If you approve, liaison responsibility for INS will be transferred from SA Papich to NAME

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.*

*OK but R. O. L'Allier  
lead NAME  
H 10*



(E) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) - DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE -- You previously have been informed regarding CIA's Contact Division which has had offices in various U. S. cities and which is openly identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of aliens, travelers, businessmen, etc. The division has not been engaged in any operational activity such as the development of double agents. For your information, CIA has reorganized this division and it is now called the Domestic Contact Service.

An examination of CIA's activities in the area of overt collection of positive intelligence has indicated that the Bureau can strengthen its position by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. [This particularly applies to those situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc and Yugoslav nationals, excluding those who are connected with embassies or the United Nations.] We recognize that CIA has a responsibility for collection of positive intelligence (i. e. information regarding Soviet-bloc capability in a particular research field) which might be acquired from such visitors but we cannot condone any CIA activity which might interfere with Bureau operations. - You therefore are authorized to establish liaison with local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. (S)

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 5 -

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

(5) In each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a [visiting Soviet-bloc national] you should obtain from the local Domestic Contact Service the nature and extent of CIA interest and all pertinent information which CIA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with Bureau objectives, you should so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau s discharge of its internal security functions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 6 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10/25/65

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -  
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

# 100216  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-7 ALM/STC

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

NAME, Philadelphia Office, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Domestic Contact Service, was contacted on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter. NAME advised he had just returned from conferences at his Agency Headquarters in Washington, where he had been advised the Bureau was directing its field offices to establish liaison with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. NAME offered his complete cooperation with this office in matters of mutual interest.

Arrangements were perfected whersin Agents of this office making inquiries or investigations of a Soviet-Bloc National can contact NAME and he will place them in contact with the Domestic Contact Service representative handling the case, so that information of interest to us can be secured. Any information coming to the attention of the Domestic Contact Service relating to our internal security responsibilities will be immediately reported to this office.

NAME requested, in view of his Agency's regulations, that CIA not be identified as the source in the event

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information received from his office should be included in a communication going to anyone outside the Bureau. NAME was assured that CIA's identity in this regard would be fully protected.

INFORMATION RELATING TO THE  
TERRITORY COVERED BY THE PHILADELPHIA  
OFFICE CIA DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE  
INCLUDING NAMES OF CIA PERSONNEL.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contacts with CIA in these cases, it is anticipated that CIA representatives may at times request information relating to Subjects' background, habits, and characteristics, as well as any available photographs.

The Bureau is requested to advise if it will be permissible to orally furnish such background information to the CIA representative and to furnish copies of photographs, if they are available.

The Bureau is also requested to advise if the establishment of liaison on the field office level with CIA's Domestic Contact Service envisages the furnishing of reports and letterhead memos to this Service at the field office level where they have a legitimate interest in the Subject.

SAC, Philadelphia

10/29/65

Director, FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

#M0216  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP7 ALM/AB

Reference is made to your letter dated 10/25/65.

The Bureau has been following a policy of not disseminating Bureau information to the Domestic Contact Service at a local level. This policy will continue unless you are advised to the contrary.

In the event that the local CIA office desires information concerning any subject, such requests should be directed by CIA to Bureau Headquarters.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2ALM/216

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field. For example,

SPECIFIC EXAMPLE GIVEN

In addition, CIA has a domestic operations office in the District which makes name checks with WFO and secures background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel. No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate operational matters.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/26/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 AM/FR

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the operational contacts between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office. Mr. Tolson noted "I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter" and the Director said "I most, certainly intended the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

It is possible that other field offices have working-level contact with the CIA offices in their territories. If the Director desires, similar instructions will be issued to them.

## ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be handled by letter.

no.  
/s/

(2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be prepared containing similar instructions, applicable to all offices.

no  
/s/

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I  
Item number 9

#MDA16  
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DATE 1-8-01 BY SP2-AMT/116

B



March 2, 1970

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2A/m/HG  
ON 1-2-01

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I ask that you approve my request to retire from Bureau service and, if it is convenient, to have this retirement become effective April 3

For several weeks I have been giving this matter serious thought since I began questioning my capability to bring about a better coordinated effort directed against foreign intelligence targets, particularly those of the Communist-Bloc. I have always aimed for perfection, but I do not find that the desired results are being achieved. For almost 18 years I have handled an assignment during a period of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, but also punishing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have badly neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left I would like to give my family the attention it rightfully deserves.

It would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the recent events which have led to the severance of direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. Since I have been the principal Bureau element in the day to day relations between the organizations, it has been my responsibility to anticipate problems, move in on the situation, and protect Bureau interests in an efficient and effective manner. I have reviewed my position in this latest development, and I certainly must share responsibility for the tragic turn of events. I believe that I might have employed better perception by following developments in Denver more closely. I deeply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose.

I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to our S.I.S. history, and I think I can speak with some authority in stating that never in our history has this nation been faced with greater security threats from communist intelligence services who, through police state organizations, have developed unusually sophisticated capabilities to strike at our vulnerabilities of a democratic and free society. A continuing and priority target of the Bloc is to penetrate and split or disrupt our internal security and intelligence organizations. Contrary to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intelligence operation or an internal security case which does not have direct or indirect international ramifications. The course of events and the highly capable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services have placed increasing burdens on us and have necessitated close working relations with CIA, military intelligence services and other agencies. The complex nature of many cases, the rapid means of travel and communication, the daily occurrence of emergency type political developments in various parts of the world have warranted direct liaison with approximately twenty CIA officials on a daily basis. In addition, there are about thirty officials contacted with lesser frequency. The Bureau is a member of the U. S.

Classified by 152  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Board and its sub-committees which cover matters such as handling of defectors, development of computer programs, leaks of classified information and production of intelligence studies. Our Legal Attaches have reason to contact CIA on a regular basis, and although it has been a small volume of business, the line of communication between our domestic offices and local CIA representatives has been definitely useful. The daily business with CIA relates to hundreds of cases pertaining to activities of all Communist-Bloc services, the New Left, Black Nationalists, the Communist Party and related organizations, and political crises in areas such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. Theoretically, all business could be handled by mail, but from a practical standpoint such a procedure will lead to unbelievable chaos. There will be almost insurmountable obstacles if we are to discharge our duties in a responsible manner and if we are to counter a relentless enemy in the interest of national security. Because interests of other agencies are frequently intertwined with cases involving the Bureau and CIA, the break in FBI-CIA liaison will adversely affect our liaison with such agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the word is received by the "troops" in all U.S. agencies that FBI and CIA no longer have any liaison. Unfortunately, there will be individuals who will maliciously distort and misinterpret the true facts. Within a short period, there will be stories in the press, and worst of all the Communist-Bloc services will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of subtle, skillful and extremely harmful disruption. I am absolutely convinced that the intelligence services of Great Britain, France, West Germany and others are well penetrated by the Soviets. I can't believe that the Philbys, the Blakes, the Alger Hisses were the last of the penetrations. I mention this because if such penetrations exist, the break in relations between the FBI and CIA will provide a basis for promoting further rifts. This is the first time in our history that such an event has occurred, and it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every effort to reap the greatest profit possible. Briefly, Mr. Hoover, I have too much respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous situation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations between the FBI and CIA, it would be most unfair of me not to comment on the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in CIA who strived for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their endeavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Bureau including notable and outstanding accomplishments. We have been furnished sources, informants, solid productive cases, technical advice and equipment, and there have been instances of cooperation which led to substantial saving of Bureau funds. There also have been examples of alertness on the part of CIA employes which prevented Bureau commission of errors and averted embarrassment. Among some of the more significant examples of cooperation I cite the excellent and badly needed assistance of CIA in the Rudolph Abel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us with one of the better criminal informants we have had in recent years in the person of **NAME**. I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the supporters of the Bureau.

~~SECRET~~

It is recognized that one can also present a bill of particulars relating to examples of poor cooperation and deliberate skulduggery. I hold no brief for those in CIA who disrupted relations between

the two agencies been an unyielded-for actions. Some of these were the parasites who converted their bureaucratic empires, many are used a creative idea, and lived off the errors of the dedicated people. I believe that an honest and thorough examination will reveal that the presence of such types at the present time is negligible or their influence is almost completely neutralized. Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances. You may not realize that a few years ago we enjoyed a poor reputation among CIA employees. We were characterized as being devious and there was a decided atmosphere of mistrust. Happily, that is not the situation today. I am confident that you can go into any segment of CIA, here and abroad, and you will find that Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity are sincerely related to the FBI. The problems in past years primarily arose from unbelievably poor communication among interested parties. This communication has been greatly improved because of the efforts of many dedicated people. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. In our own Bureau there are numerous officials and employees who have little or no knowledge of the background and the principles of the National Security Act of 1947 and of the National Security Council Directives. In addition, these same people have a vague conception of the objectives and functions of an intelligence organization. Similarly, within CIA there are very many whose conception of the FBI, its jurisdiction, its objectives, its law enforcement character, is shocking at times. Tremendous progress has been made, but it is not easy to harmoniously coordinate the operations of an organization designed to operate in a clandestine manner with an agency which is basically a law enforcement body. This difficulty is further aggravated because our relationship is still composed of a fragile fabric. One incident potentially can destroy years of constructive effort.

Mr. Hoover, I respectfully request that you reconsider the decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. I appeal to you to leave the door open for further deliberation because I am confident this conflict can be satisfactorily resolved. I believe that my removal from the scene provides the opportunity to appoint another agent who will measure up to your desired capabilities and who will be able to rapidly resolve the problem with a new and fresh approach. It is a good time to reexamine our relations with CIA and to make adjustments satisfactory to you.

I sincerely regret that this situation arose, since I readily appreciate you are burdened with so many heavy responsibilities. Yet I feel that I had a firm obligation and duty to communicate with you because of the very nature of my assignment these many years and because of my involvement in this controversial case.

My years with the Bureau gave me more satisfaction than anyone can imagine. You would have to know me better to appreciate this. I want to assure you that wherever I go or whatever I do I will be prepared to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong and respected FBI.

Sincerely yours,

*Sam Papich*  
Sam Papich

~~SECRET~~

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: ~~RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA~~

#MDR16  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 1-2-01 BY SP-2A/M/RTG

DECLASSIFIED BY  
 ON

Attached is a memorandum dictated by Special Agent Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the identification of the instances Papich had in mind when in his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that in the past we (FBI) did not always act in a forthright manner, and the agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances."

A list identifying the cases and outlining the problems involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the memorandum. A review of the 25-page document reveals that it contains several instances in which CIA has registered its dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints, and others in which presumably CIA had no knowledge of Bureau action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited and a memorandum will be prepared as to each, containing my views and recommendations as a result of that analysis. This is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will be sent through as soon as possible.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*