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Serial Scope: 586- Bulky
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INSPECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

AUGUST 17 - SEPTEMBER 9, 1971
Recommend entire document be classified "Secret,"
XGDS 1, 2, 3.

Portions recommended for excision from attached have
been underlined in red or bracketed in red in left margin.

Generally, criteria for excision were:

1. Information which could identify sources or
   sensitive techniques
2. Names of individuals or organizations whose
   privacy requires protection
3. Information which would reveal our overall success
   or lack of success in a given investigative area
4. Information from "third Agencies" or friendly
   foreign agencies
5. Identities of Bureau personnel below the Section
   Chief level

The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general,
disclose the extent of our commitment in specific areas of
counterintelligence activity. We have given the Committee
Administrative Division figures regarding total manpower
involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, we
have not given them a breakdown as to where these personnel
are assigned. A policy decision is necessary as to whether we
want to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel"
sections of these inspection reports, precisely how much or
how little manpower we have on specific types of investigations.

It is questionable whether the information regarding
criminal cases in the San Francisco report is germane to the
Committee's inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to
delete all references to criminal matters and merely substitute
a page saying that "pages ___ to ___ relate to criminal
investigations."
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INTERNATIONAL E. S. MILLER: This case is currently being afforded preferred supervisory and investigative attention. You are requested to furnish the following information about the case:

1. Brief narrative of basic investigation involving Ellsberg and provide current status.

2. You have advised this case may be part of a greater conspiracy. Advise what part you feel this and other leaks may be. It is realized the broad aspects of this case may be yet unconfirmed conjecture; however, furnish narrative of conjecture.

3. Advise what progress we have made and anticipate making in projecting our investigation into areas described in number two.

4. Advise as best you can at this point how "big" this investigation may become from a supervisory standpoint and indicate what impact an overall successful investigation may have on Governmental processes in our system of Government.

5. In regard to the administration of this investigation handled by the Nationalities Intelligence Section and due to certain intricacies of supervision the following information is requested individually from both Division Head and Section Chief:

   a. At the outset of the investigation, what instructions were issued Section handling case?

   b. What subsequent instructions or suggestions have been issued?

   c. What have been the manpower requirements of the case thus far and how have you worked these out with this Section?

   d. Division Head and Section Chief requested to make any further comments considered appropriate at this time.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71
1. Initial investigation by Bureau opened 1/20/70 based on information from step-mother of subject's former wife to the effect that subject, with his children, took papers from his office at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, and copied them with intent that they be made available for Senators Fulbright and Goodell. This information had come to knowledge of Carol Ellsberg through the Ellsberg children. Initial investigation continued through 9/25/70 when basic facts were presented to Department of Justice with note that no further action would be taken in the absence of a specific request from the Department. No such request was received.

On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" commenced publishing a series of articles purporting to report on the history of the U. S. decision-making process concerning Vietnam policies for the period 1945-1967. "The New York Times" claimed the articles were based on a study later identified as a 47-volume history entitled "United States - Vietnam Relations During the Period 1945-1967," commonly known as the "McNamara Study." The "McNamara Study" was prepared beginning in 1967 and was classified "Top Secret."

On 6/15/71 the Attorney General requested FBI to conduct all necessary investigation into the matter relating to the publication of classified information by "The New York Times." Our 1970 investigation and initial reports from sources obtained in instant matter pinpointed Ellsberg as the prime suspect responsible for the leak of classified data to news media. Extensive investigation at Los Angeles pinned down the identities of individuals present in October, 1969, when Ellsberg duplicated classified documents available to him through his employment at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Also revealed were his own statements to his former wife that he, in fact, was converting the classified documents to his own use to furnish them to various Congressional figures. The Los Angeles investigation has resulted in Ellsberg's current indictment alleging violation of Section 793(e), Title 18, U. S. Code (unauthorized possession of documents involved and unlawful retention of same) and Section 641, Title 18 (conversion of the documents to his own use). The Los Angeles investigation was the sole basis for this indictment and served as the basis for current imprisonment on charge of contempt of court of Anthony J. Russo who was present on one occasion when Ellsberg allegedly duplicated material in his possession.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
WRW:ams
4-A-3
Investigation at Washington, D. C., has pinned down Ellsberg's access to the documents in question and has additionally revealed his early change from "hawk" to "dove." It has also revealed his contacts with individuals at high levels in Federal Government attempting to persuade them to put before American public details of decisions underlying the U. S. policy in Vietnam.

Investigation at Boston has uncovered activity by Neil and Susan Sheehan, employees of "The New York Times," in late March, 1971. This activity has included extensive details of sessions where duplication of portions of the "McNamara Study" were involved. Revealed have been details identifying the printing companies utilized by the Sheehans, considerable travel between these companies and apartments available to or utilized by Ellsberg. We have uncovered extensive detail of Ellsberg's contacts from his Cambridge, Massachusetts, residence with members of the news media. Also revealed has been contact by Ellsberg with factions of the New Left and anti-Vietnam peace groups.

We have recently expanded our investigation in attempt to uncover details of dissemination of the "McNamara Study" by Ellsberg to other newspapers in which articles appeared attributed to the "McNamara Study." This investigation has revealed at least three newsmen from the Washington, D. C., bureaus of the newspapers involved were in the Boston and/or Cambridge area during the week immediately prior to Ellsberg's surrender on 6/28/71. We have learned that at least one newspaper had been contacted by an unknown individual in Boston who had offered the "McNamara Study" instructing that if the newspaper involved wished to avail itself of the offer, the classified documents could be picked up in Boston after contacting a given telephone number in that area for more detailed instructions. We are pursuing this facet of the investigation vigorously to pin down exact activities of the newspaper personnel involved and when this is done, we contemplate interviewing them for additional details.

Extensive investigation has been afforded the possibility that Ellsberg benefited from considerable assistance from other individuals in his attempt to disseminate the "McNamara Study" to the news media. Along these lines we have detected early reports of Ellsberg's cooperation with elements of the War Resisters League and have identified individuals in that organization described by Ellsberg as the principal influences on his change to a militant opposition to the U. S. - Vietnam policies. Investigation is continuing along these lines to establish if any individuals in these dissident groups may have assisted Ellsberg in his alleged violations of the statutes noted.

A relative of Mr. Haldeman at the White House, France Raine, reported that while attending a football game in Los Angeles in October, 1970, he overheard a conversation between two men sitting near him whom he believed to be prominent
in the Business Executives Movement for Vietnam (BEM). This conversation involved the plan on the part of an unidentified individual to leak secret information to the press in the Spring of 1971, with the unidentified individual being mentioned as being an employee of Rand Corporation and having formerly served as an advisor to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. Also mentioned by the conversants was the plan on the part of two White House aides to resign their positions sometime during the Summer of 1971 and to make anti-Administration revelations at that time regarding U.S. - Vietnam policy. Ellsberg was known to have appeared on at least two occasions as a speaker for BEM functions in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. A close associate of his in Los Angeles was a former leader of the BEM chapter in that city. We have intensified our investigation of BEM and conducted extensive investigation to pin down identities of persons seated near Raine during the game in question. We are continuing our investigation along these lines to pinpoint a possible conspiracy existing as early as October, 1970, with ramifications of anti-Administration activity and revelation of classified information.

We have recently received from Attorney General clarification of the areas in which we can conduct investigation in this matter and, as a result, are extending our interviews into news media circles where we feel we can uncover individuals who will cooperate with us in revealing details of the Ellsberg revelations and any conspiracy that may have existed involving him and others to expose to public scrutiny the classified information involved in this case.

2. At the outset of this investigation Assistant Director Brennan spoke at a Division Chiefs' Conference and also directly to the Section Chief, Nationalities Intelligence Section, regarding the possibility of a wide-scale conspiracy in which Ellsberg could be involved. His observations along these lines were recorded in a memorandum to all Division Chiefs dated 7/23/71 and captioned "Re: Organizational Survey (Priorities and Manpower)." In this memorandum he commented upon the fact that the Ellsberg case might be a landmark in historical significance in view of the long-range potential regarding Governmental operations and the FBI's role in relation thereto. He stated that the leak in this case represented a deliberate and determined effort on the part of certain individuals to seriously disrupt and destroy the Government's capacity to carry out effectively its foreign policy in various areas.

Mr. Brennan noted that the past 15 to 20 years had witnessed the evolution of a new breed of fanatics who were determined to disrupt and destroy Governmental operations and to alter this country's foreign policy. He further noted that the movement supported by these fanatics bordered on treason which must be dealt with if our current form of Government is to survive.
During the early stages of the investigation in this case it became quite evident that Ellsberg had received assistance in getting into the hands of various newspapers the "McNamara Study." He admitted as much on 6/28/71 in responding to questions raised by reporters when he surrendered himself at the Boston Courthouse following issuance of a complaint charging him with violating the Espionage Statute. Accordingly, the thrust of our investigation has been directed toward identifying any individual or individuals or organization that may have assisted or conspired with Ellsberg. It was noted that developments had indicated that at least part of the "McNamara Study" was reportedly in the possession of the Institute for Policy Studies and that while a page-by-page review of the Bureau's file on that Institute had not revealed any information concerning Ellsberg, we had developed material in the Ellsberg investigation showing connections between him and some of the Institute employees.

On 7/6/71 the Director prepared a memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan, Brennan and Bishop to advise that the Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, had called the Director about the Ellsberg case. The Director stated that Mr. Haldeman said the President wanted a report on the case immediately to bring him up to date and then to keep him filled in, and that the President was particularly interested in the complicity of individuals.

On 7/6/71 with the Director's approval a conference was held with Departmental attorneys during which Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian explained that information coming to his attention from Departments of Defense and State officials indicated that a group at each of these Departments may be involved in a ring to pass out classified information. He said that while this may or may not be related to the Ellsberg case he was most desirous of getting a complete rundown on Ellsberg's background to determine if any of his associates may have come under suspicion in connection with other leaks. He also said the President was vitally concerned not only with the Ellsberg case but with all aspects of leaks of classified information of the Executive Branch.

We have not developed any hard evidence confirming that a wide-spread organized conspiracy exists to leak Government information. We are aware, however, of one thread common to certain of these leaks. That is, individuals such as Ellsberg, who were either bitterly opposed to the U. S. - Vietnam policy or in disagreement with other major foreign policy issues, have set themselves up above the law, claiming the right to decide what should be released to the public regardless of Executive Branch classification assigned to information. Many of these individuals in common with Ellsberg have been affiliated with one or more of the so-called "think tanks," such as Rand Corporation, have served
in a number of sensitive positions in the Executive Branch of the Government and to a large extent are acquainted with one another, at least on a professional basis. Communications to appropriate field offices dated 7/7 and 12/71 contained instructions regarding the necessity for exploring the various facets of this situation.

The conspiracy aspects of the Ellsberg case as revealed to date are set forth in Item 3 below.

3. Speculation that Daniel Ellsberg conspired with others in obtaining, reproducing and disclosing the "McNamara Study" has some basis in public remarks made by him on 6/28/71 indicating that "It is implicit ... that other individuals helped out in various ways," and that he and the press share the responsibility for the newspapers' obtaining the study. We have, however, pursued the possibility of conspiracy from every conceivable angle and while investigation has produced some circumstantial evidence to support this theory, we have not found grounds to indicate existence of an over-all plot or conspiracy, threading its way throughout Ellsberg's actions.

Count One of a two-count indictment returned by a Federal grand jury on 6/28/71 charges Ellsberg with unauthorized possession, access to, and control over copies of what, in effect, was the "McNamara Study," from about September, 1969, to approximately October, 1969, while Count Two of this indictment charges that during the same approximate time span Ellsberg willfully, knowingly and unlawfully converted to his own use copies of these documents. We have established Ellsberg legally had access to the Study in the course of his employment with Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California, but that he also obtained and had in his possession 18 volumes of a preliminary draft of the Study for at least nine months without the knowledge of the Top Secret Control Officer at Rand in Santa Monica. Failure of Rand employees in Washington, D. C., and at Santa Monica to adhere to established, in-house security procedures accounts for the fact Ellsberg was able to conceal his possession of these 18 volumes, and while over-all possession by Ellsberg of the Study and its preliminary draft volumes continues to be closely examined, no evidence exists of conspiracy at this point of the case.

Count Two of the aforementioned indictment, relating to conversion of these documents, is founded on information that Ellsberg reproduced a large quantity of classified documents in October, 1969, at the office of one Lynda Sinav in the Los Angeles area. Ellsberg's two children, present at this reproduction session, have identified individuals who assisted Ellsberg in this task, but
interviews of these persons have developed nothing to indicate they were aware of the nature of the items being reproduced or of what use Ellsberg intended to make of the copies reproduced. Anthony Russo, a fellow employee of Ellsberg's at Rand in Santa Monica, would have been in an excellent position to have been aware of the ultimate purpose of Ellsberg's actions but has refused to talk to the Federal grand jury in Los Angeles, and is currently in jail for contempt of court relating to this refusal.

Subsequent to the duplicating of documents in October, 1969, Ellsberg, by his own statements, claims to have made efforts to furnish copies of these documents to Senator J. William Fulbright and former Senator Charles E. Goodell, and Senator George S. McGovern may also have been approached by Ellsberg concerning making these documents public. Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., is also known to be in possession of documents which he publicly admits were given to him by Ellsberg. Data available concerning this phase of Ellsberg's actions also fails to indicate he acted in concert with anyone.

On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" published the first of a series of articles purporting to have been based on the "McNamara Study," and a number of other newspapers in the U. S. subsequently printed similar articles. Investigation has placed Neil Sheehan, a reporter for "The New York Times," in Cambridge, Massachusetts, during March and April, 1971, under an assumed name, and we have determined Sheehan and his wife engaged in a number of frantic copying sessions of documents during the period 3/21-23/71. Four blurred Xerox copies discarded during this duplicating have been identified by the National Security Agency as being reproductions of pages appearing in the "McNamara Study." It is highly probable Sheehan and Ellsberg cooperated closely in actions which enabled "The New York Times" to obtain the documents utilized in articles published by this newspaper and we have recently uncovered evidence indicating representatives of at least three other newspapers which have published articles based on the "McNamara Study" were in the Boston area in June, 1971, for the apparent purpose of obtaining copies of these documents. A source closely connected with one of these newspapers has advised that his newspaper obtained the documents after receiving a telephone call from an unknown individual who instructed that a reporter from the newspaper go to Cambridge and make the necessary arrangements to obtain them by calling a certain, unidentified telephone number. Investigation subsequently placed this reporter in Cambridge, but we have, to date, been unsuccessful in determining who furnished him with the material in question. While the newspapermen thus involved may have cooperated with Ellsberg in various ways in order to obtain the desired documents, available evidence does not suggest they conspired with him in carrying out the disclosure of these documents, but rather took advantage of his offer to furnish them with the material.
We are, however, vigorously pursuing all leads relating to the possession by "The New York Times" and other newspapers of the "McNamara Study" and have proposed that the field be authorized to immediately initiate interviews with friendly newsmen concerning this matter. We believe this area of investigation offers excellent possibilities of effecting a major breakthrough in this case.

There remains the suggestion Ellsberg may have received the cooperation of or conspired with various New Left, anti-draft, anti-Vietnam war elements, and this possibility has received the most penetrating examination. We know Ellsberg to have been friendly with a number of individuals connected with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington, D. C., and evidence exists that the IPS has been in possession for some time of documents which may be identical with the "McNamara Study." We have also learned, in tracing the development of Ellsberg's thinking from "hawk" to "dove," that from August, 1969, he became increasingly associated with a number of the more prominent anti-war exponents in this country, many of whom occupy important posts at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We are in the process of tying together all of this data, in an effort to surface, if possible, any possible connection between these elements and Ellsberg in the disclosure of the highly classified "McNamara Study," but information available to date does not, as yet, substantiate or corroborate existence of a conspiracy in this regard.

4. With particular regard to the President's concern expressed by Mr. Haldeman to the Director, mentioned hereinbefore, with respect to the complicity of individuals, and the instructions of the Attorney General that the Bureau in each leak case identify the individuals responsible, it is quite clear that we must resolve all allegations, especially those pertaining to possible conspiracies, during the course of our inquiries. As noted in Item 1, our inquiries have expanded to include not only the leak to "The New York Times" but to encompass the eight other newspapers which carried portions of the "McNamara Study." Since its inception, the Ellsberg case has required expanding supervisory attention here at the SOG. Nine men are currently committed to the case. There are no indications at this time that less supervisory attention will be needed in the near future. In fact, all indications are that there may have to be more commitments in this regard, particularly if the Department refers additional leak matters to us for the intensive investigative attention which has been requested in the past.

A successful investigation followed by a successful prosecution would certainly have a very important impact on Governmental processes, particularly
within the Executive Branch of our Government. When the Supreme Court refused to grant injunctions sought by the Executive Branch against newspapers publishing the "McNamara Study," this upheld the freedom of the press. The question has not yet been litigated with respect to the right of the Executive Branch to protect its secrets through its classification system.

Unless Ellsberg is prosecuted successfully, anyone within the Executive Branch would apparently have the right to decide on his own initiative what information he wishes to place in the public domain by turning the information over to the newspapers. Much of the sensitive negotiations of the Executive Branch with foreign countries is dependent upon the secrecy with which they are carried out. If through a classification system or some other means the Executive Branch is not able to preclude the unauthorized disclosure of its secrets it is felt the Branch will be weakened to the extent that it cannot effectively function on the national scene certainly, and probably on the domestic scene in some instances. Thus, the structure of the Executive Branch might well collapse.

An unsuccessful prosecution would buttress the considerable support, particularly from the news media, for Ellsberg's contention that his disclosure of the classified documents was basically motivated by conscience and by deep concern that the public should be informed. It is closely related to the viewpoint held by a small but growing minority that an individual is free to follow the dictates of his conscience and to be the final arbiter of the validity of our criminal and civil statutes. If this thesis were to be supported, then it could apply to murder and bombings of Government and private institutions where such acts are dictated by conscience. It could follow that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial functions of the Nation are exercises in futility. This would be a road to anarchy.

From the above, it would appear that the outcome of the Ellsberg case would have a direct bearing on the Executive Branch of our Government and could affect the entire Governmental structure.

5(a). At the outset of the investigation, Assistant Director Brennan instructed the Section Chief to afford special attention to this case and to let him know of any manpower needs. He emphasized the importance of the case in his mind and wanted it handled as a special.

Within a day or two Mr. Brennan introduced the Section Chief to Departmental attorney James McGrath, who is a special assistant to Assistant Attorney General Mardian. Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that McGrath was the coordinator for Mardian of the various groups under Mardian engaged in consideration of phases of the Ellsberg case. For example, he explained that
one group headed by Departmental attorney John Martin analyzed all investigative results received by the Department in an effort to establish whether a case was being made. Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that Mr. McGrath would be in a position to furnish any information required by the Section Chief from the Internal Security Division and instructed that copies of daily teletypes received from our various offices be furnished through Mr. McGrath to the Internal Security Division as they came in.

5(b). Approximately two weeks after this case was instituted, the Section Chief asked Mr. Brennan if he would brief both the Section Chief and the Section Number One Man on his concept of the magnitude of this case and its various ramifications. This was done and Mr. Brennan again emphasized the need for following all facets on a special basis.

Following the conference with Departmental attorneys 7/6/71, mentioned hereinbefore, Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore and Section Chief Wannall to his office and instructed that a "book" be prepared on Ellsberg covering his activities and associates during a period of a couple of years. He explained what he wanted in this book and provided for an Agent from Research Section to be assigned full time on its compilation.

On 7/15/71 Mr. Brennan instructed that a copy of each teletype received at the SOG on this case be furnished to him.

On 7/28/71 Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore, Section Chief, Section Number One Man, and all Agents working on this case to his office for a conference. In compliance with his request, he was briefed on investigative results to date. He asked if serious consideration had been given to the possibility that Ellsberg himself was not directly involved in turning over the "McNamara Study" to "The New York Times," and instructed that we look into this phase of the matter very carefully.

On 8/2/71 Mr. Brennan summoned to his office the Section Chief and Case Supervisor Wagoner for the purpose of introducing them to Mr. G. G. Liddey of the White House. He explained that Mr. Liddey was coordinating all White House interest in this matter. Mr. Liddey pointed out that the White House wanted this case handled as a "Bureau special" and that a letter from the White House to that effect would be forwarded.
5(c). At the present time there are nine Agent Supervisors assigned to this matter.

Investigation was instituted 6/15/71 and from then until 6/23/71 manpower assignments were handled within the Section.

On 6/23/71 two additional Agents were placed in the Section on a loan basis and they were assigned to operational desks, as Agents permanently assigned to those desks from within the Section were assigned to the McLeck case.

On 6/28/71 an Agent was assigned on a loan basis from Extremist Intelligence Section and this loan Agent has been rotated on a weekly basis since. He has been utilized to cover an operational desk while one of the regularly assigned Agents in the Section (H. J. Morgan) has been assigned full time to this case.

On 7/8/71 an Agent from Research Section was assigned full time to prepare a "book" on Ellsberg and has worked on this exclusively with the exception of an annual leave period of 8/2-13/71. He has not participated in any other phase of the case on a day-to-day basis.

On 7/8/71 one man on weekly rotating basis was assigned temporarily from the Espionage Section and continues to the present time. This loan Supervisor has been utilized to cover an operational desk within the Section while the regularly assigned Supervisor on the desk (J. R. Hagy) has been utilized full time on instant case.

On 7/29/71 an Agent from within the Section (L. E. Belanger) was assigned part time to handle special aspects of the Ellsberg case, relating specifically to electronic surveillance checks on potential witnesses.

Memorandum Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson 8/4/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)," recommended and the Director approved that the number of Agents assigned to handle leak cases, including Ellsberg case, be increased immediately from five to seven, these two additional Agents to be diverted from other assignments in Domestic Intelligence Division with at least one to be diverted from the CP, USA Unit. The Director approved this. At that time we had five men working full time on instant and related cases, including J. M. Sizoo, who was involved exclusively in preparation of a "book" on Ellsberg.

On 8/9/71 in the absence of additional manpower from outside the Section, the number of Agents committed to instant and related cases was increased
from five to seven by assigning full time from within the Section. SA L. E. Belanger and on a rotating basis one Agent from the Middle and South American Unit (B. M. Perez). Perez was replaced by SA W. W. Hamilton on 8/16/71.

On 8/13/71 two additional Agents were provided from outside the Section, one on a full-time basis and one on a rotating weekly basis. The Agent assigned on a full-time basis (T. J. Seabaugh) was immediately assigned to the McLek case. The Agent assigned on the weekly rotating basis was assigned to assist on one of the regular operational desks within the Section and an Agent who had been continuously on loan with the exception of an annual leave period of 8/6-16/71 (J. P. Benedict) was assigned full time to instant matters.

In summary, manpower from outside the Section have been assigned on a temporary basis on 6/23/71 (two Agents); 6/28/71 (one Agent); 7/8/71 (two Agents); and 8/13/71 (two Agents). Three of these loan Agents are now working full time on McLek case while four are assisting in covering operational desks that exist within this Section. Six Agents from within this Section are assigned full time to McLek case.

5(d). From above discussion, it will be noted that this case is directed at developing evidence concerning violations of Federal statutes under which we have investigative jurisdiction and our principal efforts have been directed toward this responsibility. There are also far reaching aspects of the case which require investigative attention and because they are so diversified there is a necessity for directing efforts in the first instance along those channels which are of greatest importance. These channels relate especially to the possibility of a conspiracy, if in fact one exists, on the part of individuals to acquire and release without authorization classified material of the Executive Branch of the Government.

As noted above, evidence has been developed which would support those prosecutive aspects which to date have been considered by the Department and efforts are currently underway to resolve the potential conspiracy aspects.

The principal problems which have arisen with respect to supervision of this case have related to efforts on the part of Assistant Attorney General Mardian and attorneys within his Division to (1) conduct investigative activity on their own and (2) to direct our investigative activities frequently into areas tangential to the main thrust of the case. With respect to investigative efforts by Mardian, the following are cited as examples:
On 6/29/71 Mardian telephonically advised he was sending a Departmental attorney to see Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., who had received from Ellsberg some copies of classified documents. He said the Departmental attorney would discuss with Mathias the possibility of Mathias' turning these documents over to him. Mardian asked if we wanted to have an Agent accompany the attorney. The Director concurred that no Agent accompany the attorney, stating, "Let Mardian's emissary accept them."

On 7/21/71 when Agents of Washington Field Office endeavored to interview Mr. Charles W. Cooke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, they were advised by Cooke that he would not submit to interview in the absence of clearance granted by the Deputy Attorney General. This was in pursuance of a lead which had been referred to us by Mardian and when the Cooke interview was attempted it was learned for the first time that two attorneys from the Internal Security Division had been designated to conduct the interview with Cooke.

On 8/10/71 one of Mardian's attorneys telephoned to say that he was going to interview an informant the next day in connection with this case and asked if the Bureau would arrange a place where he could meet securely with the informant and whether the Bureau desired to have an Agent present during the interview. In concurring that Bureau should not accede to these requests, the Director noted, "If Mardian's outfit would refrain from what are basically investigative activities and leave it to the Bureau there would be less friction."

On 8/12/71 the Bureau received through misrouting a communication which Mardian had addressed to the Attorney General to summarize current information in what he described as "Our continuing investigation into the acquisition of the 'McNamara Study' by the 'New York Times.'" The Director inquired whether Mardian's outfit was conducting their own investigation in this matter, as indicated by the contents of the memorandum. As a matter of fact, material summarized by Mardian was nothing more than information extracted from Bureau teletypes showing FBI investigative results.

With respect to Mardian's efforts to direct our investigative activities, the following are the most recent examples:

By letters dated 8/12 and 8/23/71 we received from Mardian lengthy instructions for conducting of investigation in the Ellsberg matter. It is quite evident from a review of these communications that the requests contained therein are the results of disorganized review of the material furnished to Department by the Bureau.
For example, both letters contained requests to conduct investigation previously conducted and reported to the Department. Certain other requests contained therein would more logically fall within the province of the Special Task Force Committee established by the Department of Defense to analyze Rand Corporation security procedures. Other requested investigation had previously been initiated by the Bureau and other investigative requests were not on their face germane to the violations or potential violations of law. Certain of the requested investigation appeared to be based on unsupported assumptions and theories of the involvement of other individuals in the leak of the "Pentagon Papers" but offered no basis or reasons for the requested investigation.

The most recent letter, 8/23/71, contained request for investigation of Ellsberg's travel. We have been developing this information since the inception of our investigation and it has been furnished to the Department on an almost daily basis. This letter also requested inquiries concerning certain telephone calls by Ellsberg, investigation concerning most of which had also been previously initiated. Mardian also stated Department files had no information on Leonard S. Rodberg, whose name has recently come up in this case as the possible source of the "McNamara Study" material which will be published by the Beacon Press in Boston. We have in this and other cases furnished information on Rodberg in approximately a dozen communications.

The analyses of these lengthy letters from Mardian requires the expenditure of a considerable amount of Agent time. They indicate that Mardian's group, apparently in efforts to direct our investigation, are propounding questions, some of which are relevant but many of which are not relevant to the main thrust of our investigation, some of which should be referred elsewhere, and others of which have been previously answered.

In accordance with instructions issued by the Assistant Director, we are furnishing to Mardian copies of the daily teletypes from our field offices. These teletypes contain "raw" investigative results not coordinated. The coordination of these results regularly appears in our investigative reports which are also furnished to Mardian. We feel that the reports resolve many of the questions which have been propounded by Mardian in the past and it would enhance our investigative efforts to eliminate dissemination of the daily teletypes in the future and give to the Department investigative results in report form, supplemented by a weekly summary letter which we regularly forward to him.
ELLISBERG CASE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENnan:

I generally concur with the comments of Mr. Wannall as to the progress and status of this case from an investigative standpoint. I have reminded Mr. Wannall that the development of direct evidence should not be obscured by the broadening of the scope of this case. He has been advised that his objective must consistently be the development of substantial admissible evidence necessary to establish a conviction as to Federal violations charged in the Los Angeles indictment of Ellsberg and others which may develop from other corollary investigations being conducted.

From the outset, as stated by Mr. Wannall, I expressed the importance of this case and instructed him to advise me of any manpower needs. The question of manpower is discussed under the caption "Adequacy of Personnel" found in 6E of this report and was the subject of my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 7/29/71 captioned "Proposed Adjustments of Work Assignments, DID," memorandum of W. R. Wannall to Mr. Felt 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, DID," and my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, DID."

In reference to Mr. Wannall's concluding suggestion in his writeup, the procedure of furnishing daily teletypes to the Department in major cases is not unusual. The high level interest of the Department, which will eventually be responsible for the prosecution of this case, as well as the interest of the White House dictates that teletypes in this matter be disseminated consistent with the Director's instructions, copy attached. It appears we should clarify the Department's use of these "raw" investigative results as set forth in our teletypes and suggest their detailed reviews be conducted from Bureau investigative reports, which are the normal communication for such use. Mr. Wannall will be instructed to advise the Department by letter with regard to the foregoing pointing out that our weekly summary letters and investigative reports will resolve many of the questions they raise as to information in our teletypes.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/27/71
CDB:1ml
4-A-3
April 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAN

MR. BRENNAN

MR. ROSEN

I have tried to lay down intelligent guidelines as to what should be sent and what should not be sent to the Internal Security Division of the Department. In the last several days I have noted a number of memoranda addressed to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General about matters about which the Internal Security Division should have been advised and I have had to send these back and request that memoranda be appropriately addressed to the Assistant Attorney General of the Internal Security Division. Apparently I have failed in pointing out the guidelines I desired, so henceforth, you should send everything, including the kitchen sink if it comes in, to the Internal Security Division. It is hopeless to get a considered understanding of my wishes in this matter, which I believe is largely due to some degree of stubbornness because of the recent disciplinary action I had to take when we failed to advise the Attorney General about the Media burglary.

Therefore, as I have indicated, henceforth you will send everything to the Internal Security Division that in any way relates directly or indirectly to the work and jurisdiction of that Division.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover

Director

JEH: EDM (7)
ADDITIONAL

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: This case involves the publishing of parts of the "McNamara Study" in June, 1971, by "The New York Times." The evidence to date strongly indicates Daniel Ellsberg is responsible for furnishing the classified data to representatives of this newspaper, and he has been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for the unauthorized possession and conversion of these documents. This is the case simply stated; however, this matter is far from being so simple. From its inception, this case has been complicated by the enormity of the work to be completed and problems inherent in this unusual investigation.

In regard to the amount of work involved, a survey was made to establish how many communications were dated during the period of a single week (Saturdays and Sundays included). As a result of this survey, the following represents the number of communications dated during the weeks noted below:

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<th>Teletypes</th>
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<td>7/11-17/71</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/1-7/71</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>8/8-14/71</td>
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<th>Teletypes</th>
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| 8/1-7/71 | 7 |
| 8/8-14/71 | 15 |
The above-noted chart is believed to be representative of the high volume of communications received daily. Many of these communications were lengthy and/or complicated requiring close analysis by one or more supervisors assigned to this "Special." Also, a check of the work devoted to the preparation of daily summary memos and of weekly summaries disclosed that a supervisor would arrive at the office at approximately 5:30 a.m. each morning, Monday through Friday, to have the daily memos dictated and typed by 8:15 a.m. the same day, and the Supervisor responsible for the weekly summary due each Monday would spend approximately 6 hours preparing this communication on the prior Sunday. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that many responses to the letters from the Attorney General's Office require extensive research.

With the approval by the Attorney General to interview newspapermen, it is anticipated that the work load will increase rather than decrease in the immediate future. Initially there will be at least 75 newspapermen to be interviewed and numerous additional leads will be developed from these interviews. This investigation involves numerous facets and requires extensive work and supervision.

Presently there are 9 Supervisors assigned to this case and their responsibilities are as follows:

**E. R. Harrell**, Unit Chief, reviews all outgoing correspondence, reviews incoming reports in Ellsberg case; supervises preparation of daily summary memorandum, weekly White House memorandum in Ellsberg case, SALT Lek case (leak of classified information concerning Strategic Arms Limitations Talks appearing in "The New York Times"), and the Toll Lek case (leak from State Department cables concerning alleged misconduct of Bert M. Tollefson, Jr.); assists in setting out leads from daily teletype correspondence from field.

**J. R. Wagoner**, as case Agent in McLek, responsible for review of all incoming reports as to adequacy of reporting and leads; maintains and supervises operation of lead box in Ellsberg case; responsible for follow-up communications on outstanding leads; has basic responsibility for preparation of weekly White House summary; assists in preparation of daily memorandum summarizing prior day's investigative activity in the field.

**J. R. Hagy**, as case Agent, has all supervisory responsibility for Toll Lek; conducts research on all New Left aspects of Ellsberg investigation and responsible for preparation of comprehensive analysis of New Left implication in the case; responsible for setting out leads relative to New Left associates and contacts by Ellsberg; responsible for following field investigation; corroborating attendance by Ellsberg at New Left functions; assists in leads obtained from daily teletypes in McLek and Toll Lek cases;
assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum; and assists in preparation of weekly White House summary.

H. J. Morgan, as case Agent, has primary responsibility for supervision of SALT Lek case; reviews all incoming correspondence and sets out pertinent leads relative to SALT Lek; assists in preparation of daily memorandum summarizing investigation in all three major leak cases aforementioned; assists in review of daily teletype traffic in all three major leak cases; review of dissemination of weekly reports in SALT Lek; assists in preparation of White House summary.

L. E. Belanger handles all ELSUR checks; reviews, correlates and conducts necessary research relative to all material received from Department of Defense in Ellsberg investigation; responsible for backup file reviews in connection with New Left contacts by Ellsberg; assists in preparation of weekly White House memorandum; assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum.

T. J. Seabaugh assigned exclusively to a comprehensive study, charting and research into extensive travel performed by Daniel Ellsberg; responsible for setting out leads to insure complete coverage of all details of travel facets of investigation.

J. P. Benedict responsible for extensive file reviews regarding numerous news media personnel and personalities involved in Ellsberg investigation to ascertain their susceptibility to interview as cooperative sources; conducting extensive research and charting of the considerable telephone traffic involved in this matter, including traffic from Daniel Ellsberg, Anthony Russo, the Sheehans, "The New York Times," the Washington bureaus of all newspapers involved, traffic from various hotels utilized by Ellsberg and his contacts, and all other individuals whose telephone traffic has been subpoenaed as a result of Departmental action via Grand Jury subpoena.

W. W. Hamilton assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum; responsible for review and appropriate preparation of all summary teletypes for dissemination to Department of Justice; file reviews on the numerous news personalities being considered for interviews as potential cooperative sources in the Ellsberg investigation; handling of correspondence connected with leads obtained from daily teletypes; assists in preparation of White House summary.
J. M. Sizoo assigned exclusively to the research and preparation of an extensive biographical write-up on Ellsberg. In this regard, facts concerning Ellsberg's life, behavioral patterns, associates, education, political views, personality transformations, family, and influences will be studied and analyzed.

In addition to the above specific assignments, each member of the unit on a daily basis is required to participate in Section, Unit and/or Branch conferences for resolution of investigative facets of the Ellsberg, Toll Lek and SALT Lek investigations.

Some of the problems involved in this investigation are:

(1) Whether Ellsberg was alone responsible for this crime, or whether he was part of a small or large-scale conspiracy.

(2) Whether the purpose was for idealistic reasons (anti-Vietnam War beliefs), to discredit the Executive Branch of the Government, or to make available classified information to a foreign nation.

(3) Investigations have been conducted by agencies other than the FBI: State Department, Department of Defense, NSA and the Attorney General's Office, and it is the Bureau's responsibility to review and analyze these investigations.

(4) To determine what other persons and newspapers received these documents and from whom they received this data.

(5) Innumerable interviews involve newspapermen, Government officials, and persons having far left leanings, against U. S. policy in Vietnam and antagonistic toward the present Administration. These are all delicate interviews.

(6) To determine whether the New Left and/or any anti-Vietnam peace groups are involved in this case.

(7) All logical avenues of investigation to bring this case to a successful prosecution must be explored. An unsuccessful prosecution would open the door for anyone at whim to disclose classified information which could easily endanger the stability of the Executive Branch and impair our relations with other nations.
(8) The White House and the Attorney General's Office are closely following this matter and all other leak cases, and in this respect the Attorney General's Office has sent numerous communications requesting certain leads be covered by the FBI. These requests must be analyzed by DID and the appropriate communications answered, which is a time-consuming administrative procedure.

In regard to the last situation noted above, you are aware that the Department is reviewing for lead purposes the daily teletypes we furnish them. Thereafter, they send us a communication requesting us to conduct these leads. This must be stopped. Such a procedure is unproductive and time consuming, resulting in additional unnecessary communications to the Department. You are instructed to immediately advise the Department that the purpose of the daily teletypes is to make them cognizant of the developments in this case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investigation based on these communications.

With the importance of this case, the urgency of the problems to be resolved, the immediacy of the work to be performed, and the volume of communications received daily, there appears sufficient work at the present for nine Supervisors. However, you must constantly evaluate the work load to assure that the assigned manpower is fully justified. Also, much of the present work is exploratory, which involves researching and analyzing and thereafter assuring that the many facets are immediately and fully probed. Once these exploratory aspects are sufficiently investigated, this case will be directed toward more specific objectives which will narrow the investigative field. As this transition period is entered, immediate consideration should be given to reducing the manpower assigned to this matter. Also, it is incumbent upon you to make certain that all logical investigation is expeditiously and fully conducted in order that the Bureau will not be subjected to criticism by any person or agency.

A review of this matter indicates that you should continue affording it top priority supervision and direction.

Comments of Assistant Director and Section Chief Wannall requested.
ADDENDUM
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL: The analysis and observations of
(WRW:ams 9/7/71) the Inspector have been noted.
We will continue affording top priority supervision and direction to this case. In addition, we will immediately advise
the Department that the purpose of daily dissemination of teletypes to the
Internal Security Division is to make that Division cognizant of developments in
the case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investigation
based on these communications.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above.
(CDB:mls 9/7/71)
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: At the time of the last inspection this matter was being afforded urgent supervision and investigation for the purpose of identifying all of the conspirators and perfecting cases for prosecution against them.

You are requested to provide a brief narrative summary of this investigation and bring it up to date. Indicate in your response the number of subjects on whom we have developed prosecutive cases, the number yet to be developed and in each instance indicate what you feel are the possibilities of successful prosecution.

In this regard, identify any cases in which successful prosecution is in doubt and indicate what action is being taken to erase the doubt.

What is the current status of prosecution of these cases and when do you feel these cases will be adjudicated?

From a supervisory standpoint, advise how much manpower is being expended presently on the supervision of this (these) cases and indicate when you feel these men can be reassigned to other work.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: The investigation of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (EASTCON) is concerned with plots in Washington, D. C., to blow up the tunnels housing the heating system servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government official. Individuals connected with these plots are all associated with the Berrigan antiwar movement. An indictment was returned during

8/24/71
FBG/CHM:plm

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ESM:wmj
4-A-4

John...
the last inspection (1/12/71) at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which charged six individuals with complicity in these plots and two of these six were charged additionally with a violation of the contraband statute in that they caused unauthorized letters to be exchanged into and out of the Federal Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. There were also seven individuals named in the indictment as unindicted co-conspirators.

Our investigation into this matter continued, and on 4/30/71, a superseding indictment was returned which expanded the charges and strengthened our case. Eight individuals were included in this indictment as defendants, and the number of unindicted co-conspirators was reduced to four. The superseding indictment includes those charges listed above and added the conspiracy aspects of the selected Selective Service break-in cases in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rochester, New York; Wilmington, Dover, and Georgetown, Delaware. Two additional counts added to the superseding indictment involve three individuals and charged them with the mailing of a threatening communication.

In addition to the substantive case, potential witnesses have been either cited for civil contempt of court or indicted for criminal contempt of court in connection with their refusal to answer questions before the Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in Harrisburg after being granted immunity. Five individuals were cited for civil contempt, and four individuals were indicted for criminal contempt. Two of these cases are currently the subject of a petition by the Government to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, and the other cases are being held in abeyance until the Supreme Court renders its decision.

From the investigation conducted to date and the comments of the prosecutive staff of the Department, there does not appear to be any reason to believe that prosecution of this case will not be successful.

The substantive EASTCON case is currently in the pretrial stage with numerous motions of both the Government and the defense still pending before the court. At present, it appears that the court will be unable to set this matter for trial until January, 1972. Even though we are well on our way to trial, due to the complexities of charges in the indictment and the broad scope of the violations involved, there exists additional facets of investigation of a continuing nature which will possibly increase as the trial date approaches.
For example, in the Fall of 1970 we undertook to determine through an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project whether EASTCON principals had established a long distance telephone communication network. The basis for this theory was information received from our informant, PH 1211-S, who advised that fictitious telephone credit card numbers were being utilized by members of the Berrigan antiwar movement to facilitate contacts. This project disclosed voluminous calls between EASTCON principals and between them and sympathizers from their own telephones and also corroborate the fraudulent use of fictitious telephone credit card numbers. This information was of value to the Department in the examination of witnesses before the FGJ since it placed witnesses in a position of either admitting contact between each other on specific dates, committing perjury, or claiming the Fifth Amendment. This project has more recently been extended and is now being utilized to identify individuals involved in the Washington, D. C., plots of the EASTCON case through "nonhit" telephone toll calls between EASTCON activists and persons not previously known to have been active in the movement. It is believed that recent information from this project, developed further by investigation, has identified a Capitol Hill elevator operator who was recruited for these plots. The project is a continuing one, and the investigation of pertinent developments hopefully will identify an engineer who was consulted on the tunnel plot, as well as other individuals involved in the Washington, D. C., action. The very technical nature of the raw material developed by the ADP project has resulted in individuals at the Bureau and certain offices such as Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, and WFO having become well versed and particularly adroit in the interpretation of such complicated information.

The investigation of EASTCON includes the handling of two informants; the first, PH 1211-S, is the individual who will be responsible for the introduction of the most convincing evidence against all of the defendants - the letters between Philip Berrigan and Elizabeth McAlister which relate to every count in the indictment. Since the testimony of this informant before the FGJ, he has become theoretically the responsibility of the Department, as a Government witness, but of necessity, the Bureau has coordinated his activities, etc., because of his peculiar status until he testifies at trial. He is currently
living many miles from Harrisburg under an assumed identity and is
gainfully employed through the assistance of the Bureau. All of
these problems have been coordinated through the Bureau to insure
the security of this valuable source. As an example, the informant's
father recently died and unfriendly members of the news media
became aware of funeral arrangements. By instructions of the
Bureau and through very competent handling by the field, the
security of this informant was maintained in spite of the presence
of unfriendly members of the press at the funeral. It will be
necessary to continue to coordinate any other problems of this
nature until his testimony is heard during trial. In this regard,
as the trial date approaches, other problems develop requiring
Bureau assistance such as arrangements for "in depth" conferences
with the Department's prosecutive team under secure circumstances.
This will be a very important conference since the informant has
only been interviewed (briefly) by the Department on one occasion,
and no opportunity has existed since his appearance before the FGJ
to further explore his testimony.

We have also developed another informant, PH 1223-S, who
is a close friend of Philip Berrigan and active sympathizers in
the Berrigan antiwar movement. He is the only individual who has
obtained any identification of possible MEDBURG suspects from
John Peter Grady (arrested in the Camden Federal Building break-in
8/22/71). Grady indirectly claimed credit for that action and by
inference named other people who are considered prime suspects.
The informant has recently accepted a position of running a
newspaper at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on behalf of The Defense
Committee, the legal, bail bond, and public relations arm of the
Berrigan antiwar movement. He is a unique and cunning individual
who is now in a vital position to keep us informed of the on-the-
scene and behind-the-scene activities in Harrisburg during the
EASTCON trial. One extremely important example of the valuable
information this informant has furnished resulted in our initiating
(as a corollary investigation to EASTCON) an Espionage - X-type
case based upon information he received from an ardent Berrigan
supporter who has stated the intention to obtain classified
documents from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas,
to be publicized for the benefit of the antiwar movement in the
same manner as those circulated by Daniel Ellsberg.

With respect to The Defense Committee, investigation is
being coordinated as to the activities of this loose-knit group
due to its direct relationship to the EASTCON case. There has
evolved a national organization, and the activities of local
groups, as they become organized, will be followed by the Bureau
for intelligence information. As an indication of the potential
of this body, recognizing that its real push for funds
will reportedly not begin until the Fall of 1971, information has been received that they already have substantial funds in their coffers.

From information developed by PH 1223-S, it was determined that John Peter Grady was planning an "action" which from an analysis of the facts known at the Bureau appeared to centered in the New Jersey area. After observations in this regard were furnished to the field, investigation culminated in his being located in the Camden, New Jersey, area. The investigation which followed resulted in the arrest of 20 individuals on 8/22/71 in the act of destroying and stealing draft board records in the Camden Federal Building. The individuals arrested included Peter Fordi (an original member of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives), Paul Coumig, and John Swinglish, both indicted at Harrisburg for criminal contempt after refusing to testify before the EASTCON FGJ when granted immunity from prosecution. PH 1211-S determined Swinglish was the "recruiter" for the Washington, D. C., plots in the EASTCON case. It is to be expected that other individuals who are EASTCON activists will also be indicted at Camden. The evidence already obtained in that case discloses other EASTCON activists were responsible for the Selective Service draft board break-in at Trenton, New Jersey, 5/21/71. Likewise, the obviously coordinated Buffalo, New York, draft board break-in on the night of 8/21-22/71 involved sympathizers of the EASTCON movement.

Much of the foregoing represents the continuing intelligence coverage of the Berrigan antiwar movement, absolutely necessary to the Bureau's interests, aside from the important development of admissible evidence in the EASTCON prosecution. Further, many pretrial motions (by defense counsel) have been ruled on by the court, and many others are still outstanding. In anticipation of the court ruling on a motion for Discovery and Inspection as provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government, in order to expedite such matters, has previously allowed the inspection of certain evidence in this case. This has been done at various field offices under Departmental supervision. The lists of evidence made available, other arrangements and details with regard to such inspection, has been handled by guidance from the Bureau. Approximately one half of this evidence has thus far been inspected with hundreds of items of evidence still to be inspected in Washington, D. C., Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The court has ruled in favor of the defense broadly interpreting the right of Discovery and Inspection, particularly as to photographic evidence, Laboratory, and Identification Division reports. The Department has requested such material
to be made available for inspection at the Department in the near future, and this project is being coordinated by the Bureau. There are estimated approximately 1,000 photographs submitted by 11 offices. The Laboratory (document examinations) and Identification Division reports will be voluminous since they include not only those prepared in connection with the EASTCON case itself, but also all of those prepared in connection with six Selective Service Act cases included as conspiracy charges in the EASTCON indictment. It is apparent that the evidence from the three offices covering these six Selective Service Act cases will be voluminous and require close coordination by the Bureau with the Department into the EASTCON case for a successful prosecution at trial.

At present, two supervisors are assigned full-time, and one supervisor spends approximately one half of his time in the supervision of this case. This investigation continues to generate a great deal of paper not only on the substantive case but also in connection with the other matters directly related thereto. It is anticipated the time of two and a half Agents will be the absolute minimum required to effectively handle this matter through the completion of the trial. Depending upon the volume of work generated by necessary requests of the Department in the pretrial and trial stages, additional manpower may be necessary at various times.

The Inspector has specifically inquired as to when these men can be reassigned to other work. It is to be noted that since the return of the superseding indictment on 4/30/71, two other full-time supervisors have been reassigned to other work within the Division.

It is not anticipated that the two supervisors assigned full-time to this case will be released prior to the conclusion of the trial in this matter.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan: I have read the attached and concur in the views expressed by Section Chief Shackelford.
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:wmj 8/26/71)

You should insure that every action is taken to insure successful prosecution in this matter.

Assistant Director please note.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN (JAS:mls - 8/30/71)
The Inspector's comments have been noted. The Bureau may be assured that every possible action is being taken in the interests of successful prosecution.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Briefly set forth the noteworthy accomplishments of your Division, with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 1/26/71. This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplishments. Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplishments on this program. This will give you an opportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertaining to the Bureau's progress, welfare, efficiency or any other items not covered elsewhere in this inspection.

A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to such matters should be in general terms.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached are individual write-ups from each Section in the Division pertaining to the accomplishments of that particular Section.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 8/17/71
ESM wni
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - ARBOR W. GRAY

Attached are memoranda setting out noteworthy accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the last inspection.

This Section is responsible for supervision of investigations of the Communist Party, USA, its fronts, pro-Chinese communist groups, selected Trotskyist-communist groups, Klan and white hate groups, international organizations affiliated with the world communist movement and international New Left extremist movement, individuals affiliated with these organizations and movements, as well as sedition cases. Our purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive organizations and individuals under various statutes relating to the internal security of the Nation and to gather intelligence of interest to Government officials and other agencies. The Section also supervises the development and administration of security informants in basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive and New Left groups. Where appropriate, the Section directs counterintelligence operations against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our supervision.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves from the case entitled, "Solo. IS - C." Due to the sensitive nature of this case, it will be orally discussed with the Inspector.

In essence, this case involves sources developing intelligence information of the highest quality concerning the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Soviet Union and its satellites, and the world communist movement. Since its inception, 38 successful missions to communist countries have been completed. Information developed by this operation from high-level contacts in the world communist movement is continually disseminated to the highest levels of our Government and, in many instances, is information not available from another source.

Examples of this since early 1971 include the following: Soviets requested CPUSA to provide analysis of public opinion in U.S. regarding Nixon Administration and U.S.-Soviet relations to be used by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, in speech before 24th Congress of CPSU in March, 1971, and essence of analysis was provided; during the 24th Congress, it was learned Soviets doubted whether U.S. was serious on disarmament and they were concerned over U.S.-Chinese communist improved relations; Soviet countermeasures to counteract include planned vast propaganda campaign against U.S., initiation of a European Security Conference to isolate U.S., and improvement of Soviet relations with Japan; General Secretary, CPUSA, Gus Hall, planned visit to North Vietnam and Laos Spring of 1971, thereafter returning to U.S. to hold mass rallies to raise antiwar movement in U.S. to a new high; visit was set for 5/15-20/71; however, North Vietnamese canceled same, angering Hall who felt this resulted from Chinese communist pressure; information concerning possible split in CPUSA along racial lines; details concerning meeting of CPUSA leaders and Soviet Ambassador to U.S. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, at which time Dobrynin stated hope for world peace would be improved if President Nixon were re-elected in 1972.

All of this information was furnished the White House and other interested officials of our Government, usually by teletype. Central Intelligence Agency has expressed great interest in information developed by this operation and on July 24, 1970, requested permission to include pertinent data developed by our operation in a "Top Secret/No Foreign/Controlled Dissemination" classified document for senior U.S. Intelligence Board officials.

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The two principal informants in this operation have received the "Order of Lenin," with the title "Hero of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets. This is the highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the international communist movement."

Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were officially members of the CPUSA National Committee. This number remains the same. In addition, we have another informant who is an ex officio member of the National Committee because of the sensitive nature of his Party assignments. This latter source is also a member of the Political Committee which, in effect, runs the Party. This top-level coverage is responsible for furnishing information regarding policy-making matters on a day-to-day basis as they occur.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PRO-CHICOM UNIT

A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the intelligence community is to develop intelligence relating to efforts of foreign hostile governments, organizations, and individuals who influence, direct, or dominate the domestic subversive and extremist movements. There has been considerable evidence compiled over the years of this foreign influence. Since the last inspection, the following noteworthy achievements in our investigations relating to foreign influence have been accomplished:

1. In March, 1971, a coalition of leftist individuals including subversives and extremists under the sponsorship of the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, American Friends Service Committee, and Fellowship of Reconciliation traveled to Paris where they were in contact with the North Vietnamese and other elements antagonistic to the U.S. We developed two informants to participate in this travel and as a result, identified all 170 people in attendance, their activities, contacts, and objectives. All information developed was afforded dissemination to appropriate Government agencies and we were commended by one intelligence agency for the excellent coverage.

2. The World Peace Council is the leading Soviet-dominated international effort to discredit and subvert U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Upon determining the World Peace Council would hold a General Session in Budapest, Hungary, in May, 1971, an effort was made to obtain informant coverage. An informant was developed for the travel and coverage resulted in the identification of all American participants including the Communist Party, USA, delegation and the activities of these individuals at the meeting. All pertinent documents relating to the Conference were obtained, as were the contacts and activities of American subversives at the Conference. Widespread dissemination of intelligence relating to this Conference was made and both the White House and Central Intelligence Agency favorably commented on its exceptional value.

3. During the past six months, the Unit has afforded specific coverage to the travel of U.S. citizens to three hostile communist countries: North Vietnam, North Korea, and Communist China. All individuals traveling to these countries during 1970 have been identified and, where pertinent, investigations have
been opened. Careful records have been maintained regarding U.S. citizens who have visited these countries during the current year and arrangements have been made to receive quarterly reports from another intelligence agency which will enable us to double check our files and insure cases are opened on visitors to these hostile countries, when warranted. We feel this is a strong achievement because, as noted below, we have developed evidence that Americans are currently being recruited for intelligence assignments in these countries.

4. Early in 1971 it was determined an informant who had participated in Venceremos Brigade travel to Cuba had established a rapport with North Koreans in that country. Through careful direction of this informant, he was able to effect an invitation from the North Koreans to visit their country at their expense. He departed the U.S. with a group of three other Americans and traveled to Korea via Paris and Algiers. In Korea he was recruited by the North Koreans for an intelligence assignment, furnished funds, and a code. This is the first individual affiliated with the domestic subversive movement who, acting in a capacity for the U.S. Government has been able to penetrate North Korea. We believe this informant will be able to furnish exceptionally valuable intelligence relating to foreign intelligence and political influence of the North Koreans in the domestic subversive movement.

5. Through cooperation with the British Security Service we have developed, during the past six months, direct connection between an individual who was associated with the Weatherman in the U.S. and bombing activities in England. British intelligence is extremely interested in this matter and we are carefully following it for developments.

Through intensified investigation of the Revolutionary Union (RU) and Venceremos Party (VP), we have been able to identify over 200 hard-core Marxist-Leninists who have all indicated violence-prone propensities. Of particular note is the fact that our closely supervised investigations in this area have developed an informant on the National Committee of the RU and have resulted in identification of an extremely militant RU group in Eugene, Oregon. The Department has expressed extreme interest in our RU investigation and has indicated a desire to explore prosecutions at the first opportunity.

In late 1970 Mark Lawrence Webers, the student body president of the University of New Hampshire, traveled with a National Student Association group to North Vietnam. While there he made recorded speeches encouraging the servicemen in
South Vietnam to lay down their arms or turn their guns on the real "pigs." Wefers' incendiary comments were broadcast over Radio Hanoi. Intensive investigation has been and is continuing to be conducted and the Department has indicated an interest to prosecute Wefers under the sedition statutes at an early date. This will represent the first prosecution under the sedition statutes since the 1950's.

A suit was instituted against the Director and two Special Agents of the Memphis Office seeking preliminary injunction against the FBI and punitive and compensatory damages amounting to over $100,000 against the Director and the Agents. The suit was instituted by the Southern Conference Educational Fund claiming harassment and intimidation of war resisters. Former communists, extremists, and subversives were involved as plaintiffs. In July the plaintiffs dropped their plea for a preliminary injunction. Excellent information identifying the principal plaintiff, on whose statements the false allegations were based, as having a criminal record involving furnishing of false information and theft, has been furnished to the Department as well as the fact that he is the subject of a current outstanding State Bench Warrant. It is anticipated when this matter is argued before the court, the plea for punitive damages will be dropped, much to the embarrassment of the communist subversives and extremists involved.

The Unit endeavors to keep track of all efforts to discredit the U.S. military effort through organization of antiwar coffeehouses, oriented groups, and publications. Last January we intensified investigation on Peoples House, a coffeehouse operated by subversives in Clarksville, Tennessee. Excellent information has been developed, all the principal subversives participating have been identified, and details have been furnished to the Department and interested military intelligence agencies. The House Committee on Internal Security has taken an interest in this coffeehouse and it is expected to be the subject of a Congressional hearing which will publicly expose the involvement, tactics, and objectives of the extremist elements behind this subversive endeavor.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT

The FBI has continued its investigation of 18 Klan-type organizations including 255 klaverns (units) throughout the United States which had a slight increase in membership from 4,300 a year ago to approximately 4,500 at present. This increase in membership is primarily attributed to renewed interest in Klan-type organizations brought about by Federal directives regarding school busing in order to achieve racial balance in public schools.

In recent months the UKA and Shelton have undertaken a major campaign aimed at harassing the FBI. The initial step of the campaign was named by Shelton as "Operation Polly" in which he sought to obtain polygraph machines to help "weed out FBI pimps." We have taken steps to assure he is not successful by instructing our key informants to talk it down and, if necessary, to ultimately refuse to take such an exam. We have also discreetly contacted a potential supplier to be assured we are aware of any positive action taken by Shelton in this regard.

Further, as a result of our hard-hitting investigation and interviews of Klansmen, Shelton printed a series of articles in the monthly UKA publication "The Fiery Cross," entitled "Exposing the CIA and FBI," in which Shelton vehemently attacked the Bureau as a "Gestapo-like police force" and the Director as "a man who has sold out his country for his prided FBI." Picketing of the Norfolk and Richmond FBI Offices to protest interviews of Klansmen by FBI Agents as infringement of the individual rights of Klan members also took place recently and Klansmen were instructed to attempt to secure photographs and identities of our Agents in order that this information could be published in "The Fiery Cross" with the intent that the FBI be embarrassed and our Agents transferred. This information was furnished to appropriate field offices and to the Department. To date our Agents have avoided having their photographs taken by the Klan.

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Violence has been noticeably absent among Klan-type organizations during the past year. This is due in the main to our effective informant program. We have been able to direct our informants to positions of leadership throughout the country, and these informants have been extremely successful in forming nonviolent Klan policy. We have also been able to keep local authorities advised of potential Klan violence in time to thwart such action.

Since last inspection, information was also developed through Joan Gourley, former mistress of Robert DePugh, concerning murder of Walter Barnes, former Minutemen member who was allegedly murdered and buried by DePugh while in underground hide-out in New Mexico prior to his arrest by the FBI. Gourley traveled to New Mexico to locate gravesite in company of local authorities who granted her immunity. Gravesite disclosed only four small bones identified by coroner as coming from foot of human victim. Gourley furnished statement to New Mexico authorities and, in addition, stated DePugh had indicated in July, 1970, while imprisoned, that body had been removed from original gravesite, but she did not believe him at that time. Local District Attorney, while believing Gourley's story, felt prosecution not feasible without body. During July, 1971, SD 1155-R, a Minutemen informant of this Bureau furnished information and explosives reportedly to be utilized in the bombings of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division (ATFD) and Internal Revenue Service offices in the California area, resulting in the arrest of several individuals, including informant, by ATFD, thus preventing the bombings.

Subsequent to last inspection, dissemination has been made concerning weapons, possible violence and demonstrations of these groups which has resulted in the curtailment of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate group organizations in some areas. In several cases, confiscation of weapons has been made by ATFD of the Treasury Department based on our information. We have also made apprehensions of extremist subjects for illegal possession of firearms following conviction of a felony, a violation under our jurisdiction.

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ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: There follows a summary of accomplishments of the Research Section since the last inspection:

Central Research Unit

This Unit performs a wide range of research and writing assignments and preparation of various documents and special reports. These include the following:

An extensive special assignment on new left research for the Director.

A special report which is kept up to date on FBI usage of electronic surveillances.

The "FBI Current Intelligence Analysis" issued approximately every week summarizes significant items of interest in subversive field.

"FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" issued weekly summarizes significant items relating to black extremists.

"The Extremist Speaks" is a monthly compilation showing extremist views taken from their publications.

A pamphlet entitled "The Black Panther" was prepared for public distribution.

A pamphlet entitled "1970: Year of the Urban Guerrilla" was prepared for distribution.

The monograph entitled "The CPUSA Annual Intelligence Digest" was issued in February.

A number of papers were prepared for the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

A number of book reviews of interest were prepared.

Special reports are prepared on a continuing basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Committee.

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The Unit coordinated the preparation of material for the Division's participation in the conference with police officials concerning attacks on police and prepared a special packet of material for distribution to those police officials in attendance.

This Unit also was responsible for coordination of preparation of damage assessments relating to Domestic Intelligence Division documents stolen in the burglary of the former Media, Pennsylvania, Resident Agency, and handling other aspects of the Medburg case as related to this Division.

In addition, the Unit also collected and prepared material for various articles, speeches, and surveys. Personnel of the Unit have handled lectures on subjects of communism, the new left, and racial extremism. These have consisted of classified lectures to Bureau's New Agents and In-Service classes, appearances before other intelligence agencies and National Academy classes and appearances before outside groups.

Special Records Unit

This Unit is primarily responsible for records keeping for emergency planning. Further details concerning programs handled by this Unit are set forth in Section 4-H.

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly called the Racial Reporting Unit, has continued to coordinate all phases of disturbances, violence and other developments where race is a factor as well as information bearing on the potential for violence throughout the country. Material being reported on a daily basis by the field offices is reviewed, coordinated and disseminated to interested officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other high officials. Statistical data on civil disorders, school disorders and attacks on police is extracted from communications received from the field and is maintained in this Unit for use in the preparation of special papers. Detailed statistical data is prepared for automatic data processing.

This Unit also prepares on demand certain studies and briefs concerning specific subject matters relating to racial extremists and racial situations. Examples of these are a detailed study on the extent of foreign influence on the black extremist movement completed in February of this year. A current document on this subject matter is presently
being prepared for early dissemination. In June, 1971, a comprehensive document on the potential for violence in the Nation during the Summer of 1971 was prepared for high-level dissemination.

In addition to the above, this Unit prepares a monthly "FBI Digest of Civil Disorders" briefly summarizing all disorders occurring in the previous month growing out of racial unrest. The incidents are listed geographically and chronologically so that the White House and other recipients can tell at a glance the general nature of incidents and problems and where they are.

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly known as the New Left Reporting Unit, coordinates coverage of activities relating to all New Left, student, and antiwar demonstrations, as well as other civil disturbances arising from issues other than racial in nature. A daily teletype summary on demonstrations and other disruptive activity is prepared for dissemination to the White House, the Attorney General and other interested Government officials.

Continuing and timely dissemination is made concerning major demonstrations in addition to the teletype summary and advance information concerning possible demonstrations is furnished Government officials (principally the President and Vice President) traveling throughout the country.

Since the last inspection, this Unit has covered the following major demonstrations:

Marches on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, California, on 3/20/71 sponsored by the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) to protest unemployment.

A series of disruptive demonstrations held in Washington, D. C., during the period 4/1-5/71 sponsored by People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and May Day Collectives. During this series of demonstrations, some 12,000 arrests were made.

A massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on 4/24/71 sponsored by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC). A similar demonstration was held in San Francisco. The Washington, D. C., demonstration attracted an estimated 400,000 persons.


Nationwide demonstrations during the period 8/6-9/71 sponsored by NPAC and PCPJ, as well as other peace groups to protest the war in Vietnam and to commemorate the atomic bombing of Japan.

This Unit also prepared studies and briefs when they are called upon to do so and regularly issues the monthly "FBI Intelligence Calendar of Major Events." Also statistics are maintained concerning the disorders for use as needed.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD. Attached are comments from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the New Left Section since the last Inspection. This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left movement, including terrorist groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus. Investigations concerning New Left publications are also supervised in this Section, as are sabotage investigations, and Protest and Trotskyist groups.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - WEST

The primary objective in this Unit has been and continues to be the goal of overcoming the threat to American institutions presented by violence prone extremists, such as those within the revolutionary Weatherman organization. This Unit and the Special Investigation Unit - East, supervise security investigations of the Weatherman group and its individual members. Through coordination with the General Investigative Division, which has handled certain criminal investigations involving Weatherman members, and with the Special Investigative Division, which has supervised the investigation of Weatherman fugitives, substantial accomplishments in the task of neutralizing these extremists have been achieved. A number of Weatherman leaders have been indicted on Federal charges involving violations of the Federal Anti-riot, gun control and bombing statutes. Many leaders and activists in the Weatherman organization have gone underground and the organization is currently composed of a few hundred adherents including those underground and above ground. Its underground existence and the fugitive status of its leaders have isolated Weatherman from the mass of American youth. Consequently, Weatherman has experienced a considerable reduction in strength, based on the number of its present adherents and its influence among young people.

Weatherman, though a small group, continues to be extremely dangerous in view of its violent and destructive tactics. It is noted that Weatherman has claimed credit for a number of bombings, including the bombing of the national Capitol building on 3/1/71.

Weatherman continues to receive intensive investigation. In recent months, a Weatherman bomb making factory has been discovered at 1038 A Pine Street, San Francisco, California, and subsequent investigation there has uncovered a number of persons, including attorneys, who are acting in a covert support role for Weatherman. The Department of Justice has now indicated in a letter to the Bureau that it will institute Federal Grand Jury proceedings concerning activities at this Pine Street address, with the prospect of further indictments and further discourage-
ment of Weatherman sympathizers. Approval has been obtained for this Unit to supervise this Pine Street case in view of its intimate connection with the overall Weatherman investigation. Approval has also been obtained for this Unit to supervise a New Left - Violence case in Tucson, Arizona, which involves Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms (UPRF) charges. This Tucson case concerns five New Left extremists, three of whom have now been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury. Two of these have been apprehended and the third is a fugitive. Another subject in this case has been sentenced to jail for contempt of court for refusing to testify before the Grand Jury.

An example of the salutary effect of vigorous investigation and prosecution of New Left extremists is seen in the Seattle area. There, a radical group called the Seattle Liberation Front (SLF), which was composed of former Weatherman members, had fomented continuing violence. Then SLF leaders were tried in Federal court on anti-riot charges. This trial ended in a mistrial but the SLF leaders were cited for contempt of court. Since that mistrial in December, 1970, SLF has been disbanded and most SLF members have left Seattle. There has been a noticeable reduction in New Left violence in Seattle.

In the several cases referred to above, it is noted that in each instance information crucial to the prosecution of New Left extremists was provided by New Left informants.

In recent months significant accomplishments were made in a case involving two extremists in Ohio through the use of a tesor installation. These two extremists were Nancy Kurshan and Howard Emmer, who were leaders of the Youth International Party (YIP). Between February and June, 1971, a tesor covered the activities of Kurshan, Emmer, and others with outstanding success. This source provided advance information concerning the plans of May Day leader Rennie Davis for the recent May Day national action. The source also provided extensive information on planned demonstrations and strikes at Kent State University on May 3 and 4, 1971, the anniversary of the killing of Kent State students by the National Guard in May 1970. This source furnished information concerning activities and movements of suspects in the Capbomb case and other New Left extremists. This source also developed information on plans for the Women's March on Washington on April 10, 1971.
As a result of dissemination of advance information developed by this source, authorities were able to further control these demonstrations and reduce the violence arising out of such activity.

With reference to the complicated Weatherman investigation, much progress has been made recently in the development of information on the technical aspects of the actual operation of the Weatherman underground, particularly its use and methods of obtaining false identities, its courier system, its use of radical attorneys in covert support roles and in the movement of its support personnel. Effort is continually being made to develop new techniques and approaches to facilitate this investigation. A "stop index" program in NCIC, for Bureau use only, concerning extremists on Priority I of the Security Index was initiated in June, 1971. This program enables our field offices to receive prompt notice by teletype when police agencies make inquiries about these subjects. In addition, new procedures have recently been devised whereby the Identification Division can better disseminate to the field arrest information on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file. This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices to determine if fingerprints have been received since the last check.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT-EAST

Incidents of sabotage currently being investigated by the Bureau are, for the most part, the "home grown variety" occasioned by attacks against the military and related operations on the part of New Leftists, dissidents, and elements opposed to U.S. participation in the Vietnam War.

There are under investigation at the present time 9 sabotage initiated investigations with prosecution pending, involving 21 subjects who are charged with various violations including Attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government Property, Antiriot Law violations, Civil Rights violations, Violation of National Firearms Act, Possession of Destructive Device, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Contempt of Court and Conspiracy.

Since last inspection and as a result of sabotage investigations, 10 individuals have either been tried in Federal court and found guilty or have entered guilty pleas. Three of these individuals have been sentenced to a total of 30 years while the remaining 7 are awaiting sentencing. Additionally, since last inspection and as a result of sabotage investigations, 6 additional individuals have been indicted but not yet brought to trial. Two of these 6 are currently in a fugitive status. It should be noted that as a direct result of this Bureau's sabotage investigations, 5 subjects are currently included in the Bureau's Most Wanted Fugitives List and Identification Orders are currently in effect concerning another 3 subjects.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST 4-E

The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being June, 1969, as a coalition of representatives from various New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic Society, Young Socialist Alliance, the militant Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organizations including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party.

Four contingents have traveled to Cuba since November, 1969. The first group was composed of 216 young Americans who obtained their own transportation to Cuba in defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that country. These young revolutionaries were returned to Canada on 2/12/70 at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship. The second contingent of 687 sympathetic American youths were loaded aboard this boat for its return trip to Cuba. This group, like the first contingent, worked in the sugar cane fields until its return by the same means of transportation on April 28, 1970. In August, 1970, the third contingent of the VB, made up of 407 persons, journeyed to the Isle of Youth where they participated in a Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and fertilizing citrus trees. This group returned to the U. S. mid-October, 1970. The fourth contingent of 233 young Americans traveled by air to Cuba during the last week of March, 1971, and were returned to Canada by Cuban ship on May 29, 1971.

Each group worked approximately 7 1/2 hours a day, 5 1/2 days a week, and in their free time were afforded the opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They were reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to show "solidarity with the socialist struggle, to
smash the U. S. blockade, and to make a breach in the facade of the U. S. imperialist monster."

Each of the more than 1500 brigade members has been the subject of a security investigation which includes the identification and obtaining of background data as well as a personal interview with each brigade member. These investigations are being made to determine the immediate danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also to ascertain the long-range role they will take in the revolutionary movement in the U. S. Upon completion of the investigation and the interview of each of these individuals, the field must recommend either the inclusion or noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index. In addition the field must continue to report every 90 days for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts of each brigade member.

The intelligence responsibilities of the Bureau in regard to the VB have been handled through the placing of Bureau informants in the ranks of the various contingents. Accurate on-the-scene reports concerning the training and activities of these groups in Cuba have been furnished to the intelligence community and factual responses have been made to congressional and other legitimate inquiries regarding these young supporters of the Castro Regime. As a result of our investigations, more than 275 VB participants have been placed on the Security Index and it has been noted that about 25% of those individuals currently being intensively investigated as extremists in the New Left section, are ex-VB members.

Plans for a fifth contingent of the VB have been formulated. This new group is tentatively scheduled to depart for Cuba in early January, 1972, and is to be comprised of 225-250 individuals politically oriented to the socialist cause.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS - NEW LEFT UNIT

Among the primary responsibilities of this unit is the identification and investigation of individuals who, because of activities or affiliation with one or more violence-prone revolutionary groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the nation. In most instances, this unit handles initial stages of the investigation and carries it through to completion. In some instances where individuals are determined to be of an extremist nature, those cases are referred to the units in this section handling extremist cases. At the conclusion of each investigation or at the phase of the investigation when it is determined that the individual therein could be considered a danger to the internal security of the country, an evaluation is made and, if appropriate, the individual's name is included on the Security Index.

The immense volume of cases handled in this unit is clearly exhibited by the fact that since the last inspection approximately 5000 cases have been handled in this unit. To be exact, 5418 cases have been opened and 4951 cases have been closed.
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

This Unit is responsible for the investigation of antiwar protest groups and key activists connected therewith, as well as the Eastcon case. Accomplishments of the Unit worthy of note are as follows:

EASTCON

As a result of our investigation of the plots to blow up the underground tunnels housing the heating system servicing Government buildings in Washington, D.C., and to kidnap a high Government official, an indictment was returned at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 1-12-71 covering six individuals as defendants and seven unindicted co-conspirators. Our investigation into this matter continued, and on 4-30-71 a superseding indictment was returned at Harrisburg which added two additional defendants and reduced the number of unindicted co-conspirators to four. In addition, five individuals have been cited for civil contempt for refusal to testify before the Federal Grand Jury regarding this matter, and four individuals have been indicted for criminal contempt. By letter dated 2-25-71 to the Director, Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian advised of his appreciation for cooperation extended by the Bureau in this case and singled out the efforts of six members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, as well as two Agents of the Philadelphia Office.

Of paramount importance to the successful prosecution of this case is our principal witness, Boyd Frederick Douglas. He testified before the Grand Jury in January, 1971, and subsequently assumed a new identity and has been living under appropriate cover in Des Moines, Iowa. Inasmuch as he is a witness rather than an informant, the Department is primarily responsible for his welfare and his cover. We maintain liaison between the witness and the Department in order to insure that the Bureau's interests are properly looked after. The death of the informant's father in July, 1971, created a situation whereby the informant's identity and location could have been ascertained by irresponsible members of the press. Through the concerted efforts of the Omaha Office, the informant and his wife attended the funeral with no adverse effects. Assistant Attorney General Mardian, by letter dated 7-21-71, praised the high degree of proficiency of five Agents of the Omaha Office in protecting the identity of the witness.

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The development of a highly placed informant, **PH 1223-S**, within the pro-Berrigan forces is also a significant accomplishment. This individual has gained the confidence of leaders in the Berrigan movement and is privy to information not available from any other source. The informant has furnished a wealth of information regarding fund raising and strategy and tactics planned by movement leaders to propagandize their position and to attempt to gain public support for the Berrigan cause. In the course of this coverage, the informant furnished information concerning plans of the group for action in the event parole was not granted to **Philip and Daniel Berrigan** on 7-28-71. He also furnished plans of the group to mount an attack on the Bureau of Prisons which culminated in a hunger-work strike at the Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, on 8/6-7/71. This action resulted in the transfer of eleven inmates to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri. We furnished plans of this proposed action to the Bureau of Prisons, and in a letter to the Attorney General dated 8-11-71, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons noted that the action of the inmates confirmed our intelligence reports received several weeks prior.

**PH 1223-S** also furnished information concerning the intention of the group to embarrass the administration by having **Daniel Berrigan** prepare the text for a Mass composed by musical conductor **Leonard Bernstein**. This Mass is to be part of the dedication ceremonies for the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D. C., and is to be performed on 9-9-71. The words prepared by **Daniel Berrigan** were to have been in Latin and were to follow an antiwar theme. The group anticipated the President and high ranking administration officials would applaud the work and subsequent publicity would be to the effect that they had applauded antiadministration views. This information was furnished the White House and, according to the news media, the President has declined to attend the ceremonies on 9-9-71.

**PH 1223-S** has also furnished information showing the Berrigan supporters are interested in obtaining classified material such as that publicized by **Daniel Ellsberg** in an effort to embarrass the Government. The individual who is to attempt to get these papers is **Linda Shaw Finlay**, an ardent supporter of the Berrigan cause. Her target is the Lyndon B. Johnson Library at the University of Texas, Austin, which is the repository for former President Johnson's papers. We have a separate espionage investigation underway regarding this situation.
ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

This Unit is responsible for the investigation of dissident protest groups in order that their potential threat to the internal security of the country can be assessed. This includes development of informant coverage and the dissemination of timely intelligence information, as well as possible violations of Federal laws.

The organizations concerned are the communist Socialist Workers Party (SWP), its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), and the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) which is controlled by the SWP/YSA. All three of these groups utilize the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) as a vehicle to project their antiwar message. The Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), continuation group of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), also exercises considerable influence in the antiwar movement and is a target for infiltration by the Communist Party, USA (CP). The May Day Collective (MDC), organized by Rennie Davis, is a militant group which split from the PCPJ following the May, 1971, demonstrations in Washington, D. C. Also of considerable interest is the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) which came into prominence during the Washington demonstrations. We have disseminated on a daily basis hundreds of reports and memoranda concerning the activities of these and other groups, as well as information regarding principal activists. This dissemination has been augmented by the preparation of several CINALs pertinent to specific demonstrations, conferences, or activities.

Of particular value has been our coverage of national conferences and conventions sponsored by various groups which are used to plan future antiwar activity and demonstrations. We have been able to cover these sessions most effectively and have furnished other interested Government agencies with advance information of their plans. Included in these conferences were the following:

2/19-21/71 -- National student antiwar conference, Washington, D. C., sponsored by SMC.

5/15/71 -- SMC National Steering Committee meeting.


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7/2-4/71 -- NPAC national antiwar convention, New York City.

8/8-15/71 -- SWP national convention, Oberlin, Ohio, which also included Student Activist Educational Conference of the YSA.

8/13-17/71 -- MDC national conference, Atlanta, Georgia, preceded by regional conferences in Washington, D. C., and Fayetteville, Arkansas.

With regard to the MDC national conference, our informant coverage led to the apprehension of three leaders of the New York MDC contingent by the New York City Police Department for possession of firearms. Our informant determined the exact location in a specific vehicle where a shotgun, 22 caliber rifle, and 357 Smith and Wesson revolver, all loaded, were recovered. In addition, in excess of 500 rounds of ammunition for these weapons were seized.

Our investigation of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIFAM) produced significant intelligence information with regard to the exchange of letters between prisoners of war in North Vietnam and their families within the U.S. By letter dated 8-9-71, the Directorate of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force, advised that this information was of "considerable assistance" in an intelligence collection program concerned with prisoners of war.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

Included in the work of the New Left Groups Unit are the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of the Weatherman), other New Left campus groups, the Key Activist program, New Left Movement reports, New Left publications, and the maintenance of a library of research material on the New Left for use of Bureau officials in connection with approved speaking commitments.

In 1969, the Worker Student Alliance (WSA), Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions of SDS split into separate groups. Accomplishments concerning Weatherman are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYM faction of SDS is now practically defunct. Currently, the largest faction of SDS is the WSA faction, which is dominated by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party (PLP).

Approximately twenty Bureau informants attended the SDS/WSA National Convention in Chicago, December 26-30, 1970. This convention was dominated by PLP controlled leadership; however, dissent was widespread, much of which was led by our informants. Since the last Inspection, this dissent has spread further and has resulted in additional factionalism within the SDS/WSA.

During the past winter, the SDS/WSA has continuously attempted to inject itself into labor disputes without success, due mainly to factionalism. The objective of the SDS/WSA is to build ties with workers inasmuch as in the old Marxist-Leninist tradition, they view the students-workers as the vanguard of the revolution. In this regard, the SDS/WSA set up a Summer Project with the twofold objective of a massive recruitment program and the fostering of a general strike, nationwide, through infiltration of industry and unions. We have been on top of this program from its inception and have kept all interested Government agencies advised of developments on a continuing basis. In addition, again largely due to factionalization, the SDS/WSA Summer Project program has not had significant success in any of its twenty-one target cities.

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New Left Movement reports submitted quarterly by each field office have enabled us to furnish interested agencies timely and informative documents on the activities of the New Left movement. This is a substantial contribution to the objective that responsible Government officials be alerted concerning the nature and extent of this aspect of subversive activities and the threat it presents to our democratic society.

By conducting an intensive review of many New Left publications which range from the pornographic to the clearly revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these publications; their subversive activities and whether or not they urge violence; and sources of funds. Since these publications are the voice of the New Left and are influential in recruiting youth, pertinent factors concerning them are disseminated to interested officials and agencies. Since our review of these "underground" publications has revealed many of them frequently come into being and become defunct within a short time, we are alert to the birth of new publications by perusing various underground news service lists as well as other documents and books which report new publications in this field.

A library of research material on the New Left is maintained for use of Bureau officials in connection with approved speaking engagements before Government officials and responsible citizens. In this manner, we have assisted these Government officials and responsible citizens to more fully understand the subversive and anarchist manifestations of the New Left movement.

Through the key activist program, we have focused investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left movement with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible. This program has proved successful in that we have been able to closely follow the activities of these individuals and furnish interested agencies and high Government officials with information concerning their subversive and agitational activities. Of particular note is the fact that more than half of the 73 individuals designated as key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Section Chief W. A. Brahigan
Espionage Section

The primary mission of this Section involves counterintelligence operations against Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Services (SBIS). Counterintelligence, by definition and in practice, is a reaction to initiative displayed by a hostile intelligence service. This factor largely inhibits bold and aggressive initiatives on our part and the major part of our efforts is spent in routine, programmatic, non-remunerative work and patient, painstaking analysis of information developed. Positive counterintelligence achievement in the final analysis depends on the ability to detect and exploit in a timely fashion circumstances which arise naturally--contriving, to the extent this is feasible, to anticipate, encourage, or modify circumstances to our own advantage or the disadvantage of the SBIS.

In this perspective, the accomplishments listed below are most noteworthy. These are highlighted by the current operation of four defectors-in-place and the identification of three "illegal" agents since the last inspection. From both a quantitative and qualitative viewpoint, these successes represent an extremely high level of accomplishment in these two vital areas.

In keeping with the Inspector's instructions, brevity will be stressed in the examples portrayed. Security and the "need-to-know" principle also requires limitation of detailed information on many cases discussed. These matters, however, are identified sufficiently so that any additional data desired may be obtained from the individual file. Accomplishments cited are restricted to the most significant and/or representative.

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I. Defectors-in-Place (DIP)

The most valuable asset which counterintelligence can acquire is the recruitment of a Soviet-bloc official who is an active intelligence officer or who otherwise has access to intelligence information. Such a source can produce information of incalculable value not obtainable from any other source. Highest priority and emphasis is assigned to cases which have such potential. Although we have had success in this area in the past, at the time of the last inspection we had no DIP. Currently we are operating four sources in this category, which are briefly described below.

IRONCLAD is a sensitive, highly placed DIP who furnishes, on a continuing basis, a large volume of high level information concerning operations of Soviet Intelligence Services (SIS). He has identified hundreds of SIS officers and furnished information concerning approximately 250 intelligence operations. Some of his information involves penetrations of other Government agencies as well as substantial information which has been of high interest to the White House. The value of information he has furnished and has a potential to furnish is beyond estimate.

WINGTIP is a DIP who is in a position to furnish information concerning Polish intelligence activities. He was recently recruited and his potential is still being exploited.

KIELBASA is a DIP who is a Polish intelligence officer whose recruitment was recently effected. He is under continuing development.

SPINNAKER is a DIP in the Yugoslav field who has furnished information on Yugoslav intelligence activities pertaining to identities of intelligence agents, their sources and targets. Dissemination of pertinent information furnished by him has been made to interested U. S. agencies.

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II. Double Agents

A double agent is an individual under Bureau control who has been recruited and given intelligence assignments by SBIS. Double agent development is given great emphasis since this is a primary method to obtain valuable information concerning hostile intelligence operations, targets, techniques and personnel. At the time of the last inspection, this Section listed 138 double agents, 296 potential double agents, and 49 inactive double agents. Figures for August 1, 1971, are 133, 291, and 47 for the respective categories. Apart from statistics, the most significant accomplishment lies in the quality of the double agent operations which has developed since the last inspection. A representative number of these situations are set forth below.

CHOWLINE is a double agent which began in 1958. Through the years this operation has grown steadily in significance and productivity. The source has been paid over $52,000 by the Soviets while passing carefully cleared material, some of which was deceptive in nature. A deception concept concerning nonexistent U. S. military capability has been accepted by the Soviets and their attempts to counteract this capability have reportedly caused them to commit $1.5 billion in their defense budget. Most significant developments were the identification of two Soviet illegal agents in the U. S. as a direct product of the CHOWLINE operation (see Palmetto and Ixora).

The SNOOD operation involves a Soviet agent who was uncovered through information received in 1962 from a DIP. We initiated interviews with this individual on a pretext of interest in the source of funds deposited by him which we knew to have originated with the Soviets. After extensive interviews source admitted his involvement as an agent for SIS and agreed to cooperate with the Bureau. During June, 1971, he met with a Soviet contact and through corroborative information from DIP, we know that Soviets still accept him as one of their most trusted and valuable U. S. agents.

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BASELINE is a double agent operated against Hungarian Intelligence Services (HIS), who is reportedly considered to be the top Hungarian agent in the U.S. Although HIS has been most recalcitrant to have personal contact with this source in the U.S., we were able to induce such a meeting on January 28, 1971, in New York City and identified a Third Secretary of the Hungarian United Nations Mission. Informant has been told he will handle HIS agents in the U.S.

CANDY is a double agent operation directed against HIS on intermittent basis for 14 years. HIS interest was dormant from 1966 to 1970, when this operation was reactivated by HIS. HIS has attempted to have source meet with them abroad, but under our direction he has resisted this pressure. We are still attempting to manipulate this operation to bring about intelligence meetings in the U.S.

In 1968 HIS, under cover of the East-West Exchange Program, dispatched a 29-year-old Hungarian national (HA4578-PSI) to the U.S. on an intelligence mission. This individual is now under our control. Under HIS instructions he was to seek permanent residence in this country to further his intelligence mission. This is being done under our control.

AQ 366-S is a double agent serving with U.S. Air Force in New Mexico. He has been operated against the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). He receives radio messages originating with GRU radio in Havana, Cuba. In June, 1971, he had a meet in Juarez, Mexico, and the Soviet principal was identified as an official from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Considerable information has been developed in this case concerning Soviet capabilities and communications systems.

In three double agent operations in the U.S. - Mexican border area we have identified four Soviet officials assigned to Mexico City as intelligence officers. In addition, we have uncovered a Soviet illegal agent. (EP 628-S; EP 656-S; SA 888-S).

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III. Soviet Illegal Operations

These operations are staffed by officers or agents of SIS who enter the U. S. and operate without any connection with the legal bases, i. e., the intelligence residencies staffed by intelligence personnel under cover of official position located at the Soviet Embassy and Mission to the United Nations. In view of the completely clandestine nature of these operations, they are the most difficult to detect. We have in the past achieved some success in detecting several illegal operations. Since the last inspection, three such agents have been identified in the cases outlined below.

Palmetto is an investigation of an individual detected removing espionage material from a dead drop filled by the Chowline source in March, 1971. This individual was successfully identified through intensive, discreet investigation as a Mexican national currently doing graduate work at a western university in the U. S. Intensive investigation is underway in this case to determine additional information concerning this individual's activities with a view to uncovering other Soviet agents in the U. S. whom he may be servicing.

In another outgrowth of the Chowline case, we have identified the IXORA subject as a Soviet illegal agent. This individual is an Austrian national who entered the U. S. in 1968 as a permanent resident and resides and is employed in the New York City area. Identity of this person was furnished the Chowline informant as an emergency contact to be made only in event a war is imminent. Intensive investigation is also underway in this case to determine the extent of this individual's activities and contacts.

In a double agent operation (referred to above), a Soviet illegal agent has been identified as a resident of Juarez, Mexico, who has been used in servicing Soviet agents in the U. S.

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IV. Counterintelligence and Special Operations

In this category, on a highly selective basis we take initiative in actions which are designed to disrupt, deter or otherwise disadvantage the operations of SBIS. We employ our own resources and whenever feasible, those of other U.S. agencies. Brief examples of activity in this category since the last inspection are set forth.

A former Soviet exchange student in the U.S. reappeared as an official assigned to the Soviet United Nations mission during his previous visit in the U.S. he had recruited a fellow student, whom we had identified as a result of information furnished by a DIP. When the Soviet recontacted this American we were in a position to control the latter's actions. At our direction the double agent wrote a letter to the Soviet United Nations Ambassador complaining about the treatment he had received and the indiscretions committed by the Soviet. The Soviet has been reprimanded and there are indications that his assignment to the U.S. will be cut short.

A Soviet defector who formally operated as a KGB officer in the USSR was recently used by us to contact a Czech professor temporarily in the U.S. as an East-West exchange participant. The professor's wife is a Soviet national who was known to our defector source as an agent for the KGB in the Soviet Union. The Czech was suspected of being affiliated with Czech intelligence. An approach was made and although the Czech couple seriously considered the proposition for defection put to them, they finally decided against such action and returned to Czechoslovakia. During our contacts some information of low level intelligence significance was developed.

The Soviet Government is currently engaged in securing property in San Francisco to house the office and personnel of the Consulate General. Through conferences held with State Department we have been able to exert an

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influence on the choice of properties made available to the Soviets. As a result of our action it appears almost certain that the Soviets are settling on a property considered by us to offer the best advantage for counterintelligence coverage.

In late January, 1971, we furnished information to State Department and White House concerning activities of a very aggressive KGB officer in Washington, D.C., who was attempting to obtain equipment involved in a classified communications system used by White House and other agencies. We suggested to State that subject be declared persona non grata and State, after securing concurrence of White House, decided instead to personally admonish a representative of the Soviet Embassy concerning these activities. This action resulted in curtailing the Soviet's intelligence activities and probably resulted in his early recall.

A Soviet attached to the staff of the new Consulate General in San Francisco came to our attention as a KGB officer who had formerly been stationed in China. He had been declared persona non grata and expelled from Peking with some publicity. This information was furnished by us to a cooperative newspaper source in San Francisco and resulted in a newspaper article which repeated the charges. Considerable embarrassment was caused and long range curtailment of this Soviet's intelligence activities is hoped for.

V. Prosecutive Action

One objective of counterintelligence investigations is prosecution. Since most intelligence officers have diplomatic immunity, this objective is rarely attained.

A Soviet intelligence officer operating under cover of employment at the United Nations Secretariat has requested classified information from a double agent regarding the F-14 aircraft being manufactured by Grumman. The facts have been presented to the Department of Justice and Department of State and both have approved prosecutive action. The Soviet was scheduled for arrest during May, 1971, but this action
was held in abeyance pending final approval of the White House, which had requested a temporary delay. Soviet has been on summer leave and recently returned to the U. S. We are currently seeking concurrence from the White House so that arrest may take place at the next meeting scheduled for 9/13/71.

VI. Dissemination of Significant Intelligence Data

One of the products of our counterintelligence operations is the development of intelligence data of interest to other U. S. agencies. The following are examples of significant data which has been disseminated on a high level since the last inspection.

1. Dissemination to National Security Agency regarding an unknown subject connected with that Agency who was reported to us as cooperating with the KGB.

2. Dissemination to Atomic Energy Commission concerning a high official of that Agency who was being cultivated by the Soviets for intelligence purposes.

3. Dissemination to State, CIA, and the White House of information we developed concerning the delivery to the Soviet Embassy on June 17, 1971, of a package containing a copy of the "Pentagon Papers."

4. Dissemination to White House, CIA, and State concerning an intelligence approach made by the Soviets to a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

5. Dissemination to the White House of information we developed concerning the receipt by Soviet intelligence of information concerning Dr. Kissinger's trip to China prior to the release of this information by the President. This information was obtained from an American agent of the KGB in Washington, D. C.

6. Dissemination on high level to White House and CIA concerning Soviet intelligence targets relating to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks then in progress.

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7. Information in the CHOWLINE and PALMETTO cases has been disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney General. Dr. Kissinger has commended the Director and the FBI in this matter and specifically requested that he be kept informed of any additional developments.

VII. Soviet Information Collation System (SICS)

SICS is the system in which we have utilized automatic data processing equipment to record data concerning Soviet officials in the U. S. Since the last inspection, a continuing expansion has been made in this system and we are looking to the inclusion of Satellite personnel in the near future. This is a time consuming project which holds a tremendous potential, already partially realized, for reducing administrative work and making our overall investigative operations more efficient and successful. Detailed write-up is included in Section 5-Q of the inspection report.

VIII. Recovery

$9,288.76 has been claimed as a recovery in the SNOOD case. This is the amount paid Internal Revenue Service as tax on income belatedly reported by subject due to action by the Bureau.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The significant accomplishments of the Extremist Intelligence Section can be seen most clearly in the accomplishments through our investigative efforts as well as the accomplishments achieved through the extremist informants.

Since the last inspection we have supervised the "Newkill Special." This case involves unprovoked attack on two New York City (NYC) police officers, 5/21/71, by two Negro male assailants. Both officers were shot and killed. Prior to this shooting on 5/19/71 two NYC officers were machine gunned and seriously wounded as they attempted to stop a speeding car occupied by Negro males. Anonymous letters were received by news media in NYC claiming credit for these shootings.

The Director met with the President and the Attorney General regarding the killing of the two officers as this incident received nationwide publicity. The Director instructed an all-out effort be made to effect Bureau solution.

Intensive investigation has been conducted to identify assailants with investigation conducted abroad and in over 40 field offices. Over 2000 people have been interviewed. The Identification Division has compared the fingerprints of over 700 persons with latent evidence and the Laboratory Division has conducted about 400 separate examinations of ballistics and other type evidence in this case.

Since its inception, we have concentrated on members of the violence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) as suspects. This has paid off since four persons were arrested in NYC on 6/5/71 while attempting an armed robbery. Two of the individuals
arrested were Bureau fugitives. We had previously identified the two Bureau fugitives from fingerprints from material submitted by them to news media in May claiming credit for the murders. The two Bureau fugitives, Richard Moore and Edward Joseph, were BPP members who were reportedly in Algeria. A machine gun utilized in armed robbery and in possession of Moore was determined to be same weapon used in machine gunning of two NYC police officers on 5/19/71. Moore has been indicted by Queens County, New York, Grand Jury for attempted murder of the two officers. He and Joseph remain in custody of local officials.

Our intense investigation has in some respects decimated the BPP in NYC. We have kept them on the defensive and in hiding. Our investigation and interview program has resulted in developing a witness who is an associate of the prime suspects in this case.

Based upon her testimony of acts of violence, she identified seven Panthers who participated in killing a Negro BPP leader in NYC. Of the seven, three had previously been arrested in the above-mentioned armed robbery 6/5/71. The remaining four became Bureau fugitives for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution for murder.

On 8/7/71 a Panther informant of our Detroit Office under instructions to locate the four fugitives located Michael Dennis Hill, one of the four, who was accompanied by an associate. Based upon informant's report, Hill and Anthony Nicholas La Borde were arrested, both armed with firearms, and La Borde also had a live hand grenade in his possession. A Federal Grand Jury has indicted Hill and La Borde with possession of destructive device and La Borde also charged with harboring Hill.

Hill is reportedly the "trigger man" in shooting of two officers on 5/19/71 and our witness has stated Hill was extremely upset for his failure to actually kill the officers and is a likely suspect in killing the two officers two nights later on 5/21/71. Hill is described as the "hit man" of BPP.
and was the planner and "hit man" in armed robberies and acts of violence committed by BPP. La Borde was also indicted on armed robbery charges on 8/16/71 in NYC having been identified as the person who held up a bar during July, 1971. Hill and La Borde are prime suspects in the killing on 5/21/71 and lineup is being arranged for our crime scene witnesses to view these two.

We have kept the White House and the Attorney General apprised of all pertinent developments in this case and on five occasions Mr. John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, the White House, has advised the Director by letter of his appreciation of being kept fully informed on this case.

Through the investigative efforts of the field and the various Bureau programs, we have been able to follow closely the development and activity of the BPP which revealed as of June, 1971, a total membership of 710 in 39 branches located in 37 cities.

The Bureau's Black Nationalist Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which was in effect for several years, was discontinued 4/27/71. Prior to discontinuance, counterintelligence activity directed toward disruption of the BPP was carried out at an accelerated rate taking advantage of—and exploiting any appropriate situation. Emphasis was placed on creating distrust between Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, and Eldridge Cleaver, BPP Minister of Information, a fugitive in Algeria. These efforts resulted in a break between Newton and Cleaver on 2/26/71 which soon grew into an irreconcilable split and a name-calling contest between the two of them. Through our mass media program, we disseminated publicity concerning the split within the party as well as the fact that Newton lived in a $650-a-month apartment while rank and file Panthers went hungry.

The publicity concerning the internal factionalism as well as Newton's high living definitely served to discredit the BPP and caused further factionalism. The financial
supporters were disenchanted bringing to a halt the flow of donations into the organization. The resulting strain added to the paranoia of Newton causing him to create complete chaos within BPP national headquarters. Newton, in an effort to justify his position and to criticize Cleaver and his dissident followers, claimed that Cleaver and his appetite for violence were the root of all of the BPP problems in the recent past. Newton maintained the BPP was really nonviolent but was led astray by Cleaver and that he, Newton, will now return the organization to a position of nonviolence and community work.

In summation, our Cointelpro efforts split the BPP, cut off their supplies of outside funds and created chaos within.

As a result of the ever increasing information being reported by our informants regarding the acquisition of weapons by black extremist groups, on 5/17/71 an airtel was sent to all SACs setting forth instructions regarding the handling of such information. This airtel sets out in detail the possible gun law violations under the National Firearms Act, State Firearms Control Act and the unlawful possession or receipt of firearms. The field was instructed that we have secondary investigative jurisdiction in such matters and that information developed by our informant coverage regarding possible gun law violations should be handled by us and vigorously pursued looking to the ultimate prosecution of the black extremists involved.

The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of this group was Alfred Dwight Amos Featherstone, an articulate black extremist and an admitted communist who had in the past visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Through the outstanding informant coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investigative techniques used, this dangerous extremist organization has been completely destroyed and is no longer a factor in the extremist activities in the Miami area. Our informant coverage developed information regarding the participation by BAMM leaders and members in fire bombings in the Miami area including a bombing at the University of Miami. Through this coverage and other investigations an excellent criminal case was developed.
regarding the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices by BHAM leaders. In December, 1970, Federal Grand Jury in Miami, Florida, rendered indictment charging Featherstone and two other BHAM leaders with violation of the new antiriot laws. All three subjects have been found guilty in Federal court Miami. Featherstone and Charles Riley, Jr., another BHAM leader, have been sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for periods of four and two and a half years respectively. The third subject, after testifying for the Federal Government, was placed on probation.

Earlier this year, one of our informants being operated by the Richmond Office reported on a conspiracy by leaders of the Washington, D. C., Chapter of the BPP and leaders of the Richmond Information Center (RIC), an affiliate of the BPP, to steal and transport weapons from Richmond, Virginia, to Washington, D. C. This informant reported on the theft of such weapons in Richmond and their subsequent illegal transportation to Washington, D. C., by this group.

As a result of this information developed and other investigation, two of the BPP leaders in Washington and three RIC leaders in Richmond, Virginia, were subsequently indicted by a Federal Grand Jury.

Our informant testified in Federal court as the principal Government witness resulting in the conviction of the two Washington, D. C., leaders and two of the RIC leaders. The trial for the fifth individual involved is scheduled for 8/20/71 in Richmond. The sentencing of the convicted leaders is scheduled in the near future.

As a result of the conviction obtained based on the excellent information furnished by our informant, the RIC has been completely destroyed and conviction of the two Washington BPP leaders has been highly significant in curtailing the activity of the Washington, D. C., BPP Chapter.

The continued operation and development of extremist informants has resulted in a steady flow of valuable intelligence information, which information has brought about the apprehension
of badly wanted extremist fugitives, confiscation of explosives and firearms in possession of extremists, the prevention of violence and the saving of lives. In addition, these informants have been responsible for bringing about the arrest of 630 individuals since the last inspection, 145 of these individuals were Bureau fugitives, as well as being responsible for the recovery of $327,760.53.

Concerning the development of information as to black extremist activities outside the United States effecting the United States, we have placed an informant in Canada under the direction of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This operation is commented on in detail in the extremist informant write-up.

Some of the concrete examples of our informant and investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:

Ghetto informants in June, 1971, developed information concerning the motive and circumstances leading up to an unsuccessful attempted fire bombing of a Jackson, Mississippi, police vehicle; identified a local subject involved in assault and theft of a revolver of a Cincinnati, Ohio, police officer, which information resulted in the arrest of the subject by the police department; furnished information which was instrumental in arranging for the surrender to FBI Special Agents of a 16-year-old male who was badly wanted by the Buffalo Police Department in connection with a shooting incident.

Omaha informants advised of the location of several weapons which were owned by members of the Black Revolutionary Party in Omaha and which were subsequently seized by the Omaha Police Department; Houston informants furnished information which was the basis of a raid by the Houston Police Department on the headquarters of the Peoples Party II, which resulted in the arrest of nine individuals, eight of whom were charged with burglary and firearms theft, and the recovery of numerous weapons.

Detroit extremist informants advised concerning a BPP member who was involved in a holdup killing in Detroit. He also advised that this individual was carrying the same
pistol used in the killing, which enabled the Detroit police to arrest the BPP member, recover the pistol and determine that this weapon was used in the killing referred to above.

A Tampa informant furnished information concerning identity of two Negro males who placed a fire bomb in a garage in Tampa, Florida.

A Miami ghetto informant was instrumental in obtaining advance information concerning problems in a local high school. It is noted there was a walkout by students at this high school and as a result several Negro students were arrested. A Washington Field informant obtained information concerning Stokely Carmichael's trip to the United States from Africa and this information was verified by the New York Division.

Detroit informant provided information which saved two lives. This informant, who was a member of the BPP, was instrumental in saving the lives of two BPP members who were being disciplined by the BPP and his information when furnished to local police was responsible for arrest of seven BPP members who were charged with kidnapping and assault to do bodily harm less than murder.

A Memphis informant furnished information which prevented a shootout between members of the BPP chapter and the Memphis Police Department.

Extremist intelligence information gathered through our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated to the White House and other high-level Government agencies. This document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest of the extremist problem in the United States.

The quality of our informants can also be judged by the fact that since the last inspection 16 Special Agents have been recommended for either incentive awards or letters of commendation for their work in developing and handling these informants. In addition, 11 extremist informants were given bonus awards for valuable information furnished and services rendered.
In relating to the accomplishments of the Extremist Intelligence Section, comment must be made concerning the contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division during their analysis of extremist matters in the various field divisions. In addition to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section, the Inspection Staff, through their on-the-spot review of extremist matters in the field, are often able to detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and offer constructive assistance to the office involved in strengthening their operation.

The information furnished in the Inspection reports is used by this Section to do a comprehensive analysis of every field office operation and to furnish the results of the analysis to the field divisions by communications captioned "Administrative Review." These reviews have been most helpful in strengthening the various field office operations.

Since the last inspection, informant coverage has improved in the Boston, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Newark and New Haven field divisions and this improvement can be attributed in part to the Inspector's analysis of the above operations.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual units. Specific tangible accomplishments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
AJD:ams
4-E
SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT

FBI liaison Agents stationed abroad in 17 foreign posts have facilitated and encouraged the prompt handling by foreign agencies of FBI requests for investigation in the countries covered by those agencies. The productivity of this liaison during the first six months of 1971 was demonstrated by the location in those countries of 779 FBI fugitives, 35 fugitives wanted by other agencies, and 573 Selective Service delinquents for a total of 1,387 persons wanted in the U. S. Eighty-eight automobiles, stolen in the U. S., were recovered abroad during the same six months and the total estimated value of stolen property and funds recovered abroad was $596,442.

Requests for U. S. information and investigations within the U. S. are handled on a reciprocal basis for the foreign agencies with which we are in contact. This cooperation has played a large part in maintaining our dominant position in international police work and has encouraged a spirit of cooperation between the countries concerned. During the first seven months in 1971, we handled a total of 1,773 investigations under our Foreign Police Cooperation program. In one of these cases initiated as an FPC matter but transformed into an Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property case, New York City Agents were successful in locating the famous painting by El Greco "La Asunciòn de la Virgen," which had been stolen in Spain in 1936 and brought into the U. S. in 1968 through Mexico. This painting, a Spanish national art treasure, is estimated as worth a minimum of one million dollars and its location has received exceptionally wide publicity in Spain and resulted in expressions of gratitude to our Legal Attache for FBI cooperation.
The expansion of our operations abroad was undertaken at the instruction of the President for the specific purpose of developing high-level political intelligence and each such item submitted is identified by the code word "HILEV." After a slow start in January, when the new offices were just getting underway, the production of HILEV items has increased to the point that during July, 1971, 73 such items were submitted of which 53 or 72.6% were actually disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney General. Through August 17, 1971, a total of 245 items have been so disseminated. By letter March 3, 1971, Dr. Kissinger, referring to our work, stated "it is gratifying that efforts thus far have been so fruitful" and "your contributions in the foreign area are deeply appreciated." In June, 1971, the President informed the Director that he desired that we again expand our foreign liaison in view of the valuable information which had been procured by the Bureau in its operations abroad.

Agents of the Unit receive telephone calls from the other agencies in the Executive Branch who need information or have problems they wish to discuss with the FBI. Some of these are referred to the interested division but every effort is made to resolve them without unnecessarily involving Bureau officials. As an example, in May, 1971, we received an Army proposal for the checking of all fingerprints submitted by applicants for enlistment or induction into the Armed Forces. Special Agent Schwartz immediately discussed this proposal with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy and a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army and was able to convince these officials that no change in the present procedures was necessary or desirable. As a result of the efforts of Special Agent Schwartz, the Bureau was saved a large volume of fingerprint classification and searching, and he was commended by the Director for his successful handling of this proposal.
CUBAN UNIT

This Unit has responsibility for neutralizing Cuban intelligence and subversive Puerto Rican independence activities against the United States. The Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN), New York City, is the focal point for Cuban spying operations, but Puerto Rican terroristic endeavors are carried out by several groups, some being strictly local San Juan operations and others, under Cuban direction, carrying out incendiary bombings and acts of sabotage in the New York City area, as well as in Puerto Rico.

Cuban Intelligence Matters

We currently have 11 active, 24 potential and one inactive double agents in the Cuban intelligence field. Through a concerted effort mounted against the CMUN in February, 1970, we had developed 24 DESECO-type sources at the time of the last inspection. Since that date, 19 other similar sources have been cultivated, and each is being used in some capacity on a continuing or intermittent basis in our efforts to establish blanket coverage of the known intelligence officials at the CMUN (9 out of a 15 man complement) and to develop a defector-in-place there.

Recently we have developed documentary proof that an Attache at the CMUN is illegally purchasing television cameras in violation of United States regulations, and State Department is considering persona non grata action based on this data. One of our sources has obtained the repair contract for CMUN automobiles which assures us continuing access to them.

In March, 1971, the Director's approval was obtained to carry out a concerted defection effort against a CMUN Second Secretary, using a Special Agent of the New York Office who has a Latin American background and who has gained the complete confidence of the Cuban intelligence official through his facility with the Spanish language and his finesse in posing as a Washington, D. C., businessman who is looking ahead to the time when United States will reestablish trade relations with Cuba. State Department is preparing back-up material for this operation. The White House has been offered this arrangement as a vehicle to feed disinformation to the Cuban Government, and it has responded with enthusiasm that serious consideration is being given to use of this communication channel.
In other positive moves we have arranged for a friendly newspaperman, who writes for Spanish-language newspapers in New York City, to prepare feature articles on Cuban defectors who have settled happily in the United States. In conjunction with State Department, we received concurrence of Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations to bar two strong-arm-type Cuban intelligence officials from United States territory even though neither had ever been in the United States or performed any known acts of violence against United States property or citizens. Mr. U Thant pointed out that this was a landmark action, as the United States had never before presented a case which warranted entry denials in the history of the United Nations.

Our around-the-clock coverage of Cuban intelligence activities has allowed us to identify, with a minimum of effort, the various extremist, New Left and subversive Puerto Rican independence leaders who maintain contact with the CMUN. Two valuable double agents in the Miami area have gained the complete confidence of a top Cuban collaborator based in New York City, and they are able to provide full details concerning Cuban Government military and civilian targets in the Miami area. One of these double agents is being groomed to make clandestine trips to New York City, and it is anticipated that we will receive valuable data concerning other Cuban Government targets when these trips materialize.

The field offices responsible for covering Cuban intelligence activities have consistently taken an imaginative approach to the problem, and supervisory personnel in the field and at the Seat of Government consistently strive to insure that all available tools are furnished the investigating Agents.

Subversive Puerto Rican Independence Matters

The terroristic Puerto Rican proindependence movement, responsible for over 230 incendiary bombings in Puerto Rico and over 40 in the New York City area since 1967, is a very real menace to major United States installations and to the security of Puerto Rico, as well as to the United States. While only a small minority of persons desiring independence for Puerto Rico is involved, we now have approximately 1,000 individuals marked for special handling in case of a national emergency, and a majority of these have been associated in some way with violent acts against public or private property.

The largest of the extremist Puerto Rican independence groups is the Puerto Rican Independence Movement (MPIPR), while others practicing violence are the Puerto Rican Socialist Workers...
Party (PSO), Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA),
Armed Commandos for Liberation (CAL), and the Nationalist Party
of Puerto Rico (PNPR), the oldest of the revolutionary groups.
MIRA and CAL, in particular, are dominated by native Puerto
Ricans who had many years of sabotage training in Cuba, returned
surreptitiously to Puerto Rico and led the wave of major
explosions which heavily damaged United States installations
in metropolitan Puerto Rican areas. Property loss resulting
from such acts of violence since 1967 has been estimated at over
$15 million with an economic loss of over $100 million.

In addition to the previous apprehension of
Filiberto Ojeda Rios, Cuban espionage agent and leader of several
major bombing expeditions, the FBI was instrumental in the
arrest by Police of Puerto Rico (POPR) of Narciso Rabell
Martinez and Roberto Jose Todd Pagan, two other long-time espionage
agents with extensive sabotage training in Cuba. Following
the deaths of two police officials and an ROHC cadet during a
riot in March, 1971, at the University of Puerto Rico, one of
our informants was able to identify and bring about the arrest
of a Federation of University Students for Independence (FUPI)
leader involved in the killings. FUPI is a radical college
student group which advocates violence in bringing about indepen-
dence for Puerto Rico.

Our sources in the Puerto Rican independence field
have given us information concerning subversives traveling
between Puerto Rico and New York City to transport incendiary
devices for use in acts of sabotage. Also a close rapport has
been established between POPR and our San Juan Office in recent
months. The resulting arrests and seizure of explosives, as
well as intelligence material, have slowed down the acts of
violence noticeably during the first seven months of 1971.

We are quite apprehensive that the National Conference
of Governors has been scheduled for September 12-15, 1971, at
San Juan. Realizing the volatile nature of the Puerto Rican
independence movement, we have directed an airtel to all offices
pointing up the powder keg situation and asking that every effort
be made to obtain advance information concerning planned acts
of violence to be carried out against participating officials.
We are watching this situation closely and are prepared to give
the POPR all logical assistance in helping to curtail any such
plans.
MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT

This Unit is primarily responsible for the overall supervision and direction of the FBI's activities relating to countries in the Western Hemisphere commonly referred to as the Latin American nations. Such activities involve Espionage, Internal Security, Registration Act, Neutrality Matters and the collection and dissemination of foreign intelligence data. In addition, the Unit handles anti-Castro activities, pro-Castro organizations and individuals, Cuban Security Index matters and cases and Cuban travel, immigrant and refugee matters. The Unit is also responsible for the supervision of cases involving Spanish American and other ethnic groups.

The President and other policy makers have indicated a continuing interest in political intelligence information from areas in South and Central America and the Carribean. The critical need for such data from these areas, which are in constant political turmoil, prompted us to augment our office in Buenos Aires and to establish new offices in La Paz, Bolivia; Managua, Nicaragua; and Caracas, Venezuela. These offices coupled with our offices in Mexico and Buenos Aires give us representation in the areas from which political intelligence data is urgently needed. To further develop such information, we have established sensitive coverage in Panamanian and Chilean fields.
We have on a continuing basis been able to provide the President and other responsible officials with information of the type needed. With increasing frequency our Legal Attaches have been able to provide high level intelligence information which has been given exclusively to the White House and the Attorney General. One such item, for example, provided by the Legal Attache in La Paz on 5/20/71 and disseminated on the same date to the White House and the Attorney General dealt with plans of the Bolivian Government to request the withdrawal of the Peace Corps from that country. Subsequently on 5/22/71, the Bolivian Government did request the withdrawal of this group from the country. A representative of the National Security Council commented favorably concerning this data and the Legal Attache was commended by the Director for developing the source who was able to produce this type of information.

The Unit continues to be successful in thwarting the plans of militant anti-Castro groups which have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba. Successful development of key informants who have infiltrated anti-Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities. Cuban exile activities are embarrassing to the U. S. Government and could lead to a major confrontation between the U. S. and the Soviet Union which has assumed the role of Cuba's protector. An example of our success in this area was the arrest by appropriate authorities of four members of Alpha 66, militant anti-Castro group, on 7/11/71 and the seizure of machine guns, ammunition, explosives, hand grenades, other weapons and a boat. Seizure of this material has hurt Alpha 66's capability to conduct raids on Cuba. Action taken in this instance was based on data furnished by FBI informant.
During February, 1971, we identified Robert Miling Teng (65-73910) as the individual reported by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as having had clandestine contact with a Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence officer in Ottawa, Canada, on 2/2/71. Teng has outstanding credentials as a former Chinese Nationalist diplomat and a former United States Government employee. His background makes him an ideal type for covert use by the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service. Since February, 1971, Teng has attempted to gain employment on the White House staff, with State Department, with Department of Justice, and with a contractor handling work for National Aeronautics and Space Administration. We learned of these efforts through a sensitive source and were able to alert responsible officials concerning Teng.

In July, 1971, with Director's approval, a desk-level conference regarding Chicom matters was held at the Bureau with our RCMP counterparts. The conference was most rewarding and informative and the results were furnished to the Director, who instructed that a memorandum, based on results of the conference, be prepared for Dr. Kissinger at the White House. This memorandum was sent to Dr. Kissinger, who replied with a personal letter of thanks to the Director. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Bureau's timely coverage of these matters is most important, and he requested to be further advised of these developments as they occur.

An analysis of our existing method of handling cases on Chinese seaman deserters was made during February and March, 1971. This study resulted in a recommendation, approved, to streamline handling of these matters. Annual savings of $16,160 realized from this new procedure (see Bureau letter to Albany dated 3/22/71 captioned "Chinese Seamen Deserting in the U. S., IS - CH," 105-129735).

In view of the recent increase in the number of contact cases growing out of the establishment of a Chicom Embassy at Ottawa, Canada, it was recommended and approved that Legat Ottawa submit communications in unknown subject contact cases in a manner which would allow prompt relay to appropriate field offices inasmuch as identification of unknown subjects is of extreme importance at the outset.
In view of the increase in the number of contact cases mentioned above, Legat, Ottawa, has been requested to devise a form he can utilize in furnishing pertinent information to the Bureau. The present manner of submission of this data does cause some administrative problems here.

During August, 1971, one of our sources began a trip scheduled to last almost three weeks during which he will contact a number of pro-Chicom individuals in the United States and Canada and will culminate in an effort to establish contact with Chicom intelligence officers in Ottawa. Travel to Canada is with the concurrence of RCMP, and RCMP will provide coverage in order that we can evaluate the results of the source's efforts.

During the last three months, two other sources being directed against the Chicom travel to Hong Kong where they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts.

Another source, who is under Bureau direction and who is employed at the United Nations (UN), is now in Red China on home leave. This travel was made at no cost to the Bureau and when debriefed, it is expected that this source will be able to provide us with up-to-date information regarding conditions in Red China and possibly valuable political intelligence.

During July, 1971, Paul Lin, described by RCMP as the foremost Chicom agent of influence in Canada, visited Cambridge, Massachusetts, to consult with Harvard University officials. His schedule also called for a meeting with Senator Kennedy who has exhibited a keen interest in U. S. relations with Red China. One of our sources was able to maintain personal contact with Lin during this visit, and Lin has asked the source to carry tasks for him. It should be noted that RCMP has described Lin as the person most likely to be involved in any future discussions in the United States relating to Chicom efforts to ensure entry into the UN.
NATIONALITIES UNIT

Israeli and Middle East Investigations

Information from these investigations continues to be of extreme interest to the White House, the Secretary of State, and high-level officials within the intelligence community. We have continued to furnish information from our sensitive coverage in the Israeli field under a program of dissemination which has been assigned the security designation of "SCOPE." "SCOPE" information is disseminated only to select individuals at the White House and Department of State and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the intelligence community. Data primarily relates to attempts by officials of the Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction and support within United States Government circles for continued support of the Israeli Government politically and economically, as well as affording military equipment. The personalities involved in these dealings with Israeli officials have included prominent members of the United States Congress, as well as individuals in the Executive Branch. With regard to the information we have furnished, favorable comment has been received from Dr. Henry A. Kissinger at the White House, the Secretary of State and other dignitaries within the intelligence community relative to its timeliness and value in formulating United States Government policy and keeping abreast of the continuing tense situation in the Middle East.

This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation with the National Security Agency designed to penetrate diplomatic communications of foreign governments. We are currently conducting six such operations, all of which are most successful and responsive to high national priority requirements in the production of cryptanalytic and intelligence data. Two of the above-described operations were accomplished since January, 1971.
In view of the sensitivity of these particular operations, it is suggested that I or my Number One Man be consulted for details.

Investigation of Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to "The New York Times:
by Daniel Ellsberg

On June 15, 1971, the Attorney General requested the FBI conduct all necessary investigation into the publication of classified information by "The New York Times." Our continuing investigation on a "special" basis into this matter has, from its inception, identified Daniel Ellsberg, Senior Research Associate, Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, as being the principal suspect in this matter. Investigation has revealed that Ellsberg had access to the material involved while employed at Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California; reproduced classified documents in Los Angeles, California, in October, 1969; and subsequently made copies of this material available to various members of Congress who failed to make the data public. Strong circumstantial evidence has been developed indicating that in March, 1971, he made copies of the information available to representatives of "The New York Times" for reproduction.

On June 28, 1971, a Federal Grand Jury at Los Angeles returned a two-count indictment charging Ellsberg with violation of Section 793 (E) of the Espionage Statute in that he unlawfully retained classified documents and failed to deliver them to appropriate Government officials. He was also charged with violation of Section 641 of the Theft of Government Property Statute in that he converted to his own use certain documents having a value of excess of $100.

Investigation revealed that Anthony Russo, former employee at Rand Corporation and associate of Ellsberg, assisted Ellsberg in the reproduction of documents in October, 1969. He was immunized from prosecution and
subsequently refused to testify before a Federal Grand Jury. As a result, he was held in contempt and was committed to jail on 8/16/71 until such time as he purges himself by testifying.

Considerable evidence has been developed indicating employees of "The New York Times" have also violated Section 793(E) of the Espionage Statute in regard to their unauthorized possession of classified information and refusal to deliver the information to appropriate officials of the United States Government upon demand.

The summary of facts in the Ellsberg matter, as stated above, derived from a mass of details uncovered by extensive investigation handled on a "special" basis in four of the Bureau's major offices and represents lesser degrees of investigative activity in virtually every Bureau continental office, as well as several Legal Attaches. The Unit has successfully coped with the supervisory responsibilities of this investigation to date and it's servicing of the numerous inquiries in this matter has contributed to the Bureau's stature in the eyes of the highest levels of the Executive Branch who have evidenced concern in the overall problem of the leak of classified information to unauthorized persons. Ramifications of the Ellsberg investigation could foreseeably touch every level of Government operation in view of the necessary revisions in the handling of classified data pointed up as being required because of shortcomings uncovered in this investigation. The need to uncover such shortcomings and to uncover any indication of a concentrated conspiracy to subvert the national security by violation of classification rules continues to be a matter of considerable concern in our investigation of Ellsberg and shares equally with the Unit's recognized responsibility for overseeing the investigation looking toward successful prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and others involved in this matter.
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

You are requested to furnish information regarding various surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This information should include identity of the project or program, background and date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category.

Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you may wish to comment on:

1. Security Index Program.
2. Security Informants.
3. Extremist Matters. (Black extremist groups)
4. Extremist Informants.
5. White Extremist Groups.
7. Counterintelligence.
10. Espionage.
11. Any other program deemed pertinent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENAN:

Attached are individual write-ups from each of the Sections concerning the above.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS  4-H

SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY:

In connection with the Inspector's request under above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following handled by the Internal Security Section:

(1) Security Index Program
(2) Security Informant Program
(7) Counterintelligence Program - Disruption of White Hate Groups
(11) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent
   (a) Thumbnail Sketch Program

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LLA:co
4-H
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS 4-H

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION

Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat to the national security began prior to World War II. The actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of a threat to the national security.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program is field-wide in scope. The goal of the Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals who because of their membership and activity and/or association with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country. The program includes the collection of sufficient information relating to the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion. The SI is broken down into three Priority groupings, the cards being tabbed either Priority I, II or III in accordance with the relative factor of dangerousness. Most dangerous individuals are tabbed Priority I.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION

By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter of temporary expedience, the Executives Conference approved a moratorium on certain Security Matter - Communist investigations and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971. By memorandum October 29, 1970, from the Executives Conference to Mr. Tolson, approved by the Director, the moratorium was lifted. At the time there were approximately 10,690 individuals on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types. Virtually no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7,000 of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

February, 1969. Many of these persons had changed residence and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive, timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these individuals. Implementation was directed by airtel November 3, 1970, to all offices, and in doing so we took a realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening of these cases so that they would be spread out over the period November 3, 1970, to June 30, 1971. This was considered essential in view of our approximation that it would be necessary to reopen about 7,000 of the Priority II and III types. Our experience in the nine months since moratorium was lifted has demonstrated the wisdom of the lifting of the moratorium as it was found that many of these subjects had changed residence and/or employment, thus necessitating substantial investigation to determine new whereabouts. There are presently pending a number of these cases for the precise purpose of determining whereabouts.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION

Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section. Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate supervisory personnel. I personally follow this matter closely to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

This is a major internal security program based upon Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION

The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated. The most recent justification is contained in memorandum from R. D. Cotter to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated January 12, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
SFP: rrd
4-H

- 5 -
BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program was initiated in September, 1964, for the purpose of counteracting and neutralizing white extremist organizations, leaders and adherents. During period January, February, and March of 1971, there were 17 field offices involved in this program and as specific situations arose, other divisions participated.

THE UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., (UKA)

Under the leadership of John Paul Rogers, Grand Dragon, Realm of Florida, the UKA in that area has become increasingly aggressive in recent months and has been afforded generally favorable coverage by the news media in Florida. In addition, Rogers has been infuriated by recent interviews of Klansmen by the FBI and has been increasingly vehement in his verbal attacks against FBI Agents. As a result, Rogers has been considered a primary subject for counterintelligence activity. Tampa has instructed its informants to discredit Rogers wherever possible without creating suspicion.

John Paul Rogers above has also recently devoted practically all of his energy to the UKA to the exclusion of his wife and job, having hired a retired barber to handle most of his business; yet he purchased a $19,000 home. Tampa is seeking ways to create suspicion of Rogers by other Klansmen.

Imperial Wizard, Robert M. Shelton of the UKA has for some time been attempting, without success, to purchase polygraph machines in order to "weed out FBI informants." Chicago, with Bureau authority, interviewed Walter Van De Werkin, past president of the American Society of Polygraph Examiners, in an effort to ascertain who we should logically contact in the polygraph field to prevent Shelton and the UKA from purchasing this machine. Interview, which was handled in a discreet manner and in complete confidence, revealed that we should not expand this endeavor further at this time due to the large number of individuals and companies involved. In the event we learn of a specific firm or individual the UKA desires to contact for this purpose, further consideration will be given to this matter.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
LLA: co - 6 -
During March, 1971, Washington Field Office was authorized to interview Robert J. Lee, admitted National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) official allegedly involved in raid on Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to cast suspicion on Jesse Clayborn Stephens, self-styled east coast coordinator for Minutemen and to disrupt cooperative relationship between respective organizations and effect possible defection of Lee. Interview appeared to be successful in that rapport was established with Lee which may be beneficial in the future. Lee volunteered information concerning NSWPP matters not previously known to the Bureau and indicated he would be receptive for further contacts. It is felt this matter has long range potential.

CURRENT STATUS OF PROGRAM

While counterintelligence of Klan and white hate groups is an ongoing thing all counterintelligence programs as such which were operated by this division were discontinued by airtel to all field offices 4/27/71. In exceptional instances where counterintelligence action appears warranted, recommendations are now submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains. These recommendations are then considered on an individual basis.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
LLA:co
4-H
This program was initiated and authorized by SAC Letter 53-72 (J) dated October 27, 1953, to insure that the field is using current characterizations of subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing such organizations. Those characterizations deemed to be of field-wide interest are now to be furnished to the field by letter to all offices on an annual basis rather than by SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, in accordance with approval of suggestion in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr dated December 7, 1970.

The background and value of this program is the same as it was at the time of last inspection. Since June 1, 1971, we have been receiving and processing the annual submission of thumbnail sketches. To date thumbnail sketches on 387 separate organizations have been received and these are being processed by appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of field-wide interest, of which there are 70 at this time, will be furnished to the field by letter to all offices. Others are being returned to submitting field offices as they are approved. This program was last reviewed and analyzed and its continuance approved by memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970. Annual approval will again be requested when the current project is completed.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb

THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM 4-H
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY AND NEW LEFT ORGANIZATIONS

At the time of the last inspection in January, 1971, the Internal Security Section handled informants only in the basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. There was no Security Informant Unit as such, informants being handled on subversive organization desks. On June 16, 1971, a Security Informant Unit was formed and this Unit now handles informants in the New Left field as well as in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups.

At last inspection there were 264 member informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA); at present there are 226, a decrease of 38. At last inspection there were 31 member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); at present there are 48, an increase of 17. As of July 31, 1971, date of latest monthly tabulation, the Security Informant Unit handled a total of 755 security informants and 671 potential security informants, a total of 1,426. This includes 630 informant cases transferred from the New Left Section to the Security Informant Unit in the Internal Security Section on June 16, 1971.

There has been continuing recognition of the fact there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant coverage. However, economy has increasingly become a primary factor. In line with the President's message on August 15, 1971, tightening economic controls and our continuing efforts to hold down expenditures, the field is being instructed by letter to all offices to cut down payments to security and extremist informants and sources by five percent. To assure uniformity and fairness in the application of this cutback throughout the field, each office was instructed to follow this formula: Total expenditures for all such informants and sources for the six month period ending July 31, 1971; reduce this total by five percent; divide the resulting figure by six (months). The resulting figure is to be the guideline for each office.

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This instruction is not a mandate to reduce payments across the board on all informants and sources. Offices are to evaluate expenditures within the determined guideline amount and adjust individual payments accordingly.

These instructions do not mean the Bureau will cease authorizing payments where new informants are developed and fully justified. It is incumbent on all offices to evaluate these matters within the guideline figure. There are to be no increases in payments to informants and sources for the next 90 days, in line with the Director's instructions.

Each office was instructed to advise the Bureau by return airmail of the guideline figure determined. By close of business September 30, 1971, the Bureau is to be advised by each office that these instructions have been complied with and that expenditures have been reduced by the five percent factor. On the basis of our expenditures during the past fiscal year, the five percent reduction will result in an annual saving of approximately $129,000.

Security informant development receives continuous supervision. It is not technically a program justified semianually or annually but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative operations that requires and receives vigorous day to day attention.

The Security Informant Unit maintains an up-to-date index of Security Informants and potential security informants. It correlates personal and operating data (such as name, address, code, file and symbol number) concerning these informants, which it receives from the Division's investigative sections, and places such material on FD-348s, three by five cards that constitute the index. This index is maintained on discontinued as well as current informants.

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At the time of last inspection in January, 1971, a total of 1,159 security informants was being operated. As of July 31, 1971, the number had increased to 1,182, or an increase of 23. During the same period the number of potential security informants increased from 765 to 841, or an increase of 76.
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

Section Chief R. D. Cotter: Following are applicable activities of Research Section.

Security Index (SI) Program

Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security Section (4-H), which has investigative responsibility under this program. Research Section, Special Records Unit, maintains records applicable to the SI and is responsible for coordinating program. In line with this responsibility, Research Section prepared a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan, dated 1/12/71, re-evaluating SI.

As of 12/15/70 there were in the Index 3,450 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,614 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12,064. Of these, 831 and 4,718, respectively, are communists—a total of 5,549 or 46 percent. As of 7/15/71 there were in the Index 4,013 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,680 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12,693. Of these, 825 and 4,329, respectively, are communists—a total of 5,154 or 40.6 percent.

Emergency Detention Program

The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is field-wide, involves the planning for apprehension and detention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of a national emergency and for the search and seizure of contraband. The EDP is not a program as such but is based on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950. The basic responsibility for the operation and implementation of the EDP rests with the Attorney General. Detailed plans regarding the EDP are drawn up and included in the "Attorney General's Portfolio," copies of which are in the Bureau's possession.

This program has been maintained in an up-to-date status. Administrative plans for the implementation of the program in each office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro Survey." Lists of individuals to be detained are furnished to

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of the Internal Security Division of the Department each month and the listing of places to be searched under authority of the Master Search Warrant are maintained on a current basis. The Seat of Government and all field divisions maintain essential records for successful implementation of the EDP. Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to the U. S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.

This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit, Research Section. Primary responsibility rests with the Department and changes can be made only upon approval of the Department. We merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable changes. Periodic checks are made to insure that all records connected with the EDP, stored away from Headquarters city, are current. Field division surveys are kept up to date and the Bureau is advised semiannually of the status.

Legislation has been introduced in the 92nd Congress to repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. In the event Title II should be repealed at a future date under new legislation, the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally will continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsibility for protecting this Nation's internal security.

This program is under constant supervision and re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining may be made. A memorandum justifying the continuance of this program was last submitted on 1/12/71.

Technical and Microphone Surveillances

There has been no significant change regarding the utilization of these techniques in the internal security field since the last inspection. As of 8/16/71, we have 30 telephone surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau's internal security cases. We also have two tesurs in operation at the request of the State Department.

We are conducting four microphone surveillances (misurs) in internal security field, four misur installations are being operated at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA) and one at the request of Central Intelligence Agency. In addition, 62 teletype facilities are being covered at the written request of NSA.

*Only such records presently maintained away from SOG or field office headquarters are located at Quantico, Virginia.
Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence

This program was initiated in 1964 under the title "Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas." It requires each field office to conduct a continuing survey of localities having a potential for violence based on current racial conditions. Objective is twofold—to insure Bureau receives a current, realistic, and comprehensive picture of existing conditions which may lead to violence, and to obtain advance information of developments clearly pointing to the possibility of violence.

The field submits semiannual reports summarizing information received. Of course, pertinent information is submitted on a timely basis depending upon the circumstances involved. The survey provides the basis for a cogent analysis of potential for violence and pertinent information is disseminated to the White House, Attorney General, and other Government agencies. In the spring of each year an analysis entitled "Potential for Violence in Major Cities in Summer" is prepared and disseminated on a high level in the Government.
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

NEW LEFT SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD: Attached are comments concerning surveys, projects and/or intensification programs in effect against the New Left Movement. This section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left Movement, including terrorist groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus. Investigations concerning New Left publications are also supervised in this section, as are sabotage investigations, and protest and Trotskyist groups.

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New Left Movement

Special Investigations Unit - West

The following surveys, projects and/or intensification programs are in effect against the New Left movement:

New Left Extremists

By letter to all field offices dated 2/13/70, the field was advised that the violence-prone Weatherman group planned to go underground and to direct "strategic sabotage" at military and police installations. The field was instructed to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group and to advise appropriate local police agencies of Weatherman plans. By airtel to all offices dated 3/19/70, the field was advised of Weatherman plans for extreme violence. The field was instructed to locate and identify Weatherman communists and activists. Intensive investigation of Weatherman leaders was ordered.

By airtel to Chicago dated 3/24/70, that office was instructed to initiate investigations and interview all individuals arrested in Chicago during a Weatherman rampage in October, 1969, where such investigations had not already been undertaken. More than 280 persons had been arrested, most of whom were either members of or closely associated with the Weatherman group. In connection with cases of bombing or arson which appeared to have New Left or black extremist connotations, SAC Letter 70-18 (C), dated 4/7/70, captioned "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Bombing Matters" provided the field with guidance. In those cases where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists or where the Department has advised that no investigation is warranted, the Bureau must be immediately advised concerning involvement of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident and recommendation made concerning additional investigation.

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By teletype to all offices dated 4/17/70, the field was advised of specific areas of investigations to be made against New Left terrorist groups and standards were set for investigations of communes. The field was also instructed to develop necessary informant coverage of these communes and groups so that advanced knowledge of planned violence could be obtained, preventive action initiated, and prosecution undertaken where possible.

By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/13/70, instructions were given concerning implementation of investigations of New Left terrorism which were begun with available manpower and further implementation was to be as rapid as possible. All adherents to the Weatherman ideology which advocated a Marxist-Leninist revolution and the use of terrorist tactics in furtherance of revolution are made subjects of these investigations. These subjects are to be considered for Priority I of the Security Index and when placed on Priority I, the Bureau must be advised every 45 days of their current residence and other pertinent information developed. Each office was instructed to submit a monthly airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities of communes or organizations; (2) number of cases opened during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of cases under investigation; (4) informant coverage utilized against these communes and organizations; and, (5) a brief summary of New Left violence in area during preceding month and action taken.

By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70, the field was furnished a copy of a Departmental letter concerning specific areas of interest to the Department of Justice in campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action. The field was specifically instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and concerning agitational activities prior to and during violent campus disorders by subversive groups.
By airtel to all offices dated 7/16/70, the field was advised that New Left terrorism was continuing through bombings, arsons, and other violence and that each Special Agent in Charge must personally insure that sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these matters and to investigating New Left terrorists.

SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70, captioned "New Left Movement - Violence, Internal Security - Miscellaneous (Weatherman)" instructed the field to develop better informant coverage of Weatherman and other terrorist groups. By airtel to all offices dated 9/3/70, captioned "Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity" the field was instructed that in view of increased attacks on the police, it could be expected there will also be physical attacks against the FBI and that all Special Agent personnel should be fully cognizant of this possibility. To obtain complete intelligence data concerning any extremist influence in attacks on police, the field was instructed to institute appropriate investigation when information was received concerning an impending attack on police and informants directed to develop full facts concerning the attack.

SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70, captioned "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Informant Coverage" instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can infiltrate terrorist groups.

SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70, captioned "New Left Movement - Police Training Matters" advised the field that in view of recent violence by New Left terrorists, the Bureau will consider requests for SACs or ASACs to brief local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel regarding New Left extremism and violence. These briefings would be at law enforcement meetings and conferences where attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law enforcement officials.
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised that a special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and other New Left terrorists has been initiated. The field was instructed to submit to the Bureau the identity of New Left terrorists whose fingerprints should be included in this special file.

By airtel to all offices dated 6/15/71 the field was advised that a new "stop index" program had been instituted in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This program is for Bureau use only and concerns extremists who are in Priority I of the Security Index and who are not already carried in the NCIC Wanted Persons file. Through this program, the field obtains prompt notice from NCIC by teletype whenever a police agency makes inquiry concerning one of these extremists, which enables the field to better follow the activities and movements of extremists.

By SAC Letter 71-37 (E) dated 8/10/71, captioned "Security Flash Notices Regarding Security Index Subjects" the field was advised of new procedures which will enable the Identification Division to better disseminate arrest information on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file in the Identification Division. This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices (FD-165) which determine if fingerprints of a Security Index subject have been received since the last check and if so, a stop is placed in the fingerprint record to assure that the field is advised of all subsequent fingerprint submissions. The Security Flash Notice is periodically submitted at different intervals depending on the priority of the subject's Security Index status.

Intensified investigation of New Left extremists has led to numerous prosecutions and indictments of extremist leaders. To provide further guidance for the field in these matters, SAC Letter 71-10 (E) dated 3/9/71 and captioned "Security Informants - Judicial Matters" advised the field of procedures to be followed in handling informants who are developing information on New Left groups and individuals who are in contact with these New Left activists or with their attorneys.
The Department of Justice has advised that informants may be utilized in furnishing information concerning the location of fugitives or the location of other New Left activists even though such utilization may result in the informant inadvertently learning of defense plans or strategy. The field has been instructed that when an informant is present in a conversation between an attorney and an individual under indictment he should, if possible, leave, or if this is not possible, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Since radical attorneys are deeply involved with New Left extremists, not only in their legal defense but in their other activities, the above procedures are most helpful in extremist investigations.

Intensified investigation of New Left extremists has severely disrupted their operations and limited their influence. Numerous Weatherman leaders have been indicted and subsequently arrested or remain in fugitive status. The Weatherman organization has gone underground and is isolated from contact with the mass of American youth. The number of adherents to Weatherman is significantly less as a result of these prosecutions and investigations. The Weatherman group continues to be most dangerous in view of its adherence to violent tactics and continuous effort is being made to develop new approaches and techniques to facilitate this investigation.

Key Activists

By airtel to all offices dated 10/23/68, the Key Activist program was intensified and expanded. The field was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage on individuals designated as key activists in the New Left movement. At the present time there are 73 key activists under investigation.
A Key Activist album containing photographs and biographical data on each key activist has been furnished to all offices. This album is maintained in a current status and has proved invaluable in following activities and travel of New Left key activists. By airtel dated 3/10/69 to all offices the field was instructed to submit reports each three months on key activists. The field was also instructed to prepare communications suitable for dissemination when these key activists filled a speaking engagement and whenever they made statements indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation. The purpose of this program is to secure testimony and evidence concerning violations of statutes particularly where these key activists are involved in campus disorders. The field has also been instructed to develop detailed information on sources of funds used by key activists and to closely follow their travel. Handwriting specimens of each key activist must be obtained and placed in the National Security File maintained by the laboratory.

The key activist program has been most successful. We have been enabled to closely follow the activities of these individuals and to provide other interested agencies with pertinent information. It is noted that more than half of the individuals designated as key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action.
NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS)
WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE (WSA)

In Bureau airtels 5/24/71, 6/2/71 and 6/3/71, appropriate field offices were alerted to the SDS/WSA Summer Project and its twofold objective consisting of a massive recruitment program in 21 target cities and the fostering of a general strike, nationwide, through infiltration of industry and labor unions. Instructions were given to appropriate offices to take aggressive measures to expand their informant coverage during the SDS/WSA recruitment effort, and to develop and furnish information concerning the SDS/WSA Summer Projects in their territories. Numerous SDS/WSA members have been identified as having moved into cities other than those in which they usually operate, in connection with the SDS/WSA Summer Project...

New University Conference (NUC)

The NUC, composed of radical professors, graduate students and teachers, is committed to the growth of a revolutionary socialist movement in the U.S., with educational institutions and professional associations being their primary targets. In Bureau airtel 6/4/71, the attention of Chicago Division, office of origin, was directed to the fact that the NUC claimed 42 national chapters plus fifteen pre-chapter groupings, with 675 national members, and anticipated further expansion. Chicago Division was instructed to insure appropriate leads were set out to confirm the existence of all NUC chapters and to conduct appropriate investigations in accordance with Bureau instructions relating to investigations of organizations connected with institutions of learning. It was further instructed these investigations should include information concerning the leaders and leading activists, aims and objectives and the activities of these chapters.

New Left Movement Reports

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 10/28/68, a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their

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territories and to follow these reports with a report each quarter, similarly captioned, showing the status of the movement and its activity during the preceding three-month period. These reports have enabled the Bureau and the submitting field offices to assess the potential dangerousness of the New Left movement, determine from one document the divisive or unifying issues within the movement and whether the activity is increasing, decreasing or continuing at the level indicated in the previous report. Since individual reports have not been required on the many small local New Left groups in each territory in lieu of adequate LRM, inclusion of pertinent data concerning these groups in the quarterly report alleviates the need for regularly submitted reports and puts the activities in a better perspective within each field division. Additionally, these reports have presented on a continuing basis a clear cut picture of the entire New Left movement which identifies its leaders, sources of funds, propaganda outlets, and shows the extent to which the New Left movement has been influenced by domestic and foreign subversive elements. This program has enabled the Bureau and the field to make a self analysis of all facets of our investigation of the New Left movement so we may expand and intensify our investigation of those phases indicating a need thereof. These reports have served as a valuable research tool at the Bureau and afford the individual field divisions an opportunity to evaluate the direction and success of their investigations in the New Left movement.

New Left Movement - Finances

In February, 1970, Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, requested, for the President, available information concerning income sources of various revolutionary groups. Since that time, information of this nature has been gathered and transmitted periodically by memoranda to the White House, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, after approval by the Director.

Key Activist Program

The Key Activist Program, described in detail in the Special Investigations Unit - West write-up, is coordinated by the New Left Groups Unit.

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New Left Movement - Publications

By letter dated 11/5/68 to all offices under the caption of "New Left Movement, Publications, Internal Security - Miscellaneous," the field was instructed to cover the principal propaganda mills of the New Left which are described as "underground" newspapers. This survey has been particularly beneficial in view of the fact that the New Left, to a great extent, depends on the written word to spread its propaganda. The survey has disclosed that in excess of 200 papers are published on a regular basis with a central theme being criticism of the "establishment" in general and law enforcement, the draft and the Vietnam War in particular. Youth, particularly students, are the main target of these publications, which are effective vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they reach a large portion of the student population. Additionally, the survey has revealed the papers are in poor financial condition and often miss publication dates due to lack of funds. Funds are generally received from advertising, subscriptions, donations and benefits. Volunteer labor is used in most instances and many times the staff of the publication resides collectively in a commune.

A survey of underground publications is currently being conducted by the New Left Groups Unit, the purpose of which is to determine if trend information can be developed. Trend information is being developed during the course of this survey and information obtained will be incorporated into an educational-type document. Based on this survey, it appears the New Left movement is at a crossroads and is groping for a sense of unity and direction. This unity, if developed, will no doubt include future activity in political channels. These newspapers, which are often written in the foulest language, are a major influence on the youth in this country and are the strident propaganda voice of the New Left movement.

Informant Development - New Left Groups

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning informant development in New Left groups directed each SAC to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete analysis of his informant coverage in New Left groups, clearly setting forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken to rectify these weaknesses. As a result, a clear-cut view of each division's informant coverage was obtained as well as an
analysis of where programs needed shoring up. Those offices found to be deficient in their coverage were directed to submit periodic communications detailing their coverage and setting out what steps are being taken to increase the coverage in terms of quantity and quality.

The Counterintelligence Program – New Left was discontinued by Bureau airtel to all offices dated 4/28/71 in view of the fact that sensitive intelligence techniques and disruptive activities were involved and absolute security was difficult to achieve.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT – EAST

The Venceremos Brigade

The field was authorized by airtel to all offices, dated 5/11/70, to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members on SAC authority except in those instances where the subject is under 21, currently a student, professor, has some connection with an institution of learning or is a journalist. Bureau approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals.

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 5/15/70, instructed the field to immediately intensify investigations of all VB returnees from Cuba, ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt interviews and submit current reports with Security Index recommendation. In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to a violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90 days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III and non-Security Index returnees. In case of Priority I Security Index subjects, this information is to be furnished the Bureau every 45 days.

Prosab

Current Bureau instructions require development of adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative responsibilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal security fields can be properly discharged. Semiannual reports are submitted by each office having a Strategic Air Command Base or an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Base within its territory. A review of semiannual reports submitted by the field as of 7/1/71 disclosed that a total of 1,225 informants have been developed.

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PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

May Day Collective (MDC)

Prior to May, 1971, MDC was the hard-core youth activist group of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and was the main force behind massive civil disobedience in Washington, D.C. There has been a definite split between the two groups over the question of violence which is favored by MDC. Following regional conferences in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and Washington, D.C., MDC held a national conference in Atlanta, Georgia, 8/13-17/71 to map its future course and to plan antiwar activity for the Fall of 1971. By airtel to all offices dated 7-26-71, the field was instructed to determine the existence of MDC organizations in the respective divisions and to furnish all available information to Bureau by 8-30-71 with comments regarding extent of coverage. Potential for violence by MDC was emphasized, and the field was alerted to possibility of violations of Federal laws.

Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)

Letter to all offices dated 8-3-71 instructed each office to initiate a survey to determine existence of VVAW. This action was necessary in the light of increasing indication that the VVAW may be a target for infiltration by subversive groups such as the Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party and their respective youth groups. VVAW has also been involved in aiding and financing U.S. deserters, including false identity papers and reportedly in one area has a cache of arms. VVAW has become increasingly active in the antiwar field and must be considered a prime target for infiltration.

East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (EASTCON)

This is an extremely important investigation requiring constant supervision and review at the Seat of Government. It involves plots to blow up the tunnels, housing, heating systems servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government official. Conspiracy aspects of selected Selective Service break in cases are included in the indictment as well as violations involving the contraband and issuing threatening communications statutes. The Eastcon case is the subject of a write-up in Section 4-A-4.

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SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS - NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/3/70, instructed the field to resume verification of residence and employment in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases and to resume periodic report writing in proportionate number in Priority II Security Index cases so that all such cases would be opened by 6/30/71.

As a result, annual reports in Priority II Security Index cases are being received pursuant to existing instructions and where verification of residence and employment shows a change, appropriate changes are being made on Security Index cards.

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/4/70, instructed the field to initiate investigation of all SDS members as well as members of procommunist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence and that each individual investigated should be considered for the Security Index. Results of investigations in these cases are being received and supervised in this section. Activities in each instance are evaluated and where it is found the subject could be considered a danger to the internal security of this country in the event of a national emergency, the individual's name is included on the Security Index.

SAC Letter 71-35 (D), dated 7/27/71, instructed the field to discontinue use of Internal Security - Miscellaneous, Security Matter - Miscellaneous, and Security Matter - Anarchist as characters in security investigations. Instructions for using new characters were set out. This action was necessary in order to facilitate routine of mail at the Bureau and to more properly describe the characters of security investigations.

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SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR
INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section

The following programs discussed immediately hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the Espionage Section: Alem Program, Bureau file 65-69532; Banpop Program, Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program, Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program, Bureau file 65-70719; DESECO Program, Bureau file 105-71688; East-West Exchange Program, Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.
1. ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. S. under assumed identities as 1. alien husbands of American wives or 2. as male immigrants on first preference petitions because of certain professional and technical skills. The basis of this program is information furnished by the Fedora informant. This program was initiated in August, 1965. Individuals entering the U. S. under the above two categories have been determined through a machine run of Immigration and Naturalization Service Form G-188 punch cards. The Bureau has reimbursed the Immigration and Naturalization Service for expenses incurred in sorting these cards for immigrants entering the U. S. between the years 1960-1965.

2. Approximately 2100 cases have been opened under this program since its inception, of which 77 are now pending. We have not uncovered any illegals to date although we have been able to identify through this program a valuable KGB agent who entered the U. S. as an immigrant from Belgium (Buchboard Case, Bufile 65-66185).

3. ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA A. P. Lirento. The responsibility of reviewing the pertinent G-188 cards and initiating investigations is placed with the Washington Field Office. The procedures followed in opening cases do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.

4. According to the Fedora informant, the KGB has used the techniques set forth above in dispatching KGB "illegals" to the U. S. During 1960-1965, four KGB "illegals" reportedly arrived in the U. S. under category number one according to information the Fedora informant was able to obtain from a KGB officer in the New York Residency.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis. It was last evaluated on December 24, 1970.

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1. BANPOP is the code name for a program initiated in August, 1966, in an attempt to identify illegals in the U. S. who may be receiving funds through Swiss banks. The basis for the program was an analysis of four Soviet illegal cases between 1955 and 1966 in which the Banque Populaire Swisse of Switzerland was used by the Soviets to fund illegals. The transfers are screened with the following criteria: (1) the person or individual beneficiary is named; (2) the amount of the transfer is between $300 and $5000 and (3) the last name of the person ordering and receiving the funds is the same or the money is directed to a specific bank account.

2. The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago and Philadelphia Offices.

3. When one of the offices locates an individual who might be a possible suspect, the Bureau is advised by letter and a copy is sent to the appropriate field office requesting investigation to identify this person. The title includes the name of the subject and the code name of the program to insure that all mail is handled by the same Supervisor. At the present time, there are 7 pending cases. For the six-month period ending 4/1/71, Philadelphia reviewed 2950 transfers, has two pending cases and used two Agent hours per month. Chicago reviewed 1000 transactions, opened no cases and used six Agent hours per month. New York Office reviewed 6050 transactions, opened 8 cases and used 15 Agent hours per month.

4. This program is supervised by SA J.P. Lee of the Special Cases Unit, Espionage Section.

5. All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the program on a six-month basis. The program was last justified by memorandum of April 1, 1971.

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1. CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet illegals who may have arrived in Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered the U.S. on immigrant visas obtained at one of the American consulates in Canada. This program is based on the Cowslip case which involved a Soviet illegal husband and wife team who used this method of entry. Legat, Ottawa, effected arrangements with various American consulates in Canada to obtain the Immigration Visa and Alien Registration (IVAR) forms filed by European immigrants prior to their destruction by the consulates. It is consular practice to retain these forms for 16 to 18 months then to destroy them. Legat, Ottawa, forwards these forms to the New York Office where they are reviewed. To develop suspects, the New York Office uses criteria developed from analysis of the Cowslip case.

2. Since inception of this program in June, 1966, 35 cases were opened. There are 7 cases pending. No illegals have been uncovered to date. The procedures followed in this program do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the New York Office.

3. CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA A.P. Litrento.

4. The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security field. It is felt this program still has a good potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical and has a sound basis. Past experience has shown that Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi continuously, if successful.

5. This program was evaluated in February, 1971. Legat, Ottawa, has suggested discontinuance of this program and New York's comments have been requested by Builet 8/5/71.

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4-H
COKMA PROGRAM

65-73750

1. Title is code word for physical surveillance coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelligence in the past several years. The New York Office instituted this program in July, 1970. This program receives close supervisory attention, is evaluated on a continuing basis and was subject of justification memorandum dated 8/16/71. In view of the success of this program by the New York Office, consideration has been given to its implementation by the Washington Field Office, however, the absence of subway transportation facilities used extensively by the Soviets in New York City precludes its adoption by the Washington Field Office.

2. The New York Office has catalogued known meeting areas as a result of past physical surveillances of Soviet intelligence officers. Information received from defectors-in-place and double agents operating against Soviet intelligence officers is almost impossible to conduct a discreet physical surveillance of trained intelligence officer and this program places our agents in an area where there is a likelihood of a Soviet meeting without surveillance hazards that could thwart meetings. Our objective is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence officers under clandestine circumstances.

3. The New York Office utilized one four-man team initially in connection with this program. During the initial six months of this program, seven Soviet intelligence officers were observed in the area selected for coverage (Jamaica area of the Queens, New York), on 22 occasions. Two individuals were observed in contact with Soviets and one individual contacted a Polish official. Based on the results obtained, coverage was expanded to the Flushings and Woodside section of the Queens, as well as the Rego Park section of the Queens, adding an additional four-man team. Since January known or suspected Soviet intelligence officers have been observed on 38 occasions accompanied by unknown individual or individuals on five occasions in the area covered by this program. We have determined through our Ironclad source the Soviets have placed the Jamaica section of the Queens off limits for meetings. While we are still affording this area some coverage

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we are now concentrating on the other selected sites mentioned above. One of the most interesting developments of recent date has been the detection of a known Committee for State Security (KGB) officer who during his tour of duty in the United States has made approaches to Soviets who defected to this country, visiting a residence in the Jamaica area. The occupant of this residence is currently the subject of an investigation and it is anticipated he will be interviewed to determine the nature of his contacts with the Soviets.

4. This program is supervised by Special Agent E. J. Cassidy, Soviet Unit-New York, Espionage Section. Expense and time in handling this program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since program in field consist of surveillance activities there must be close supervision at field level.

5. This program is sound and has enabled us to uncover Soviet intelligence activities with minimum expenditure of manpower. It has also given us additional insight into Soviet modus operandi. Manpower limitations have restricted our full utilization of this investigative technique. Special Agent personnel assigned to this program must be familiar with Soviets assigned to the New York area and must be experienced in surveillance procedures.

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4-H
1. The Desco Program (program for development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) originated as result of conference between field and Bureau representatives in December, 1957. Purpose is to select and develop individuals to be placed in contact with Soviet-bloc intelligence officers as a means of (1) penetrating Soviet-bloc intelligence; (2) exerting control by keeping intelligence officers occupied with running our sources; and (3) assisting in possible defection of bloc intelligence officers.

2. Nineteen offices are engaged regularly in this program and other offices on occasion conduct investigations to develop background on selected sources. Greatest activity has been in New York, Washington Field, Chicago and San Francisco which cover Soviet-bloc establishments. The 10 offices are authorized to conduct "sounding-out" interviews of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority. Follow-up interviews with potential Desco sources are conducted on a UACB basis. New York and Washington Field submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of the program. The other 17 offices submit summaries on a semi-annual basis.

3. Between the last inspection and July 15, 1971, approximately a 6-month period, 26 Desco subjects were placed in contact with Soviet-bloc officials. Of these, four have developed to the status of security informants or double agents.

4. This program is correlated in the Espionage Section, Coordination Unit by Special Agent Lish Whitson. The program is handled in the field by Special Agents assigned to Soviet-bloc investigations who are familiar with the habits, weaknesses and intelligence targets of bloc personnel and are qualified to select and develop the type of individuals needed in this program. Unusual or sensitive cases in this program are routed to the Division front office for approval. All rules, policies and procedures regarding

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DESECO PROGRAM

interviews, developments and handling of Deseco sources are contained in Section 105 O, pages 42-44, Manual of Instructions.

5. This program is re-evaluated on an annual basis. It was last justified by memorandum W. A. Branigan to C. D. Brennan, dated March 29, 1971. Limitations on other investigative techniques have underscored the value of this program demonstrated in the individuals developed as security informants or double agents. Selectees have enabled us to uncover and pin-point Soviet-bloc intelligence targets, identify Soviet-bloc intelligence officers and furnish information of value in considering defection approaches. During the month of March, 1971, a double agent, developed through the Deseco program, was instrumental in enabling the Bureau to identify a Soviet illegal operating in the guise of a graduate student in Salt Lake City. Direction of this program against Soviet-bloc intelligence officers will continue to be pressed to insure improvement in our coverage of Soviet-bloc intelligence operations.

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EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM
Bufile: 105-42300 4-H

This program originated in 1955 in an attempt to provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence regards the visits of East-West Exchange Agreement participants as opportunities to promote intelligence activity.

As a result of the 1970 Inspection revisions were made in the investigative action taken in this field. The change was made as a result of other manpower commitments. SAC Letter 70-25 provided that no investigations will be conducted of groups or individuals participating in the East-West Exchange Program in the absence of any information indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles are checked on all Soviet participants and where information is developed showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then opened and the field instructed to conduct necessary investigation.

During the period of January-June, 1971, 982 individuals were scheduled to enter the U. S. under the provisions of this exchange program and of this number, we had information indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 25 of these individuals.

With regard to Soviet exchange students there are currently 32 in the U. S. Based on information furnished by defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously in the U. S., we have determined that Soviet intelligence utilizes these students in an intelligence capacity, principally as spotters. In view of this, we afford these students active investigation. We have also found that a number of these students return to the U. S. for assignment at one of the Soviet establishments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in the U. S. as students are generally reactivated. The case of Yuriy Aleksandrovich Gostintsev is an example of an individual entering the U. S. under the East-West Exchange Program as a graduate student and engaging in intelligence activities. Ironclad, our sensitive defector in place, advised that Gostintsev who entered the U. S. 3/9/71 for a period of six months to do research at three American universities was working for Dr. Martin Summerfield at a laboratory at Princeton University. According to our source, Gostintsev, on 7/2/71, turned over a portfolio of 1,000 pages to a Soviet intelligence officer who...

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took the documents to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, photographed them and returned them to Gostintsev. Similar operations took place on 7/16 and 7/23/71. Gostintsev originally entered the U. S. in 9/69 under the East-West Scientific Exchange Agreement for three months to work under Dr. Summerfield. He left the U. S. in 12/69 and returned again in 5/71.
RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS

105-36365

1. Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have central repository for information developed in connection with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to radio and technical equipment purchased by them.

2. Washington Field and New York Offices furnish information developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis. Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, Bureau of International Commerce, United States Department of Commerce and where pertinent, to the National Security Agency (NSA). Material submitted includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description and cost of the items purchased. It involves maintenance of three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and New York Offices. Program established to achieve following objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the United States by Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control list; and to permit discreet markings by FBI Laboratory of certain technical equipment furnished to Soviets through overt or covert means which would permit its identification at some future time.

3. Since January, 1971, Program has disclosed continuing purchases by Soviet nationals of Grundig Satellite Multiband portable radios. During 3/71 one KGB officer in Washington purchased 12 of these radios at one time. Soviet husband and wife illegal team previously in U. S. used one of these radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which contained their operating instructions. Program made it possible to secure serial numbers for possible future identification. Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments and security devices being operated. Program also disclosed detailed information concerning two new antennae systems purchased by Soviets from company in Nebraska. It appears one of these will be used at new Consulate General in San Francisco when permanent location for that establishment secured. Details concerning such installations are of interest, not only to FBI Laboratory, but to State Department and NSA in connection with
its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities. Intelligence agencies of the military, such as Navy and Air Force, took to Bureau for details concerning purchases of this type made by Soviets since it enables reasonable estimate of their ability to monitor and intercept U. S. military communications. During 7/71, Program identified Soviet interest in purchase of sophisticated electronic apparatus in New York which can be utilized for radar or communications satellite tracking. They had not requested export license from Commerce Department for this article. It may be intended for clandestine use in U. S. for satellite tracking designed to improve accuracy of Soviet ICBM guidance systems. We have notified White House and interested Government agencies concerning this activity which is being conducted clandestinely from Soviet establishment in Washington, D. C.

4. Program supervised by Special Agent Eugene C. Peterson, Soviet Unit - Washington, Espionage Section. Expense and time utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of material submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor and no weaknesses in program are apparent. Administrative tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Soviet Unit - Washington, Espionage Section.

5. Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination of material developed. Possession of some equipment on which discreet markings were previously placed by FBI Laboratory or item with serial number showing original acquisition by Soviets could serve to identify possessor with involvement in Soviet intelligence activity. Program is evaluated annually to determine justification for continuance.

6. Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971. Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.
SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS

Racial matters investigations were intensified through establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67.

By memorandum dated 7/14/71 it was recommended, and the Director approved, that the Racial Intelligence Section would, thereafter, be known as the Extremist Intelligence Section and the character of cases supervised would be changed from Racial Matters to Extremist Matters. This action was taken as the majority of extremist activity in U.S. is not based solely on racial hatred but based on a desire to overthrow U.S. Government by revolution.

This section handles extremist matters investigations involving black extremist organizations and individuals. Objectives are to identify organizations and individuals that are involved in extremist activities, that advocate or had actually committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal laws. The dangerousness to the U.S. of such individuals must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index. The extent of foreign influence or influence of the Communist Party or other domestic revolutionary groups among black extremists, especially black extremist organizations, is a prime objective. To accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerning individual extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources likewise have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled the Bureau to stay on top of the black extremist situation. These sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of alerting local authorities, and of keeping other Government

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agencies dependent upon us for information informed of pertinent developments and advance intelligence, including data concerning potential violence.

Our informant coverage has made it possible for us to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House, the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an interest. Additional information pertaining to black extremist intelligence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the Research Section.

Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Government.

The activities of black extremists continue to place a heavy demand upon the Bureau's manpower and resources.

There are numerous black extremist groups throughout the nation, the majority of which are local in nature and relatively small in membership. These groups, however, either directly or indirectly, advocate defiance of the law, hostility toward constituted authority and, in some instances, advocate outright destruction of Government and establishment of a Marxist-Leninist form of Government. The activities of these groups constitute a constant threat to the internal security of the country through their propensity for violence, hatred of and outright opposition to our form of Government.
BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Bufile 157-8415

Black extremism is concentrated in organized activities of 64 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities throughout the U.S. The five major nationwide groups have chapters in 139 cities. Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals in excess of 8,300. This membership figure, however, disguises the real following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities and the extent of influence and leadership they exercise. This real support, especially from young blacks, is surfaced during confrontations with police and the Establishment. In fact, hostility toward the police by black extremist groups, as well as by black youths, continues unabated in many of our major cities.

Set out hereinafter are summaries concerning the key black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation.

Computerized Telephone Number File (CTNF) was expanded on 2/26/71 to include telephone numbers of black, New Left and other ethnic extremists. As a result, black extremist groups, black extremist Security Index subjects and individuals included in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album have been entered into the CTNF. This has proven to be extremely valuable investigative tool and has saved the field considerable investigative time in ascertaining subscribers of telephone numbers since "hits" are made on 15.5 percent of numbers checked against the file.

The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was established on 3/8/69 to assist in identification of militant black extremists who travel extensively.

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The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist organizations, militant black nationalists who are known to travel and black extremists who are Bureau fugitives. Each office prepares a form on such individuals within its territory and the form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete album. In the event of travel by any of these individuals, the office covering the area being visited already has a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately available. The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa and Mexico City and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel. Over 470 extremists are currently carried in this album. Information concerning fugitives was included to insure each office has a photograph and biographic sketch immediately available for its use in conducting investigation to locate or apprehend them.

To insure broad circulation among investigative personnel and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization of informants, especially extremist sources, we initiated the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitives List in June, 1970. This list, which is prepared quarterly and sent each field office and selected Legats, identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations are black extremists. For the months in which no quarterly list is prepared, all offices and selected Legats are advised of deletions and additions to this list. Currently there are 64 fugitives listed, 20 of whom are 10 fugitives. This list has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents handling extremist matters and extremist informants and has been effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives among extremist informants. Thirty-two of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was initiated.

Bureau airtel 11/12/70 advised the field of formation of Black Extremist Section of Single Fingerprint File in Latent Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division. Field was instructed to insure all black extremists who have a propensity for violence or who would logically be considered suspects in serious crimes in which the Bureau may have an interest were included in the Black Extremist Section.
By airtel dated 3/19/71, captioned "Black Extremist Section of Single Fingerprint File, Identification Matters, Racial Matters," all offices were instructed to give greater emphasis to this program on a continuing basis due to increasing participation of black extremists in crimes of violence and continued reports from knowledgeable sources of plans of these extremists to participate in bombings, hijackings, kidnappings and other crimes of violence. As a result of this communication and aggressive supervision by Extremist Intelligence Section supervisors, the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File has doubled. The value of this valuable investigative tool was demonstrated in the special investigation being handled by this section known as Newkill. This case involves the murder of two New York City police officers on 5/21/71. Latents forwarded by our New York Office for comparison against this file resulted in the identification of two Black Panther Party (BPP) members and directly led to the solution of the machine gunning of two New York City police officers on 5/19/71. This information has also resulted in these individuals being developed as suspects in the Newkill murder. Supervisors are constantly alert to insure logical black extremists are included in this file.

In view of the high percentage of black extremists who have been reported to have weapons in their possession, the field by letter 3/18/71 captioned "Firearms Acts!" and by airtel 5/17/71 captioned "National Firearms Act, State Firearms Control Assistance Act, Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms, Racial Matters," emphasized that active investigation should be initiated concerning firearms violations stemming from Bureau investigations over matters within our primary jurisdiction, including racial (now extremist) matters investigations. Field was instructed to vigorously pursue possible violations arising out of extremist matters investigations. Such investigations will lead to statistical accomplishments and to the neutralization of black extremists. It was emphasized that all Agents assigned to extremist matters should thoroughly review all of the criminal statutes involving Federal gun law violations so that they would be in a position to recognize and vigorously pursue possible violations coming to their attention during extremist matters investigations.
Numerous investigations have been initiated by the field as a result of these instructions and recently four BPP leaders in Richmond or Washington, D. C., were convicted for Federal gun violations and one is awaiting trial. With the emphasis being placed on violations of Federal gun laws by black extremists, the number of convictions will increase and add to the Bureau's statistical accomplishments as well as neutralizing black extremists.

Investigation disclosed in Fall of 1970 that increased campus disorders involving black students posed a definite threat to the nation's stability and indicated the need for increase in both quality and quantity of intelligence concerning Black Student Unions (BSU) and similar groups which were targets for influence and control by violence-prone BPP and other extremists. On 10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources, on BSU and similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to determine if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant further active investigation. On 11/4/70 instructions were sent to the field to implement the program authorized by the Executive Conference.

The results of these discreet preliminary inquiries were analyzed and it was concluded that our responsibilities could adequately be handled by limiting our inquiries to black student groups on college campuses which have engaged in violent and lawless activities or are reported by knowledgeable sources to be moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness. As a result, field offices were instructed by letter dated 7/26/71 that, thereafter, discreet preliminary inquiries on black student groups on college campuses should be limited to those groups which have engaged in violence and/or lawless activities or are moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness. Results of any preliminary inquiries conducted through established sources only in accordance with the above provisions must be reported to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination along with recommendations regarding whether an active investigation of the group and/or its leaders is warranted. The field was instructed that
if established sources report a black student group is moving toward, or being influenced in the direction of, violence and lawlessness, although no such activity has occurred, the facts are to be furnished the Bureau with field office recommendations regarding active investigation. No active investigation of an organization connected with an institution of learning is conducted without prior Bureau authority.

The following pages set forth summaries concerning the key black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation.
The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California, for the ostensible purpose of patrolling the black community to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.

It expanded rapidly throughout the United States during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969. Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s, it expanded until there were approximately 48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported by many thousands of sympathizers as of December, 1970. Another gradual decline began in 1971; and as of June, 1971, the Party had 710 hard-core members in 39 branches representing 37 cities.

In February, 1971, the differences between Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, and Eldridge Cleaver, then BPP Minister of Information, a fugitive in Algeria, rose to the surface; and Newton expelled Cleaver and his followers. About 100 BPP members in New York and New Jersey declared allegiance to Cleaver and became known as the BPP-Cleaver Faction.

The official goal of the BPP has always been the violent overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist system. The BPP has openly advocated urban guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government leaders and other forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and particularly local police. "Off the pigs," BPP jargon for "kill the cop" is the battle cry of the organization. Newton now claims the BPP was led astray by Cleaver in his quest for violence when actually the BPP is a nonviolent, community serving organization. In spite of Newton's peace loving front, the truth is that Newton and his BPP are just as much anarchists as ever. On 6-30-71 a Washington, D. C. BPP leader and follower of Newton stated "the ultimate goal of the BPP is the complete destruction of the United States Government and its replacement with Marxist-Leninist socialism."

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Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967 and since that time has expanded as the organization itself expanded.

By letter to all offices dated 2-27-70, approved by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions. Previously, offices were submitting quarterly reports on the BPP. The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to eliminate some paper work in the field.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968, and changed to a monthly summary on the approval of the Director by letter to all offices dated 2-27-70. This change is a result of a recommendation by the Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to cut down paper work in the field. The monthly summary relieves the field of some paper work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the field up to date on BPP developments.

San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP. Because of the excellence of this summary and the need for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau airtel 1-21-70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental offices which is the current practice.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were instructed by airtel 6-17-70 to submit a monthly summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch. This financial summary includes data on sources of income, foreign funding, expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations, and the steps being taken by each office to develop full financial data. This summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all financial developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis.
San Francisco was instructed 8-19-70 to submit monthly lists of nationwide bank accounts and expenses for BPP. This survey was devised by San Francisco; and since it is very helpful in establishing the "big picture" it is being required monthly.

The Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc. (SCPI) to control all BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser and/or lessee of any property utilized by the BPP. The corporation and its activities are under intensive investigation which has revealed that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York. By airtels 1-7 and 1-19-71 to San Francisco and New York, these offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary of all pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the previous week plus a monthly review of SCPI bank accounts. These summaries keep the Bureau aware of SCPI operations and also enables us to regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements.

It is noted that there are currently 25 field offices conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed information concerning its operations and activities including organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by headquarters and foreign support and internal factionalism.

All field offices having a BPP investigation were required by Bureau airtel 10-3-68 to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary data required by the Department, and they were also required by Bureau airtel 6-25-69 to maintain records of and to use permanent T symbol numbers to identify all concealed sources in BPP organization reports. Both of these requirements were based on Department requests. The Department advised that the need on which these requests were based no longer existed, and the field offices were instructed by Bureau airtel 5-17-71 to discontinue both programs.
By Bureau airtel 11-6-70, all continental offices were instructed to submit a biweekly airtel regarding underground BPP operations within each field office. This specific requirement was removed by Bureau airtel 4-29-71. However, all offices were admonished to keep the Bureau advised of any developments in this area.

"The Black Panther" newspaper, official organ of the BPP, had been printed in San Francisco since 1967 until recently when the printing was changed to New York City. The Bureau receives a sufficient quantity of the paper from New York to disseminate it to interested agencies and all Legal Attaches. New York also furnishes one copy of each weekly issue to all field offices. This newspaper in the past has been the best indication of current Party line; therefore, this program is essential to our intelligence gathering efforts.

Our ultimate objective is the prosecution of the BPP as an organization or by individual members for any violations of Federal or State laws. As in the past, we will continue to disseminate to local authorities any information we may receive concerning possible local violations. A secondary objective is to more completely develop information concerning the activities and objectives of the BPP for intelligence purposes.

In July, 1969, the Attorney General established a special task force for the specific purpose of developing a prosecutive theory against the BPP. Attorneys of this task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this purpose.

It is recommended that the intensive investigation of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as above be continued.
BLACK REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
157-15276

The Black Revolutionary Party is an all black revolutionary, political organization which was formed in April, 1971, at an internal meeting of the pro-Red China Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) (CP of C-ML). Among 16 people present were four Americans including well-known black extremist, Charles Knox, former Black Panther Party leader in Des Moines, Iowa.

The BRP was formed within the CP of C-ML to organize blacks in the United States and Canada operating from headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. The BRP follows the political line of communist Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung and publishes a newspaper which serves as its vehicle for disseminating its revolutionary dogma known as the "Black Revolutionary," the first issue of which appeared in May, 1971.

The BRP intends to maintain its existence secret until firmly established which is estimated at taking from one and one-half to two years. It intends to draw recruits from both sides of the current Black Panther Party factionalism and its proposed revolutionary program will reportedly be based on the issue of racial suppression. This is to be accomplished by the formation of armed self-defense units to "fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly, capitalist class."

On July 12, 1971, Charles Knox and an additional Omaha black extremist were detained temporarily by United States Customs officials in Detroit while returning to the United States from Canada. Search of their vehicle by Customs officials determined Knox and his companion were in possession of numerous pamphlets and leaflets of a pro-communist nature.

Investigations of the BRP and its identified leaders and members are being aggressively pursued and, where necessary, closely coordinated with Royal Canadian Mounted Police via Legat, Ottawa.

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CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)
157-16554

CAP was formed as an international black separatist organization as the result of the convening of the fourth annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States and Atlanta, Georgia, during September, 1970. The organization, which is heavily infiltrated at the leadership level by black extremists, advocates the unity of blacks and the establishment of a black nation via the revolutionary ideology of Pan-Africanism as espoused by CAP supporter and well-known black revolutionary, Stokely Carmichael.

CAP is now active in 15 cities across the Nation and is vigorously pursuing its objectives in this country as well as establishing rapport and lines of communication with black groups and individuals abroad. Recent information indicates two United States CAP representatives plan a trip in the future to Tanzania for the purpose of establishing a CAP organization in that country.

CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black revolutionaries Hayward Henry and LeRoi Jones, call for the extensive use of disruption and violence, if necessary, by blacks in order to create Independent Black Institutions as are necessary to accomplish CAP's revolutionary objectives by mass action programs utilizing "direction, dedication, and discipline."

CAP held a Western Regional Conference in San Diego, California, during June, 1971, during which it was recommended a national committee be established to consider the possibility of establishing a black paramilitary organization which would furnish support in the form of a united front action with all "liberation struggles" in the United States and internationally.

CAP is currently engaged in efforts at forming an all-black political party in the United States to nominate and elect black officials at local, state, and national levels who, it is felt, will support CAP's plans at establishing a separate black nation. The organization has planned an Eastern Regional Conference in Newark, New Jersey, for September, 1971, and has tentatively scheduled another international meeting in early 1972.
Investigations of the CAP, its black extremist leaders and members, are receiving most close supervision. Pertinent information developed in regard to their activities is being disseminated to the Department and interested Government agencies and officials.
INTERNATIONAL BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS, aka
BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS
File 157-21532

The International Black Workers Congress (IBWC), which is in its formative stages, is dominated by James Forman, an official in the black revolutionary Student National Coordinating Committee. The IBWC makes its headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, at the same locale as that of League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a black extremist labor union in that city.

IBWC is involved in the organizing of black workers and students to further the revolutionary struggle in the United States and other parts of the world as well as for the purpose of building unity among all third world peoples. IBWC's stated objective in organizing black workers is to bring about a national work stoppage, thus severely damaging the United States economy. James Forman has repeatedly stressed the necessity for blacks to be organized to change the capitalistic system to that of a Marxist-Leninist society through seizure of state power.

The IBWC held a regional meeting in Gary, Indiana, in June, 1971, at which discussions centered around organizing black workers into a Marxist-Leninist society and preparations for a drive to organize blacks employed in the steel industry and in the "U. S. Post Office." It was indicated that IBWC would receive assistance from the pro-Chinese Communist Progressive Labor Party (PLP) in the form of advice concerning organizing activities.

An IBWC conference tentatively scheduled to be held in Detroit on August 21 - 22, 1971, has apparently been canceled. Indications are that the conference site has been shifted to Chicago, Illinois, where the conference will be scheduled within two weeks.

It is particularly significant to note IBWC leader James Forman, together with other United States black extremists, including affiliates of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, recently undertook travel abroad which was to include visits to North Korea, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Algeria.
The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black extremist organization with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida. This group continues to be the leading organization of all black militant groups in the State of Florida. It was founded in St. Petersburg during May, 1968, with 85 ghetto youths as a nucleus who believed liberation of black people will not come about through "normal channels." The organization has affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky, and other cities in Florida. They have attempted to organize on a national basis but have experienced little success except with the establishment of a chapter in Boston, Massachusetts.

The founder and leader of this organization is Joseph Waller, Jr., an articulate Negro who holds the position of "Chairman" and states that he intends to have all black militant groups in Florida designated as affiliates of JOMO.

The organization's voice and propaganda organ is "The Burning Spear" which is published on a monthly basis. This publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white America. In this connection, JOMO members have participated in racial disturbances, fire bombings, and have been involved in attacks on police through the use of violence. Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida, and participated in a plot to break out two black "political prisoners" from a Florida prison. Members have also been arrested for the commission of murders and robberies.

The organization has accumulated a large cache of weapons, and its members are taught guerrilla warfare and receive firearms training.

Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection
8/17/71

4-H
Junta of Militant Organizations
Bufile 157-9903

Recently JOMO has been reincorporated under "The International Junta of Militant Organizations" and now appears to be attempting to make contact with organizations abroad and has embraced Stokely Carmichael's concept of Pan-Africanism.

JOMO has received contributions from all over the United States and recently was almost successful in receiving a large contribution from a church group in New York; however, this latter contribution was ultimately not received.
NATION OF ISLAM  
Bufile 25-330971

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an independent semi-religious group consisting of an adult, hard-core, all black membership of 6,000 members. Muhammad's Temple Number 2 of the Holy Temples of Islam, Chicago, Illinois, is the national headquarters of this organization consisting of 108 groups in the U.S. and one in Bermuda. In seven U.S. cities it operates University of Islam schools for 200 to 600 children at each school. Local groups convene weekly, and once each year a national convention is held in Chicago which is attended by 5,000 to 6,000 individuals.

The NOI remains under leadership of Elijah Muhammad who is the self-proclaimed Messenger of Allah and "Supreme Ruler of the Universe." Leaders continue to stress creation of a separate black nation; complete segregation of the races; hatred of the white man; and development of a black economic community. The group opposes the war in Vietnam, teaches members to evade the draft, and strongly supports the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East.

Although for years the leaders of the NOI have taught members to refrain from carrying weapons and engaging in acts of violence and open attacks on the white man, as recently as July, 1971, the NOI Mosque, Tyler, Texas, planned the execution of radio disc jockey and his associate for having previously killed a fellow NOI member. Subsequently, seven members of this mosque were involved in killing one of these men. Local police recovered three pistols and a rifle from among members of this group. The highly inflammatory antiwhite ideology espoused by the NOI continues to make this group a highly volatile extremist organization.

The organization is reaching new heights in accumulating wealth. Three-fourths of a million dollars monthly flows in and out of bank accounts at a national level. Corporations
have been formed to operate food processing plants, acquire land in the U.S. and in Bermuda, and acquire and maintain a fleet of jet airplanes.

This group continues the propagation of its beliefs through distributing 400,000 copies weekly of its newspaper, "Muhammad Speaks," and radio broadcasts throughout the country.

We have conducted a continuous security and/or extremist type investigation of this group since 1953 in accordance with Department directives. Each group is reported on semianually, and the leaders, functionaries, and those involved in violence or extremist activities are subject to active investigation. The Department by letter dated 7/28/66 requested our investigation of this organization be continued.
The Republic of New Africa (RNA) was formed in Detroit, Michigan, in March, 1968, by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist. It has chapters in nine U.S. cities and a current hard-core membership of approximately 116 individuals.

RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard Henry, long-time extremists in the Detroit area. When first formed, RNA named as its President-in-exile Robert Franklin Williams, violence-prone black extremist then living in China. Williams, who has since returned to the U.S., has resigned his position as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems and dissension existing within the organization.

RNA was established to create a black nation within the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, in addition to individual reparations of $10,000 per black citizen as payment for 400 years of ancestral slave labor.

RNA's organizational structure is revolutionary in character and its leaders have proposed efforts be made for international recognition and financial assistance from Cuba, Red China and the black nations of the world. RNA, in September, 1970, made a formal agreement of mutual revolutionary and financial support with the leader of the Black Power Movement in Surinam.

RNA established a black army known as the Black Legion whose function was to protect the persons and property and to attack the enemies (police) of that nation. Training programs were instituted and uniforms complete with leopard skin epaulets were designed as the official dress for the Black Legionaires.

RNA maintains its national headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, despite the fact that since early 1970, two factions have arisen within the organization. One faction, led by Richard Henry, is attempting to establish a national headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana. This faction is the most active and militant of the two groups and has called for intensification of RNA activities throughout the U.S. The other group, under the
leadership of Milton Henry in Detroit, has been relatively inactive for some time. The Milton Henry Faction, however, has scheduled a national RNA convention to be held in Dayton, Ohio, September 4 through 6, 1971, which activity could herald renewed revolutionary activity by this group.

The Richard Henry Faction has been extremely active in the past several months in attempting to obtain land and establish a black nation in Hinds County, Mississippi. During July, 1971, this faction held a "peoples court" to hear RNA's case against a black farmer and owner of the land claimed by RNA which was consecrated as the group's capitol in March 3, 1971. The black farmer has reneged on a former offer to sell his land to RNA. The RNA group found the farmer guilty and threatens to seize the land by force, if necessary.

The RNA's propensity for violent action is demonstrated by the fact that on August 18, 1971, local police officers in Jackson, Mississippi, accompanied by Bureau Agents raided an RNA site seeking four subjects for whom warrants were outstanding, one of whom was wanted for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) for murder in Detroit. A shoot-out occurred during which two police officers and a Bureau Agent were wounded. One police officer subsequently died of a head wound. Eleven RNA members, including Richard Henry, have been arrested by local authorities and the UFAP subject is still being sought. A subsequent search of the raided RNA headquarters determined it was a virtual arsenal of weapons of all types including homemade bombs and Molotov cocktails. The front door of this building had been booby-trapped and it had an escape tunnel leading from its rear which was accessible via a trap door in the building's interior and a trench-bunker similar to that utilized by the Viet Cong in the war in South Vietnam.
SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael as its Chairman in May, 1966, the organization operated as a nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and black participation. Carmichael, on assuming the Chairmanship of SNCC, immediately eliminated all whites from participation and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a position which the organization maintains today.

H. Rap Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black extremist who served as National Chairman for a time following Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969. At that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word "nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City.

Under Brown's direction, SNCC moved to restructure and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence as a black extremist organization. The national leadership issued directives on the reorganization of the national office in New York City, as well as the local organizations and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary Economic Council, an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a Research Council, and others which make up a body within SNCC known as the Revolutionary Political Council.

As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970, to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt. Hunt also serves as head of the organization's Revolutionary Political Council. Frances Beal is the National Political Education Officer. Hunt and Beal are the only two national officers of SNCC.

In July, 1971, a reorganizational meeting was held in Atlanta, Georgia. SNCC cadres gathered from several states and were directed by Hunt to study, understand, and then practice principles set forth in "Contradictions" by Mao Tse-tung and "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" by Joseph Stalin. SNCC members in San Antonio, Texas, are
Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

already receiving extensive political education in communist ideology of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The decision was made to establish a State Bureau of SNCC in every state and to move the national headquarters from New York City to Atlanta. SNCC will support various black revolutionary labor groups and will attempt to rally those under 25 years of age into a new Revolutionary Youth Organization. The cadres discussed establishment of a short-wave communication system utilizing code as a more secure alternative to telephone and mail systems.

Investigations of SNCC, its leaders, affiliates, and their activities continue to receive close supervision. Information of pertinence concerning the organization continues to be disseminated to the White House, the Department and other interested Government agencies and officials.
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OF BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS
100-442529

This intensification was initiated in August, 1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume and importance of this information made it necessary to follow this communist influence in a separate investigation. This investigation includes not only the influence of the Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups, splinter groups and others including the New Left.

The overall objective in this and related investigations is to protect the internal security of the United States by submitting information relating to possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop intelligence information and disseminate to interested Government agencies. Additionally, we take measures to neutralize the communist influence in the black extremist field whenever feasible.

Reports are submitted quarterly and the investigation is evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent information is disseminated to the White House and the Attorney General.

The year 1970 saw continued influence by communists and other subversives in extremist groups. In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist Party. This has not diminished in any way the Communist Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers whether they want it or not.
There are those in the Communist Party who oppose or are extremely reluctant to support the Black Panther Party especially those in the Black Panther Party who call for "revolutionary suicide." Charlene Mitchell, Secretary of the Black Liberation of the Communist Party, is reportedly attempting to split the Communist Party and form a Black Panther Communist Party which believes in violent and dramatic action. Her group is reportedly waiting for Angela Davis, admitted Communist Party member currently incarcerated in California awaiting trial in connection with the kidnapping and murder of a judge in California during an attempted escape by prisoners from the courtroom, to be released at which time Davis will become public leader of the new party. The Communist Party is girding itself to oppose the split.

In June, 1971, a group led by James Rufus Forman, Coordinator of International Affairs for the black extremist Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC), visited Hanoi ostensibly to establish rapport between the North Vietnamese and black people in the United States. The group's trip was also to include Algiers, Guinea, and Tanzania to reestablish old contacts for SNCC and initiate new ones.

"SNCC Monthly," the publication of SNCC, in its March, 1971, issue, contained an article about "Third World People," united by "common historical oppression." People in Cuba, Vietnam, Guinea, and the Palestinian guerrillas were mentioned as having cut off the tentacles of "the monster," imperialism. Another article in the same issue was printed to politicize the readers on the Arab-Israeli conflict and clarify the similarity between the Arab position and that of other "people of color" throughout the world.

Curtis Nelson Powell, Black Panther Party member involved in restructuring of Black Panther Party - Cleaver Faction, while in Stockholm, Sweden, in early August, 1971,
inquired about the possibility of obtaining small arms on behalf of Eldridge Cleaver for the Black Panther Party. He specifically mentioned machine guns, pistols and bazookas and stated there would be no difficulty in getting these items into the United States. His request was rejected. Powell subsequently traveled to Algeria, headquarters of the Black Panther Party International Section, and then on to Tanzania. He met with the Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning and requested permission to open a Black Panther Party office in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Although the Tanzanian Minister was sympathetic, he doubted the Tanzanian Government would grant such permission at this time.

Write-ups concerning the Black Revolutionary Party and the International Black Workers Congress are incorporated in this survey. Such write-ups document the pro-Red China Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) influence over the Black Revolutionary Party and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the International Black Workers Congress.
KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

Key Black Extremist (KBE) Program initiated 12/23/70 with Director's approval to intensify investigative coverage of selected black extremists throughout United States who are extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence. Ninety individuals are currently on the KBE list, including such persons as Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton and David Hilliard.

Objective of program is to develop complete and detailed information on the day-to-day activities and future plans of KBE individuals. Investigative summary report is required followed by investigative report every 90 days.

All KBE individuals are included in Priority I of Security Index. Each is included in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album. All aspects of their finances are determined. Their handwriting specimens are placed in the National Security File in the Laboratory Division. Their fingerprints are included in the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File in the Identification Division. Particular attention is paid to their travel. Possible criminal violations are vigorously pursued. Emphasis is placed on obtaining record of their inflammatory statements. High level of informant coverage on each individual is required.

Supervision of KBE investigations is handled on the individual desks and additions to and deletions from KBE list must be approved by Bureau. Inasmuch as KBE individuals are of the type whose investigation would ordinarily require close supervision by Bureau supervisors, the administration and supervision of this program entails only a minimum amount of time above that which would ordinarily be expended on the supervision of the cases of these persons.

Continuation of this program will be justified in December, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
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EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

The prime purpose of development and utilization of extremist informants and sources is to provide intelligence and evidentiary information concerning black and white extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are also called upon to furnish information concerning situations affecting civil unrest in all parts of the country.

Supervision of extremist informants at the Seat of Government includes review and approval of new informants and confidential sources, review of progress of informants, review of payments being made to informants, analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nationwide informant coverage of the various extremist organizations, coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremist groups' conventions, supervision of operations for the development of top-echelon BPP informants, and other special projects such as development of information concerning black extremist underground escape routes and coordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision with a minimum of paper work.

As of 7/31/71 we are operating a total of 7,477 extremist informants compared with a total of 7,184 at the time of the last inspection. This is an increase of 293 informants. Concerning the above informants, 583 informants report on black extremist organizations and 353 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan. We are operating 6,541 ghetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities as compared to 6,224 ghetto informants at the time of the last inspection which represents an increase of 317 ghetto informants.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71
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In line with the fluctuating membership in the various black extremist organizations, we have constantly adjusted our informant coverage. This can be seen very clearly with the most violent of the black extremist groups, the Black Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection, BPP membership was 1,000, and we afforded coverage of these 1,000 members with 173 informants which represents 17.3 percent of the membership. The present membership is 710, and we have 156 informants reporting on these individuals which represents 21.7 percent of the membership. This is a net increase of informant coverage to total membership of 4.4 since the last Inspection. This also indicates our aims and purposes of penetrating these organizations with the most qualified informants and keeping within the policy of operating the informant program in a very efficient manner.

At the time of the last Inspection we were operating 376 informants furnishing information concerning white extremist organizations, and as of 7/31/71 we are operating 353 informants. This is in keeping with the current membership of the Klan and white hate organizations.

By memorandum dated 2/19/71 from G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan captioned "Penetration of Black Extremist Groups in Canada, Racial Matters" it was recommended and approved that this Bureau attempt to penetrate the black extremist activities in Canada due to the close working relationship being developed between the extremists in that country and the United States. We made available to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) a top source of the Baltimore Division. By letter dated 7/20/71 from Legat, Ottawa, it was set out that the RCMP advised they have been extremely pleased with the progress made by our source in that he has furnished information concerning future plans for acts of violence and the establishment of guerrilla warfare training by black extremist groups in the Toronto, Canada, area.

RCMP indicated that Halifax, Nova Scotia, is fast becoming a focal point of black extremist activity in Canada.
RCMP pointed out that the above area is visited frequently by black extremist figures from the United States and admitted that they have experienced considerable difficulty in the recruitment of suitable sources in the Halifax area. RCMP requested of the Bureau another source of the caliber of the one presently operating in Canada.

By memorandum dated 7/29/71 it was recommended and approved that we solicit of the field the identities of informants who may be able to travel to Canada. This project is presently being followed very closely.

By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned "Racial Informant Development, Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters" it was recommended and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a top-level informant in the BPP. By letter dated 8/17/71 San Francisco was instructed that captioned program is being discontinued. Review of this program showed that all avenues leading to the possible development of high-level BPP informants have been explored and the groundwork laid for the development of top-echelon leaders who might defect. Therefore, it was believed that it was no longer necessary to have two Special Agents assigned exclusively to this program. This will bring about a savings in manpower; however, San Francisco is under instructions to continue aggressive efforts to penetrate the top echelon of the BPP. This is being closely followed at the Seat of Government.

GHETTO INFORMANTS

The ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67 to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. A ghetto informant is an individual living or working in the ghetto area who is available to furnish information concerning conditions which may create civil unrest.
Since 1967 this program has been significantly modified in that this vast network of informants have been changed from listening posts to individuals who are actively seeking extremist information as well as information concerning violations of Federal and local statutes.

We have noted numerous incidents where ghetto informants are being converted by the field to regular extremist informants in that they have been graduated into positions where they can report on a regular basis concerning the activities of individual extremists and/or extremist organizations. As a valuable by-product we are also achieving criminal statistics through contacts with our ghetto informants. This program was justified by memorandum dated 7/4/71 from G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial Matters" and is scheduled to be rejustified in July, 1972.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - BLACK EXTREMISTS
Bufile 100-448006

Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70. This program was a supplement to our black extremist investigative activities and involved a variety of sensitive intelligence techniques which were afforded close supervision at the Seat of Government. No action could be instituted under this program without prior Bureau authorization.

To afford additional security to our sensitive techniques and operations, all counterintelligence programs, including this program, were discontinued and the field was so advised by airtel 4/28/71.

Although this program was discontinued, the field was advised if exceptional instances arose wherein it was considered counterintelligence action is warranted, that recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the specific case caption involved. These recommendations will then be considered on an individual basis. The field was also reminded that prior Bureau authority is required before initiating any activity of a counterintelligence nature.

Significant results since last inspection as a result of this program are set forth under"Accomplishments 4E" elsewhere in this report.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
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[Signature]
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION: There are attached separate write-ups regarding the following programs supervised in the Nationalities Intelligence Section:

1. Name checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas
2. Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV)
3. Security Index-Cuba
4. American Repatriate Program
5. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries
7. Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States
8. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
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NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS

This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of foreign officials where their activity requires such action.

The basis for this program is found in the procedure by Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results being channelized to the FBI. We correlate this information with data from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In those instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions to the field for active investigation.

Since the program was initiated, 794,570 Immigration and Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have undertaken 474 investigations based on results thereof.

The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program, the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures. The program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security threat to the United States.

The program is justified annually, with the last justification having been made February 18, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71

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PROGRAM
COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER
BOCOV
BUFFILE: 100-356015

I. Background and Date of Inception

BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948 to fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U. S. - Mexican border by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

II. Scope and Desired Objectives

Three border offices, El Paso, San Antonio, and San Diego, as well as the office of the Legal Attache, Mexico, participate in this program. Ten Agents and two Assistant Legal Attaches devote a portion of their time directing some 200 sources and informants. Population of the zone areas involved is approximately 1,700,000 persons of which some 2,400 have been identified as either members or sympathizers of major Mexican subversive groups.

III. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection

Program has furnished valuable information relative to threat against U. S. by Mexican subversives residing and or operating in the border area. Investigative results are furnished to all levels of interested U. S. Government intelligence community. Program continues to keep us advised of potential trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
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IV. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Periodic reports on individuals and organizations as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed and correlated by SA Bernardo M. Perez. Involved is review of incoming letters, memoranda, reports and semiannual progress letters detailing informant coverage and subversive strength. Analysis of this material provides a basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for counterintelligence moves.

V. Current Justification for Continuance

BOCOV continues to fill the above-described intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with other intelligence programs originating in the border area, in particular the SECOMEX program.

VI. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified January 8, 1971.
BOCOV

Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive elements entering the U. S. Although this operation is no longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also in investigating criminal matters of an international nature. Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing abroad.

Substituted for pages 159-160
in copy to SSC
Background and Date of Inception

This program was instituted in November, 1960. By that date it was obvious that Cuba, whose Government had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959, was a communist state posing a real and present threat to the internal security of the United States. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, an Agent Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for administering this program to assure the apprehension and special handling of the individuals included therein in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba.

Scope and Desired Objectives

As of July 15, 1971, there were 409 individuals included in the Security Index - Cuba Program, divided into two categories:

1. Individuals placed on the Security Index solely on account of their pro-Cuban activities (Cuban Special Section - 93 persons).

2. Persons already on the Security Index because of other subversive connections and activities who would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban" - 316 individuals).
Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date record of location and activities of individuals included therein, by means of established Security Index procedures and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of these persons become necessary.

Positive Results Achieved

Determination as to the validity of an individual's inclusion in this program is constantly under review. Since the program was last justified on April 7, 1971, the number of persons on the Cuban Section of the Index has been reduced from 95 to 93. These 93 persons are judged to be hard-core pro-Cubans, action against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory. Of these 93, 28 are Cuban aliens. Each subject of pending security investigations with Cuban ramifications is considered for inclusion in the Index.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The Agent Supervisor responsible for this program is required to review each investigative communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether the individual meets the criteria for inclusion in the Index, as outlined in the Manual of Instructions. He must make a decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the field's recommendations regarding these matters. He initiates procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence Division and Voucher Statistical Section of the Administrative Division regarding the placing of an individual on the Index, his removal and the assignment or change in apprehension priority.

If the individual involved is an alien, correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre-positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and Naturalization Service. Action is also taken with the Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index.
Current Justification

The threat to the internal security of the United States from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years. A workable priority apprehension system which receives current and continuing attention is mandatory. This program, as presently organized and handled, is fully justified.

Frequencies of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation

This program is evaluated on a semiannual basis. The most recent review and evaluation was dated April 7, 1971.
AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM

The American Repatriate Program which was instituted in February, 1962, to specify procedure to be followed upon receipt of information that U.S. citizens residing in Cuba had been issued Swiss Protection Passports by Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba, for travel to U. S. was discontinued by memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated March 25, 1971.
CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE U. S.  4-H
(Bufile 105-135923)

CHINESE ENTERING THE U.S.
CLAIMING U.S. CITIZENSHIP
(Bufile 105-12752)

Inasmuch as the criteria and objectives regarding the above two programs are similar, both are included in this write-up.

Investigations under the Chinese alien program were instituted 1/26/65 and investigations relating to Chinese entering the U. S. claiming U. S. citizenship were initiated 9/14/65.

Both of the above programs are designed to uncover, through investigation, ethnic Chinese who may enter the U. S. under the guise of a legitimate alien and/or U. S. citizen but who, in fact, may be covert intelligence agents of Communist China. Prior to inception of these programs, we were made aware of emphasis placed by Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence organizations on the need to introduce illegal agents into the U. S. Provided sufficient indoctrination and training are given, the legal alien channel is undoubtedly the easiest way to accomplish the desire of the Chicsoms to plant their agents in this country.

Under existing immigration laws, up to 10,000 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U. S. for permanent residence annually. Under an additional program initiated in 1971, another 250 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U. S. monthly as Conditional Entrants. All of these aliens have backgrounds closely connecting them with Communist China and some leave behind on the mainland immediate family members or very close relatives. Our experience in this field over the years indicates that alien entrants into the U. S. who may be selected for intelligence assignments would probably have resided in a communist country while in the 19 to 45-year age group and would probably have at least 8 years of formal education. Accordingly, our investigations of aliens are limited to those who fit the above criteria.

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The key to investigations of this type is the initial interview which is conducted after the field office covering the alien's residence has developed sufficient background information on the subject. These interviews are designed to have the subject personally verify information he may have furnished to U.S. authorities at some time in the past and in cases where significant discrepancies are disclosed through the interview, we will intensify the investigation, looking toward the possibility that the subject is now unable to recall a previous cover story. In the event the initial interview is satisfactory, the case is closed subject to being reopened after two years for a second interview. The second interview, which is conducted for the same purpose as the first interview, will determine whether or not additional action is to be taken. If the second interview is satisfactory, no subsequent action is taken with regard to the subject. Cases investigated under the citizenship program are handled in a similar manner.

Our investigations in both these areas produce intelligence information of various types which is valuable to other U.S. agencies having a primary interest in developments in mainland China. The two programs have produced tangible results in that a number of sources in the Chinese field have been developed through interviews.

Chinese alien cases originate with Legal Attache, Hong Kong, who views appropriate records and thereafter submits pertinent data to the Bureau regarding those aliens who fit the criteria for investigation or any others whose backgrounds are deemed to be so unusual that investigation may be justified even though they do not fit the criteria. Cases in the citizenship category are initiated by the Washington Field Office after review of passport records. Alien and citizenship cases are handled on the Desks of two Supervisors and constitute only a portion of the work on each Desk. Results of investigation are carefully reviewed and evaluated in line with our objective of determining if the subject is or may be of investigative interest.

It is felt that these two programs are fully justified for continuation since they cover areas which may be utilized by the Chicsms to introduce illegal agents into this country. No other U.S. investigative agency carries out investigative activity along this line. In addition, these programs provide us with sources and positive intelligence of
interest to other U. S. agencies. No additional manpower is necessary to carry out our responsibilities under these programs.

These programs are evaluated and justified annually. Both programs were considered justified based on Division inspection write-up 1/12/71.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN) (Bufile 105-135614)

Captioned program was initiated in May, 1965, to combat Chinese communist (Chicom) efforts to initiate intelligence operations and develop intelligence data in the United States.

Analysis indicates that our current efforts relating to development of informants, particularly double agents, is an activity which we normally carry out in connection with our intelligence responsibilities. Since CHICOIN was previously defined as a means by which we were creating situations and placing our informants in contact with Chicoms abroad, with the aim of their being recruited by the Chicoms, it is felt we are accomplishing the same objective through source and double agent development in individual cases.

We are constantly aware of the need to employ counterintelligence methods designed toward penetration of Chicom intelligence, particularly since a Chicom official establishment has opened in Canada and with the knowledge that the Chicoms will probably enter the United Nations within the next 14 months. Along these lines, we are continuing, on an individual basis, development of sources who can be directed toward the penetration mentioned above.

Accordingly, it is felt that use of the term CHICOIN in connection with our basic efforts, is no longer necessary. CHICOIN, as a program, is therefore discontinued.
VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

I. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.

This program was initiated in 8/65 in an effort to uncover Chinese communist (Chicom) activities in the United States. The identities of individuals, both citizens and noncitizens who are residents of this country, were furnished to us by United States intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services. These individuals either attempted to enter Communist China or contacted the diplomatic establishments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) throughout the world. Since 1965, the number of diplomatic establishments maintained by the PRC has increased many times, particularly during the past year when many countries recognized the PRC.

This program is field-wide and not directly connected with any other investigative program. The objectives include identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom establishments. It is essential that visitors to Communist China and PRC Embassies in foreign countries be identified to determine if they have access to classified material or could be utilized for an intelligence or espionage assignment upon their return to the United States. During recent months, the United States Government has lifted the ban on travel to Communist China. However, the PRC has been very selective in the issuance of travel documents to United States citizens and, up until now, has restricted the issuance of these documents to chiefly a few newspapermen, some scholars, known pro-Chicom sympathizers and a very limited number of ethnic Chinese. During the past month, the Department of State and the Justice Department have indicated that the travel restrictions will be lifted on permanent resident aliens in the United States who wish to visit Communist China, Outer Mongolia and Albania. Previously, the restrictions on United States citizens limited the number who actually entered China as well as the number of visitors to PRC diplomatic establishments. The lifting of the
restrictions on United States citizens and the proposed amendment to the law concerning permanent resident aliens will greatly increase the number of investigations under this program. Many of the individuals traveling to China from the United States will be legitimate merchants, scholars and tourists. However, they will be subjected to possible approaches for intelligence purposes. In addition, we will possibly be able to utilize legitimate travelers as walk-ins. Therefore, it is essential that we fully identify all those who enter China or contact PRC diplomatic establishments abroad. The ethnic Chinese is of greatest interest to the Chicoms as a visitor, particularly if he has relatives residing on the Chinese mainland. Based upon the experiences of friendly foreign intelligence agencies, particularly RCMP, we have learned that the Chicoms primarily recruit as intelligence agents the ethnic Chinese.

2. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.

Investigations since the last inspection have greatly increased. Many of the investigations are in the initial stages of identifying the individuals. In February, 1971, the Chicoms established an Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. During that month, 14 United States residents contacted the Embassy. During June, 156 residents contacted the Embassy in addition to contacts with the Chicom propaganda news agency, New China News Agency. Included among these people are ethnic Chinese, national political figures in the United States, China scholars, journalists and merchants. The increase from February through June of over 1,000 percent indicates the acceleration of the problem facing the Bureau in this program. During July, there was a substantial increase over June. The Chicoms have taken on a new look and are encouraging visitors to the Embassy in Ottawa. Our common border, which is so easily crossed, offers no resistance and it is through the excellent cooperation of the RCMP that we are able to obtain the names and addresses of individuals contacting the Embassy or the New China News Agency (NCNA). It is expected that in the future the number of contacts will increase both at Ottawa as well as at the China Travel Service in Hong Kong and the various Embassies of the PRC in foreign countries. The present policies of the President and the Department of State speaking for the United States Government
will continue to encourage visitors, any of which is a possible subject for recruitment by Chicom intelligence for hard espionage, intelligence activities or propagandizing the American people.


Portions of this program are handled by three Bureau supervisors. However, the visitors to China are correlated by one supervisor and the contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments are correlated by a second supervisor. This has become necessary because of the increased work load based upon information furnished by RCMP through Legat Ottawa. Investigations are conducted to fully identify the individuals primarily through established sources, if possible, to determine their current residence and particularly their employment. Identification of employment is essential to determine if the individual has access to classified information or if he is in some field of endeavor which is of particular interest to the Chicom. Each case is evaluated on its individual merits and cases are not opened on individuals on whom sufficient background information is available, such as nationally known journalists, scholars or political figures.


RCMP has advised as recently as July, 1971, that they feel that at least 50 percent of the Chinese communist intelligence effort in Canada will be directed against the United States. The wife of a Chicom intelligence officer of the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa has stated that the Embassy staff in Canada will be large because "we will be responsible for the United States as well as Canada." It is absolutely necessary that this program be continued to identify all contacts both in Canada as well as at other PRC diplomatic establishments throughout the world. In addition, Legat, Hong Kong, has submitted a form which has been approved to forward to the Bureau the identities of those individuals who are American citizens or permanent resident aliens who cross the border of Hong Kong into Communist China at Lo Wu.
In addition, identity of visitors will give us a fertile field for development of sources which we may utilize as walk-ins, particularly at the Embassy in Ottawa. RCMP has greatly encouraged this procedure.

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification.

This program is evaluated annually and the last date of justification took place on 1/12/71.
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: In order that the overall foreign liaison can be fully and currently evaluated, you are requested to furnish your comments concerning each Legal Attache Office presently operating (17); former Legal Attache Offices which you have proposed to be reopened (3); and proposed new Legal Attache Offices (3).

In providing this information, you are requested to be specific as to: (1) productivity (including intelligence) of each existing office (provide examples); (2) comment as to adequacy of personnel assigned (fully document if additions, deletions or changes recommended); (3) make specific recommendations regarding continuing or discontinuing each of existing offices.

You are also requested to state your current recommendations regarding each former and new Legal Attache Office proposed above.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: C. D. BRENNA: (CDB: mls 8/25/71)

I concur with the attached comprehensive analysis of Section Chief Wannall in regard to our Legal Attache operations abroad. The Inspector should particularly note Wannall's concluding observation that any future expansion abroad will be resisted by the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless specifically ordered by the White House, will require approval from State and Bureau of the Budget. As Mr. Wannall points out, we are not in a position to balance the value of the information expected against the costs, and I would suggest the Inspector insure that a copy of Mr. Wannall's overall analysis is furnished to the Administrative Division inasmuch as the Director on 8/23/71 approved the recommendation that the Administrative Division should coordinate and handle all requests for increased staffing, as well as the creation of new Legal Attache posts.
LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES
FOREIGN LIAISON

COMMENTS OF SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL: In response to the Inspector's inquiry, comments follow concerning (1) the 11 foreign offices in operation prior to the expansion in December, 1970, (2) the 6 new offices opened in December, 1970, and (3) the 6 additional offices which we proposed be opened in response to the Director's inquiry in May, 1971. With respect to categories (1) and (2) it is noted that these 17 offices have just undergone inspection, most of them during the current month. As very few of the inspection reports are yet available, these comments are necessarily based upon those facets of the work which it is possible to observe from the Seat of Government.

(1) Offices in Operation Prior to Expansion

BERN

Our operations in Switzerland are most delicate because of the fierce independence of the Swiss, who would not permit the use of "Legal Attache" as it was considered too widely identified with the FBI. As a result, our representative is known in the Embassy and in Switzerland merely as an Attache. The office has become increasingly important in the criminal field very recently as a result of the large scale thefts of securities in the United States and their transportation to and attempted sale or hypothecation in Switzerland. In addition, it has long been the goal to obtain access to information concerning bank accounts opened in Switzerland by subjects of our investigations. Progress has been slow but we have been able to secure limited information and the cooperation received is the direct result of the personal liaison of our Legal Attache.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, the office located 7 fugitives and arranged 4 "informal deportations." Its pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 83 which is approximately average on a per agent basis in the foreign field. Through 8/23/71 Bern had submitted 7 HILEV items of which 5 were actually disseminated. This is the smallest number of submissions of any Legal Attache and the second smallest number of acceptable items.
Personnel
Adequate. No increase envisioned.

Recommendation
Continue.

BONN

This is a very important European office covering Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. There is a high volume of both criminal and security work. The large United State military presence in Germany is both an espionage target and a source of Bureau work. The military intercept program furnishes our office copies of correspondence passing through Germany to and from Iron Curtain countries and the volume of this is so great as to require extra clerical assistance. The Legal Attache has served in Germany since 1951 and is universally respected and given full cooperation.

Productivity

In fiscal 1971 20 persons wanted in the United States were located in the Bonn territory and 5 stolen cars were recovered. The Legal Attache is currently working a ring case which will result in location of an additional number. Through 8/23/71 he has submitted 18 HILEV items of which 7 have been disseminated. This is considerably below average and this matter was discussed with the Legal Attache during his visit to Washington on home leave recently. He has shown improvement as evidenced by the fact that he has submitted 4 items already during August of which 3 have been used. His pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 355 which is considerably above average on a per agent basis.

Personnel

A third agent was added to Bonn in December, 1970, at the time Austria was added to its territory. It is felt this is adequate.

Recommendation
Continue.
BUENOS AIRES

For several years this was a one-man office attempting to cover not only Argentina but also Brazil, some 1,200 miles away and larger than the United States. Although we had a very capable Legal Attache, he could barely touch the high spots in his territory and maintained a very low case load. Two additional agents were assigned in December, 1970, and Paraguay was added to the Legal Attache's responsibilities as was intelligence reporting on Chile. We believe the results have justified this move although one agent is still trying to cover Brazil on a road trip basis.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 38 persons wanted in the United States were located in the territory. The pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 294 and above average on a per agent basis. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 47 HILDV items of which 21 have been used and 2 are still pending. This is well above the average.

Personnel

One agent and one clerk could be transferred from Buenos Aires if an office were to be opened in Rio de Janeiro. Under present circumstances, the personnel is adequate but three agents and three clerks would not be needed if Brazil was removed from their territory.

Recommendation

Continue. At present, this is our only point of coverage for an enormous area of South America.

HONG KONG

Originally opened to provide coverage of Chinese communist activities, Hong Kong fell heir to the entire Southwest Pacific area when our office in Manila was closed. We believe the area has a high potential both for cases pertaining to the Bureau's domestic jurisdiction and for items of high-level intelligence. The intermittent road trips, however, do not permit adequate development of contacts who can be relied upon to look out for our interests. In addition, the Legal Attache has required an abnormal amount
of supervision in regard to administrative matters. He experiences great difficulty in meeting deadlines and has been censured twice already this year for delays in reporting. He has an outstanding personality, speaks readily and fluently, and has a good background in Chinese matters. Nevertheless, very few of his HILEV submissions have been acceptable and he has evidenced a lack of understanding of what constitutes intelligence of interest to the White House. It was suggested that these matters be inquired into by the Inspector together with the Legal Attache's relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) so far as the passage of information to and from British sources is concerned. The results of the inspection are not yet known.

**Productivity**

Fifty-four persons wanted in the United States were located by the office during fiscal 1971. Eight "informal deportations" were arranged. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 178 which is approximately average on a per agent basis. As of 8/23/71, the Legal Attache had submitted 27 items for HILEV dissemination of which 7 were considered acceptable.

**Personnel**

The present personnel complement is not considered adequate to discharge the Bureau's responsibilities, including HILEV in Southeast Asia. We have, however, recommended that three additional offices be opened in this area. If these offices are opened, the complement of two agents and two clerks should be able to handle the work in Hong Kong and, if necessary, provide relief to any one-man office opened in the area.

**Recommendation**

Continue. The resumption of relations with Communist China will make this office increasingly important.

**LONDON**

This is our most productive office in Western Europe and handles a heavy volume of criminal cases. Our office has developed a very close relationship with Scotland
Yard and its Special Branch with the result that we receive splendid cooperation in both criminal and security investigations in the London area. There are always a large number of Americans in England and Ireland and there will always be a need for our representation there.

Productivity

As of 6/30/71, London had 333 pending cases, the largest number per agent of any office except Ottawa. Ninety-one persons wanted in the United States were located by the office during fiscal 1971 and 4 "informal deportations" were arranged despite the British insistence upon formal legal procedures. As of 8/23/71, London had submitted 20 items for HILEV dissemination 11 of which were accepted. This is slightly below average.

Personnel

We have recommended that consideration be given to assigning an additional agent to London and if approved, this will still leave London with an above average number of cases per man. We believe that the Bureau gets high value for its investment in the London Office.

Recommendation

Continue.

MADRID

An increasing number of American travelers are visiting Spain and they have included fugitives and other United States criminals. The present Legal Attache has developed strong contacts in Spain, including Prince Juan Carlos, the heir apparent to General Franco. Although operating alone, the Legal Attache has done a particularly good job both in his contacts and the administration of his office.

Productivity

Twenty-four persons wanted in the United States were located by the Legal Attache during fiscal 1971. His case load as of 6/30/71 was 115 which is substantially above average on a per agent basis. To date, he has submitted 28 items for HILEV dissemination of which 17 have been accepted with 2 still pending. This is above average.
Personnel

We recently recommended that one agent and one clerk be added to Madrid in the event of a future expansion. While the present complement can handle the normal FBI cases, the emphasis on HILEV items can best be satisfied by an additional agent.

Recommendation

Continue.

MEXICO CITY

Our operation in Mexico is unique in that we are actively developing informants and working most closely with the cooperative Mexican officers who handle our cases there. This is our largest office both in terms of case load and personnel. Unlike Canada where practically all our work is handled by one agency, we are dealing with a number of different agencies in Mexico most of which lack the training and sophistication of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) hence the disparity in the personnel required to handle our work north and south of the border. In an effort to streamline our operations in Mexico, the Legal Attache has been instructed to reduce the number of informants he is operating and to cut back on his investigation in certain areas such as the American Communist Group in Mexico.

Productivity

Two hundred and eighteen persons wanted in the United States were located by the Mexico City Office during fiscal 1971. Thirty "informal deportations" were arranged and 53 stolen automobiles were recovered. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 627 which is below average on a per agent basis. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 37 HILEV items of which 28 were actually disseminated. This is substantially above average.

Personnel

We feel the present complement is adequate until the Legal Attache recommends additional "Resident Agencies." The large expanse of territory and the necessity of working
closely with Mexican police require our agents to be on the scene for anything but relatively routine investigations. The Legal Attache has for some time been considering possibility of opening one or more additional "Resident Agencies" to afford faster coverage and more thorough investigations in areas which now require extended road trips.

Recommendation

Continue.

OTTAWA

With Mexico City this is one of our two most important and productive offices. The establishment of a Chinese Communist Diplomatic Mission in Canada, the asylum afforded our deserters and Selective Service fugitives, and the relatively open border make Canada an area of intense FBI interest. We are fortunate in having RCMP with nation-wide security jurisdiction and nearly nation-wide police jurisdiction to handle our investigations. While we have a two-man office in Ottawa, RCMP has a three-man office in Washington because of the number of United States agencies with which they do business. Our relations with RCMP are outstanding and they are the closest counterpart of the FBI of any foreign investigative agency.

Productivity

The case load as of 6/30/71 was 548 which is by far the highest on a per agent basis. During fiscal 1971, the office located 994 FBI fugitives, 37 fugitives for other agencies, 755 Selective Service delinquents, and recovered 92 stolen automobiles. Ninety "informal deportations" were effected. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 22 HILEV items of which 10 were used. This is below average.

Personnel

The sheer volume of work makes the problem in Ottawa primarily clerical. As a streamlining measure, RCMP has printed routing slips with spaces for our titles and file numbers which the Legal Attache uses in forwarding RCMP work to the Bureau. An additional clerk has recently been furnished Ottawa and it is expected that the recent inspection will have noted the effect of this increase.

Recommendation

Continue.
PARIS

This is a major continental office to which an additional Agent was assigned at the time of the recent expansion in order to concentrate on development of high-level intelligence. Our Legat enjoys the confidence of the French investigative agencies and is able to secure cooperation which is denied to the Central Intelligence Agency as a result of the latter's involvement in a wire tapping incident during the 1960's. The departure of the American military from France has somewhat reduced the volume of criminal matters, but the establishment of NATO Headquarters in Brussels, also in Paris territory, has continued the flow of security matters. A substantial number of friends of the Bureau visit Paris each year and require time and attention from our Legat.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 23 persons wanted in the United States were located by Legat, Paris. His case load as of 6/30/71 was 244, which is average on a per Agent basis. As of 8/23/71, Paris has submitted 38 HILEV items, of which 21 have been used and one is pending. This is above average.

Personnel

No increase in personnel is envisaged for Paris. This office provides both clerical and Agent relief to Madrid.

Recommendation

Continue.

ROME

In addition to Italy, Rome covers Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on a road trip basis. The office has not yet reached its full potential in the development of political intelligence, but a very satisfactory relationship exists with the Italian investigative agencies; and we are receiving coverage of organized crime figures and other criminals who have relocated in Italy. It is expected that the Legat
will expand his contacts in Italian cities other than Rome, such as Naples, Milan, Florence, and Venice, in order to widen his capabilities in the criminal field and improve his collection of HILEV intelligence items.

**Productivity**

During fiscal 1971, 14 persons wanted in the United States were located by the office and one informal deportation was arranged. As of 6/30/71, there were 145 pending cases, slightly below average on a per Agent basis. As of 8/23/71, 13 HILEV items had been submitted, of which 9 were used. This is below average.

**Personnel**

We believe the personnel are adequate but not excessive.

**Recommendation**

Continue.

**TOKYO**

In addition to Japan, Tokyo covers South Korea and Formosa. The latter presents a particularly delicate situation as the United States moves toward recognition of Communist China. Our Nationalist Chinese contacts, however, have promised to continue their cooperation despite what they view as an unsympathetic move by the United States Government. Despite the language barrier in both South Korea and Formosa, our representatives have been consistently successful in getting the work of the Bureau handled in adequate fashion. As the United States military commitment in Japan is reduced and as the economic goals of the United States and Japan draw farther apart, it is increasingly important that we have a liaison capability in Tokyo.

**Productivity**

During fiscal 1971, Tokyo located 23 persons wanted in the United States and arranged three informal deportations. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 279,
substantially above average on a per Agent basis and the third highest of the foreign offices on that basis. Tokyo has submitted 40 items for HILEV dissemination, of which 17 have been used. This is slightly above average.

Personnel

We have recommended that one Agent and one clerk be added to Tokyo in the event of further expansion. This would permit more frequent visits to Taiwan and South Korea and would also permit widening of contacts within Japan itself, which is necessary if increased emphasis is to be placed upon HILEV production.

Recommendation

Continue.

(2) New Offices Opened in December, 1970

The following six offices were opened in December 1970, for the specific purpose of developing HILEV intelligence. Four of these offices were opened in entirely new territory while two were assigned areas previously handled by other Legats. In considering these six offices, it must be recognized that they were primarily intended as intelligence collectors and not as sources of normal Bureau cases. We have been pleased, however, to note that several of these offices are making a substantial contribution to the Bureau's domestic jurisdiction in addition to their HILEV work.

BEIRUT

This is a one-man post established in new territory where there had previously been little need for coverage. The Legat has developed several very productive sources of political intelligence and at the present time is the highest producer of HILEV items. He has been commended for this. Nevertheless, should there be any reduction in White House interest in HILEV items, we could not justify continuation of this office.

Productivity

One FBI fugitive and one Selective Service delinquent were located by this office between January and June,
1971. As of 6/30/71, there was a pending case load of 27, which is the smallest case load of any foreign office. Beirut has submitted 61 HILEV items, of which 31 have been used and three are still pending. This is the largest number of items used submitted by any office.

Personnel

Present complement is fully adequate and cannot be reduced. Vacation relief for the Legat should come from Rome and for the clerk from Tel Aviv (we cannot send Assistant Legat Rubenstein to relieve in Beirut because of the political situation).

Recommendation

In view of the high production of HILEV items, the office should be continued.

CARACAS

This office was opened to cover the large area of northern South America, together with the numerous territories and independent countries in the West Indies. It is essentially a road trip office and affords the Bureau coverage in an area where we have been totally dependent upon the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency for the handling of our leads. Our Legat, who started out with a semihostile Ambassador, has won the latter's respect and has made a gratifying start at development of the large and scattered area assigned to him. In addition to the Latin-American countries, he is covering French, British, and Dutch possessions; and the effectiveness of his liaison is demonstrated by his ability to devise channels of communication to his contacts throughout his area.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, Caracas located 11 FBI fugitives, one fugitive for another agency, and three Selective Service delinquents, while arranging one informal deportation. His case load 6/30/71 was 72, which is well below average on a per agent basis but is expected to increase with the further development of his territory. He has submitted 25 HILEV items, of which 12 have been used. This is slightly below average.
Personnel

In view of the road trip nature of this territory, two Agents will be necessary to insure continued coverage. While the present case load is low, this is a brand new office in completely new territory and we expect improvement.

Recommendation

This office should be continued without regard to the emphasis on HILEVS.
COPENHAGEN

This office was opened to exploit the potential of the Scandinavian countries handled on a road trip basis from London prior to the expansion in December, 1970. A large number of deserters, Selective Service subjects, and other fugitives have been granted asylum in Sweden and the liberality of the laws in Denmark has served as a magnet for youth from the United States. In addition, the entire area is attuned to moves from the Soviet Union and it was hoped that there would be a reasonable volume of regular Bureau work together with a steady flow of political intelligence. The potential of the office has not yet been reached. The unfortunate security breach which resulted in the change of Legal Attaches has put an experienced man in charge but he has been there less than two months and has not yet been able to bring the office into line. There has already been a marked improvement in the rate of HILEV submissions and we expect the office to be more successful under new management.

Productivity

Twenty-eight persons wanted in the United States were located by the Legal Attache during the first six months of 1971. One "informal deportation" was arranged. The case load as of 6/30/71 (prior to arrival of the new Legal Attache) was 43 representing the smallest per agent assignment of any Legal Attache. Through July, 1971, Copenhagen had submitted 8 HILEVs of which 2 were used. Already in August, 4 submissions have been received for a total of 12 and 3 have been used for a total of 5 with 1 still pending. This is the smallest HILEV production of any Legal Attache and Bulet 8/4/71 pointed this out and insisted upon improvement. Results thus far in August indicate that the Legal Attache is responding.

Personnel

While the present case load does not, on the surface, justify continuation of a two-man office, we believe the potential for far greater achievement exists in the Scandinavian countries and we feel that the new Legal Attache should be given an opportunity to exploit this potential.
Recommendation

We recommend that the office be continued in its present status for an additional six months at the end of which time consideration should be given as to its personnel complement.

LA PAZ

Coverage of Bolivia and Peru was initiated for the sole purpose of developing HILEV data and cannot be justified on any other grounds. The Legal Attache has done an outstanding job under very difficult circumstances. The government (until 8/22/71) was pro-communist and basically anti-United States. The Legal Attache is living inside a barbed wire fence with a full-time guard at his door. We have had to armor plate his car and furnish him a two-way radio to insure full-time communications with his Embassy. The altitude is such that persons with other than completely strong hearts and lungs should not be permitted to visit there. The office gives us coverage in an area we have not visited since the days of SIS but normal Bureau work there is minimal.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, the Legal Attache located 1 FBI fugitive and 3 Selective Service delinquents. His case load as of 6/30/71 was 45 which is well below average on a per agent basis. He has submitted 24 HILEV items of which 14 have been used which is about average. He has twice furnished advance information concerning important political developments including the current coup and he has received commendation from the Director for the material he has furnished.

Personnel

The work load certainly cannot justify any increase in personnel but it cannot be decreased without closing the office.

Recommendation

It is recommended that operations continue in La Paz for another six months at the end of which time a close hard look should be given to closing the office. It is possible that a more friendly regime in Bolivia will result in an increase in HILEV items but it will have no bearing on his over-all case load.
MANAGUA

This is an office opened in the right area but in the wrong place. There is Bureau business in Central America and we had long considered recommending an office there prior to the President's request in 1970. We did not want to open in Managua, however, but in San Jose, Costa Rica, where the living conditions are far superior. We were forced to settle for Managua when the Ambassador to Costa Rica objected to our opening there. As a result, we have two men living under difficult circumstances resulting in varied domestic problems including education of their children, and morale in our Managua Office is probably lower than in any other foreign post. It was expected that Central America would prove a fertile source of HILEV items because of the constantly changing political alignments in the various governments. This has not been the case and Bulet 6/4/71 informed the Legal Attache of our disappointment in his production. At the start of June he had only submitted 2 items, 1 of which had been used. He is showing improvement as indicated by the submission of three items in June, four in July, and five in August, as of 8/23/71. The Legal Attache has been placed on probation as a result of administrative deficiencies discovered by the Inspector and it is expected that this will have a salutary effect not only in his administration but also in the contribution of his office to the work of the Bureau.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, 14 persons wanted in the United States were located in Central America, 5 "informal deportations" were arranged, and 10 stolen automobiles were recovered. The Managua case load as of 6/30/71 was 65 which is far below average. A total of 14 HILEV items have been received of which 9 have been accepted. This total is below average but his current submission rate is well above average.

Personnel

The 7 Central American countries have enough substantive Bureau work to justify the present complement of this office, if the potential is fully exploited. We are watching this situation closely and expect marked improvement.
Recommendation

It is recommended that this office continue. It is possible that a change in leadership may be necessary as indicated by the Inspector's findings and recommendations concerning this will be made as soon as it can be determined whether or not there has been an improvement.

TEL AVIV

This office was opened solely as a source of HILEV material and it has proved fertile in this respect. There have been some unexpected fringe benefits in that an organized crime figure has taken refuge in Tel Aviv and the Legal Attache has been able to secure the cooperation of the Israeli police in affording coverage to the anti-Soviet Jewish Defense League, which has proven so troublesome in the New York City area. As the office has only been open during the current year, it is too early to assess accurately either its potential or its achievements.

Productivity

Eight persons wanted in the United States have been located in Israel and 3 "informal deportations" arranged. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 69, which is considerably below average on a per agent basis. Forty-four HILEV items have been submitted of which 27 have been used with 1 pending. This is substantially above average, and the Director recently noted the Legal Attache's excellent production and he has been recommended for commendation.

Personnel

It is too early to make an accurate assessment as to future personnel needs. One agent could handle the present case load but we do not feel that the full potential of the area has yet been reached and any reduction would result in two one-man offices at the end of the Mediterranean with accompanying problems of relief.

Recommendation

Continue for the time being.
(3) New Offices Recommended If Further Expansion Undertaken

In response to the Director's request, we recommended by memorandum 5/28/71 that six additional offices be opened for the specific purpose of increasing our production of high-level intelligence of interest to the White House. Three of these would be offices formerly operated but presently closed, while three would be completely new offices. The following are the three former Legat offices which we proposed be opened:

MANILA

We recommended that one Agent and one clerk be assigned to Manila to relieve Hong Kong of its present road trip coverage and to provide closer following of political developments in the Philippines, which area is apparently drawing farther away from its former close alignment with the United States. We have a number of applicant-type loads in the Philippines, and the handling of these could be expedited by a representative on the scene.

RIO DE JANEIRO

We proposed that two Agents and two clerks be assigned to reopen our office in this important population center of Brazil, a country larger than the United States. We are presently trying to cover this area from Buenos Aires, which is over 1,200 miles away, and we are passing up the opportunity to develop political intelligence items concerning developments in this huge country which, like most of Latin America, is in the throes of deciding between communism and capitalism.

SANTO DOMINGO

We proposed that one Agent and one clerk be assigned to reopen our office at the capital of the Dominican Republic. This would be entirely for the purpose of developing HILEV items, although there is a modicum of Bureau work in the area which is presently handled on a road trip basis from San Juan. We developed a number of
informants and sources during our period of operation there, and we feel that these could be reactivated to become a productive source of HILEV material.

The following are the three new offices which we proposed be opened, each to have a complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerks:

**CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA**

This office could cover Australia and New Zealand thereby relieving Hong Kong from its present futile efforts to cover the area by road trip and give on-scene coverage in this huge area where our work has been increasing. We presently are trying to cover 35 leads in the area which indicates there is a nucleus of essential Bureau business upon which an office can be predicated. Here again, however, the primary function of the new office would be production of HILEV items.

**KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA**

This office would cover Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, presently handled out of Hong Kong, and would initiate coverage in Indonesia, where we have no coverage other than through State and the Central Intelligence Agency. There is now a nucleus of 20 Bureau cases pending, insufficient to justify the opening of an office, but the high interest in Southeast Asia would indicate that any production of political intelligence should include coverage in this area. Opening of the two foregoing offices, plus Manila, would relieve Hong Kong of all road trips and permit that office to concentrate on the important security matters involved in the new relationship between Communist China and the United States.
NEW DELHI, INDIA

This office would open completely new territory affording coverage of India, East and West Pakistan, and Nepal. The potential for political intelligence here is high, but there would be very little substantive Bureau work in the area.

Our recommendation for opening of the six foregoing offices was made strictly in response to the Director's request. We cannot justify opening of these offices on the basis of substantive Bureau business, but it is our judgment that these offer the most productive locations for the development of political intelligence. Any expansion abroad will be resisted by State and the Central Intelligence Agency; and unless specifically ordered by the White House, will require approval from Budget and State who maintain a personnel ceiling for each Department's representatives abroad. We are not in a position to balance the value of the information expected against the costs.
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You are requested to clarify and document your observations "that any future expansion abroad will be resisted by the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless specifically ordered by the White House will require approval from State and the Bureau of the Budget."

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(GAD:hc 8/27/71)

The quoted observation concerning anticipated problems to be encountered in connection with any future expansion is based solely upon our experience during the December, 1970, expansion, together with regulations which have been promulgated applicable to United States personnel overseas. In December, 1970, we asked to open an office in San Jose, Costa Rica, but ended up in Managua, Nicaragua, a much less desirable location, because of what was termed the "objective of lower United States profile" in Costa Rica. We asked to open an office in Saigon, Vietnam, and were met with intolerable restrictions imposed by the Ambassador, with the result that we canceled our request. In connection with opening in Caracas, Venezuela, the Ambassador there demanded that we agree to coordinate any intelligence activities with the Central Intelligence Agency under the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 and that our representative measure up to a certain standard in his ability in Spanish. In fact, the Ambassador in Caracas said he would send our man back on the same plane if he did not possess the desired ability. Even before we had made a formal request, State indicated their desire that we not open an office in Helsinki, Finland, because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) then in progress.

Reference to approval by State and Budget is actually reference to the procedures established for any increase in overseas personnel. Such procedures are of long standing being known under the Johnson Administration as "BALPA" (Balance of Payments) and initially during the Nixon Administration as "OPRED" (Overseas Personnel Reduction). A "National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee," which includes representation from Budget and State, establishes fixed ceilings on all United States civilian employees abroad. Under the rules established by this

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committee any increase in these ceilings must be either 
(a) a result of "special studies" or at White House direction; 
or (b) by a request for a ceiling increase by proposal to 
the committee explaining the requirement and demonstrating 
its consistency with national policy and approved program 
plans. The present FBI ceiling is 88, and regular reports 
concerning our overseas positions are made to the committee 
through the Department by the Administrative Division.

The above has been set forth in some detail in 
response to the Inspector's request. The Director has stated 
that any expansion will be discussed with Dr. Kissinger at 
the White House before any action is taken. White House 
approval supersedes red tape developed by other agencies. 
We are confident that the President's desires can be rapidly and 
efficiently satisfied once he gives the word.
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Since the last inspection there have been certain significant developments in the overall problems of meeting our responsibilities to this work. You are requested to furnish briefly such developments and also provide your appraisal of the situation as presently see it. Obviously, there are strong indications that increases of investigative manpower in the field and imaginative supervision and direction here will be necessary. What has been accomplished since last inspection and what are your plans for the immediate future? Be specific in advising of programs currently being considered for recommended implementation.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: There is no doubt that our work in the Chinese field will increase both at the SOG and in the field. Attached are comments by Section Chief Wannall with which I concur. Proposals for implementing programs discussed will be recommended by appropriate memoranda.
At the outset it should be noted that Western nations have been isolated from Communist China for more than twenty years. The Chinese communists (Chicom) have established themselves officially in countries of the same or similar political persuasion and, therefore, we receive little or no data concerning the Chicom's which is relevant to our investigative responsibilities in the security field. We have been fortunate, however, to receive from Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) much data relating to their experience with the Chicom's who are now firmly officially established in Canada. The programs and methods we use or may implement in the future to deal with the Chicom's must, in some measure, be based on our prior experience in the security and intelligence fields and an analysis of the data we have received from the RCMP.

Recent Developments and Appraisals Thereof

Since last inspection (1/26/71), the following significant developments have occurred:

1. The Chicom Embassy in Canada has become operational. The Embassy staff numbers 26, of whom nine (33 percent) are known or suspected intelligence officers. The significance of the aforementioned figures is obvious when we recall the report of an RCMP source who quoted the wife of an Embassy official as stating "The (Chicom) staff will necessarily be large as it will be responsible for the United States as well as Canada." In addition, RCMP has advised, based on its intensified and expanded coverage of the Chicom's, that at least 50 percent of Chicom effort in the intelligence field having a Canadian base will be directed against the United States. RCMP has confidentially advised us that the Canadian External Affairs Office is willing to allow the Chicom official staff in Canada a maximum of 60 persons. This approximates the number of individuals staffing Soviet official establishments in Canada.

In appraising the above, we must heed the warning flags and prepare for a severe test of our resourcefulness. We cannot expect less than a substantial effort by the Chicom's to mount a variety of intelligence operations against this country from Canada. This situation will exist at least as long as no official Chicom establishment is located in this country.

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2. Restrictions on travel of U. S. citizens to Red China have been lifted entirely, and there is presently under study by Department of State and the Attorney General a recommendation that the prohibition on travel of permanent resident aliens to Red China also be lifted.

While the Chicoms have not allowed wholesale entry of Occidentals into their country, recent events suggest they are slowly but surely revising policy to permit more Westerners to visit the mainland. We are aware that the Chicoms have openly supported revolutionaries who operate in the U. S., and the desirability of personal contact with such types as well as with others who would work for the Chicoms is obvious. The new United States policy regarding travel of U. S. citizens to Red China will most assuredly prompt overt travel by individuals of Chicom persuasion as well as by persons who could well be subjected to an intelligence recruitment approach albeit unwittingly. While this area may not immediately present problems of the magnitude expected in other areas involving the Chicoms, we must realistically consider that U. S. citizens traveling to Red China deserve a careful look from an investigative standpoint, either as potential sources, one-time interviews for intelligence purposes, or as individuals who may have been recruited by the Chicoms during their visit to Red China.

With regard to the possibility that restrictions on travel of resident aliens to Red China will be lifted soon, there are in the United States many thousands of Chinese aliens having permanent resident status, most of whom have family members or close relatives residing on the mainland. If travel restrictions on these individuals are lifted, we are faced with an even greater danger of having Chicom-recruited individuals returning here. On its face, such a situation would pose an enormous investigative problem for the Bureau.

3. Within the last few weeks, Secretary of State Rogers announced U. S. policy as regards admission of Communist China to the United Nations (UN). Simply stated, Administration policy is to not oppose UN membership for the Chicoms while not agreeing to the ouster of Nationalist China (Taiwan) from the UN. There has been much talk of a "two China policy," but this is incidental to the real problem we face. With the removal of U. S. opposition, it is likely. Red China
will be admitted to UN membership and that its representatives will appear in New York City between October, 1971, and September, 1972. When this almost certain development takes place, we will be faced with grave internal security/intelligence problems.

In appraising the above situation and noting that the Chicoms, should they gain UN membership, would be entitled to the largest delegation and largest percentage of UN Secretariat employees of any member nation, we would clearly require a substantial increase in the number of Agents handling Chinese work in the New York Office. Such an increase would include assignments to that office of as many Chinese-speaking Special Agent personnel as may be available and examination of the need to train additional Agents in the Chinese language. Dependent on the size of a Chicom UN delegation, it might be necessary to establish a Chinese Section in New York Office. Should a substantial increase in case load in the Chicom field come about as a result of Chicom entry into the UN, it would also suggest an increase in the number of Supervisors in this field at the Seat of Government.

With regard to the investigative aspect of Chicom entry into the UN, it is felt that the Chicoms, on arrival, will proceed cautiously at the outset in any program of covert or overt intelligence activity. That intelligence efforts will be undertaken, there is no doubt inasmuch as information in our files and sound logic demand the conclusion that the Chicoms will rely on a variety of methods by which to gather information to assist in the planning and execution of political moves as well as to combat or neutralize technical and scientific progress and military moves made by this and other countries. The Chicoms, with a base at the UN, might limit early intelligence efforts to political matters until they have their feet on the ground. Knowledge of their collection of such intelligence, however, could be of as much benefit to this country as would knowledge of Chicoms efforts to collect other types of intelligence.

The inevitability of the appearance of a Chicom delegation at the UN requires that we marshall all the assets we have in this field in order to be in a position to have broad quality coverage in the informant area and the ability to spring into quick and effective action from an investigative standpoint.

4. On 7/15/71, President Nixon announced his plan to visit Red China before May, 1972. The FBI may well be called
upon in months ahead to provide intelligence support in connection with the President's trip.

The step taken by President Nixon emphasizes the importance our Government places on the status of Red China as a world power. It is felt we should be in a position to provide the White House with as much intelligence as we can logically gather in the event such a request is levied upon us.

Accomplishments Since Last Inspection (1/8-26/71)

Our cooperative efforts with RCMP paid off during February, 1971, when we identified an unknown subject who made a clandestine contact with a Chicom intelligence officer in Ottawa. RCMP, through its coverage, recognized at the outset that preliminary contacts by the unknown subject were most unusual because of security precautions demanded by him. Within hours after our investigation was initiated, we identified the unknown subject as a Washington, D. C., resident holding impressive credentials in political circles. Our subsequent coverage in this case disclosed efforts made by the subject to gain employment on the White House staff as well as jobs with State and Justice Departments. We promptly alerted the White House and appropriate officials of other agencies.

In July, 1971, with the Director's approval, a desk-level conference was held at the Bureau with our RCMP counterparts. The results were most productive and, at the Director's instruction, we sent a memorandum to Dr. Kissinger setting out the highlights of the conference. Dr. Kissinger, in a personal letter to the Director, expressed his thanks for the information and noted that the Bureau's timely coverage of these matters is most important. He requested he be advised of significant developments as they occur.

Two of our sources who are being developed to fulfill double agent roles traveled from the U. S. to Hong Kong where they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts. Another source, who is employed at the UN, is now in Communist China, and this trip was made at no cost to the Bureau. We expect to obtain valuable current intelligence information from this source upon her return to this country. Yet another source was directed to undertake a three-week period of travel during which he was to contact pro-Chicom individuals on the West Coasts of the U. S.
and Canada. These contacts were planned to serve as a basis for his contact with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa as the last phase of his trip.

Nine individuals are being considered for use along DESECO lines with the expectation that we will be able to target them against the Chicom's either in Canada or in the U. S.

State Department approval has been obtained to interview and/or re-establish contact with 16 employees of the United Nations Secretariat who, it is felt, offer potential to assist us in the future or in an early effort connected with a joint operation with RCMP.

Two suggestions were submitted with a view toward streamlining administrative and investigative procedures in the Chicom field. Both were adopted and annual savings indicated to be $16,160.

Future Plans

In connection with foreseeable additional security and intelligence responsibility as regards Chicom activities, the following is set forth:

1. We have an Index of over 600 names of Chinese aliens who have been interviewed in the past and who are graduates of universities and/or graduate schools in Red China. We see this group as a reservoir from which we could develop a number of sources who could be directed against the Chicom's in the future or, if facts so indicate, could be utilized in connection with existing efforts to penetrate Chicom intelligence operations. This would involve opening cases on these individuals, providing instructions to the field offices involved, looking toward interviews for the purpose of determining informant potential and willingness to assist us.

2. Five field offices are currently involved in an effort relating to ethnic Chinese scientists having security clearances. Each office involved has been instructed to limit its efforts to ten such individuals, in the hope that we may find some who would be willing to initiate a contact with the
Chicom for the purpose of making themselves available for possible recruitment by Chicom Intelligence.

We have a list of approximately 3500 ethnic Chinese scientists and/or technicians who have security clearances. Because of manpower limitations, we have not included other offices in this program nor have we allowed more than 50 cases of this type to be opened. It would be desirable to expand this effort to include other offices and to increase the number of individuals involved in each office to perhaps 50. Again, our object is to develop a nucleus of sources who would be of present or future value in our counterintelligence operations against the Chicom.

3. We would like to consider the use of ethnic Chinese Special Agents as well as nonethnic Chinese-speaking Special Agents who could, in an undercover capacity, be targeted against the Chicom in Canada or against any Chicom establishment which may be located in this country in the future. Such an operation would require substantial indoctrination, direction, and development of cover employment and identity, and would be in essence a most appropriate and secure means by which to mount an operation designed to develop a defector in place.

4. Since the door to travel by U. S. citizens to Red China is wide open, we should expand our efforts in this area to fully identify each traveler (other than legislators and news media types) for the purpose of considering these individuals for interviews in order to gather positive intelligence or to identify any traveler who may have been subjected to a recruitment approach by the Chicom.

5. We should consider instructing a limited number of field offices to begin efforts to develop sources who could be used in a "walk-in" program directed against the Chicom in Canada as well as any Chicom establishment formed in this country. Here, we would not have to look toward ethnic Chinese but could selectively approach types who might be of interest to the Chicom including military personnel because of their backgrounds in fields in which the Chicom have expressed an interest.

6. In Chinese alien cases where a hostage situation exists, we should revamp current instructions to require a reinterview of such persons one year after the initial interview.
(current practice calls for reinterview two years after initial interview). This is felt desirable since the alien who has immediate family and/or relatives residing in Red China is most susceptible to a recruitment approach and is more likely to be the type who has entered the United States on an intelligence mission.

7. We should consider issuing instructions to closely examine our UN sources to determine which may be logically directed to initiate contact with the Chicom Embassy in Canada. Contacts of this type, although they may indicate no immediate interest on the part of the Chicom's, may well serve as a basis for a later approach by the Chicom's, either before or after Chicom entry into the UN.

8. National Security Agency (NSA) representatives are of the opinion that the possibility exists that Chinese Intelligence Service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the United States or in border countries (Canada, Mexico). Under Bureau instructions, our San Diego Office recently monitored broadcasts on the basis of predictions made by NSA. Broadcasts undoubtedly emanating from Red China were heard during this monitoring and the clarity of the signal on our West Coast was excellent. Discussion with NSA led NSA representatives to observe that the broadcasts mentioned above might be connected with an illegal agent network, and they agreed to make a further study of this situation and provide us with additional sensitive material they have uncovered in order to determine if some tie-in could be developed. While this effort is a new one, and does not definitely establish that an illegal Chicom operation exists in this country, it is an indication that we should undertake action designed to uncover such a situation. In the absence of more specific data, we should consider at this time having field offices check warranty cards submitted by purchasers of certain radio equipment, primarily radio receivers capable of tuning in on broadcasts such as those mentioned above. This would involve identification of the equipment, its manufacturer and subsequent instructions to the field to check warranty cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards. Inquiry should include developing background information on the purchaser and, in cases where warranted, conducting interviews.
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:wmj 8/26/71) You have advised that items one through
nine in this write-up will be fully im-
plemented by separate memorandum in
each case consistent with the availability of manpower.

   It would appear that present developments indicate that
   further delay in implementation of some of these programs may seriously
   retard our response to important investigative responsibilities.

   You are requested to advise specifically when such
   programs will be implemented and what manpower requirements are
   necessary to do so.

   Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief
   Wannall requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I believe the five areas
(CDB:mls 9/1/71) outlined by W. R. Wannall
constitute a valid base from
which to expand our coverage of anticipated Chicom intelligence
and subversion which will be directed against this country when
diplomatic relations are established and/or United Nations membership
is established for the Chicoms. It is desirable to initiate these
programs as soon as possible, prior to being faced with the Chicom
activity.

   My position concerning available manpower to accomplish
this is covered under the write-up captioned "Adequacy of
Personnel," 6E. As you are aware, the proposed work load adjust-
ments contained in my memorandum dated 7/29/71 will make available
some additional personnel, and further adjustments may well be
made possible by close examination of case count figures under
the new tightened procedures for counting pending cases. A mid-
month case count was prepared for the Inspection Staff as of
8/20/71, and an end of the month case count is currently being
prepared.

   If these figures confirm a lower case load for
Nationalities Intelligence (8/20/71 figure is 275 case load
average and well below other Sections), I believe at least one

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man from within that Section should be made available to implement this program.

If the Inspector feels two men should be made immediately available to this program from within the Domestic Intelligence Division complement and the nine men currently utilized by Wannall on the Ellsberg case are necessary and productive, a thorough review of case loads and other gauges of work load will be made, Section by Section, and another man added.
In connection with our objective of being prepared to counteract and/or neutralize the Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence and subversion effort we expect will be mounted against this country, it is proposed that the following action be recommended for implementation immediately. In each case, a separate memorandum containing appropriate recommendation will be submitted within the next ten days.

1. Initiate investigations on 300 of the over 600 individuals listed in our Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index. This effort would be aimed at developing quality sources we can direct against the Chics as well as developing intelligence from among a group of well-educated Chinese aliens. Based on our initial accomplishments in this area, additional cases on the balance of more than 300 names in the above Index would be opened for the purposes indicated above.

2. Initiate investigations on 500 ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances. This represents an expansion of our current effort which we have heretofore limited to five field offices representing a total of 50 individuals in the above category. The objective of this effort is to identify ethnic Chinese scientists who would, under Bureau direction, be willing to initiate contacts with Chics for the purpose of making themselves available for possible recruitment by Chicom intelligence.

We have a listing of over 3500 ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances, and opening 500 cases would be our initial attempt to expand source development in this area. Depending on the success of this effort, additional cases would be considered for opening for the purpose indicated above.

3. Expand our investigations relating to United States residents who visit Communist China to include development of background information on each visitor and, except in cases where the purpose of the visit appears legitimate on its face, to consider these individuals for interview. Such expansion is the obvious follow-up to the recent lifting of restrictions on travel by U. S. citizens to Red China. Experience in the

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security field has shown that intelligence recruitment of individuals visiting communist countries is an established practice. These investigation and/or interviews would not include subjects of pending cases handled in other Sections in this Division. Examples of the latter would be travel to Red China by New Left types or black extremists who are subjects of continuing investigation.

4. Close examination of the situation as regards our sources in the Chinese field now employed at or having access to the United Nations who could be directed against the Chicom immediately. This must be a critical examination closely supervised with the expectation that some of our existing sources and others who may be developed could be directed in early contacts with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. Our objective here is to develop within the United Nations itself, sources who can supply us with quality information on the Chicom, who will almost certainly enter the United Nations within the next year.

5. Initiate a survey of offices having ethnic Chinese-speaking Special Agents assigned to determine whether or not any of these Special Agents can be directed toward an operation against the Chicom involving an undercover role. The purpose here is to establish an appropriate and secure means for utilizing one or more Special Agents for development of a defector in place among the Chicom.

Implementation of the above will require a substantial amount of research for the purpose of issuing instructions to field offices. It is felt that in order to provide adequate supervision regarding the above numbered items, two Supervisors should be added to the existing complement (3) of the Chinese Unit.

Consideration has been given to all items (9) previously mentioned as being within the area of future plans for meeting our responsibilities in the Chicom field. It is felt that immediate implementation of the above 5 items should be accomplished while the remaining items herein before discussed will be considered for implementation in light of continuing developments in this field. We believe we have selected for immediate implementation those matters which will bring about the most substantial positive accomplishments in areas of current critical need.
9. Foreign intelligence agencies have concluded that one of the weakest links in Chicom intelligence operations is in the field of communications. We should, therefore, consider renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop programs, both of which were discontinued in 1965. Through these programs, we had a secure means to review communications between the United States and Red China and from them we acquired data on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians which was of security interest to us.

The matters discussed above are set forth in light of our current knowledge in the Chicom field. It is realized that continuing developments in this area may suggest new efforts which could be initiated or could suggest further expansion of our existing programs. Such recommendations would, of course, be made on a timely basis.

Items 1 through 9 above will be fully implemented by separate memorandum in each case consistent with the availability of manpower.
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: It is understood that additional work is anticipated as a result of Executive Order 11605 and subsequent Congressional action. You are requested to advise what action you have taken to brace for this additional work and how much volume you anticipate. Also advise as specifically as possible which Units will be affected the greatest, and to what extent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN The implementation of Executive Order 11605 will affect primarily the work of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence Section and Internal Security Section.

I have conferred with the Section Chiefs of the aforementioned Sections and instructed them to initiate a review of each of the cases which the Department has indicated it intends to proceed against to determine what additional investigation is required to develop the evidence necessary to present to the SACB. Administrative procedures for handling these cases have been worked out and since the cases are supervised in three different Sections, a Division Coordinator, who has had previous experience in preparing cases for presentation to the SACB, has been designated to insure that the cases are handled in a uniform manner in each of the three Sections.

So far, the Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party, Progressive Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Ku Klux Klan; however, we have not as yet had any specific requirements levied upon us by the Department in these cases. Based on past experience, it can be anticipated the services of one supervisor, full time, will be required to prepare each of these cases for presentation to the SACB.

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The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and generally coincides with the basis for our investigation of extremist groups. Conceivably, consistent with manpower available, proceedings could be initiated on most of the organizations we have under investigation although the Department has not indicated at this time that they will undertake any wholesale action.

For additional observations concerning the anticipated impact of Executive Order 11605 on the work of this Division, see the Adequacy of Personnel write-ups of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence Section and the Internal Security Section.
ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS
DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INTO TWO DIVISIONS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Assistant to the Director Sullivan has suggested that Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) be divided into two separate divisions. In order that this matter can be analyzed during this inspection you are requested to furnish:

1. Complete table of organization for each of two new Divisions as you would organize them if suggestion were adopted. Do not use names of supervisors, Section Chiefs, Front Office administrators. Use only position designations, Section and Unit designations and number of Agents and clerks designated for each Unit and Section.

2. In the event you feel work now being handled by another Division should be realigned in the event above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate new division.

3. Following each of the two tables of organization for the above new divisions, set out Section by Section and where appropriate, Unit by Unit, your reasoning for placement in division. In this regard, it will be necessary to take into account and balance both volume of work and nature of work being handled.

4. Indicate advantages in adoption of above suggestion.

5. Set out disadvantages you feel apparent in dividing DID. Also indicate how such can be overcome and resolved.

6. Since adoption of above would involve possible realignment of space in some instances, you are requested to advise what new space would be necessary and what other movement of personnel and equipment would be involved.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

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see attached
DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INTO TWO DIVISIONS

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENAN:

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Inspector there are set forth below two proposed tables of organization for the new Divisions which would be created by dividing the current Division into two Divisions. These Divisions would be named Domestic Intelligence Division and Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division respectively.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Domestic Intelligence Division

Assistant Director
Inspector
2 secretaries
1 clerk-stenographer

4 p.m. to Midnight Supervisor (Agent)
10 clerks (Includes security patrol and Front Office mail room)

Division Front Office Total: 3 Agents
13 clerks

New Left Section

Front Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Left Groups Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Agents</td>
<td>4 Agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 clerks</td>
<td>4 clerks</td>
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Special Investigations Unit-East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subversive Individuals-New Left Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Agents</td>
<td>6 Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Clerks</td>
<td>6 clerks</td>
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</tbody>
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DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71

GCM:mlm
5-A-1a
Special Investigations Unit-West
5 Agents
5 clerks

Section Total: 27 Agents
28 clerks

Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit
4 Agents
5 clerks

Extremist Intelligence Section

Front Office
2 Agents
2 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-West
5 Agents
5 clerks

Section Total: 26 Agents
27 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-East
6 Agents
7 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-Central
4 Agents
3 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate-South and Extremist Informant Unit
5 Agents
7 clerks

Antiriot and Bombing Unit
4 Agents (4 Agents & 2 clerks to be transferred from General Investigative Div.)
3 clerks

Internal Security Section

Front Office
2 Agents
2 clerks

Communist Party, USA Unit
2 Agents
3 clerks

International New Left and Sedition Unit
2 Agents
2 clerks

Subversive Individuals Unit
4 Agents
4 clerks

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit
2 Agents
4 clerks (2 clerks also handle Security Index)

Security Informant Unit
3 Agents
6 clerks
Current Intelligence Reporting Unit

2 Agents
2 Clerks

Steno Pool

14 clerks

Section Total:
17 Agents
37 clerks

DIVISION PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

73 Agents
105 clerks

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division

Assistant Director
Inspector
2 secretaries
1 clerk-stenographer

Midnight to 8 a.m. Supervisor (Agent)
9 clerks (Includes security patrol and Front Office mail room)

Division Front Office Total:
3 Agents
12 clerks

Espionage Section

Front Office

Soviet Unit - New York

2 Agents
2 clerks

4 Agents
5 clerks

Coordination Unit

Soviet Unit - Washington

3 Agents
5 clerks

3 Agents
4 clerks
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Number of Agents</th>
<th>Number of Clerks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Special Cases Unit</td>
<td>2 Agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satellite Unit</td>
<td>4 Agents</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18 Agents</td>
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<td>Nationalities Intelligence</td>
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<td>Section</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>2 Agents</td>
<td>2 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle and South American Unit</td>
<td>3 Agents</td>
<td>4 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5 Agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Coordination Unit</td>
<td>5 Agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationality Unit</td>
<td>4 Agents</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9 Agents</td>
<td>16 clerks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuban Unit</td>
<td>3 Agents</td>
<td>3 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality Unit</td>
<td>6 Agents</td>
<td>4 clerks</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9 Agents</td>
<td>14 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>2 Agents (Section Chief R. D.)</td>
<td>2 clerks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Research Unit</td>
<td>5 Agents</td>
<td>8 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7 Agents</td>
<td>10 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Records Unit</td>
<td>1 Agent</td>
<td>3 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steno Pool</td>
<td>8 Agents</td>
<td>14 clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9 Agents</td>
<td>17 clerks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DIVISION PERSONNEL Recapitulation

52 Agents
96 clerks

2. It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing cases currently in General Investigative Division has been included in table of organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now assigned to this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred to the new Division.

This is a most logical move and will afford tighter and more effective supervision of antiriot and bombing violations in view of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and final prosecutive actions.

3. The line of reasoning utilized in the breakdowns as set forth above in the tables of organization was to separate the work into two categories as nearly as possible - domestic and foreign.

The proposed Domestic Intelligence Division is composed of New Left, Extremist Intelligence and Internal Security Sections. All work of these Sections is domestic oriented consisting of domestic subversive and extremist organizations such as Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, black extremists, New Left and anti-war groups as well as individuals affiliated therewith.

On the other hand, the proposed Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division is composed of the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections which supervise investigations which for the most part have definite foreign ramifications. The work of these Sections is foreign oriented consisting of such investigations as Soviet and satellite establishments and individuals as well as other foreign nationality groups and nationals, including Chinese communists. The Nationalities Intelligence Section will continue to supervise Legal Attaches and domestic Liaison through the Special
Coordination Unit. Other miscellaneous investigative matters involving extremist groups with foreign nationality ties such as Mexican-Americans, Spanish-Americans, and Puerto Ricans will continue to be assigned to the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

The Research Section has been placed in the Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division in order to balance the workload as well as to provide for expansion for research-type work in espionage and foreign intelligence areas or for the manpower therein to be used as the Assistant Director sees most advantageous to carry out his responsibilities. It is recognized that this will cut DID short but it is felt DID will be able to handle any needed research at a Section level.

The New Left and Civil Disorder Reporting Units, currently in the Research Section, will be placed in Internal Security Section as data pertains solely to domestic groups. Likewise, administration of Security Index (SI) will be shifted from Research Section to the Internal Security Section as most of the cases on the SI are supervised in the DID.

In realigning work, we have provided for transfer of three Agents from Sections within the proposed Domestic Intelligence Division to the Nationalities Intelligence Section of other new Division. This has been accomplished by absorbing Klan and White Hate cases (2 men) into Extremist Intelligence Section and releasing one Agent from the current four-man Security Informant Unit of the Internal Security Section.

The proposed reorganization will result in the following Agent - clerical count:

**Domestic Intelligence Division**

73 Agents
105 clerks
This includes four Agents and two clerks to be transferred from General Investigative Division to handle antiriot and bombing matters.
Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division

52 Agents
96 clerks
This includes raising the overall Agent complement of current Division personnel by one to provide for a new Assistant Director.

4. The advantage of the suggestion to form two separate Divisions out of the current Division is that it would provide for smaller Divisions thus allowing for tighter and more effective supervision.

5. The disadvantages in dividing the current Division far outweigh the advantages as can be seen from the following observations:

(a) The nature of the work of DID does not readily lend itself to division. The interrelationship of foreign influence in domestic subversion cases is well established and requires close coordination within the Division. If split, something would be lost in the process, as is now the case with antiriot and explosives and incendiary devices cases, predominantly involving extremists who are DID subjects being handled by General Investigative Division. Our goal should be to obtain maximum utilization of the knowledge and expertise of supervisory personnel, and division of DID would obviously result in diffusion of related talents and a less efficient use of available manpower.

(b) Budgetary considerations and administrative efficiency would be affected by imposing an additional Divisional superstructure (mail room, mail delivery clerks, Division Head and staff, with their equipment, odd-hour duty Agents, supply clerks, and steno pool, etc.) to handle the work presently being handled efficiently by existing DID. The creation of an additional high-level job (Division Head and staff) would be contrary to the President's economic freeze. Apparently the
suggestion of Assistant to the Director W. C. Sullivan to divide the Division referred to by the Inspector is that set forth in memorandum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson dated June 28, 1971. On that memorandum the Director stated, "I do not approve. We do not have any provision for another Assistant Director and all hearings before Budget Bureau and Congress have been concluded for Fiscal Year 1972." In light of the current national economic picture, the Director's comment is even more meaningful today.

These disadvantages, with the exception of the economy factor, can be overcome to a large extent by utilizing current space in 9th and D Street building with a minimum of carpentry work involved. The Executive office space can easily be arranged to handle another Assistant Director and staff. The Mail Room and Steno Pool would require alterations involving additions of partitions. Extra-duty shifts involving 4 p.m. to Midnight and Midnight to 8 a.m. can be arranged to service both Divisions from operational and security standpoints. On the other hand, the biggest disadvantage is that the split definitely will serve to lessen coordination of cases having foreign ramifications as so many of our domestic extremist cases do. This disadvantage likewise can be overcome to a large extent if we make up our minds to be extra careful to make certain that coordination between the new Division is such that Bureau is not embarrassed. This could cause a certain slow down in the handling of mail and result in duplicative handling in some instances.

6. It is felt current space is adequate to house the two Divisions with slight alterations as previously set out. Equipment for a new Assistant Director should not present any significant problem.
ANTI-RIOT LAWS AND BOMBING MATTERS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: In discussions, you have advised that in your opinion there appears a great deal of logic in realigning supervision of above cases from General Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division.

You are requested to advise in greater detail documentation of your reasoning and your recommendations in this regard.

For your information, on receipt of your response to this write-up it will be furnished to General Investigative Division for their observations and recommendations.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: By memorandum 8/30/68 from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, Inspection Division did an in-depth survey with respect to similar problem relative to transfer of substantive violations of Antiriot Laws and bombing cases involving subversive matters from GID to DID. Survey ascertained proposed transfer involved two categories supervised by GID which were so interrelated with gathering of intelligence in racial and security field that overlapping supervisory responsibilities constantly occurred. Accordingly, Inspection Division recommended transfer of these cases to DID to avoid duplication of supervisory review and to promote efficiency. Transfer not effected as Director stated he was opposed to transfer of these duties. A copy of Mr. Felt's 8/30/68 memorandum is attached together with a cover memorandum from Mr. Felt dated 9/4/68.

Developments since 9/4/68 dictate that we take another good look at this problem.

Activities of extremists and terrorists have definitely escalated to the point that the overall situation is a matter of increasing concern to the public and the

8/20/71
CWT:djr

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71
ESM:wmj
5-A-1b
administration. Since terrorist activities such as bombings, riots and the like are in violation of statutes under Bureau's investigative responsibility it behooves us to make certain that our supervision is as tight and effective as possible.

Inasmuch as DID is actively investigating the terrorists who are in violation of these laws, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and handle final prosecutive actions. Not only would duplicative supervisory action be avoided but the DID supervisor has at his fingertips a feel of the case, necessary background data and a full knowledge of sources who can develop needed evidence.

In 1968, criminal prosecutions of these violations were handled for most part by Department's Criminal Division but now the Department has moved to invest the Internal Security Division with the overall responsibility of prosecuting terrorist activities regarding above-mentioned matters. Similar reorganization on our part would certainly enhance more effective supervision. Of course, any transfer of cases to DID would require transfer of personnel from GID now handling these matters.

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that supervisory responsibility for all violations of Antiterror Laws and substantive violations of Explosive and Incendiary Devices Act (Bombing Matters) involving extremist and political terrorists be transferred from GID to DID together with required Agent personnel.
September 4, 1968

Mr. Tolson:

We have carefully re-evaluated the proposal to shift subversive bombing cases and antiriot cases from Mr. Rosen's Division to Mr. Sullivan's Division but find ourselves coming back to the original conclusion.

Messrs. DeLoach, Rosen and Sullivan are strongly in favor. We recognize this does not resolve a wide variety of cases where supervisory responsibility could overlap, but these are the two areas where constant overlap occurs and where we have a great need for continuity of supervision.

The memorandum clearly spells out that antiriot cases are handled in the Criminal Division of the Department, racial bombings in the Civil Rights Division and nationalist bombings in the Internal Security Division.

W. Mark Felt

9/4/68
ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON:

I am opposed to placing supervisory responsibility for these violations under the Domestic Intelligence Division.

CT:DSS proposed transfer of duties. W
Memorandum

TO: MR. TOLSON

FROM: W. M. FELT

DATE: August 30, 1968

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TRANSFER OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN CASES FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION TO DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SYNOPSIS

General Investigative Division (GID) and Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) propose that supervisory responsibility for substantive violations of the new Antiriot Laws and for bombing cases involving subversive matters should be transferred from GID to DID. Mr. DeLoach recommended and the Director approved that Inspection Division examine matter to be certain that responsibilities are sharply and definitely fixed.

In-depth inspection survey reflects problem of overlapping supervisory responsibilities between divisions cannot be eliminated unless all investigative and intelligence functions are centered in a single division—not feasible because of sheer volume. There are many investigative situations where occasional overlap occurs, e.g., the close connection between criminal cases handled by GID and the Criminal Intelligence Program supervised by another division. However, proposed transfer involves two categories now supervised by GID which are so inter-related with the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap constantly occurs. Accordingly, these two categories (relatively small in case volume) should be transferred to DID as proposed, to avoid duplication of supervisory review and to promote efficiency.

ANTIRIOT LAWS

These laws were enacted on 4/11/68 and prohibit incitement to riot and related violent acts connected with riots and civil disorders. Since enactment only 11 substantive cases have been opened; however, extensive intelligence gathering is continuously directed by DID relative to organizations and individuals likely to engage in riots such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown and other agitators throughout the country. Individual acts arising from riots and constituting possible violations of Antiriot Laws are not practically separable without causing duplication of supervisory review and loss of continuity in development of cases.

Antiriot Laws are handled by the Criminal Division of the Department. It now disseminates intelligence material to the Criminal Division and works with
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
For Certain Cases from General Investigative Division
to Domestic Intelligence Division

that Division on specific violations such as current sedition case against Stokely
Carmichael and prior requests of Criminal Division concerning activities of H. Rap
Brown. Since enactment, 11 specific cases have arisen, the most recent being in
connection with allegations of police brutality during the Democratic Convention in
Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers.

BOMBING MATTERS

The same principle of duplicate supervisory review is involved in those
bombing cases that arise from the activities of subversive organizations and
individuals which are supervised on a day-to-day basis by DIDs. Examples are foreign
nationalist groups, Ku Klux Klan, militant black nationalist groups and New Left
groups. These cases should definitely be supervised by DIDs for maximum efficiency.
All other bombing cases will remain with GID.

The Internal Security Division of the Department now has responsibility over
these foreign nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalist organi-
izations. Mr. Yeagley’s Division is also charged with the development of criminal
violations in the recent bombings by the so-called Cuban Power group. The Civil
Rights Division of the Department usually has jurisdiction over other bombing cases
arising from white and black hate groups, but again DIDs has liaison with that Division
on intelligence matters affecting these groups and has engaged in specific investiga-
tions to observe and photograph demonstrations at request of Civil Rights Division.

Guidelines to delineate the proposed consolidation of supervision have been
drawn and are set forth in an appropriate SAC Letter to so inform the field (attach to
for approval).

EFFECT ON WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL

The changes proposed herein deal only in the two specific categories of An-
riot Laws and certain Bombing Matters cases. Special cases that arise in the civil
rights field such as the murder of Martin Luther King and the murder of the three
civil rights workers in Mississippi will not be affected by the proposed changes.
Review of all pending cases that are affected by these changes discloses only one
group (11 cases) that should now be transferred -- these are the recent bombings
instituted by the Cuban Power group.

Analysis of all work load factors represented in the proposed switch of su-
visory responsibilities indicates that, if approved, it would be appropriate at the
same time to reduce personnel complement of Civil Rights Section (GID) by one Ag-
supervisor and increase complement of Racial Intelligence Section (DID) by one Ag-
supervisor.
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
For Certain Cases From General Investigative Division
to Domestic Intelligence Division

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That effective close of business 9/16/63 DID have supervisory responsibility over all violations of Anti-riot Laws and over those Bombing Matters violations within guidelines set forth herein.

2. That Supervisory responsibility for the specific pending cases (Cuban Power group of bombing cases) identified in this memorandum be transferred to DID effective 9/16/63.

3. That Agent personnel complement of GID be reduced by one and that of DID increased by one. If approved, to be handled by Mr. Mohr's office.

4. That attached SAC Letter be approved.
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility for Certain Cases From General Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

DETAILS

BACKGROUND

By memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 8/2/68, it was jointly proposed by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) and General Investigative Division (GID) that supervisory responsibility for the new Antiriot Laws investigations (classification 176) and certain types of bombing matter cases be transferred from GID to DID. With respect to the new FBI jurisdiction in Antiriot Laws, it was point out in this memorandum that extremist organizations and individuals who will likely be engaged in riots and racial disturbances are the subject of continuing racial investigations supervised by DID. Similarly many of the bombing cases arise out of work handled in DID such as bombing of diplomatic establishments and bombings arising out of activities of groups in the racial field and internal security field. Following submission of this memorandum, Assistant to the Director DeLoach proposed and it was approved that Inspection Division thoroughly survey the entire question in order to draw appropriate guidelines and clearly define responsibilities to achieve orderly transition of the proposed reassignment of supervisory responsibility in these matters.

Thorough analysis has been made by Inspection Staff of all aspects of the proposal and means to accomplish it in the most practicable manner, including reviews of representative cases that have been handled under these categories and the overall volume and work load represented. The logic of the proposed reassigments appears unassailable. In both categories of cases the principle involved is the same, namely: that individual violations of applicable statutes arising from the activities of subversive organizations or groups should be supervised within the same division (DID) that has the basic and continuing responsibility for supervision of the overall investigations of these organizations and groups as well as of the members thereof and the development of informants within the groups. The obvious benefit to be derived from the reassignment of these categories is the avoidance of duplication of supervisory reviews of these interrelated matters and the ready identification of individuals who may be involved in a specific violation with person already under investigation from an intelligence standpoint. Informants who may be utilized in specific violations or who are developed in the course of investigation of such violations must of necessity be closely correlated with the supervision of these informant programs which now rests with DID. Furthermore, violations of the new Antiriot Laws may well be revealed in the course of general supervision of racial intelligence matters.

DETAILS
CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
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for Certain Cases from General Investigative
Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

ANTIRIOT LAWS

Contained in Public Law 90-284 enacted 4/11/68 (Civil Rights Act of 1968) were certain new additions to Title 18, representing criminal statutes for which investigative jurisdiction has been assigned FBI. Other provisions of this Act extended and enlarged existing civil rights legislation, the investigative jurisdiction for which primarily remains in the Civil Rights Section and is not involved in the subject matter herein discussed. The three pertinent statutes are as follows:

1. Section 245-b (3) of Chapter 13, Title 18, which makes it a violation for any person to use force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with any person engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce during or incident to a riot or civil disorder or attempting to perform any of these acts.

2. Section 2101, Chapter 102, Title 18, makes it a violation to travel interstate or to use the mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, television or other facility of interstate commerce to incite a riot or organize, promote, encourage, participate in or carry on a riot or commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot or aid or abet any person in inciting or participating in a riot.

3. Section 231, Chapter 12, Title 18, makes it a violation to teach or demonstrate the use, application or making of a firearm or explosive or incendiary device or technique causing injury or death intending or having reason to know that same will be used in connection with a civil disorder which may interfere with commerce or with a federally protected function or the transportation in interstate commerce of such devices with similar intent or the commission of any act to interfere with any law enforcement officer or fireman engaged in official duties in connection with civil disorder or a federally protected function.

The foregoing three statutes have been designated by the Bureau as having the character of Antiriot Laws and are all included in the new classification 176. No other violations are included in this character or classification. Thus the
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility for Certain Cases from General Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

reassignment of the entire classification to DID should present no problems with respect to any division of responsibility or routing of communications. Experience gained thus far under apparent violations which the Bureau has been requested by the Department to investigate supports the close correlation of such violations with racial intelligence matters now handled by DID. 11 specific cases have been opened thus far and are now pending. The most recent involves allegations of police brutality during Democratic Convention in Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers. Review of these cases disclosed them to be noncomplex in nature and in view of the current status of supervision and investigation, it appears most practicable for GID to retain the specific supervision of these 11 cases to their conclusion. Thus supervisory responsibility under this classification will be fixed at a clear cut-off point after which all new cases arising will automatically be routed to and supervised by DID from inception. No further guidelines appear necessary in this classification.

BOMBING MATTERS

A variety of different types of cases arises under this category and it will hereafter represent a split classification with those cases applicable to the overall fields of supervision in DID being handled by that Division and the remainder continuing under supervision of GID. Accordingly, specific guidelines have been drawn to delineate this division of supervisory responsibility and encompassed in an SAC Letter in order that the field may make appropriate designation on communications to facilitate routing at the Seat of Government. Upon adoption of the guidelines and the dual character coincidental therewith proper routing will automatically be achieved of new matters arising (this coordinated with Files and Communications Division).

Inspection Staff analyzed the various types of bombing cases handled during Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 and reviewed representative sampling of specific pending files. There are two major areas herein which appear proper and logical to delegate future supervisory responsibility to DID. These are bombing matters arising from foreign nationalistic interests and those arising from racial intelligence interests. The reasons are the same as heretofore cited, namely the overall familiarity within DID of aims and activities of organizations and groups involved as well as the following of activities of individual members of such groups and the responsibility for the informant programs applicable to them. Other types of bombing cases not falling within the guidelines set forth hereinafter will remain with GID as in the past. Bombing matter violations (including threats) represent violations of Section 837, Chapter 39, Title 18. The violation is the interstate transportation of explosives with intent they be used for destruction of real or personal property which property is used for the objectives specified in the statute (educational,
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
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business, civic, etc.). Threats or false reports also constitute violations within the statute and the entire discussion within this memorandum includes threats or false reports under the use of the term bombing matters. Although the Department frequently resorts to other statutes for prosecutive considerations, this appears to have no significant bearing on the question of supervisory responsibility which is directed toward the full development of the investigation to establish identity of the perpetrators of the bombing violation and evidence to support prosecution.

In the vast majority of potential bombing violations that arise from the field, the Department is promptly advised and appropriate dissemination made without there being a substantial supervisory responsibility thereafter for the following of investigations because relatively few are opened by the Department for full investigation. For example, in FY 1968 there were approximately 15 bomb matter cases opened for full investigation at the Department's request whereas approximately 170 instances occurred of dissemination of initial information to the Department with no subsequent investigation requested. Of the 15 bombing matter cases opened for full investigation during FY 1968, nine were in the racial field (apparently Klan inspired), five in the foreign nationalist field and one unrelated to DID responsibility.

The following guidelines are proposed for determination of supervisory responsibility in bombing matter cases that hereafter will lie with DID (all others remaining with GID). Bombing matters (including threats) wherein:

1. The victim is a diplomatic or other establishment of a foreign government (such as embassy, consulate, official or quasi-official tourist agency, purchasing agency, etc.).

2. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing was instigated by a foreign nationalistic organization, group or coalition (such as recent series of bombings by so-called Cuban power groups), or member thereof.

3. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing was instigated by a subversive organization (such as Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, or Students for a Democratic Society), or member thereof.

4. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that bombing was instigated by a white or black extremist group (such as Minuteman, Ku Klux Klan, Nation of Islam or Black Panthers Party), or member thereof.
Memorandum to Mr. Jolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility for Certain Cases from General Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division

Those cases which fall under the foregoing guidelines will hereafter bear a dual character in addition to Bombing Matters or Bombing Matters - Threats, name the appropriate designation for the type of apparent instigator and/or victim in order to accomplish routing to the appropriate unit and section within DID such as Internal Security - R. Racial Matters - Klan, or Internal Security - Cuba. The foregoing guidelines have been incorporated in an appropriate SAC Letter together with instructions concerning use of dual character which is attached for approval.

The supervision of a particular case will remain the responsibility of the Division originally assuming it even though subsequent developments bring it within the purview of the type normally handled by the other Division, unless in the mutual judgment of the respective Assistant Directors, Bureau interests are better served by transferring the case.

In making the proposed transfer of the limited group of cases discussed herein, no problem appears to be presented insofar as liaison with appropriate Division of the Department is concerned. The Criminal Division has responsibility for Antitrust Laws. DID now regularly disseminates intelligence material to that Division and will closely with it on certain specific violations, such as the current sedition case against Stokely Carmichael as well as previous requests to follow activities of H. Rap Brown. The Internal Security Division of the Department has responsibility over the foreign-nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalist organizations and has also been charged with the development of criminal violations in the recent bombings by the Cuban Power group. It is this Division headed by Mr. Yeagley with which DID consults on all subversive and espionage matters. The Civil Rights Division of the Department usually has jurisdiction over other bombing cases arising from white and black hate groups, but again DID has regular liaison with that Division on intelligence matters affecting these groups and has engaged in specific investigations to observe and photograph demonstrations at the request of the Civil Rights Division.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSITION AND SPECIFIC PENDING CASES

To achieve an orderly transition and to permit coordination of policy, instructions, etc., among the supervisors at the working level prior to the effective date of transfer it is proposed that such effective date be applicable to all matters arising after the close of business 9/16/68. From review by Inspection Staff of the current pending cases now within DID which would under the new guidelines hereafter fall within the supervisory responsibility of DID, it appears that none of these pending cases should be physically transferred for remaining supervision to conclusion except for one group of eleven cases. This group constitutes relatively recent cases arising from the series of bombings and attempted bombings in Florida, New York, Chicago, Newark and Los Angeles directed at diplomatic establishments and other offices of foreign governments who maintain relations with Cuba. Credit for many of the bombings has been claimed by "Cuban Power," a similar term to Black Power and several militant anti-Castro refugee organizations and individuals.
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson  
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Division to Domestic Intelligence Division  

are suspects in these bombings. There has been extremely close coordination  
between GID and DID in these specific cases and DID is thoroughly conversant with  
the details of the individual investigations. Because of this and also in view of the  
likelihood of additional such bombings arising in the future by the same group or  
groups it appears feasible and practicable to transfer the eleven pending cases now to  
DID as well as any new ones by the same group arising in the days ahead. These  
eleven cases are Bureau files 174-688, 174-689, 174-749, 174-759, 174-760, 174-761,  
174-762, 174-767, plus three new cases which have not been assigned Bureau file  
numbers, namely bombing of Mexican Airlines Office, Miami, 8/17/68; Bombing  
of West Side Liberal Club, New York, 8/19/68, and Bombing of Air France Airlines,  
Los Angeles, California, 7/19/68.  

WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL  

The Bombing - Civil Rights Act of 1964 Unit of Civil Rights Section, GID,  
is composed of 6 Agent supervisors including Unit Chief and in addition to general  
bombing matters (those not falling under above guidelines) has supervisory  
responsibility over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal Train Wreck Statute,  
Discrimination in Housing (Civil Rights Act of 1968). The latter violation which was  
established in the same Public Law as the Antitriot Laws has had only very recent  
experience and appears may well generate a substantial number of cases in the  
future. However, from analysis of total work load of the unit as well as of the  
entire Civil Rights Section, both from a standpoint of ratios of individual cases  
supervised for FY 1968 and percentage of manpower time expended, it appears  
that the transfer of supervisory responsibility for those cases as outlined in this  
memorandum will constitute the approximate full time of one Agent supervisor  
and accordingly it is being recommended that GID Agent complement be reduced by  
one.  

Within DID the new Antitriot Laws and the majority of the bombing matter  
cases which will be transferred will increase supervisory responsibility in the  
Racial Intelligence Section. Other bombing matter cases will be spread among  
various units such as Special Investigations Unit of Internal Security Section, Cuban  
Special Cases Unit of Latin American Section, etc., and based upon past experience  
will not be of such volume as to require additional Agent supervisory personnel in  
those other individual units. Accordingly, it appears appropriate at this time to  
authorize increase of complement of DID by one Agent supervisor.
August 15, 1968

MR. TOLSON:

RE: SUGGESTED TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF CASES INVOLVING RIOT LAWS AND CERTAIN BOMBING MATTERS FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION TO THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

I have for some time felt that a lack of clear cut responsibility existed in the handling of captioned matters.

To be brief, it would seem logical that the enforcement of anti-riot legislation would obviously belong to the same Division that is supervising the investigations and development of informants and intelligence regarding the Ku Klux Klan, hate groups and racial organizations. The question arises as to whether or not the transfer of certain bombing matter investigations should also be made to the Domestic Intelligence Division. Quite naturally, the General Investigative Division, because of the supervision of certain type cases in this category, should retain overall supervision in this field. However, consideration should be given to the Domestic Intelligence Division handling that category of cases wherein that Division's development of informants and intelligence would greatly aid in the continuance of supervision of this type case.

In view of the "gray area" involved in such supervision, I asked Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan to study this matter carefully so that appropriate recommendations could be made to you and the Director regarding a shift of responsibility. The findings of Rosen and Sullivan will be found attached to this memorandum. I am, however, not yet satisfied that responsibility is sharply and definitely fixed.

I would like to recommend that the Inspection Division make a survey of this entire matter and then present recommendations which will definitely tie down this matter once and for all. This survey should be expedited in view of the new legislation passed by Congress for which the FBI will obviously have heavy responsibilities in the future.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Enclosure

CDD: hmm

(3)
1 - DeLoach
1 - Felt
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: (ESM:wmj 8/23/71)

For the information of General Investigative Division, by separate write-up Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)

was advised that Assistant to the Director Sullivan has suggested that DID be divided into two separate Divisions. In order that suggestion could be analyzed during current inspection, DID was requested to furnish certain observations regarding suggestion. Among these, Division was asked "In the event you feel work now being handled by another Division should be realigned in the event above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate new Division."

DID responded, "It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing cases currently in General Investigative Division has been included in table of organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now assigned to this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred to the new Division.

"This is the most logical move and will afford tighter and more effective supervision of antiriot and bombing violations in view of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and final prosecutive actions."

A separate white write-up captioned "Anti-Riot Laws and Bombing Matters" was prepared and DID asked specifically to comment regarding these matters. This addendum is part of that write-up.

You are requested to furnish your views of Mr. Sullivan's suggestion both as to the present structure of DID and as to the handling in the event DID is split. For your information, DID has proposed ARL and Bombing Matters be handled in the Extremist Intelligence Section.

Comments of Assistant Director Rosen requested. It would be appreciated if you would expedite this request.
ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROSEN:

(The following comments are equally applicable whether the Domestic Intelligence Division remains intact or is reorganized into two divisions.

Transferring these cases to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) would eliminate much duplication of handling cases and would result in increased efficiency; however, this would require transferring to DID all bombing and antiriot cases as distinguished from transferring only those cases known to involve "extremists and political terrorists." As a practical matter substantially all antiriot laws investigations involve extremists and political terrorists. With regard to bombings, substantially all investigations deal at the outset with unknown subjects and it would be most impractical to attempt to delineate between bombings which do or do not involve terrorists. Since the act of bombing is in itself an act of terror it is logical to assume at the outset that terrorists are involved and the types of bombings delegated to the FBI by the Department's guidelines are limited to those targets most likely to be selected by political terrorists. (These targets pertain to Government property or functions, Federally funded projects, diplomatic establishments, colleges and universities, and those probably perpetrated by terrorists.)

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

(ESM:wmj 8/25/71)

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested concerning Assistant Director Rosen's remarks.

ADDENDUM:

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

I concur with Mr. Rosen's comments.

RES: djr
8/27/71
COMPUTATION OF CASE AND WORK LOAD IN THE
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: I have been advised that a new system of
computing case and work load has been
implemented within your Division. Describe and state reason for implementation.

It would appear that utilization of this system will result in a decrease
in case load figures but not necessarily in the work load picture. You are
requested to advise by Section and Unit basis the number of cases it is
anticipated that the case load will decline in each instance. Use a "before"
and "after" approach. Case load figures 7/31/71 will be satisfactory for use
as known base (before). Be as specific as possible.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
ESM:wmj
5-A-1 c
ADDENDUM: 5-A-1c

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN In February, 1971, I issued
(MSR:amt) instructions that each Section
Chief submit monthly case load figures for his Section to the
Branch Chiefs to be furnished to me with the Branch Chief's
analysis as a basis for establishing a logical and current
method of periodically assessing work loads and manpower
needs within the Division. Inasmuch as it was intended
these figures would serve as a guide for possible manpower
changes to meet fluctuating and ever-changing problems, it was
essential that figures presented be accurate and equally
essential that like matters be tabulated uniformly.

On August 6, 1971, I instructed that a study be made
to insure consistency not only in the counting of the cases
but in the presentation of the monthly reports. As a result
of this study, guidelines were firmly established concerning
case counts within the various Sections. Changes from prior
figures principally relate to cases involving (1) security
informants (2) Security Index cases (3) certain organizations
and other matters requiring only periodic reports.

Under the standardized procedures for case counts
within the Division, informant cases, whether relating to
security informants or PSIs, once initial approval by the
Bureau for designation has been granted and where active
day-to-day supervision is not necessary, are no longer retained
in a pending status but are closed and placed on an administrative
tickler to be reopened at the appropriate time to follow for
the periodic justification letters required. Cases involving
Security Index subjects as well as certain organizations and
other matters requiring only the submission of periodic reports
at no less than six month intervals, are now opened on a uniform
basis 15 days after the due date of the periodic report in
order that appropriate followup may be made to insure submission
of report.

A format was devised for the Section Chiefs to submit
the monthly data required and to account for each Agent in the
Section and his current assignments as well as total and
average case load figures by Unit and by Section.
Pursuant to your request, there follows a tabulation of the case load by Unit and by Section as of 7/31/71 and as of 8/20/71. Total case load for the Division decreased from 29,565 to 25,417—a decrease of 4,148 cases. Some small part of this decrease can be attributed to normal month by month fluctuation in case load; most of it is attributable to the changed procedures concerning case count as will be readily evident by the significant decreases in case loads in those Units handling principally informant cases, Klan cases, and organizational-type cases. This reduction in case load resulting from the changed case count procedures, of course, in no way decreases the work load on the individual desks. It is believed the current procedures for counting cases is more accurate and equitable and places the case load figures in perspective insofar as these figures are a factor in judging overall work load.

This in brief constitutes the basis for implementing the new system of computing case and work load in the Division. In the overall, it is directly related to our manpower problems and I have included a more detailed write-up bearing on this new system in its relationship to the Division's overall capacity and capability to fulfill its responsibilities in the "Adequacy of Personnel" write-up (6-E) which also bears on the matter.
### Espionage Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>7/31/71</th>
<th>8/20/71</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Cases Unit</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet - Washington Unit</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>842</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet - New York Unit</td>
<td>1223</td>
<td>973</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination Unit</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Satellite Unit</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>1261</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Section Total</strong></td>
<td>5575</td>
<td>4833</td>
<td>-742</td>
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### Nationalities Intelligence Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>7/31/71</th>
<th>8/20/71</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Coordination Unit</td>
<td>(No cases assigned)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Unit</td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>776</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese Unit</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle &amp; South America Unit</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>593</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality Unit</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>632</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Section Total</strong></td>
<td>3816</td>
<td>3031</td>
<td>-785</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Handled by Clerk)</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>333</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4158</td>
<td>3364</td>
<td>-794</td>
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### Extremist Intelligence Section

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>7/31/71</th>
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<th>Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Nationalist - East Unit</td>
<td>1501</td>
<td>1423</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Nationalist - West Unit</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>845</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Nationalist - Central</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>1332</td>
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<tr>
<td>Racial Informant, Black - Nationalist - South</td>
<td>1749</td>
<td>1564</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Section Total</strong></td>
<td>5428</td>
<td>5164</td>
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### New Left Section

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<th>8/20/71</th>
<th>Change</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Investigations - East</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Investigations - West</td>
<td>1495</td>
<td>1343</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left Groups</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>812</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversive Individuals - New Left</td>
<td>2492</td>
<td>2538</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest and Trotskyist Groups</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>588</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Section Total</strong></td>
<td>7159</td>
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### Internal Security Section

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<thead>
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<th>7/31/71</th>
<th>8/20/71</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party, USA</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>272**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*International New Left and Sedition Unit</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>871**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klan and White Hate Groups Unit</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>511</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Informant Unit</td>
<td>1466</td>
<td>869</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversive Individuals Unit</td>
<td>2636</td>
<td>2688</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section Total</strong></td>
<td>7245</td>
<td>5211</td>
<td>-2034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Research Section

No cases assigned

---

**Division Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>7/31/71</th>
<th>8/20/71</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,565</td>
<td>25,417</td>
<td>-4148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Unit now Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit

**I Supervisor and 253 cases transferred from CPUSA Unit to Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit 8/13/71
POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
ESPIONAGE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: "Double Agent" (DA) is a commonly and frequently
used term in the field of espionage and counter-
intelligence. In the Bureau's activities in these fields, DAs are a distinctive
group of Security Informants (SIs) utilized against foreign intelligence operations
in the United States. "Potential Double Agent" (PDA) is a unique term used by
DID to identify an individual under development as a DA; one who is in contact
with a foreign intelligence officer but who has not yet been solicited by his foreign
contact to perform clandestinely or covertly for the benefit of the foreign intelligence
group.

During this inspection a representative number of files were
reviewed to determine the extent of supervision afforded PDAs. A similar
review was conducted last inspection. It is realized, however, that a comparison
is not possible in view of recent DID instructions regarding the administrative handling
of all SI and PSI files.

Subsequent to last inspection DID established procedure whereby
those SI cases requiring day-to-day supervision or PSIs still under investigation
should remain in active status; informant-type cases requiring only periodic
review are closed and placed on administrative tickler, to be made pending 15
days after the six-month justification letter is due. DA and PDA files are
included in these categories.

During the last inspection 237 files were reviewed. Included
in that group were PSIs and DESECOs, and not limited to PDAs. All of the files
were then in a pending status. During this inspection there were 65 files on
PDAs in a pending status and 212 PDA files in a closed status. These were strictly
PDA files and did not include other PSIs or DESECOs. It has been determined
that at any given time there will probably be approximately 70 such cases in a
pending status, if the number of such investigations in the field remains constant.

Of the 65 pending files, 58, or 89%, were reviewed. Of these,
22, or 38% contained specific instructions, directions or other guidance to the field

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/27/71
JON:wmj
5-A-1-d
since last inspection. At the time of last inspection of 237 files reviewed, less than 10, or 4%, contained such outgoing communications.

Also during this inspection 62 closed files on PDAs were reviewed at random. Of these, 12 or 19%, contained outgoing communications of the type described above since last inspection. It was observed that since last inspection a majority of the closed files contained only the six-month justification letter and were closed in accordance with Division instructions described above.

Due to current Division instructions, only those PDAs requiring day-to-day supervision or those on whom six-month justifications are due are considered pending at any given time. Hence, it is logical that a larger percentage of the closed PDA files will contain only the justification letters and no outgoing correspondence since last inspection.

It is well recognized that the field of DAs is a highly specialized one. Its success, both at the Seat of Government and in the field, requires skillful handling, patience, finesse and careful aggressiveness. In reviewing the PDA files, it was observed that many excellent candidates, with varying backgrounds, have reached various stages of development with excellent potential for use as actual DAs. Specifically, these cases are:

105-113525 134-11898
105-141001 134-15414
105-201286 134-18458
105-207600 134-19684
105-26896 134-19961
                     134-20321
                     134-20912

The quality of these PDAs would, in itself, suggest substantial potential and, in turn, need for greater supervision. The above-listed cases should be kept in a pending status, carefully reviewed, with guidance and instructions furnished to the field. The field should be instructed to assume a more aggressive position in these cases and followed closely to insure proper attention is given to development of these persons as PDAs.

Review of PDA files shows evidence of closer supervision since last inspection. The percentage of files, including instructions and guidance to the field, rose from 4% to 38%. However, to realize greater accomplishments in this area of responsibility and to use our PDAs to the fullest extent, there is still need for improvement in supervision of these cases.

Comments of Section Chief W. A. Branigan, Inspector D. E. Moore, and Assistant Director Brennan requested.
Section Chief William A. Branigan

The comments of the Inspector regarding the marked improvement in supervision of our work is most gratifying. As was noted during the last inspection, evidence of supervision appearing in the PDA informant file is not always a completely accurate gauge of the supervisory attention being given each case. The informant file is designed, by provisions of the Manual of Instructions, to be a repository for information regarding the background and administrative handling of the source. Information reflecting operational activities and instructions more often appears in the active investigative file of the Soviet-bloc principal with whom the PDA is in contact.

In view of this significant factor, it is felt that the marked increase in supervision (from 4% to 38%) detected through review of informant files alone, is a most favorable trend and one which every effort will be made to sustain.

Twelve specific cases have been cited as quality PDAs which, by their very nature, suggested a need for greater supervision due to the substantial potential of each. The Inspector has instructed that these cases be kept in a pending status, carefully reviewed, with guidance and instructions furnished to the field to assume a more aggressive position in these cases. These instructions are appreciated and will be followed. As the Inspector has noted, the development of double agents is a highly specialized field requiring special faculties, not the least of which is careful aggressiveness. As these comments recognize, aggressiveness in the development of a double agent is inhibited by the practical necessity to restrict our manipulation of the sources to actions which appear naturally responsive to the initiatives displayed and opportunities offered by the Soviet-bloc representative with whom the source is in contact. Particularly is this true during the development phase before the source has been accepted as bona fide by his principal. Any unnatural or gratuitous action to hasten or strengthen the relationship is viewed with utmost skepticism and could result in compromise of our interest and rejection of the source. This is not to say we must eschew any initiatives; but that any such options must be pursued only after careful consideration of all the complex and variable factors peculiar to each individual case.
Section Chief William A. Branigan
(CG5:EWL:pdr  8/30/71)

Within this perspective the 12 cases referred by
the Inspector will be kept open for intensive review to insure
that all possible action not already taken to enhance and
exploit the potential of each source has been considered
and, where appropriate, additional instructions issued to
the field.

It is noted that 10 of the 12 PDA cases referred to
were in a closed status in accordance with recent DID instructions
regarding the administrative handling of all SI and PSI files.
Briefly under these procedures such cases are placed in a
closed status and are reopened only at such time as a justifi-
cation letter is due. These criteria will continue to be
applied to PDA cases with exceptions, on a selective basis, in
those situations which fall within the category defined
by the Inspector.

Inspector D. E. Moore
(DEM:bsf  8/31/71)

The continual need for quality double agents
is certainly recognized in our counterintelligence efforts
against Soviet bloc intelligence and the cases referred to
by the Inspector as excellent candidates will be given
careful and aggressive handling.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
(DEM:bsf  8/31/71)

The comments of the Inspector have been noted and
his instructions will be closely followed.
PERSONNEL MATTERS
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Please tabulate by Sections and Units the current Agent and clerical personnel complement of your Division as of the close of business 8/17/71. Show actual and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the Division Front Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be considered in the overall tabulation.

1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority has been obtained to fill.

2. Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Division as of 8/17/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as of that date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of resignation.)

3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized personnel as of 8/17/71.

4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.

5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.

6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.

7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall Divisional write-up.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/17/71
ESM:wmj
6-E
Adequacy of Personnel

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan: Attached find the Section (CDB:amk) 8/30/71 write-ups concerning each category of information requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel. These comments are current as of August 17, 1971.

The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office consist of one Assistant Director, two Inspectors, two Special Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and twenty clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division teletype room and Mail Room and Messenger Service, and the Security Patrol force in addition to five Agents.

The overall authorized personnel complement of the Division at the beginning of inspection was 120 Special Agents and 199 clerks, compared to an authorized complement of 116 Special Agents and 190 clerks at the time of the last inspection.

As of August 17, 1971, we had 119 Special Agents assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). This includes 2 Special Agents who are assigned on a temporary loan basis to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee in the Department of Justice (IEC). Since August 17, 1971, SA Dean N. Lloyd reported to the Research Section as a replacement for SA Bernard A. Wells who retired on 7/30/71. We are awaiting the replacement for SA Victor R. Schafer who was transferred to Salt Lake City on 7/23/71 as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of that office. SA George M. Quinn has been designated as SA Schafer's replacement but has not as yet reported to his assignment. With the reporting of SA Quinn, our assigned complement will be 121 in view of the fact that SA Garnett T. Tunstall (on loan to IEC from Extremist Intelligence Section) has been replaced and we include SA Tunstall in our total assigned complement.

As of August 17, 1971, we had 204 clerical employees assigned to DID. This is because recent replacements have reported to replace employees under transfer or resignation who have not left as yet. Since August 17, 1971, we had two additional clerks, GS-4, report to the Division. However, we have had two resignations submitted which will absorb them. We have one Section with an additional employee assigned which is dependent entirely upon the approval of a new position involving no increase in grade or salary.
This Division consists of six Sections. The attached write-ups of the Section Chiefs disclose adequate authorized Agent complement with exception of R. D. Cotter, Research; and W. R. Wannall, Nationalities Intelligence Sections. Authorized is underscored since Agent personnel are on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section because of the McLek Case as follows: Espionage (1), Extremist Intelligence (2), Internal Security (2), Research (1), and New Left (1).

Concerning comment in write-up of R. D. Cotter, Research, Item 6 refers to assignment of Cotter on a temporary basis to Department and need for complete staffing of that Front Office. Originally Cotter's assignment to the Department was not considered to be full time in that he was to be in the same building, readily available for consultation, and capable of handling special problems which might arise. However, the situation is not desirable for a long term arrangement and the term of that assignment is not known. Recognizing this, the adjustment of work assignments detailed in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan of 7/29/71 proposed elimination of one Section, making Section Chief Arbor Gray available to take over the Research Section. This would eliminate that problem with no additional personnel required. That proposal also makes No. 1 Man Callahan of Internal Security Section available for case assignment.

Concerning write-up of Section Chief W. R. Wannall, several points must be considered. Wannall's suggested build-up of the Chinese Unit to five men from present complement of three at this time to "handle the current work in the Unit and expand into areas which are considered necessary..." is reflective of a provincial outlook and a limited concept of the relative importance of proposed work in his area of responsibility in relation to the overall limitation of Bureau manpower and resources. Obviously some differentiation must be made to establish priorities. We must first cope with the immediate problems at hand before assigning manpower to projected problems.

Concerning Wannall's reference to needing a man for the Foreign Liaison Desk, my observations contained in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/16/71, which is attached to Wannall's write-up, still apply: I would add to that an observation that much of the material received from our Legats is actually handled on the related substantive intelligence desks responsible for the respective countries and not by the Foreign Liaison Desk. With the current special cases requiring extensive manpower commitments, I believe that desk can continue as is until the manpower situation is alleviated somewhat.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:ms
6-E
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

As to Wannall's comments concerning manpower on the Ellsberg case, under write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4A3, the personnel assigned to Ellsberg is certainly adequate and he does not at this point request additional personnel for that case.

There are two interrelated but separate problems to be dealt with here. The first, and broadest, is divisionwide adequacy of personnel and the Director has repeatedly stated the concept that major case specials must be handled with existing Division personnel. I agree with this wholeheartedly and have attempted to comply with that concept.

Also related here is the situation which uniquely affects the Domestic Intelligence Division in that our basic area of responsibility has been subjected to shifting patterns of work. Essentially, the rise of the black extremist was largely met with reduction in other work areas. The newer expanding threat of New Left terrorist activities is similarly being met by reduction of personnel committed to other areas of work of less urgent priorities.

Obviously, there are practical limits to the elasticity of manpower and our overall increase in caseload is indicative of considerable strain on our manpower capabilities. Facts concerning this increase are contained under "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1.

I believe, however, we can adequately cope with our responsibilities with existing personnel. In order to accomplish this, considerable study and review of existing administrative practices have been made at my direction since taking over this Division 8/1/70. In order to put available personnel where highest priorities existed, a major reorganization was effected 12/70 and our last inspection approved that action. The Director's letter dated 2/12/71 advising me of the Inspection Staff findings included the comment, "Continue to pay careful attention to imbalances in work load throughout the Division and take necessary action to correct these situations, as you did recently in your reorganization."

With this in mind, and drawing on facts developed during the reorganization and subsequent inspection, I directed a memorandum to Branch Chiefs J. A. Sizoo and D. E. Moore dated 2/19/71 pointing to (1) the need for case count to reflect active matters, (2) their responsibility to know what is going on in their respective Branches and (3) specifically instructing them to submit a monthly analysis of the work load of their Branches.

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The need for uniformity in case count submitted by Sections was stressed to them, as was the need to establish a logical and current basis for a regular and periodic assessment of work loads and manpower needs within the Division.

Because of (1) a continued shift in manpower needs, and (2) a growing imbalance in caseloads between Sections and manpower demands of special cases, by memorandum to all Branch and Section Chiefs, I instructed Section Chiefs G. C. Moore and R. L. Shackelford to conduct a thorough survey of the Division and make suitable recommendations for manpower adjustments to cope with current needs of the Division. My memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71 detailed their findings and recommended they be approved.

Addendum of Inspection Division 7/30/71 approved this except for assignment of Special Coordination Unit to Research Section, recommending it be retained in Nationalities Intelligence Section. Mr. Felt's memorandum to Mr. Tolson dated 8/4/71 recommended proposed adjustment of work assignments in Domestic Intelligence Division be deferred pending his study and Director noted, "OK. Expedite." We are awaiting a decision.

Based on figures developed during the survey of G. C. Moore and R. L. Shackelford, it was obvious my previous instructions to the Branch Chiefs had not been effectively carried out, because case count figures still were not as meaningful or consistent between Sections as they should have been. To correct this situation and to establish what I intended in my original memorandum to the Branch Chiefs on this subject, I instructed two Supervisors, with Inspection Staff experience, to do a complete survey of case counting procedures and prepare tight recommendations to achieve the objectives previously sought.

This was done, and after discussion of their findings with Branch and Section Chiefs, these new procedures were adopted beginning 8/13/71. The results of this procedural change is detailed in "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, and I believe validates the recommended work adjustments contained in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71.

It must be strongly pointed out here this procedural change does not bear on work load, but rather deals solely with tabulation of case count into a more accurate gauge of pending work and where the work is by desk, Unit, and Section. The work remains the same.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

The proposed work adjustments contained in my memorandum of 7/29/71 essentially took manpower from work presently in the Internal Security Section (Klan and White Hate cases and Informant matters) and made them available to other more heavily loaded work areas. The Front Office staff of Internal Security Section will be available for other assignment as well. It also called for Nationalities Intelligence to absorb one of the five men on Ellisberg from that Section's complement because of relatively low caseload.

Details set forth in "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, disclose caseload decreased in Nationalities Intelligence and Internal Security Sections by 19% and 28% respectively, which is proportionately high compared to other Sections.

Espionage Section was proposed to receive a one-half man's time to compensate for the Ironclad case. This is consistent with that Section's 13% decrease in case count under the new procedure.

That write-up also discloses a case count under the new procedure of 275 cases per Agent for the Nationalities Intelligence Section compared as follows: Espionage - 303; Extremist Intelligence - 303; New Left - 334; Internal Security - 401. These figures are based on Supervisors assigned to case desks and do not include men on specials in any Section.

I do not believe the problems faced by Nationalities Intelligence Section far outweigh those of other Sections to justify that low figure and, therefore, believe my original recommendation that Nationalities Intelligence absorb one man from existing complement was justified. W. R. Wannall's comments in write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, relative to manpower presently utilized on this case validate this further as he has now utilized manpower in his Section on this case. Obviously, tangential issues will arise from time-to-time in an investigation of this type and can and should be handled on an emergency basis within the Section handling the special. This has been the traditional practice and should be followed.

The second problem is essentially intra-divisional in nature and deals with a Division Head's responsibility and authority to effectively utilize resources available to him to cope with

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the area of responsibility levied upon him. As detailed in Wannall's write-up captioned, Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, from the beginning of this case I made manpower available for the Ellsberg case as requested by him. As this investigation progressed, however, Wannall continued to levy demands for manpower which I believed unwarranted in view of (1) his failure to effectively adjust and use his existing manpower at a time when he had a proportionately low case load and (2) his granting extensive leave to personnel in his Section while continuing to levy manpower demands.

Wannall now claims to have nine men assigned to the Ellsberg case. I invite comparison of the handling of the Ellsberg Case to Eastcon. Eastcon at no time has had over 5 men assigned full time to it, even though the case is of the very highest priority and of a magnitude and complexity seldom matched in Bureau investigations. In addition to the basic and complex conspiracy itself, the case incorporates six separate substantive investigations (draft board entries) which had to be brought up to trial standard for prosecution of Eastcon. There are at least 85 volumes to the Eastcon file alone at this time. Eastcon was absorbed within the responsible Section until it was firmly established that Section's case load could not continue to absorb the impact of Eastcon. No requests for additional manpower were refused by me on Eastcon, and those requests made were fully supported by facts, justified and granted.

In my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/12/71, captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)," I candidly stated my position and evaluation of Wannall's demands for manpower (copy attached). Attention is invited to page 2, paragraph 4, concerning the 5 highly qualified and experienced men available to Wannall, none of whom were being utilized by him on the Ellsberg case. Attention is also invited to page 2, paragraph 5, which details Wannall's claim to Mr. Felt of "enormous" problems and need for still 2 more men. Note that part of that "enormous" problem was resolved in one week with one interview. Concerning the first reference your attention is directed to my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/16/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)," (copy attached) which attaches a memorandum from Wannall to me requesting an additional Supervisor for the Special Coordination Unit. Concerning the second reference above, and the tenor of the entire memorandum, your attention is invited to Wannall's write-up in this report captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, page 10, paragraph 1, wherein he states 9 men are now assigned to that case.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E

[Signature]
These two references and Wannall's responses to them clearly draw the issues: (1) Whether he used good judgment and considered the Bureau and Division overall responsibilities in balance with his own desires for manpower in making his requests; (2) When weaknesses in his position were pointed out whether he attempted to cover them by making even more demands for manpower hoping this would somehow give them credence and (3) Whether he or the Division Head should judge the Division's resources and capabilities and determine their allocation and priority of need consistent with the Bureau's overall capabilities.

In summary, the work load of the Domestic Intelligence Division as exemplified by case loads set forth under "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, are very high. Being mindful of the practical limits of Bureau resources, I believe the currently proposed adjustment of work assignments detailed in my above referred to memorandum of 7/29/71 will allow the Domestic Intelligence Division to function effectively with existing manpower. The new method of tabulating case count affords me a better administrative device to obtain maximum utilization of existing manpower and periodic adjustments within the Division will no doubt be warranted and made.

The observations of the Inspection Staff as to the validity of manpower committed to the Ellsberg case, as well as overall manpower needs of the Domestic Intelligence Division, are welcomed.
Mr. E. C. Sullivan

August 12, 1971

C. B. Breman

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
LEAK CASES
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

Resero 8/4/71 from Mr. Felt to Mr. Toisca captioned as above, Mr. Felt recommended and the Director approved that the number of Agents handling leak cases in DID be increased immediately from 5 to 7 using DID manpower. Mr. Felt also recommended that the proposed adjustment of manpower in DID be deferred pending his study. The Director agreed and noted "expedite." The following is offered for consideration:

This involves two problems:

(1) The proposed manpower adjustments recommended in memorandums from C. B. Breman to E. C. Sullivan on 7/29/71. The Inspection Division concurred with the proposed changes in that memorandum except for moving the Special Coordination Unit which coordinates Legal Attaché matters out of the Nationalities Intelligence Section. The Director agreed, tentatively to final approval of the organizational charts. The charts were submitted by memorandum C. B. Breman to Sullivan 8/3/71 which led to Mr. Felt's memorandum of 8/4/71 recommending a further study.

(2) The second problem involves manpower needs for the Ellisburg and other leak cases which have arisen since 6/15/71. These are handled in the Nationalities Intelligence Section under Section Chief W. A. Wassall.

When the Attorney General requested we investigate the Ellisburg case on 6/15/71 I advised Wassall this was a matter of the highest priority and instructed him to use sufficient manpower to handle it. He advised me after his initial assessment that he would need the assistance of 3 additional supervisors. These were immediately temporarily reassigned to him from other sections. He subsequently said the problem was expanding and he would need 2 additional supervisors. These were also promptly temporarily reassigned to him from other sections.

This placed a heavy overall burden on all sections and led to my recommendations in my memorandum of 7/29/71 for manpower changes within DID to insure that manpower was being used on priority items.

Enclosure
CDR: #1 (3)
1 = Mr. Reit
1 = Mr. Sullivan
1 = Mr. Felt
1 = MR. W. P. Callahan
1 = Mr. Fender
1 = Mr. D. E. Moore
1 = C. B. Breman

(Continued - Over)
Memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

Mr. Felt's memorandum 8/4/71 indicates he discussed the manpower problem on the leak cases with Wannall who said his problems had now become so great he would need 2 more men for a total of 7.

In line with Mr. Felt's stated intention to initiate an overall study of the matter, I had Mr. Wannall submit to me an overall analysis of his manpower and workload as it relates to the leak cases in his section. Set forth are the case load figures for Mr. Wannall's section from March 1 - August 1, 1971:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the Ellsberg case first broke, Wannall assured me he was using his existing manpower to the fullest extent possible and needed temporarily assistance from other sections to carry on the other heavy burdens of his section, but the case load figures now available for the six-week period from 6/18/71 to 8/1/71 show that all Wannall did was put his own men on the special (6 men) and borrow manpower (5 men) from other sections to keep his other problems in hand at the sacrifice of other sections with equally or even more burdensome problems.

This is shown by the fact that for June and July the case load average in Wannall's section while handling the Ellsberg case was 292 and 294 respectively as contrasted to a Division case load average for all sections during the same period of 339 and 335. This does not even take into consideration that he has 5 highly experienced and qualified supervisors in the Special Coordination Unit whom he does not include in his case load count. He could have drawn on at least one of these men for special assignment in an emergency but did not.

Actually, it is now clear that Wannall responded in the initial stage of his problem with a panic, premature request for additional manpower as he subsequently did through his observation to Mr. Felt that he needed still 2 more men. In effect, Wannall put DID in the untenable position of giving Mr. Felt an off-the-cuff assessment of what he considered to be an "enormous" problem and a need for still 2 more men unsupported by facts and oblivious to the problems of the Division as a whole. As a matter of fact, one of the leak cases which caused Wannall great alarm was referred to us by the Department on 8/2/71. By letter dated 8/9/71 Wannall advised the Department that we had conducted one interview which showed that prosecution could not be entertained and accordingly would conduct no further investigation in the absence of
Memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

specific instructions. Therefore, one part of Wannall's "enormous" problem was resolved in one week with one interview and one letter to the Department.

Of equal concern to me is Wannall's handling of leave requests during the period of 6/15/71 to 8/5/71. When confronted with the Ellsberg case, he had discussed leave with me and had suggested that if it was necessary for him to cancel leave requests in his section he felt leave should be cancelled throughout the entire Division. I told him it would be ridiculous to cancel leave Division-wide because one section had a problem. I advised him leave throughout the Division would be approved on the basis of sound judgment in relation to overall Division work load and in accordance with the Director's instructions concerning individuals involved on major cases.

I have ascertained that since 6/15/71 Wannall has approved leave for 12 supervisors in his section totaling 763 hours. This is an average of nearly 8 days per man for each of those 12. He approved these extensive leave requests during the same period that he advised his problems were so "enormous" that he needed 7 additional men.

OBSERVATIONS:

Historically, the Bureau has learned to live with specials of various kinds. I agree with the concept that such specials are a test of the responsible official's ability to handle them within the framework of the Bureau's overall responsibilities and capabilities. In like manner, I expect no less from supervisory personnel under me and will not condone unwarranted attempts to grab manpower within the Division regardless of whether the attempts are based on an inability to think clearly, an incapacity to adjust to a stress situation, or oversight resulting from a provincial attitude and outlook.

DID has absorbed into its periphery of responsibilities many new problem areas involving racial and new left extremists in recent years. These problems have taxed our ingenuity and resulted in across-the-board heavy work load increases brought about by the need to flexibly realign manpower to meet new challenges. When other priorities of the Bureau have precluded additional manpower being added to DID, I have attempted to take the positive approach of making internal adjustments to fulfill our responsibilities with available resources.

In this vain, there is attached a copy of a memorandum I prepared for all Branch and Section Chiefs of DID dated 7/23/71 which resulted in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan of 7/29/71 recommending DID manpower

- 3 - (CONTINUED - OVER)
Memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

adjustments. I feel it will serve to show why the Inspection Division with a minor exception approved our proposed manpower adjustments. Perhaps it will serve also to facilitate the study Mr. Felt indicated he was initiating. I hope it will resolve any doubts the Director or others may have about what we are trying to do with our manpower resources in DID and why we are trying to do it.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Pending the Director's final approval of the proposed manpower adjustments within DID, the 5 men temporarily assigned to the Ellsberg case remain as assigned.

(2) Any additional personnel to be assigned to the Ellsberg or other leak cases at this time should come from within the Nationalities Intelligence Section in view of the relatively lower case load in that section.

(3) That Inspector D. E. Moore personally assume overall direction of the Ellsberg and leak cases to insure Wannall's proper utilization of manpower in the direction of our objectives. This should include daily conferences with Wannall and his men on the Ellsberg and leak cases and a weekly progress report to me from Inspector Moore.

4. Since it has been stated (irresponsibly) that if Brennan was taken off Ellsberg case it would be lost Brennan is to remain until case is concluded.

(4) That Mr. Felt as instructed by the Director expedite his study of recommended DID-manpower adjustments so that desirable changes can be effected without further delay to enable us to put our manpower on our most important problems.
August 16, 1971

C. D. Brennan

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

Enclosed memorandum Wannall to Brennan 8/12/71 requesting one additional supervisor be approved from outside DID for the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD) because of a heavy increase in work volume.

I agree expansion of our Legal offices has produced work increase which would justify additional supervisor on FLD. However, in regard to Wannall's recommendation concurred in by the Branch Chief, Inspector D. E. Moore, that it should come from outside DID, I am mindful of the Inspection Division's survey of work in DID during week of 7/19/71 following request for additional supervisor in Espionage Section. The Inspector concluded that the present supervisory capabilities of DID are adequate to handle existing work.

The Inspection Division's analysis of work in DID as of 7/1/71 compared with last inspection in January, 1971, revealed a stability of overall responsibilities from a case load standpoint shown by the fact average case load per supervisor in January was 322 and in July 330. Wannall's average case load in January per supervisor was 273 and in July 294—an average rise of only 3 cases in the Division and of only 16 cases in Wannall's section in six months.

Ordinarily, I would point out to both Inspector Moore and Wannall these factors mitigate against requesting additional supervisors from outside DID. Inspector Moore had access to these facts and should have explained to Wannall the need to follow traditional patterns in requesting an additional man, e.g., adjusting within the Division's overall manpower and work load framework of capabilities and responsibilities. The obvious answer is for Wannall to reassign a man from within his section to the FLD. This would (1) alleviate the work load there and, (2) bring his case load closer to the Division's supervisory average per man. At the end of 90 days he could then reassess his situation and consider any action the facts then warrant.

However, the significance placed on our recent Legal expansion may be an overriding factor to the Inspection Division or Mr. Felt who

Enclosure

C.O.: Iml (3)
1 = [C. D. Brennan]
1 = Mr. Moore
1 = Mr. Callahan
1 = Mr. Rohr
1 = Mr. Sullivan

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Memorandum C. D. Bromma to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

may feel the facts presented by Wannall are such to outweigh all other considerations. I feel it would be well for Mr. Felt to consider this request in conjunction with the manpower adjustment survey he is to initiate and I will be guided accordingly.

I have initiated some new guidelines for determining Division manpower assignments and case loads. I believe these will provide a still better basis for DID to insure its manpower is being most effectively used on priority matters. Mr. Felt may desire to use these guidelines immediately as a measure for his study.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Felt consider the request of Wannall for a supervisor from outside DID in conjunction with his study.

Any additional personnel for Wannall's section must come from within the DID.

4
SECTION CHIEF A. W. GRAY: As of close of business 8/17/71 the authorized personnel of the Internal Security Section was 17 Special Agents, 7 Secretaries, and 13 Clerks. A breakdown by Units follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRONT OFFICE</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS OF COB 8/17/71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number One Man</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT          |                                        |
| Supervisors                         | 1                                      |
| Secretary                           | 1                                      |
| Clerks                              | 1                                      |

| FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PRO-CHICOM UNIT |                                        |
| Supervisors                          | 3 (SA Benedict assigned temporarily Nationalities Intelligence) |
| Secretary                            | 1                                      |
| Clerks                               | 2                                      |

| KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT      |                                        |
| Supervisors                          | 2                                      |
| Secretary                            | 1                                      |
| Clerks                               | 2                                      |

| SECURITY INFORMANT UNIT              |                                        |
| Supervisors                          | 4 (SA Seabaugh assigned temporarily Nationalities Intelligence) |
| Secretary                            | 1                                      |
| Clerks                               | 5                                      |

| SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT          |                                        |
| Supervisors                          | 5 (SA WL Smith extended sick leave beginning 6/25/71) |
| Secretary                            | 1                                      |
| Clerks                               | 3                                      |
SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1. None
2. None
3. None
4. None

5. During the period since the last inspection manpower savings have been effected in that the following Supervisors for the periods indicated have been assigned elsewhere in the Division. Supervisor James P. Benedict has been assigned elsewhere in the Division for the entire period since the last inspection except for approximately 12 days that he was working in the Internal Security Section. Most of this period he was on temporary assignment in the New Left Section on the Special concerning the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives case. More recently he has been on temporary assignment to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on the McLek Special. Since 8/13/71 Supervisor Tony J. Seabaugh has also been on temporary assignment in the Nationalities Intelligence Section on the McLek Special.

6. When Special Agent supervisory personnel currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections, are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle existing case load. There is, however, an area of pending work which could greatly increase the supervisory work load and require expeditious file reviews, analysis of cases, availability of witnesses, reviews of informant reports and preparation of correspondence. Funds were recently appropriated by Congress for the implementation of Executive Order 11805 which broadened the powers of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to enable the Board to hold hearings and designate violence-prone extremist organizations as subversive. The Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings before the SACB as soon as possible and there are a number of organizations being handled in the Internal Security Section, such as the Revolutionary Union and Progressive Labor Party, which are likely to be selected for presentation. Based on past
experience, the preparation of a case for presentation to the SACB requires the services of one Supervisor on a full-time basis. Thus, it is anticipated that the Department's action pursuant to Executive Order 11605 will substantially increase the work load of the Internal Security Section.

7. In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:

-case load
-mail count
-name checks
-complexity of cases and supervision involved
-deadline matters
-special assignments
-experienced supervisors

Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in Charge (reviewing mail, conferring with employees, organizing Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments handled.
Adequacy of Personnel

Section Chief R. D. Cotter: As of close of business 8/17/71, the complement of this Section was as follows: Special Agents 12, secretaries 6, and clerks 13, for a total of 31. This is broken down by unit as follows:

Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary (Stenography), 1 Secretary (Typing), 1 Clerk (Typing - GS-5). One Special Agent on permanent detached assignment to Department of Justice.

Central Research Unit - 5 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 3 Supervisory Clerks (technical publications writers), 1 Clerk (publications coordinator), 1 Clerk (omnibus).

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 1 Clerk (omnibus).

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 1 Supervisory Clerk (technical publications writer), 1 Clerk (omnibus).

Special Records Unit - 1 Special Agent, 1 Secretary, 4 Clerks.

The following responses are numbered to correspond with Inspector's specific questions:

1. Position of Section Chief is technically vacant, with no authority to fill. Section Chief R. D. Cotter, with approval of the Director, has been on permanent detached assignment with the Department of Justice since 6/1/71. Number One Man T. J. Smith has acted in capacity of Section Chief.

One Special Agent position in Current Intelligence Reporting Unit has been vacant since retirement of SA B. A. Wells, effective 7/30/71. Authority granted to fill position and SA D. N. Lloyd will report 8/18/71 as SA Wells' replacement.

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2. SA Dean N. Lloyd is under transfer to the Division from the San Antonio Office. Transfer letter was dated 6/30/71. He has arrived in Washington and will report for assignment 8/18/71.

Mrs. Jacqueline Kelset Elliott, Clerk GS-4, assigned to Current Intelligence Reporting Unit, resigned effective 8/24/71. Letter acknowledging resignation was dated 8/3/71.

Miss Joyce Webb, Secretary, GS-5, assigned to Current Intelligence Reporting Unit, resigned effective 8/20/71. Letter acknowledging resignation was dated 7/28/71.

3. There is one GS-4 Clerk surplus to the Section complement. This is located in the Current Intelligence Reporting Unit and is due to fact that replacement for Mrs. Elliott (above) received prior to effective date of resignation, 8/24/71.

4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive to the needs of the Section.

5. There have been no manpower savings effected through streamlining procedures since date of last inspection. One Special Agent who had been on loan to Internal Security Section was transferred permanently to that Section effective 5/24/71, with no replacement to be provided. Overall Section complement was thereby reduced by one Special Agent and the work load occasioned by this reduction was absorbed by existing Agent complement with assistance from Supervisory Clerks (Technical Publications Writers).

6. Due to nature of permanent assignment of Section Chief R. D. Cotter to the Department of Justice, full burden and responsibility for running the Section and handling Section Front Office functions has fallen on the Number One Man, T. J. Smith. A replacement for Mr. Cotter is very definitely deemed necessary so that an acting Number One Man can be designated to relieve SA Smith in the Section Front Office. In the interest of continuity of responsibility and authority it is felt that designation of an acting Number One Man is a must. A replacement was approved by the Director for the other Agent named along with Mr. Cotter for detached permanent assignment to the Department. Personnel of the Section cannot be considered adequate so long as there is only one Special Agent handling Front Office responsibilities of the Section.
7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section includes a number of diverse factors. As pointed out in prior inspections, case load figures are not applicable, neither are there any other simple qualitative measurements of the Section's work. Research Section is essentially the service arm of the Division and handles a wide variety of assignments involving research, study and analysis. Of primary importance is production of a variety of documents aimed at providing the White House, Attorney General, other high level Government officials and Bureau officials current intelligence information relating to the broad spectrum of the Division's work. In addition to the writing of highly condensed intelligence summaries, digests, and analyses in pamphlet form for high level dissemination, the Section provides a daily teletype summary of racial disorders and developments and of antiwar, campus disorders and other disturbances growing out of various protest activity. The Section also handles all matters which involve the Division as a whole, where the matter crosses section lines. Director's specials involving such matters as wire taps, nonspecific topical subjects such as guidelines for internal security investigations, and similar matters are handled and/or coordinated in the Section.

The adequacy of personnel of the Section depends on the demands leveled by the White House or by Bureau officials for the specialized studies and other material which the Section is geared to produce on short notice. Demands for intelligence data were extremely heavy from the White House prior to and during the election campaign last year. It can reasonably be expected that even greater demands will be placed on the Bureau during the months ahead, and such demands will invariably involve the elements of extremism, terrorism, racial and new left agitation and other internal security problems. It is to be noted that this Section actually wrote one speech for Vice President Agnew and provided the material for inclusion in several others. We also provided Mr. Agnew with a special brief which was kept updated, for use in appearing before various groups.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
NEW LEFT SECTION 6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: There is set forth below a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the New Left Section as of close of business, August 17, 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Left Groups Unit</td>
<td>4 Agents</td>
<td>4 Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit</td>
<td>3 Agents</td>
<td>3 Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Clerks</td>
<td>5 Clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Investigations - East Unit</td>
<td>6 Agents</td>
<td>6 Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Clerks</td>
<td>5 Clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Investigations - West Unit</td>
<td>5 Agents</td>
<td>5 Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Clerks</td>
<td>5 Clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit</td>
<td>6 Agents</td>
<td>6 Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Clerks</td>
<td>7 Clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>2 Agents</td>
<td>2 Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Clerks</td>
<td>2 Clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26 Agents</strong></td>
<td><strong>26 Agents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>27 Clerks</strong></td>
<td><strong>28 Clerks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>53 Employees</strong></td>
<td><strong>54 Employees</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section.

2. There are no transfers pending in or out of the Section, nor are there any letters of resignation in the Section pending as of August 17, 1971.

3. As of August 17, 1971, this Section is one secretary over the authorized complement. This secretary is temporarily assigned to the GS-6 secretary position in the Section Front Office, which was vacated by the reassignment of the incumbent to a proposed GS-6 clerical position in the Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit. Upon approval of the proposed clerical position, the extra secretary will be utilized to fill the GS-6 secretary vacancy in the Front Office.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
RLS:cae
6-E
4. At time of last inspection, this Section had a complement of 24 clerical personnel as compared to present assigned complement of 28 clerical personnel. This increase was occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit with accompanying personnel from Internal Security Section to the New Left Section.

Congress recently appropriated funds for implementation of Executive Order 11605 which broadened power of Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to designate violence prone extremist organizations as subversive. The Department has indicated it intends to initiate these proceedings as soon as possible (See R. L. Shackelford memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan, August 16, 1971, captioned "Executive Order 11605"). This Section handles a number of organizations which will undoubtedly be selected by the Department for presentation before the SACB. Based on past experience, the preparation of cases for presentation to the SACB creates a considerable increase in work of a clerical nature. If the Department's intention in this regard is implemented, it will be necessary to obtain an additional clerk in the future, however, we are not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time.

5. The New Left Section, as of January, 1971, had an authorized complement of 22 Agents and 23 clerks. Current assigned complement is 26 Agents and 28 clerks. This increase in complement, as noted above, was occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit from the Internal Security Section to the New Left Section.

6. The caseload being handled by the New Left Section (average 371 cases per Agent as of August 1, 1971) is considered excessive. We are, at the present time, making a conscientious effort to reduce this caseload to desirable level by weeding out and closing cases which do not require additional investigation. If, in spite of our efforts, the upward trend continues, it may be necessary to request additional Agent personnel to handle the excessive caseload in this Section.

As noted in number 4 above, it is anticipated that as a result of recent Congressional action, the Department intends to soon present violence prone extremist organizations before the SACB for designation as subversive. Such presentations will,
Adequacy of Personnel
New Left Section 6-E

of necessity, include several organizations currently handled by this Section. Based on past experience, the preparation of a case for presentation before the SACB requires the services of one supervisor on a full-time basis. No request is being made at this time for additional Agent personnel. However, based on the above, it appears that a request for one additional Agent will be necessary when the above proceedings are instituted.

7. Adequacy of personnel in the New Left Section is constantly evaluated on basis of caseload and type of cases handled by each Unit, review of delinquency reports, number of requests received from Department and other agencies, and review of the overall objectives of the Section. When it is noted, because of special circumstances, that an excessive amount of work is temporarily assigned to one Unit, personnel from other Units are utilized to alleviate the situation.
(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section as of the close of business August 17, 1971, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AGENT</th>
<th>CLERK</th>
<th>SECRETARY</th>
<th>CLERK-STENO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Unit -</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Unit -</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Cases Unit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination Unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite Unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Special Agent George M. Quinn was designated to replace Special Agent Victor R. Schaefer. Special Agent Quinn is currently assigned to the Inspection Division; date of reporting to the Espionage Section is not known.

**Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary E. Triplett, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

***Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

(2) By letter dated July 28, 1971, Special Agent George M. Quinn was ordered for assignment to the Domestic Intelligence Division.

By letter dated August 17, 1971, Dale P. Ramacciato submitted his resignation to be effective at close of business
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

August 20, 1971. Letter acknowledging resignation has not been received.

(3) As of August 17, 1971, there was a shortage of one Special Agent in the Soviet Unit - New York. As of August 17, 1971, there was no overage of authorized personnel in the Espionage Section.

(4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate but not excessive at the present time.

(5) Since the last inspection the Special Agent complement of the Espionage Section has been reduced by two. At the time of the last inspection the Espionage Section had a total case load of 5,089 cases, of which 141 were handled by clerical personnel in lieu of Agent personnel. There was, therefore, an average of 275 pending investigations per Agent Supervisor. As of July 31, 1971, the Espionage Section had a total of 5,575 cases, of which 270 were handled by clerical personnel. This provided an average of 331 pending investigations for each Agent Supervisor.

(6) By memorandum June 4, 1971, a request was made to increase the Special Agent complement by one Special Agent. This was predicated on an increase in the volume and complexity of investigations handled. The request was denied. By memorandum July 14, 1971, I asked to increase the Special Agent complement by one in order that the Ironclad case could be assigned the full-time job of one Special Agent. Ironclad is a unique source of the Bureau and it is important that information from this source is given the analysis and consideration that it deserves. This request was denied, and the Special Agent complement of the Espionage Section was fixed at 18. In light of President Nixon's recent request to cut back, no request for additional Special Agent personnel is being made and the present complement is considered adequate.

(7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity of the cases, and the importance of the investigation.

In the Soviet Units - Washington and New York, we are currently handling 2,190 cases among an authorized complement of

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
WAB:hke
6-E
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

seven Special Agents. The greatest majority of our double agent cases are assigned in these Units and these are among the most complex investigations. The operation of a double agent requires minute supervision to insure that the objectives of the investigation are achieved. The Soviet Unit – Washington also supervises two illegal agent cases, and the Soviet Unit – New York has the overall supervision of the Ironclad source.

The Satellite Unit, which supervises the investigations in the Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav nationality fields, has a total of 1,408 investigations, including the informants and double agents that are being directed against the Soviet-bloc establishments and personnel. There is, therefore, an average of 352 investigations in this Unit.

The Coordination Unit is currently handling 1,226 investigations, of which 178 are assigned to a Clerk in lieu of an Agent. Considering that this Unit has the responsibility for a number of special subjects and special operations, including the adaptation of our records to automatic data processing equipment, the case load is considered very high.

In our Special Cases Unit there are currently 751 investigations, of which 92 are handled by a Clerk in lieu of an Agent. These investigations are divided among two Special Agents. The figure of 751 compares favorably with the total of 768 at the time of the last inspection, which number was divided among three Special Agents.
The current authorized personnel complement of the Extremist Intelligence Section as of the close of business August 18, 1971, is 22 Agents and 23 clerical personnel. This is broken down as follows according to Units within the Section:

**Front Office**

- Section Chief: 1
- Number One Man: 1
- Secretary to Section Chief: 1
- Secretary to Number One Man: 1

**Black Nationalist Unit - East**

- 6 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
- 7 clerical personnel

**Black Nationalist Unit - Central**

- 4 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
- 3 clerical personnel

**Black Nationalist Unit - West**

- 5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
- 5 clerical personnel

**Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit**

- 5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
- 6 clerical personnel

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/18/71

TDR:mlm

6-E
(1) There are no clerical or supervisory vacancies in the Section.

(2) No one is under transfer into or out of the Section.

(3) There is no shortage or overage of authorized personnel.

(4) The clerical personnel assigned to the Section is considered adequate at this time.

(5) The streamlining of our operations wherever possible to effect manpower savings is under continual evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since the last inspection include: (1) Abolishment of the Agitator Index on 4/21/71 as an analysis revealed that it was no longer the necessary administrative tool that it once was; (2) After consultation with the Department, discontinued submission of monthly evidentiary reports concerning the Black Panther Party on May 14, 1971. At the time this program was discontinued, 23 field offices were submitting monthly evidentiary reports averaging 37 pages in length; (3) Limited the scope of investigations of black student groups on college campuses to those groups which have engaged in violence and/or lawless activities or are moving toward violence or lawlessness by letter to all offices 7/26/71; (4) Assigned additional duties to clerical personnel in effort to reduce the workload of Special Agent Supervisors. Specifically, a clerk is now handling the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List, correlates the receipt and review of publications and newspapers dealing with the black nationalist movement, reviews and forwards to appropriate field offices information received from the military on black extremist in the Armed Forces, and handles certain correspondence with the National Security Agency concerning matters of mutual interest.

In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype dissemination facilities to the maximum extent possible
(6) The Special Agent complement is 22 including the Section Chief and Number One Man, an increase of one since the last inspection. The Division was reorganized December 17, 1970, on the basis of approximate case load per Supervisor of 279. This figure was based on the October 1, 1970, case load figures. As of January 1, 1971, the case load stood at 349 per Supervisor and a request for two additional Special Agent Supervisors was approved. The opening of cases on Black Student Union-type organizations and leaders thereof on college campuses across the Nation in December, 1970, showed up in our case load figures during the early months of 1971. These cases have been handled and closed by the end of the 1970-1971 school year. As of August 1, 1971, the case load stood at 5,428 or an average of 271 per Supervisor assigned. These cases represent hard-core extremist individuals and organizations and require extensive supervision.

Additional factors dealing with the adequacy of personnel is a special that was received in the Section on May 29, 1971, involving the killing of two police officers in New York City on May 21, 1971, which the President instructed the FBI to investigate and solve. The supervision of this investigation occupies the full time of one Supervisor. In addition, one Supervisor was placed on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on July 19, 1971, and a second Supervisor was placed on loan to that Section on August 13, 1971.

With the return of these two Supervisors to the Section, I consider the supervisory personnel as adequate.

There are several factors that would indicate that our work in the black extremist field will increase in the immediate future. With the reopening of school in the immediate future, we can foresee an influx of cases involving extremist Black Student UNion-type groups and leaders thereof.

Executive Order 11605 signed by the President on July 2, 1971, expanded the activities of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB). The Department has advised
that a Section has been formed within the Internal Security Division of the Department to file petitions before the SACB pursuant to Executive Order 11605 and that the Department is interested in proceeding as quickly as possible against such parties as the Black Panther Party and the Ku Klux Klan among others. Such proceedings will materially increase the workload of the Section.

Under the proposed reorganization of the Division which is under consideration at this time, this Section, if such reorganization is approved, will handle all Klan and white-hate organizations, individuals and informants with the present supervisory complement. In this connection, the informant cases are adoptable to full assimilation into our present extremist informant setup and a great deal of the work in connection with the handling of these informants will be assigned the responsibility of two grade 6 clerical employees in the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit. In order to absorb the Klan and white-hate organizations and individuals, they will be assigned in accordance with the geographic breakdown we are presently using within the four Units in the Section.

Black extremist activity in this country is developing more and more in international aspects. Residents of other countries including U. S. citizens and noncitizens are involved in clandestine and overt operational activity among racial extremists. We have targeted Central Intelligence Agency as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the development of data regarding foreign influence in the black extremist movement. We have levied requirements and are expanding on such requirements on the National Security Agency which has vast capabilities in developing the type of information needed.

(7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into consideration not only the case load which is compiled on a monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts taken on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures in the black extremist movement such as Huey P. Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, James Forman, LeRoi Jones, and others require a considerable amount of supervisory attention.
Analysis of current developments in the racial field, preparation of special studies, requests from other Government agencies, and so forth all require considerable supervisory time and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy of supervisory personnel.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

As of close of business 8/17/71 Section complement was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Agents</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries (Steno)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary (Typing)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stenographer (Supervisory)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical (Supervisory)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stenographers</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include 7 Agents on loan from other Sections for McLek Special.

**Includes one GS-5 Stenographer (Barbara J. Raney) out of assignment, working outside Bureau on loan to Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

***Includes one GS-4 Clerk (Kendall Wayne Shull) assigned temporarily to Section 7/22/71 for training purposes.

Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography) and one Secretary (Typing).

Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-5), and one Clerk (GS-4).

Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4).

Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three Secretaries (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and three Clerks (GS-4).

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WRW:ams

279
Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor (Clerk), one Assistant Supervisor (Stenographic), one Clerk-Stenographer (GS-5), and 25 Clerk-Stenographers (GS-4).

While the foregoing represents the organizational structure of the Section as authorized, the actual structure has been affected by the McLek and related specials since 6/15/71. There are seven Agents assigned on a temporary, and in part rotating, basis to this Section from other sections within the Division. These men, together with the 20 Agents regularly assigned to the Section, are assigned as follows:

Section Front Office - two (no change).

Cuban Unit - three (two regular, one on temporary rotating assignment--David A. Brumle of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/13/71).

Nationality Unit - three (one regular and two on temporary assignment--James H. Kavanagh of New Left Section reported 7/19/71, and John L. Adams of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/9/71). This is one less than normal unit complement.

Special Coordination Unit - five (no change).

Chinese Unit - two (regular). This is one less than normal unit Agent complement.

Middle and South American Unit - three (two regular and one on temporary rotating assignment--Wilfred R. Schlarman of Espionage Section reported 8/18/71).

McLek and Related Specials - nine (as follows):

Eugene R. Harrell (of this Section)
James R. Wagoner (of this Section)
Jesse R. Hagg (of this Section)
Herbert J. Morgan (of this Section)
Lionel E. Belanger (of this Section)
William W. Hamilton (of this Section)
Joseph M. Sizoo (of Research Section)
Tony J. Seabaugh (of Internal Security Section)
James P. Benedict (of Internal Security Section)

Harrell, Wagoner and Hamilton are regularly assigned to the
Nationality Unit, Morgan to the Middle and South American Unit, Belanger
to the Cuban Unit and Hagy to the Chinese Unit.

(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 8/17/71,
although one transfer out was pending and one resignation was pending.

(2) By letter dated 8/16/71 Linda Marie Blum, Clerk-Stenographer,
GS-4, was transferred to Phoenix Office. Carol A. Maslow has resigned
effective close of business 8/27/71. Letter acknowledging this was dated 8/2/71.

(3) Kendall Wayne Shull, Clerk, GS-4, was assigned to Section
7/22/71 for training purposes pending clerical opening within Division to which
he would be permanently assigned.

(4) The additional work involved in the handling of McLek and
related specials has to date required the assignment of nine Agents. There
has been additional clerical work involved which to date has been handled by
clerks regularly assigned to the Nationality Unit plus the clerical assistance
rendered by Kendall Wayne Shull from 7/22/71 to 8/17/71 and by Wayne T.
Smith who, for training purposes, was assigned to this Section from 7/7 to 8/3/71.
If reorganization results in setting up a special unit to handle McLek and related
matters, we would require a GS-5 Secretary (Stenography) for the Unit Chief
and a minimum of three clerical employees, one to handle lead cards, one to
handle dissemination and the third to handle indices searches, file requests
and related matters. We would endeavor to fill two of the three clerical positions
from clerical complement presently in the Section by diverting one clerk from
the present Nationality Unit and one clerk from the Middle and South American
Unit. We would request that the clerical position which has existed since 7/7/71
for training purposes be made permanent by an increase in the clerical
complement. This would result in adding to the over-all Section complement
one Secretary (Stenography), GS-5, and one Clerk, GS-4.

(5) The principal manpower savings effected since last inspection
was brought about through a voluntary reduction of over-all case load within
the Section to preclude the necessity for requesting an additional Agent for
assignment to the 13 operational desks within the Section (those existing in
all units except the Front Office, the Special Coordination Unit, and the Division
Stenographic Pool Unit). The case load reduction was effected by streamlining
procedures regarding the handling of cases relating to deserting Chinese
seamen (a reduction of approximately 160 cases) and restricting the opening
of investigations of the Jewish Defense League to high-level national leaders
(which resulted in a reduction of approximately 70 cases). Memoranda captioned
"Case Load Reduction, Nationalities Intelligence Section," dated 4/15 and
5/5/71 attached.

(6) Our regular Agent complement is 20 and we have seven men on
loan from other sections. Of these 27 men, nine are presently assigned to
McLek and related specials, six from the regular Agent complement from this
Section and three of the loan Agents. The assignment of the manpower from
this Section has resulted in the temporary reduction of the complements of the
Nationality Unit and the Chinese Unit by one Agent each. While it is felt we can
continue running these two units on a temporary basis in the immediate future
with one less man assigned to each, we will not be able to expand efforts in the
Chinese communist field which, at this time, is considered critical. To do
this, the Chinese Unit should be built to an Agent complement of five. This
would permit us to handle the current work in the unit and expand into areas
which are considered necessary at this time and which are outlined in detail
in the attached write-up dated 8/18/71 and captioned "Chinese Matters."

By memorandum dated 8/12/71 one additional Agent Supervisor
was requested for assignment to the Foreign Liaison Desk. A copy of this
memorandum is attached, together with a copy of a cover memorandum dated
8/16/71 from Assistant Director Brennan to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Adequacy
of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)."

(7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include
continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts,
complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and
intelligence requirements, personnel capabilities, and past experience in
shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.
April 15, 1971

CASE LOAD REDUCTION
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

We intend to reduce our current case load from 4197 to 3739, a reduction of 458 active cases and a reduction in the average case load for the 13 Agents handling case supervision from 322 to 287.

This reduction is in part contingent upon re-establishing the moratorium on SI cases and would be effected as follows:

Middle and South American Unit - By re-establishing the moratorium on 81 cases, 30 pending cases would be closed. This Unit has a current case load of 976 active cases and reduction will result in a net case load of 946.

Chinese Unit - The recently approved streamlining procedures will result in approximately 30 days' time in the closing of 160 cases on deserting seamen. This Unit has 1028 current active cases and with reduction will have a net of 868 active cases.

Nationality Unit - We intend to restrict the investigation of the Jewish Defense League to the high-level national leaders which will result in reduction of 143 active cases. Unit has current case load of 917 active cases and with reduction referred to above will have an active case load of 774.

Cuban Unit - Upon re-establishment of moratorium on SI cases the case load in this Unit would be reduced by 125 pending active investigations. The current case load of 1276 will be reduced to 1151.

In addition, re-establishment of the moratorium will result in eliminating approximately 600 SI cases which are presently carried in an inactive status.

The reduction in the Chinese Unit will be accomplished within a 30-day period. The reduction of SI cases upon re-establishment of the moratorium and the remaining reduction will be effected upon your concurrence.
May 5, 1971

CASE LOAD REDUCTIONS

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Pursuant to your request for observations concerning our comments in attached 4-15-71 informal memorandum, following is submitted:

We concur in the re-establishment of the moratorium on SI cases which will result in some 150 pending active investigations being discontinued.

We have previously noted that instructions have been outstanding for some time which will result in streamlining procedures in handling cases on deserting Chinese seamen. During April, 125 such cases have been closed, and it is anticipated during the month of May about 125 more such cases will be discontinued in the normal course of events.

The step which we have discussed in much detail relates to changing criteria for opening cases on individuals connected with the Jewish Defense League (JDL). The violent nature of many such individuals was the basis for our instructing several months ago that each member who has actively participated in and supported the demonstrations, acts of violence, etc. of the group be made subject of an individual investigation. This amounted to about 900 individual cases on some 3000 alleged members of the JDL at that time. The membership has increased tremendously during the interim and if we continue under this criteria, we estimate within the next year anywhere from 600 to 1000 additional cases would have to be opened.

Despite the fact we feel we will be taking a risk in not pinpointing someone who later turns out to be violence-prone activist, we suggest that at this time we revert to opening cases on: (1) each JDL organization or subsidiary organization; (2) individuals serving in a leadership capacity of such organizations; and (3) other persons connected with the JDL who by past actions have shown propensity for violence or connection with activities involving violence or terrorism. This will result in our dropping from 70-30 cases in the immediate future.
August 18, 1971

CHINESE MATTERS

On the security and intelligence scene, Communist China has emerged as one of the most important countries handled in this Section. This fact was dramatically emphasized by President Nixon's July 15, 1971, announcement that he will visit Red China before May, 1972. Available information, including an announcement by Secretary of State Rogers, indicates that Red China's entry into the United Nations is imminent and will probably be an accomplished fact within the next 14 months. For the purpose of securing more and better intelligence on Red China and Red Chinese sympathizers; to develop more sources who can provide needed information; and to have a reservoir of sources we may utilize in intelligence operations against the Chinese communists (Chicom's), it is felt the following investigative areas should be activated and/or expanded:

1. Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index - The above Index consists of cards on more than 600 individuals who have been interviewed under our Chinese Alien Program and who have attended institutions of higher learning in Red China. It is felt that these individuals, because of their educational background, would be the types we should approach in order to determine their potential for use in operations against the Chicom's. This would require opening cases on each individual, reviewing Bureau file in each case, and thereafter setting out leads and instructions to the field in order to initiate the type of inquiry felt necessary in each case. The objective of this effort would be to identify those individuals whose activities we can direct against either the existing Chicom establishment in Canada or against Chicom establishments which are expected to be opened in this country in the near future.

2. Implementation of a program in which we would select four or more Special Agents for indoctrination and training, looking toward their utilization in an undercover capacity against the existing Chicom official establishment in Canada or against any Chicom establishment which may be located in the United States in the future.
3. Implementation of an effort in selected offices whereby individuals, present sources included, could be developed for the purpose of establishing a walk-in program directed against the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) representatives advised, during a July, 1971, conference, they would cooperate fully in an effort of this type.

4. Consideration should be given to renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop Programs, both of which were discontinued in 1965. These programs provided us with a secure means to obtain communications between the United States and Red China and, from these communications, we secured valuable intelligence and background information on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians of security interest to us.

5. In connection with travel of U. S. citizens to Red China, it should be noted that all prior restrictions on such travel imposed by the U. S. Government have been lifted. The result of this action is that U. S. citizens who desire to travel to Red China no longer need to accomplish such travel clandestinely. The door is now open, and we may expect, in the near future, a substantial increase in such travel by U. S. citizens. It is felt we should fully identify each U. S. citizen traveling to Red China and in selected cases should conduct appropriate interviews, since our experience in the security field historically indicates that U. S. visitors to communist countries are frequently approached by the intelligence services of those countries for recruitment. This problem may be further magnified if and when permanent resident aliens are authorized to travel from the U. S. to Red China. Such a proposal is now under consideration by the Attorney General and the Department of State and favorable consideration could result in travel to Red China of many thousands of ethnic Chinese who have permanent resident status in the U. S. and who would desire to travel to Red China to visit families living there. In these cases, a clear hostage situation exists and such situations are often exploited by hostile intelligence services.

6. Immigration laws relating to Chinese aliens entering the U. S. have been broadened substantially and in early 1971, the Conditional Entry Program was begun. This program permits entry into the U. S. of up to 250 Chinese aliens per month, who were heretofore ineligible under our immigration laws. These aliens, in most cases, have families
residing on the China mainland, thereby creating a hostage situation which could be used as a lever by the Chicoms to gain cooperation.

It is felt desirable at this time to revamp our instructions regarding reinterviews of Chinese aliens in cases where a hostage situation exists. At the present time, our policy is to reinterview a Chinese alien two years after the initial interview. It is felt that these instructions should be modified to require that a second interview of a Chinese alien having members of his immediate family in Red China should occur one year after the initial interview.

7. We should expand our present source development program at the United Nations, looking toward development of individuals connected with the United Nations who would be willing, under Bureau direction, to initiate contact with Chicom official representatives in Canada. Based on information provided by RCMP, contacts of this type, even if no recruitment by the Chicoms is obvious, would serve to form a reservoir of individuals the Chicoms might well contact and/or operate upon their entry into the United Nations.

8. Our Chinese Scientists Program now involves five field offices, each of which is doing background inquiries on ten ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances. The purpose of this program is to select appropriate individuals from the above group of 50 to target against the Chicoms. We have a list of over 3500 ethnic Chinese who fit the criteria we are now using regarding the 50 individuals now under investigation. It is felt that continued development of good sources to direct against the Chicoms warrants expansion of this program, looking toward possible contact with almost all of the 3500 scientists on the above lists. The individuals on this list, being ethnic Chinese and being employed in the scientific and technical fields, would be most attractive to the Chicoms for intelligence purposes.

9. National Security Agency representatives are of the opinion that the possibility exists that Chinese Intelligence Service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the United States or in border countries (Canada or Mexico). Our San Diego Office recently monitored broadcasts felt by National Security Agency to have come from China, and the clarity of the signal on our West Coast was excellent. While this does not prove that an
illegal Chicom operation exists on our West Coast, it is an
indication that we should undertake action designed to
uncover such a possibility. In the absence of more specific
data, we should consider at this time checking warranty cards
submitted by purchasers of certain radio equipment, primarily
radio receivers, which are capable of tuning in on broadcasts
such as those mentioned above. This would involve identifica-
tion of the equipment, its manufacturer, and subsequent
instructions to appropriate field offices to check warranty
cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names
of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards. Subsequent
inquiry should include developing background on the purchaser
and, in cases where Bureau interests may be served, perhaps
conducting interviews.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

Mr. R. G. Sullivan
August 16, 1971

C. D. Freeman

Re attached memorandum Wannall to Freeman 3/12/71 requesting one additional supervisor be approved from outside DID for the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD) because of a heavy increase in work volume.

I agree expansion of our Legal offices has produced work increase which would justify additional supervisor on FLD. However, in regard to Wannall's recommendation concurred in by the Branch Chief, Inspector D. E. Moore, that it should come from outside FLD, I am mindful of the Inspection Division's survey of work in DID during week of 7/19/71 following request for additional supervisor in espionage section. The Inspector concluded that the present supervisory capabilities of DID are adequate to handle existing work.

The Inspection Division's analysis of work in DID as of 7/1/71 compared with last inspection in January, 1971, revealed a stability of overall responsibilities from a case load standpoint shown by the last average case load per supervisor in January was 323 and in July 330. Wannall's average case load in January per supervisor was 273 and in July 294—an average rise of only 3 cases in the Division and of only 10 cases in Wannall's section in six months. (201 cont.)

Ordinarily, I would point out to both Inspector Moore and Wannall these factors dilute against requesting additional supervisors from outside DID. Inspector Moore had access to these facts and should have explained to Wannall the need to follow traditional patterns in requesting additional men, i.e., adjusting within the Division's overall manpower and work load framework of capabilities and responsibilities. The obvious answer is for Wannall to reassigned a man from within his section to the FLD. This would (1) alleviate the work load there, and (2) bring his case load closer to the Division's supervisory average per man. At the end of 90 days he could then reassess his situation and consider any action the facts then warrant.

However, the significance placed on our recent Legal expansion may be an overriding factor to the Inspection Division or Mr. Felt who

Enclosure

(201 continued)

(201) Ins: Sullivan
(202) Br: Iker
(203) A.R. Childress
(204) C.D. Freeman

4-8-71
RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Felt consider the request of Wannall for a supervisor from outside DID in conjunction with his study.

Any additional personnel for Wannall's section must come from within the D.I.D.
FOREIGN LIAISON DESK (FLD)
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL

Mr. C. D. Brennan

W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Ponder

3/12/71

1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Day

Fully mindful of the urgent matters requiring additional personnel in the DID (East Coast Conspiracy) and particularly the Nationalities Intelligence Section (Ellsberg and other leak cases), we must ask for help in the supervision of our foreign offices. While our Legat operations are not in the public eye, they do constitute an important area of our work which must not be overlooked in view of the evaluation being placed upon them by the White House.

In January, 1971, during the inspection of this Division, we pointed out that the expansion of our foreign liaison offices from 11 to 17 had come at a time when the two FLD Supervisors had been barely able to keep up with the flow of paper let alone actually examine and analyze it in order to afford constructive supervision to the foreign offices. We noted the heavy demands made on the time of these two Supervisors in welcoming and supervising the visits to the Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who are valuable and cooperative contacts of our Legats and the 62% increase over the past ten years in the Foreign Police Cooperation cases being handled. We pointed out that the Supervisors should be preparing memoranda to keep the Director fully apprised of the work being done by our Agents abroad but just did not have time to do this. As a result of the inspection, memorandum 2/1/71 from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson secured approval for addition of one man for assignment to the FLD. He reported 2/22/71. Contemporaneously, it became necessary to assign one Agent Supervisor on a rotating basis to the New Left Section on a temporary basis to assist in the East Coast Conspiracy case. An Agent from the FLD was selected for this temporary assignment, effective 4/25/71, which assignment was made permanent when all temporary assignments were converted to permanent assignments, effective 5/22/71. In effect, therefore, the additional man was available on the FLD only during the two months from 2/22 to 4/26/71.

(8) CONTINUED - OVER
In the meantime, between December, 1970, when the new foreign offices were opened and July, 1971, the latest month for which figures are available, there has been a nearly 60% increase in the amount of paper being produced by our foreign offices and requiring review on the FLD. We are most reluctant to ask for help at a time when the Bureau's resources are strained on so many fronts but we would be derelict in our duty if we did not point out that the situation which the Inspectors in January felt justified additional assistance has since become even worse. What we badly need is a man with a background of experience abroad plus a language ability who would be able to take hold immediately without extensive training. As an example, we can think of Special Agent John Morris, now in the domestic field, who was forced to ask to be returned to the U. S. due to his wife's condition following the death of their first-born child. There are undoubtedly others of equal capability and potential.

Many foreign officials who visit Washington do not speak English or are not fluent in it. We now have a Supervisor fluent in Spanish and the addition of a French or German capability would greatly reduce our need for interpreters from the Washington Field Office and elsewhere in the Bureau. The Division presently has one Supervisor with French and one with German. There are others with such languages as Spanish, Japanese, Chinese, Polish, and the like. If we can get one with experience in foreign liaison, we may be able to provide a replacement from outside the division if furnished. There is no way in which help can be provided within the Division without a replacement. We have eliminated and streamlined programs and we are now assigning Supervisors on a rotation basis to assist on the leak cases, leaving their permanent assignments sometimes for weeks at a time.

RECOMMENDATION:

That an additional Supervisor be approved for assignment to the FLD, to come from outside the Division, increasing the Division Agent complement by one.
Pursuant to your request, this is to advise that there are two supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division with Legal Attache experience, Robert A. Bermingham, who is now assigned to the FLD, and Jessie R. Gray. Gray was assigned to this desk but is now assigned to the Ellsberg Special. Both Bermingham and Gray speak Spanish.

There are 23 other supervisors in the division with language ability. None speak German and only one, John N. Guellette, speaks French. The language ability of the others are in Russian, Japanese, Italian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian, Albanian, Portuguese, Hungarian, Yiddish and Chinese.
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: During the course of instant inspection an in-depth survey was made relative to the adequacy of personnel, both Agent and clerical, within the DID. The primary purpose of this survey was to determine the best possible allocation of manpower bearing in mind the desirability to reallocate manpower to top priority assignments.

ADEQUACY OF AGENT PERSONNEL

Set forth below is a chart graphically illustrating where it is felt reductions can be made in Agent complement:

Internal Security and Research Branch

Internal Security Section
- Subversive Individuals Unit - 1
- Security Informant Unit - 2
- Klan and White Hate Groups Unit - 2

Research Section - 1

New Left Section
- Subversive Individuals Unit - 1

Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch

Extremist Intelligence Section - 2

Nationalities Intelligence Section
- Middle and South American Unit - 1
- Nationality Unit - 1

TOTAL ---- 11

Comments and observations justifying the above-mentioned reductions in force can be found below under the individual Section and Unit captions.
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

Subversive Individuals Unit

This Unit has an Agent complement of 5. At the time of the last inspection it was a 3-man Unit; however, one was assigned on a special in another Unit, leaving actually two Agents to handle approximately 1300 cases, or 650 per man. Since the last inspection the case load has increased to approximately 2600. Consequently, it would appear that 4 men averaging 650 cases per man could handle the work of this Unit. This position is further strengthened as it can be anticipated that the case load will decrease since the deadline of lifting the moratorium expired 6/30/71 and the bulk of investigations have been brought up to date or will be brought up to date in the near future. By memorandum dated 8/26/71 it was recommended that SA John N. Ouellette be returned to the Internal Security Section due to the slackening of activity in the EASTCON case. Ouellette was formerly assigned to this Unit and the reduction could be accomplished by reassignment of him (or another Agent) to more pressing duties elsewhere.

Security Informant Unit

This Unit presently has 4 supervisors assigned; however, one has been on temporary assignment outside the Unit since June, 1971. The case load as of 8/71 for this Unit was 869 and would result in about 217 cases per Agent in a 4-man Unit, and 290 cases per Agent in a 3-man Unit. Further, you have indicated one of the factors affecting the productivity of the Unit is the necessity of obtaining authority by memorandum for the utilization of students and/or teachers as security informants. It was determined that 122 memos have been prepared since the last inspection requesting such approval. This is approximate 1 memo per workday, which does not appear to be an excessive work load. Since this Unit was formed it has functioned with 3 Special Agent Supervisors. This does not appear to have effected the efficiency of the operation and in view of the work and case load it is felt that the Unit could function quite satisfactorily with 2 Special Agent Supervisors.

Klan and White Hate Groups Unit

Under the reorganization of DDI proposed by Assistant Director Brennan in his memorandum of 8/3/71 it was indicated this Unit's cases could be absorbed by the Extremist Intelligence Section. This would free two Special Agents for other assignment. It is felt this could be accomplished even if the proposed reorganization does not become an actuality.
RESEARCH SECTION

It is noted under the proposed reorganization of 8/3/71 a supervisor from this Section would be reallocated to another. It is felt this could be accomplished regardless of the reorganization. It is noted in this regard that this Section is presently operating efficiently with an Agent supervisor assigned to the Ellsberg case. Addressing ourselves to the lack of a Section Chief, it is felt your recommendations regarding filling Mr. Cotter's vacated position should be handled by separate memorandum. The replacement request for SA Marion S. Ramey's transferral to another Division is being handled separately.

NEW LEFT SECTION

Subversive Individuals Unit

This Unit has an authorized complement of 6 Agents but is presently adequately handling the work with 5, one being assigned full time to a special. Even though the case load is high, approximately 2500, leaving 500 cases per man, many of the matters are quite routine and can be handled with bare minimum of supervision. Because of this, Agents assigned to this Unit are able to handle a large number of cases and it is felt that the Agent presently assigned to the special should not be returned.

ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL BRANCH

Extremist Intelligence Section

During the last inspection you requested two more supervisors due to the fact that your case load had increased to a total of 6642, breaking down to 349 cases per supervisor. Your request was authorized. During May, 1971, one supervisor was permanently transferred from your Section leaving you a complement of 20 supervisors plus Section Chief and Number One Man (total 22). No replacement has been requested for this supervisor. Since 7/19/71 you have had one man on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on a rotating basis and as of 8/9/71 a second man on loan. There has been a definite decrease in your case load since the last inspection. However, a slight increase would be anticipated due to the absorbing of the Klan and White Hate Groups matters. For the last 6 weeks you have been without the services of 1 supervisor on a rotating basis and for the last 3 weeks a second one. However, the Unit has still operated efficiently. As there is an imbalance as to cases and the number of men assigned it is felt that 2 supervisors could be transferred out of the Section leaving 20 (including Section Chief and Number One Man) to handle the necessary assignments (including Klan and White Hate).
Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American Unit

As of the close of business 8/20/71 the 3-man Cuban Unit had a case load of 776 and the Middle and South American Unit, also consisting of 3 men, had 598 cases. These two Units, the work of which is closely related and frequently overlaps, had a total case load of 1374 for 6 men for an average case load of 229. If the total case load of these two Units were handled by 5 men the average load would be 275, which appears more equitable in view of the overall commitments and work load of the Division. In view of the above, it is felt that the personnel of the Middle and South American Unit could be cut by one man. With 5 incumbents and with the inter-relation and natural overlapping of these two Units future fluctuation in the work load could be equitably handled between the two Units.

Nationality Unit

Under normal conditions it is believed that this 4-man Unit could be operated by 3 Supervisors. At present, there are 3 supervisors assigned this Unit's cases (exclusive of special) and the case load as of 8/20/71 was 632 cases which represents 158 cases per Agent for a 4-man Unit, or 211 per Agent for a 3-man Unit. Consequently it is felt that 3 supervisors could adequately handle the work of this Unit.

As can be seen, a pool of 11 men has been created. Treating those assigned on special to the Ellsberg case (9) as a separate entity, 2 men are available for general assignment. One man could be assigned to the Chinese Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section and the one supervisor from the Foreign Influence and Pro-CHICOM Unit of the Internal Security Section along with his cases (492). (Note this Agent is not included in the II.) What is left of the Foreign Influence Unit could be consolidated with that of the CPUSA Unit. The other supervisor from the pool of II could be assigned to the Special Coordination Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

This realignment would result in a considerable decline in personnel within the Internal Security Section. However, a balancing of work load could be accomplished through reassignment of the three-man Protestant and Trotskyist Groups Unit from the New Left Section to the Internal Security Section where it was in the recent past. Further, as you are aware, a proposal is presently being considered to reassign Antiriot Laws plus Explosives and Incendiary Devices cases from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence
Division. While it is realized that logically these should be placed in the New Left or Extremist Intelligence Section, to balance work load, they could be considered for assignment to the Internal Security Section if proposal is approved. The Research and New Left Sections would each be decreased by one Special Agent Supervisor, the Extremist Intelligence Section by two. The Nationalities Intelligence Section, excluding the Front Office, would be increased by one Special Agent Supervisor.

OBSERVATIONS:

Considerable time has been devoted to this phase of the inspection to assess as accurately as possible manpower requirements of the various Units and Sections. In addition to ticklers and file reviews your outgoing mail was reviewed for one work week.

During the course of this mail survey covering a five-day work period, 715 pieces of mail or 143 pieces 1 day were generated and reviewed. Of this number, 268 pieces or 37% were directed to the Front Office for review and 497 pieces or 63% went directly to the field or other agencies without Front Office review. This indicates an average of 6 pieces of outgoing mail per Agent are being prepared per work week. 55.6% of the total pieces of mail were of a routine nature, setting forth a minimum degree of supervision and direction. 36.1% contained a moderate degree of supervision and 8.3% contained a considerable degree of supervisory instruction or direction.

Of the average of six pieces of mail per Agent 3.3 pieces were of a routine nature requiring minimal supervision; 2.2 pieces moderate supervision and .5 pieces (1/2 letter, etc.) considerable supervisory instruction or direction per week.

Examples of minimum supervisory content would be communications permitting routine interview or informant payment (stamp). An example of moderate supervisory content would be a letter to the Attorney General with cover memo bringing AG up to date in a particular case. As example of supervisory content of considerable degree would be instructions to interview key witnesses on top priority cases setting out pertinent points to cover in the interview or would furnish supervisory direction of a substantive investigation.
It is realized the above survey reveals only a small part of the Division's production; however, it gives some insight into the amount of actual supervision and direction being afforded the field as an overall consideration. It is not felt or implied that a "letter writing" program for the sake of writing letters be instituted as obviously this does not relate to supervision. It may indicate, however, among other things, the amount of intensity of positive supervision being afforded, as an overview and is being furnished for your information as well as for mine.

The above analysis (manpower) reveals in your Division a need for 9 men on the McLek case, 2 for Chinese matters and one for Special Coordination Unit. On a priority basis, inspection surveys reveal the manpower is available as indicated. It is felt your Chinese program must "get going now" in view of impending developments.

In addition, our proposals will allow you to assign men permanently to McLek and make other necessary shifts in manpower to get away from the temporary assignment basis you now have and which is disruptive to all Sections involved. It is also acknowledged some of the realignment indicated has been proposed by your Division in studies made by you prior to this inspection.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
CLERICAL

An analysis was also made of adequacy of clerical personnel within your Division and after careful study it was determined that a reduction of 11 clerical personnel is possible. This reduction could be made through attrition. The reductions possible are graphically set forth in the chart below:

Internal Security and Research Branch

Internal Security Section
Klan and White Hate Groups - 3

New Left Section
Special Investigations - East - 1
Special Investigations - West - 1
Subversive Individuals - New Left - 1

Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch

Espionage Section
Special Cases - 1
Officials - New York - 1
Officials - WFO - 1
Satellite - 1

Nationalities Intelligence Section
Middle and South American - 1

Our findings in most instances are based on a thorough review of the work of the individual units plus case load allocations. The justification for the above-mentioned reductions is set forth below under the individual Unit and Section designation:

INTERNAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH BRANCH

Internal Security Section

Klan and White Hate Groups

Pursuant to the above proposal that this Unit be absorbed by the Extremist Intelligence Section the two clerks and one secretary can be considered excess inasmuch as the work presently being performed by these persons can adequately be performed by the clerical personnel in the new Section.
New Left Section

Special Investigations Unit - East

The surplus clerk presently working in this Unit is not needed inasmuch as the four clerks permanently assigned to this Unit were adequately handling the work before he reported.

Special Investigations Unit - West

It is felt three clerks could handle the work in this Unit inasmuch as three clerks in Special Investigations Unit - East handle a comparative work load. The East Unit has four clerks; however, one clerk handles Sabotage cases and the West Unit does not handle these matters.

Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit

Although the case load in this Unit is high the work is routine and can be handled quickly. The Special Clerk (GS-6 Reviewer) handles much of the reviewing of communications thus saving clerical time. This Unit is operating with one less Agent who is on loan to the McLek case. Due to a comparison of the clerical work load of the Subversive Individuals Unit in the Internal Security Section it is felt this Unit could operate with one less clerk.

ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Espionage Section

Special Cases Unit

It is felt based upon the case load of this Unit being handled by clerks, that with the assistance of the stenographer, this Unit could adequately operate and function with one less clerical employee.

Officials - New York Unit

It is felt the clerk-stenographer assigned to this Unit could handle the IIRONCLAD indices in addition to taking dictation from supervisors. This would leave the Unit with 2 stenographers for 3 supervisors and thereby release the clerk who is presently handling the IIRONCLAD indices.

Officials - WFO Unit

Based on the case load of this Unit, it is felt the clerk-stenographer presently assigned could assist in clerical work, thereby releasing one
of the clerks presently assigned to this Unit.

**Satellite Unit**

This Unit presently has three regular clerks and two Special Clerks. It is felt that one of the Special Clerks could assist in the regular clerical duties, thereby releasing one clerk from this Unit.

**Nationalities Intelligence Section**

**Middle and South American Unit**

Based on the case load of this Unit it is recommended that one clerk be released inasmuch as there does not appear to be sufficient work for three clerks.

Comments of Assistant Director regarding Agent and clerical adequacy requested.
ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I have thoroughly studied the Inspector's comments regarding adequacy of personnel, both Agent and clerical, and have the following observations to make:

I certainly recognize full well the need for reorganizing and reallocating personnel to provide manpower assistance to the Nationalities Intelligence Section which is handling the McLek case. In fact, the proposed reorganization of the Division as set forth in my memorandum of August 3, 1971, was based on the priority needs which arose from the McLek case and which continue to be critical. As set forth in that memorandum, manpower was to permanently be assigned to the Nationalities Intelligence Section in order to avoid disruption caused by handling this important case with temporary assignments.

In meeting the priority responsibilities in the McLek case as well as in other critical areas, I am also mindful that we do not have a surplus of manpower but are undoubtedly faced with the supervision of more complex cases in the security field with fewer Agents than at any other time in the Bureau's history. Crises brought about by terroristic acts of black extremists, Weathermen, antiwar activists, and other extremists are increasing in intensity and from all indications will continue to place heavy demands upon the Bureau. Likewise, the potential of Chinese Communist espionage activity in this country is readily apparent and the increased activity of Soviet Agents is a fact. These facts, coupled with special case commitments, have stretched available manpower to the limit of elasticity.

In making such manpower shifts, we must recognize that there will be a weakening of the supervision of the area from which the personnel are transferred and we must be prepared to accept this, at least on a temporary basis, because in the long run such weakening could be most harmful as well as embarrassing.

For example, the Inspector has indicated that two supervisors could be transferred out of the Extremist Intelligence Section and, in addition, that Section should absorb all Klan and white hate cases (now being handled by two men in another Section). Actually, this means absorption of the work of four men by the remaining men in the Section (18). Put another way, the work load has been increased by almost 25 per cent.
As will be noted in the table set out hereinafter, case loads are excessive in very sensitive areas of the Bureau's responsibilities, e.g., Soviet espionage and black and New Left extremists who are daily escalating their revolutionary activity in our streets.

The utilization of manpower on specials, such as the current nine men on McLek, will receive extremely close scrutiny and will be reallocated to these other pressing work areas as soon as possible as I do not believe the current case loads allow adequate supervision for any extended period of time.

No one realizes the potential threat which the Red Chinese pose to the security of this country better than I. We must recognize, however, that there has been considerable planning on the Bureau's part dating back to the 1950s when we had first indications that the United States might recognize Red China. But the fact is that we have more important priorities at this particular time evidenced by bombings, assassinations, arsons and other terroristic acts daily occurring by extremist elements within our investigative responsibilities. We are faced right now with a very serious internal security threat which demands immediate attention. This does not minimize the Red Chinese threat at all but we must recognize it is still a "potential" and until diplomatic channels are opened and active espionage activity begins again we must put "first things first." I believe affording one man to that work area is the limit of our available resources at this time.

With respect to the clerical reduction of 11 clerks, which is to occur by attrition, I feel that a reduction of this magnitude will definitely result in a hardship on the work of the Division. I have repeatedly stressed that wherever possible Agents should be relieved of as many duties as possible by competent clerical personnel, thus resulting in considerable savings of Agent manpower throughout the Division. A reduction of the number of clerks, as recommended by the Inspector, certainly will hamper our past streamlining efforts.
Set forth below, by Branch, are more specific observations with respect to the Inspector's comments and recommendations; however, in summary, I desire to point out that we cannot reassign manpower of the quantity involved for an extended period of time and eliminate entirely by attrition 11 clerks without such action having a deleterious effect in certain areas of our operations. I am strongly opposed to such lessening of our coverage in these areas but if such recommendations are approved and ordered, I will do my best to see that our responsibilities are fulfilled to the maximum degree possible under the circumstances.

The following comments are made concerning reallocation of Agent personnel to top priorities regarding the Internal Security and Research Branch. The Inspector recommends seven supervisors be reallocated from this Branch to other work areas. Based on day-to-day experience in these work areas and having available end of August case count figures, the following alternatives are recommended to make seven supervisors available.

Research Section: The present supervisor assigned to the Ellsberg case is a talented writer experienced in complicated research projects and preparation of research papers. He is utilized full time on the Ellsberg case in this capacity and on his own time continues to handle some speeches and research matters. Research Section will make a second supervisor available for the Ellsberg case and the original supervisor will return to Research Section as soon as his project is completed on Ellsberg. This is predicated on the assumption a replacement will be provided this Section for SA Ramey who was transferred to another Division.

Internal Security Section: Will make four supervisors available instead of five as recommended by the Inspector.

This is predicated on experience and present case load regarding the Subversive Individuals Unit primarily and also the Security Informant Unit. August 31, 1971, case count for the Subversive Individuals Unit is 2,663 cases, in addition, 523 cases were opened and 496 cases were closed during August in this Unit. This would be an average case load of 666 cases per Agent, not including the opening and closing mail flow.
The Security Informant Unit would be handling 904 cases, averaging 452 cases when reduced to two supervisors. Under the new case count system, these informant cases are largely cases with mail in hand requiring attention and close supervision because of funds being involved as well as the general sensitivity of these cases. In the event of sick or annual leave, one man could not possibly keep mail current and work loads in other units would, as a practical matter, preclude use of other personnel to carry out the work. The supervisor retained would reduce the case load in the Subversive Individuals Unit to a more reasonable and practical 533 case load average and also allow for a limited degree of flexibility in the informant matters from time to time as necessary. This provides the seven men from this Branch. (This includes one man from the New Left Section, as indicated.)

New Left Section: Will make one man available as recommended.

Regarding reallocation of Agent personnel to top priorities regarding the Espionage Branch, the following comments are made:

Extremist Intelligence Section will make two supervisors available and absorb the 559 Klan and White Hate cases with no Agent personnel. It must be borne in mind this, in effect, constitutes a net reduction of four supervisors to black extremist matters at a time when these activities are on a definite upswing. This can be lived with on a short term emergency basis and as manpower becomes available from the inevitable winddown of McLek, appropriate recommendations will be considered within the Division as to reallocation of that manpower with this in mind consistent with overall Division needs at that time.

Nationalities Intelligence Section will make two men available as recommended. With regard to the two Units being reduced, it is pointed out that the Middle and South American Unit is responsible for matters
relating to 32 countries. There are five Legal Attache (Legat) Offices located in countries handled by the Unit and each of these offices, except Mexico, covers more than one country. The Nationality Unit is responsible for matters relating to 101 countries. Eleven Legat Offices are located in the area of responsibility of this Unit and most of these Legat Offices cover more than one country.

There is a high volume of material which is received daily in these Units consisting of intelligence information from other agencies and news media material. All of this material must be reviewed in order that the supervisors will be in position not only to handle inquiries from any source relating to matters of Bureau responsibility in the nationalities intelligence field but also to process the high level intelligence (HILEV) items which are received from Legats. The latter is a very heavy responsibility since we recognize that if one high-level item goes to the President and he acts on it, and it proves to be incorrect, not only the Bureau but the White House itself might encounter serious problems. During month of August, of 106 HILEV items received from Legats, 51 were processed by the Nationality Unit and 34 by the Middle and South American Unit. Each of the two units disseminated 30 HILEV items. Dissemination of each HILEV item consumes approximately one hour of a supervisor's time.

With regard to the Nationality Unit, which has the lowest average case load per supervisor, other matters handled in the Unit not reflected by caseload are: providing for installation and maintenance of continued coverage in sensitive areas essential to the fulfillment of requests of the National Security Agency (Telex Coverage, 64 at present); establishing and maintaining highly sensitive coverage also for National Security Agency relating to electronic penetration of communications equipment; supervising and coordinating on a recurring basis coverage relating to the various United Nations General Assembly sessions (which includes close working relationship with Secret Service); maintenance of all Bureau liaison with National Security Agency.

It must be borne in mind the reduction of four case supervisors from the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence Branch and seven case supervisors from the Internal Security and
Research Branch are accepted to meet an emergency situation (McLek case) but these reductions are not considered consistent with adequate supervision nor offer necessary flexibility within Sections to meet emergencies and specials as they arise when viewed in terms of an extended period of time. It is expected the McLek case, as with all specials, will ultimately wind down. At that time and as personnel are available for reallocation, appropriate recommendations will be made and considered within the Division as to their commitment based on work loads at the time consistent with the overall needs of the Division.

**Supervisory Case Load Averages**

The following chart graphically displays caseloads per Section (excluding men on special or non-case assignment) as of August 31, 1971, and with the proposed shift of manpower contained herein which closely adheres to the Inspector's recommendations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
<th>SAS</th>
<th>Cases</th>
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</thead>
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<td>286</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist Intelligence</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espionage</td>
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<td>312</td>
<td>+1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Security</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be borne in mind the "Add or Delete" column pertains only to supervisors now included in case count computations as being assigned to regular case load duties and does not portray total movement as recommended. Some of those included in the recommendations are already on special assignment (McLek, etc.). For example, Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections will merely make permanent the personnel on loan to McLek and, therefore, are listed as zero. Espionage will get a man back and is listed as +1.
Nationalities Intelligence Section is giving up two men from present assignment, one to the Chinese Unit and one to Special Coordination Unit. The latter is a non-case assignment and deletes one man from computation of average case load in the Section which brings that Section more in line with the present Division average of 335 cases per case supervisor under the new rules for case count. This also results in one less supervisor committed to case supervision and alters the Division average per case supervisor to 341 cases.

It is recognized the Internal Security Section has a high average case load per Agent, however, that Section has less organization cases and proportionately more individual matters requiring less supervisory attention than other Sections. This will be followed closely and depending on approval of transferring EID and ARL cases to this Division and/or resolution of Eastcon and appropriate recommendation will be made to adjust a block of work internally within the Division to create a better balance there.
As to the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence Branch clerical reduction recommendations, the following comments are made.

Nationalities Intelligence will reduce one clerk as recommended.

In the Espionage Section there are 16 substantive desk supervisors with 13 clerks actually performing the work for these supervisors, a ratio of .81 per supervisor. To reduce this number by four would result in the ratio .56 or roughly 1/2 clerk per supervisor.

The Clerk-Stenographer position provides the incumbent to perform clerical work only 20 per cent of her time. The use of a Clerk-Stenographer in the Special Cases, Officials - New York, and Officials - Washington Field Units thus would not absorb the extra work placed on the remaining clerks in these Units and such is not considered feasible. The use of a Special Clerk now handling cases in lieu of a Special Agent supervisor in the Satellite Unit to handle clerical functions for a Supervisor would defeat the purpose of establishing this position and would place an unfair burden of responsibility on that Special Clerk who should be free to concentrate on the supervision of her own cases.

In summary, it is felt that the present clerical assignment is the minimum number necessary to handle the voluminous work associated with 5,575 cases currently assigned to this Section.

The Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the case load of 559 cases but will need a minimum of one clerk to accompany these cases. This Section was not recommended by the Inspector to reduce clerical complement and it is not felt practical to absorb 559 cases and no clerical personnel. This is particularly true when it is considered no Agent personnel are being received with these cases.

I believe the above reductions, totalling three, are in good faith with the Inspection Staff's and my own desire to obtain maximum utilization of personnel and continue an efficient and practical operation. Further reduction would merely result in Agents performing clerical functions, and with the continued escalation in case loads and current special cases being handled, I do not believe further reductions can be made within the bounds of good personnel management and best utilization of clerical vs. Agent manpower.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
CLERICAL

The following comments are made concerning reduction of clerical personnel in the Internal Security and Research Branch.

Internal Security Section: In the past, it has been necessary on a frequent basis to afford considerable clerical assistance from the Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to the Subversive Individuals Unit because of the extremely heavy clerical duties involved in the escalating case loads carried in this Unit, coupled with 523 cases opened and 496 cases closed during the past month, for example. It is necessary and warranted to retain two of the three clerical personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization in the Subversive Individuals Unit. If this is not done, it will result in an impractical clerical work load, with nowhere to draw upon clerical help and result in supervisors being additionally burdened with clerical functions, which they can ill afford to handle. This would also be consistent and in line with the assignment of Agent personnel in this Unit detailed previously and allow one clerk per Agent, which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work involved.

New Left Section: It is believed the Special Investigations - East and Special Investigations - West Units can function with one less clerk each as recommended by the Inspector. It is not believed good management, however, to reduce a clerk in the Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit. With one supervisor reduced, the clerical work remains the same and retention of the clerk would allow one clerk per Agent, which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work involved. With the very heavy case loads in this Unit, coupled with 768 cases opened and 776 cases closed within the past month, for example, clerks are extremely busy. Reduction in clerical staff merely means Agents will have to perform clerical functions which is uneconomical and hardly practical with the work loads involved.

Bearing in mind Agent manpower reductions in the Internal Security and Research Branch, it is believed the Branch can operate with efficiency and in good faith with the Inspection Staff and Divisions desire to use manpower to its fullest and make the above three clerical reductions.
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: (ESM: bhg, 9/9/71)

Your comments and proposals with respect to the reallocation of Agent personnel within the Division appear logical and are acceptable. However, exception must be made with respect to clerical employees.

You state it is necessary and warranted to retain 2 of the 3 clerical personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization in the Subversive Individuals Unit of the Internal Security Section. Based upon figures available the case load within the Subversive Individuals Unit approximates 2700 cases handled at present by three clerical employees giving an average case load per clerk of approximately 900 cases. Retaining one of the Klan clerks would result in an average case load per clerk of 675 cases which is not felt unreasonable or intolerable a burden. Further, it is not felt that less than 1 clerk per Agent is too great a load for the Unit.

Turning now to the Espionage Section based on our survey it was felt that 4 clerical positions could be voided through attrition, based primarily on greater utilization of clerk-stenographers on clerical duties. You state that the clerk-stenographer position provides the incumbent to perform clerical work only 20% of her time. At present there are 10 secretaries and clerk-stenographers available for transcription of communications. A survey of communications conducted during this inspection revealed that the Espionage Section dispatched 121 pieces of correspondence during a 5-day period, which results in approximately 12 communications per secretary or slightly over 2 communications per day per employee. This does not indicate a great work load on the secretarial force and consequently it is felt that clerk-stenographers could be freed for clerical functions where necessary. In view of this it is felt that at least two clerical positions could be dissolved through attrition within this section.

With respect to the Extremist Intelligence Section, you indicate that the case load of 559 cases can be absorbed but a minimum of one clerk will be needed to handle these cases. Based upon case load figures available should this clerk not be made available the average case load per clerk within the Black Nationalist - East Unit would increase from approximately 470 to 660 cases. Black Nationalist - Central from approximately 715 to 940. Black Nationalist - South from approximately 780 to 1000, and the Black Nationalist - West from approximately 210 to 350 cases per clerk. Particular note should be made of the average case load per clerk increase
within the Black Nationalist - West Unit should the cases be absorbed there with no added clerical employees. In view of the above it is felt that the Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the additional cases without an added clerk.

Based on the above it can be seen that at least 7 clerical positions could be dissolved without an unreasonable burden being placed on the remaining.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: PAYMENTS TO SECURITY INFORMANTS
AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Present regulations allow for payments up to $400 with SAC authority on a COD basis to individuals being developed as informants on security matters. (Manual of Instructions, Section 107, page 14.) Once the individual is paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on a regular basis, recommendation could be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis." Such authorization is through usage of FD-401. After the initial payments are approved, every 6 months an FD-401 is submitted requesting continuance, and, if approved, is stamped "approved" at the Bureau and returned. (Manual of Instructions, Section 107, page 15.)

In view of current Government-wide economy move and the Bureau's own economy program, it is imperative that the field exercise great care and scrutiny in payments to informants to assure that payments on a "regular basis" are fully justified and are not serving as an administrative crutch and expedient in lieu of payments under SAC authority.

A survey has been made of 80 files of informants who are presently being paid on a regular basis with respect to the date the informant was approved as a PSI, the date approval was given to pay him on a regular basis, and the amount paid the source under SAC authority before Bureau authority was sought to pay him on a regular basis.

In the following 34 informant files authority was granted to pay the source on a regular basis before the field used the full amount that could have been paid under SAC authority, representing 42.5% of the total cases reviewed:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/3/71
JMM: bhg
<table>
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<tr>
<th>134-6062*</th>
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<td>134-19732</td>
<td>134-21218</td>
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<td>134-20051</td>
<td>134-13545*</td>
<td>134-19931</td>
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</table>

Those files marked with an asterisk indicate that only token amounts had been paid under SAC authority ranging from $25 to less than $100.

This analysis would indicate SACs are abdicating authority to approve paying sources the full amount allowed before seeking Bureau permission to pay on a regular basis.

In the following 17 instances the Bureau approved the field's communication seeking approval of an individual as a PSI in which the same communication also asked approval to pay the source on a regular basis:

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<tr>
<td>105-188201</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In the following 19 cases the Bureau approved sources being paid on a regular basis within 45 days of their being approved as a PSI:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>134-6201</th>
<th>134-17689</th>
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<td>134-21762</td>
<td>134-20687</td>
<td>134-21622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>170-768</td>
<td>134-21584</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These 36 cases (17 + 19) represent 45% of those files reviewed and indicate the field's undesirable practice of asking approval to pay sources on a regular basis upon obtaining approval to develop the source as a PSI. It does not appear that contacts with these individuals are over a sufficient period of time to conclude the source is furnishing data on a regular basis to justify paying him on a regular basis.
A representative number of informant files were checked where the full amount under SAC authority was not utilized and it was determined payments were over a 3.3 month period, for an average monthly payment of $73.00 for each source. Subsequent to receiving approval to pay the source on a regular basis each source received an average of $152 over the next 6-month period. It is concluded that if payments had continued for a longer period under SAC authority before paying on a regular basis, an average of approximately $80 less per month would have been expended in each case. On an annual basis this would be $960. Estimating that as few as 33% of the present number of Security Informants including New Left, Old Left (CPUSA), Extremists, Klan and other White Hate Groups have been developed in the past two years of the 1507 total number of Security Informants presently being paid on a regular basis, this could be projected into $240,000 less having been spent each year on these sources.

Consequently, it appears every effort should be expended to insure that payments to informants on a regular basis should be initiated only after the source has furnished data on a continuing basis for at least 6 months and after he has been paid the full amount under SAC authority on a COD basis for value received. There should be no objection to the field's obtaining Bureau authority to pay source up to another $400 SAC authority before paying on a regular basis. Certainly, the request to approve an individual as a PSI should not be coupled in the same communication with a request to pay that individual on a regular basis. (Of course, in exceptional and unusual cases facts could warrant conclusion that some sources could be paid on a regular basis in a shorter period of time.) This will also help to preclude informant's obvious conclusion that he is being paid on a salary basis because of the similar amounts paid to him each month.

In addition, all communications approving the initial payments on a regular basis to security informants should be routed through Mr. Tolson's Office for review and approval.

It is felt a wider usage of payments under SAC authority to security informants, will in the long run, serve to substantially reduce total payments to them and further implement efforts to curtail costs in accordance with the Director's and President's recent directives on economy.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan

Security and extremist informants are essential to the Bureau's investigative responsibilities. They operate largely in controversial areas of old line and new left revolutionary organizations and individuals as well as in the volatile fields of black and white extremism and racial dissension. They are fraught with controversy and potential for embarrassment to the Bureau. Extended experience has taught us the absolute necessity for tight, effective, centralized control of these informants by SOG.

Fundamentally, whether an informant is paid under SAC authority or on a regular basis by SOG the same standards of justification are to be applied. The distinguishing element is the flexibility of on-the-scene, spot payment authority available to the SAC on a daily basis without the formality of time-consuming correspondence with Bureau headquarters. Money is paid in both situations on a c.o.d basis and full value must be received before payments are made. Initial payments to a developing informant under SAC authority, usually made on an expedient emergency basis, are not reviewed and evaluated at the SOG. The judgment of the SAC prevails. Generally the Bureau approves payments on a regular basis only when emergency and exceptional local conditions no longer prevail, when the informant is active, productive and gives promise of continuing to be so.

Should the currently authorized initial SAC-authorized $400 be expended rapidly—as is frequently the case—there is no objection to the field's obtaining Bureau authority to pay a second $400 to an informant under SAC authority. This does require justification through submission of full facts in the matter for SOG judgment, similar to the justification required each six months for informants paid on a regular basis.

Authorization for SAC authority to permit such payments up to six months before the field requests regular payments from the Bureau as suggested by the Inspector, could dilute both the central and consistent control of payments at the Bureau and could cause an increase in paper work required to implement the procedure. SAC authority currently has no fixed time limit for expenditures and in many cases this authorization could be
expended before the termination of a six-month development period thus requiring additional paper work in the field and resultant supervisory work at the Bureau.

It is extremely difficult to draw meaningful conclusions concerning any savings between payments under SAC authority and costs accrued under delayed SOG approval of payments on a regular basis. The informant while operating under SAC authority is in a developmental stage. It can be expected that at any given point in his development whether he continues on SAC authority or is approved for regular payments, expenditures to him will increase. It is the natural and practical order of informant development.

The sooner a developing security or extremist informant can be brought under SOG control the more effective and consistent becomes his supervision. The SAC remains accountable, of course, for the informant's handling, the validity of his expenditures, and the worth of his information. Additional supervision, based on broad field needs and applied with consistency to the over-all policies of the Bureau, necessarily is furnished by SOG supervisors and officials. This amounts to far more effective field-wide supervision of these sensitive matters.

Strict economy continues to be the rule in Bureau supervision of security and extremist informants. During the period 4/1/70 through 6/70 for example as a result of reviewing regular payments to informants $4392 was saved. During the period 1/1/71 through 3/1/71 $5156 was saved. More recently on 8/20/71 a letter to all offices instructed them to cut back five per cent in their total payments to security and extremist informants—a projected saving of $129,000.

It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the over-all sensitivity of security and extremist informants, current procedures allowing for initial payments under SAC authority with a shift to Bureau approval of payments on a regular basis as the informant progresses and develops productivity, provide the most effective and consistent field-wide supervision for the over-all needs of the Bureau.
While there is no objection to the Inspector's suggestion that all communications approving initial payments on a regular basis to these informants be routed through Mr. Tolson's office for review and approval it must be pointed out, of course, that this creates a substantial increase in the preparation and review of related correspondence, not previously required. In view of this foreseeable increase in work load, it is respectfully suggested that we continue to handle initial payment correspondence under existing regulations.
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:

(ESM: bhg, 9/8/71)

Your comments have been noted and you will be advised as to any further action necessary.

Assistant Director please note.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan

(JAS: sjr 9-8-71)

The above observations by the Inspector have been noted.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
SURVEY CONCERNING COMPUTERIZATION OF
SECURITY INFORMANT INDICES

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: During this inspection, it was noted that the Security Informant Index is under the supervision of the Security Informant Unit, Internal Security Section. This Index contains certain data concerning security and potential security informants but does not include the extremist, probationary extremist, or extremist-ghetto informants. It must be maintained on a timely basis. As of 8/24/71, the Index had approximately 2026 informants. This Index is maintained by 2 GS-5 clerks, one GS-3 clerk, and 30% of the time of a GS-4 stenographer on a full time basis. This means that 3 1/3 employees are utilized to maintain this Index at an annual cost of approximately $20,000.

SAC Letter 71-21 (C) dated 5/18/71 instructs the field to give a symbol number designation to all individuals being developed as any type of a Bureau source of information. This required the field to submit secure teletypes to the Bureau concerning every source under development and has resulted in a backlog of work in the Index of approximately 45 to 60 days. In each instance, the clerical staff is required to pull and alter 2 cards (FD 348) on each existing source or make 2 cards on any new sources. Subsequent communications add or delete from the original information which requires the cards to be again pulled and appropriate changes recorded.

It would appear that this Index would benefit from being computerized which would result in a savings of clerical time and personnel. In addition to the informants now handled by the Index, other informant indexes could probably be computerized with a similar savings.

At the time of the last inspection, the Inspector suggested that record keeping operations throughout the Division should be considered for computerizing where feasible. It is suggested that immediate steps be taken through surveys and conferences to determine if it is plausible and/or practical to computerize and expand informant indexes similar to that already done to the Security and Agitator Indexes. Consideration should be

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/3/71
RHM:mea
given to the initial and continuing costs and redesigning the source information card (FD 348). The security of this information must be considered as data concerning informant matters is highly sensitive.

Comments of Unit Chief Grigalus; Section Chiefs Gray, Shackelford, G. C. Moore, Branigan, and Wannall; and Assistant Director Brennan are requested.
UNIT CHIEF GRIGALUS AND SECTION CHIEFS GRAY, SHACKELFORD, G. C. MOORE, BRANIGAN AND WANNALL: The Security Informant Index contains certain data concerning present and former informants and sources. This data basically consists of the identity of the informant with limited background information. The primary reason for such an index is to have a central repository containing the number and identities of informants. This information is readily accessible. Informal discussions have been held in the past concerning feasibility of computerizing the Security Informant Index as well as the Extremist Informant Index. During course of these discussions, there were two prime considerations; namely, the ready accessibility of information on the indexes as well as the saving of manpower and cost to the Bureau. Previous discussions did not result in a positive recommendation to computerizing the above indexes. It is noted that the present indexes are serving the Bureau's purpose. In order to insure that all avenues of savings are considered, the Inspector's suggestion will be carried out. Surveys and conferences with our expert personnel in the automatic data processing field will be conducted to determine if such an operation is feasible, practical and economical, keeping in mind the accessibility of the information and the security of informants. It is proposed, therefore, that this suggestion be immediately acted upon.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAH (JAS:cb - 9/7/71)

I agree that it would be desirable to carry out this suggestion.

I will follow this matter closely to determine if such an operation is feasible.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY INTERNAL SECURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: At the time of the last inspection a suggestion was submitted (pages 227 - 233) pointing out advantages in implementation of a program in this area of operation which would make our approach to both above types of informants and Extremist (Racial) informants uniform. You agreed to implement for one year; however, your subsequent efforts to initiate the program were lost in a "security of transmitting problem."

Your Extremist Intelligence Section solved the same problem by having the field send their informant reports to the Bureau by secure teletype and it is understood that method of handling is satisfactory. The overall Extremist Informant Program also appears productive.

It is recommended that you again favorably consider the prior suggestion and tailor implementation after its counterpart in the Extremist Section. Administration of such a program should be more efficiently handled now since you have reinstituted handling of these informants by a Security Informant Unit.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: This suggestion will be favorably considered. A careful analysis will be conducted to tailor the suggestion to the needs of the Sections affected, keeping uniformity in mind. This matter will be closely followed by me.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/26/71
ESM:wmj
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Foreign Operations Policy Manual, Section 10, page 1, provides that Legal Attachés should submit investigative results by cover letter or cover page, on FD-263, letterhead memorandum, or informant evaluation memorandum. The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 21, provides that when reporting information in criminal and civil type cases received from the Bureau's Legal Attaché, the information should be attributed to a confidential source abroad. In reports the source would be identified on the administrative page.

During the course of the recent inspection of our Legal Attaché Offices, it was noted that generally Legal Attachés would furnish investigative results in criminal cases by airtel or letter where more expeditious means of communications was not necessary. In some instances, these communications would be rather lengthy. Upon receipt of these communications by the respective field office and if preparation of a report was desired, the information from the Legal Attaché would have to be retyped, attributed to a confidential source abroad, and the identity of the source set out on the administrative page of the report. This rather burdensome task could be dispensed with if the Legal Attaché would prepare an insert setting forth information and attributing it to a confidential source abroad. The insert would be transmitted by airtel or letter with the identity of the source set out.

The above is being brought to your attention for appropriate comment and if felt beneficial, the Foreign Operations Policy Manual should be amended to include inserts as the fourth means of reporting investigative results by the Legal Attachés.

Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
JFH:bsf
UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL

The procedure proposed by the Nationalities Intelligence Section Inspector could be utilized by our foreign offices in those cases where they recognize that an investigative report must be prepared and where the information developed abroad is suitable for inclusion in such a report. We do not believe, however, that across-the-board instructions should be issued requiring this procedure in all instances, nor do we believe that such a requirement was visualized by the Inspector inasmuch as he suggests amendment of the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include inserts as one of four means of reporting investigative results by the Legal Attaches. In fact, Legal Attaches now prepare FD-302s in certain cases when specifically requested by the field. These are, of course, restricted to cases in which testimony or evidence from abroad is anticipated.

The minimal clerical staff abroad is insufficient to prepare inserts or FD-302s in more than a relatively few cases. The high volume handled by most of our Legal Attaches requires them to use every possible streamlining device to reduce the clerical burden. In Ottawa, for example, our Legal Attache utilizes a specially printed RCMP routing slip to forward RCMP prepared letterhead memoranda. Any requirement that Ottawa prepare inserts or FD-302s in any volume would be impractical. We propose, therefore, to amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include inserts as a fourth means of reporting without levying a requirement that it be utilized on a wholesale basis.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D. BRENnan

The Inspector's suggestions and the comments of Section Chief Wannall have been noted and we will amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include the Inspector's suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
GAD:hc
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
BLACK NATIONALIST PHOTOGRAPH ALBUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was approved and established in 1968 and at this time contains the photograph and biographical data of 472 black extremists who travel extensively in this country and abroad. Each field office plus Legal Attaches, Ottawa and Mexico City, maintain this Album to assist in coverage of movement of black extremist individuals in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The Album appears to be an excellent investigative aid by making immediately available photograph and background data on individuals traveling from one Division to another or out of the country whose activities must be followed.

A review of files discloses at least 10 individuals who are included in the BNPA traveled to Paris in the recent past. It is noted a favorite route of Black Panthers traveling to Algeria is through Paris. In view of the increased activity on the part of the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party, it can be assumed that travel of individuals affiliated with the Cleaver Faction to and from Cleaver's headquarters in Algeria will continue or increase. In view of these travels, the Legal Attache, Paris, could utilize the BNPA to facilitate expedite coverage of these extremists while in France.

A review of the BNPA itself reveals that some of the photographs attached to the FD-432 in this file do not have the names of the individuals photographed on the back of the photograph. These photographs should have the individual's name on the back in the event the photographs become detached from the FD-432.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Legat, Paris, be provided with a copy of the BNPA.

2. If a further pattern of travel develops into an area covered by another Legal Attache, consideration should then be given to making available a copy of the BNPA to that Legal Attache.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
JTR:wmj/mkl
3. That a review be made of all FD-432's contained in the BNPA to insure that all photographs are identified with the name of the individual described on the specific form.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief George C. Moore requested.

SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The BNPA has been reviewed and subject's name placed on the back of all photographs where not previously done. Legal Attache, Paris, will promptly be provided a copy of the BNPA. If in the future it appears that the BNPA will be of value to other Legal Attaches, consideration will be given then to making available the BNPA to that Legal Attache.

GCM:acs
8/26/71

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: I concur with the above.

CDB:acs
8/26/71
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: From a review of the matters being handled by the New Left Section, it is evident that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the youth group of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), is the fastest growing subversive youth group in this country. In August, 1970, membership was estimated to be 1100. During the SWP convention which was held in August, 1971, it was determined that YSA membership had grown to 1500 members.

It is noted YSA played an important role in the activities of the National Peace Action Coalition during the April - May, 1971, antiwar demonstrations in Washington, D.C.

YSA has numerous chapters throughout the United States, primarily on campuses. In addition, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) has chapters on many campuses. The SMC is nothing more than a front group for the YSA and is dominated and controlled by YSA.

YSA claims it had recruited 450 new members into its ranks during the Spring of 1971.

Its leaders have called for aggressive YSA recruiting among colleges this fall and have set a goal of at least doubling their present membership.

YSA leaders have called for student strikes on campuses this fall in order to close them down and attempt to organize them for antiwar work.

The SWP is attempting to place its candidates on ballots in 32 states and YSA is being called on to assist in a vigorous election campaign. SWP and YSA plan to use this campaign as a means of recruiting new members to their ranks. It is noted YSA is planning to hold its national convention in Houston, Texas, late this fall.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71

TMJ:wmj
In view of the above and because of existing criteria which was approved by the Department that membership in YSA is sufficient to place an individual on the Security Index, the New Left Section should consider issuing instructions to the field that sufficient effort be expended on their investigations of YSA activities to insure that all YSA members are identified and investigated for possible inclusion in the Security Index.

Comments of Section Chief Shackelford and Assistant Director Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD

I fully concur with the Inspector's observations concerning this matter. We are carefully analyzing the informant reports which are now being received concerning the results of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) National Convention and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Educational Conference which was held 8/8-15/71. Considerable valuable information has been developed concerning YSA's future plans and activities, including its plans for an intensive recruiting campaign this fall. In addition, YSA is continuing to play an extremely important role in the activities of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and continues to dominate and control the nation-wide activities of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC).

With appropriate approval, we will furnish all field offices with the latest known plans and activities of YSA and will instruct them to vigorously pursue their investigations of the YSA and to insure all YSA members are identified and, thereafter, to submit appropriate recommendations for placing their names in the Security Index pursuant to existing Bureau instructions.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

I concur. With appropriate approval, the field will be issued specific instructions.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA
RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The Espionage Section in close cooperation with
the Voucher-Statistical Section - Administrative
Division, has designed and implemented an automated system known as the Soviet
Information Collation System. It is essentially a repository of pertinent data on
Soviet officials assigned to the U. S. Through the fast and easy manipulation of
this data by the computer, outputs arranged by important elements of information
can be readily and reliably obtained for Bureau use or dissemination to outside
agencies. The Espionage Section attests to the fact it has "streamlined our
operations, promoted uniformity and assured the highest level of accuracy. At
the same time, it has resulted in a substantial savings in time, money and man-
power, both in the field and at SOG."

It would seem reasonable a similar repository of information could be collected regarding New Left and Extremist individuals. This would parallel
the SICS operation.

Various reports could be selected from this data such as an alphabetical
listing of Key Activist, New Left, and Extremist individuals. Other alternatives
would include listings by phone number according to geographical areas, listings
by addresses according to geographical areas, or listings by demonstrations in
which certain individuals have participated. Summary reports or listings, if
required for dissemination to the field offices or other interested agencies, could
be efficiently prepared under such a system. There are numerous other alternative
that come to mind; however, any consideration for such a program must clearly
take into account the need and benefit for such automation.

Comments of Section Chiefs Moore and Shackelford and Assistant
Director Brennan requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/1/71
GNc:wmi

331
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA
RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS

SECTION CHIEFS MOORE and SHACKELFORD: As indicated elsewhere under Automatic Data Processing (ADP), 5-Q, automatic data banks are utilized extensively by the Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections in connection with the Computerized Telephone Number File (CTNF). CTNF lists telephone numbers known to be utilized by black, New Left and other ethnic extremist groups and individuals. Telephone numbers included in CTNF are listed according to geographic areas. In addition, a special project utilizing ADP is being operated in connection with the EASTCON case. In this EASTCON project, ADP analyses of telephone calls between EASTCON subjects are made and also new subjects are identified through ADP analyses of EASTCON toll calls.

At present, over 12,700 individuals making up the Security Index (SI) have been incorporated into the Bureau's computerized data bank and this data is available to all offices through ADP. In connection with this ADP, SI project, identifying data concerning each subject, as well as his residence and business addresses, are included therein along with other pertinent items such as his organizational affiliation. Over 20 separate print-outs are prepared monthly for administrative and investigative use of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the field.

The facilities of NCIC have also been utilized to aid our investigations of New Left and extremist individuals. "Stop Index" programs for Bureau use only at NCIC have been devised which furnish notice of any police inquiry concerning missing Venceremos Brigade subjects and all Priority I, SI subjects who are extremists, unless they are already included in the NCIC Wanted Persons File.

As indicated, much effort has been made to avail ourselves of opportunities provided by ADP. The Inspector's suggestion that further effort be made to expand our use of ADP facilities, taking into consideration the need and benefit for such automation, appears to have merit; this will be studied and appropriate recommendations made as to its adaptability.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

9/2/71
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BRENNAN: I concur with the above comments.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71
HM:sad
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

PREPARATION OF INTERVIEW REPORTS (FD-302) IN SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATIONS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: From a review of the FBI Handbook, Manual of Rules and Regulations, and Manual of Instructions provisions in regard to security type investigations, more particularly espionage matters, Registration Act, security investigations, internal security - nationalistic tendencies matters, security informants, and racial matters, it was noted that no mention is made that information which may be the subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview report (FD-302).

In this connection the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 4a, makes reference to the preparation of interview reports in security type cases. Due to the discovery procedures existent in our judicial system, the preparation of these interview reports is most necessary particularly when dealing with information of a testimonial nature received from security informants. It is felt that quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents handling security matters to prepare FD-302's may be due to the lack of mention of this in the Manual and Handbook provisions dealing with security investigations.

In view of the above, it is suggested that those provisions of the Manual and Handbook having to do with security type investigations be thoroughly reviewed and amended where necessary to set forth the fact that when information is received from security subjects, security informants, or other individuals which may become the subject of later testimony, an FD-302 should be prepared.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
JFH;bsf

334
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan, The following are my comments requested in Inspector's Suggestion Memorandum entitled "Preparation of Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security Type Investigations:

Inspector notes at outset that from a review of the FBI Handbook, Manual of Rules and Regulations and Manual of Instructions in regard to the various types of security investigations, no mention is made that information which may be the subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview report (FD-302). Inspector does recognize that the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 4a, makes reference to the preparation of interview reports in security type cases.

In Section 4, Part II of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, which Section pertains to Communications, there is a subheading entitled "Reporting Information That May Become Testimony," which is covered on pages 4 and 4a. It is specifically stated on page 4, paragraphs 2b and c, that FD-302s should be used when information is obtained which may be the subject of testimony. At the very top of page 4a, a specific reference is made to security-type cases and the use of an FD-302 in these cases. The requirement for using an FD-302 is further reiterated in paragraph 6 on page 4a.

Part I of the Handbook has a section commencing on page 36, item 48, entitled "Reporting Information That May Become Testimony." This is the counterpart to the Manual of Rules and Regulations provisions cited immediately above. The requirement for the use of an FD-302 is enunciated in item number 48.

Of particular significance is the fact that both the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook provide in their respective Indices for the requirements discussed above. In the Manual, the material is indexed under "Reporting information that may become testimony" as well as under "Testimony--reporting information that may become." The Handbook index has the same two references. It is therefore obvious that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are logically and easily retrievable by reference to either or both the Manual and Handbook.
A cursory spot check of some criminal violations in the Manual of Instructions notes that there is no specific mention made for some violations and it is quite likely that the specific requirement for use of an FD-302 is not spelled out for each of the many, many criminal violations covered in the various sections of the Manual of Instructions. The requirement is covered in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook as are many other requirements which pertain to the Bureau's work generally. A primary function of the Manual of Rules and Regulations is to have in one place general requirements that are applicable across the board in our work. The Section relating to Communications referred to above is a good example.

It was observed by the Inspector that "quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents handling security matters to prepare FD-302's may be due to the lack of mention of this in the Manual and Handbook provisions dealing with security investigations." It is respectfully observed that we have not noted any "seeming reluctance" on the part of investigative Agents handling work in the security field. We have found that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are being generally complied with and when any shortcomings might be noted they are dealt with on an individual case basis. In short, we have had no problems in this area of our operations. It may be that the Inspector's observations are based on noting rather few FD-302s in security reports as compared with reports in the criminal field. If this be the case, it is observed that by and large our obtaining of information in the security field is of an intelligence nature with prosecutable situations being generally the exception. In other words, situations where information might become testimony are rather limited.

A further aspect of the Inspector's Suggestion Memorandum relates to the preparation of FD-302s when obtaining information from security informants. In this respect it is observed that a great many of our security informants prepare written reports which are firsthand accounts and thus preferable to FD-302s which are secondhand accounts. Thus, the informants' reports are even more valuable than FD-302s and are available for the same purpose as are the FD-302s. When an informant furnishes information orally which is not backed up by a written report from the informant and the information may become a matter of testimony, the Agent is under the same requirement to execute an FD-302. We have not observed any failings to speak of in this regard.
In conclusion, it is my studied judgement that there is no necessity for augmenting the requirement concerning FD-302s in the various Manuals presently being utilized in the FBI.
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The primary intent of this suggestion was to point up a possible problem developing as a result of the increased number of criminal violations being encountered by Special Agents handling security work. An excellent illustration of this can be found in case captioned "Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice; IS-Miscellaneous," Bufile 100-459771. In WFO report of SA James F. Whalen dated 5/7/71, serial 423, page 5, is found a narrative of events at a demonstration on November 21, 1970, at New York. This information was not placed on an FD-302 and became an issue at a preliminary hearing. As the contents of this report were not on FD-302s it was necessary to excise pertinent portions of the report and considerable issue of this was made at the preliminary hearing. A further indication of this most necessary indoctrination of security Agents in the use of FD-302s can be found in the EASTCON case. Your attention is invited to an airtel under that caption dated 8/25/71 calling for an in-depth interview of a key witness. In this airtel the supervisor felt it necessary to instruct that the results of this interview be placed on an FD-302.

In light of the above, it is felt you should take whatever action deemed necessary to bring to the attention of Special Agents working security matters the necessity of placing information which could be testimony on FD-302s. It is felt the matter should definitely be highlighted and then followed in the individual cases.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Domestic Intelligence Division is appreciative of the observations and suggestions set forth in the Inspector's Addendum. Accordingly, I am instructing all Section Chiefs to stress this matter with all supervisory personnel in the Division. Further, all of our supervisors who regularly lecture to In Service classes and New Agents classes will stress this matter. We will of course follow the field in the individual cases where it is obvious or even appears that the required action is not being taken in the preparation of necessary FD-302s.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

BLACK EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS
EXTREMIST MATTERS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: By airtel to all continental offices 8/26/71 under the above-mentioned caption, all offices were requested to determine the extent of activity and/or influence attributable to black extremists within penal institutions. This was undoubtedly a result of the attempted prison break at San Quentin Prison in California in which black extremist George Lester Jackson was killed. Reports have indicated that Jackson had hidden a gun in his afro haircut. Further, press releases indicate that when the maximum security cell block was searched an afro hair-style wig was found.

Due to the numerous arrests made by our Agents, it is felt that the field should be alerted to the secreting of weapons in this manner.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I concur with the suggestion of the Inspector. The Extremist Intelligence Section is preparing an airtel to all offices alerting them to the possibility of secreting weapons as noted above.

CDB:bad
8-26-71

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/26/71
OFL:wmj

340
INSPECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

JANUARY 8-26, 1971
Why not leave in Hallman and Marrian as they are acting in an official capacity?

OK

Page 7
P2. Congressman's name deleted here but not on page 2 TP1. Why?
OK

Page 8
#4. Hallman - include?

Page 9
Last TP - include names?

Page 10
TP1 - ditto
Last TP - Libby - include?

Page 12
Marian (last TP)?

Page 13
Marian?

Page 14
Marian?

Page 23-27
Why not leave in Berrigan?

Page 26
Leave in Ellsberg?

Page 52
Berrigan? Ellsberg?

Page 54
Delete only info after quote ends?

Page 68
TP3 Ehrlichman?
Page 52: Shouldn't "Israeli" in 1st line be deleted?
In a separate paper, SSC has asked what is "Israeli". We are planning to tell them it's
"Israeli". However, I think we should excise here.

Page 52: P2 line 4. Shouldn't "...dipilomatic communications" be deleted?

Page 109: We should discuss the Bocor programs with Wannell - re inclusion.
Bocor not included in programs write-up.

Page 139: Ditto re Counterpro
Recommend entire document be classified "Secret."
XGDS 1, 2, 3.

 Portions recommended for excision from attached have been underlined in red or bracketed in red in left margin.

 Generally, criteria for excision were:

 1. Information which could identify sources or sensitive techniques
 2. Names of individuals or organizations whose privacy requires protection
 3. Information which would reveal our overall success or lack of success in a given investigative area
 4. Information from "third Agencies" or friendly foreign agencies
 5. Identities of Bureau personnel below the Section Chief level

 The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general, disclose the extent of our commitment in specific areas of counterintelligence activity. We have given the Committee Administrative Division figures regarding total manpower involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, we have not given them a breakdown as to where these personnel are assigned. A policy decision is necessary as to whether we want to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel" sections of these inspection reports, precisely how much or how little manpower we have on specific types of investigations.

 It is questionable whether the information regarding criminal cases in the San Francisco report is germane to the Committee's inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to delete all references to criminal matters and merely substitute a page saying that "pages ___ to ___ relate to criminal investigations."
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SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS
INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER: During the course of the inspection, two substantive errors were detected in files reviewed. Both of these errors involved inadequacies in the supervision of Espionage related cases.

You should consider a further review and evaluation of these matters in this area of your operation.

Assistant Director Brennan note.

Noted - 06
EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: You are requested to furnish a very brief narrative background of this case from its beginning until the present time. In addition, you should specifically outline the case developed on each subject showing probable cause established as of this time. You are also requested to advise when these cases will be presented to the Federal Grand Jury and indicate the prospects in each instance for a return of a true bill.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
4-A-1-a
EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN

The East Coast Conspiracy is a loosely knit movement composed primarily of Catholic priests and nuns, teachers, students and former students and others who have manifested opposition to the Vietnam war by acts of violence against Government agencies and private corporations identified as defense contractors. The main thrust of their efforts has been vandalism of draft boards.

The Philadelphia Office developed an informant in Lewisburg Penitentiary who was a confidant of Philip Berrigan, a Catholic priest serving time for destruction of Selective Service records. Investigation by prison authorities determined this informant had been transmitting messages in and out of prison in a clandestine manner between Berrigan and Sister Elizabeth McAlister, a nun associated with the Religious Order of the Sacred Heart of Mary, Tarrytown, New York. In addition to transmitting letters to and from Berrigan, the informant met on several occasions with followers of Berrigan such as Neil McLaughlin and Joseph Wenderoth, unassigned Catholic priests in Baltimore, Maryland. Through these individuals he met others associated with the movement.

Information contained in the letters and obtained as a result of personal contacts of the informant produced information showing this group intended to call attention to their anti-Vietnam war position by blowing up the underground heating and electrical systems servicing Government buildings in Washington, D. C., and to kidnap a high Government official. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was mentioned as a possible victim. The proposed target date for these actions was February 22, 1971.

Following the arrest on September 6, 1970, of several individuals associated with this movement for the destruction of draft board records in Rochester, New York, which action included extensive vandalism to the office of the U.S. Attorney as well as our Rochester Resident Agency, the informant learned that the leading activists in the movement intended to expand their activities to include attacks against FBI offices. Informant also learned from McAlister that the group intended to undertake some sabotage-type action at Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey, on an undisclosed date.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-11-71
FBG:plm
4-A-1-a
East Coast Conspiracy

Because of the basic responsibility of this Division for investigations involving subversive antiwar groups, overall responsibility for this investigation was assumed by memorandum dated September 10, 1970. This, of course, did not include individual Selective Service violations existing in various stages of prosecution or subsequent substantive violations in which affiliates of this group were suspected of being involved.

This investigation has been specifically targeted to two areas of prosecutive potential. First, to develop sufficient evidence to prosecute leadership of this broad conspiracy to impede the Government's functioning and conduct of the Vietnam war. In this vein, a comprehensive review of pertinent material discloses 16 related incidents from October 27, 1967, at Baltimore, Maryland, to Rochester, New York, on September 6, 1970. Of 97 individuals involved in 16 incidents during this period, 25 persons have been established as being involved in three or more of these incidents. This particular phase of the investigation is most detailed and complex; however, in terms of far-reaching damage to the movement, it is most significant. For example, we have set up an extensive Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project which resulted in a print-out showing over 300 telephone calls of interest between telephone numbers utilized by these conspirators and which corroborate information from the informant regarding calls he received from principal conspirators.

Second, we are developing sufficient evidence to prosecute the perpetrators of the plots to kidnap Presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels which contain steam and electrical conduits between Government buildings in Washington, D.C.

Because of publicity given the plots to kidnap Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels in Washington, D.C., it is imperative this phase of the investigation be vigorously pressed toward prosecutive action. Consistent with this objective the Federal Grand Jury has been hearing evidence in this matter since December 18, 1970, and according to Departmental attorney Guy L. Goodwin will return indictments concerning the above-mentioned plots on January 12, 1971. Goodwin states the Federal grand jury will continue to hear evidence regarding other facets of this complex.
East Coast Conspiracy

matter and probably will return additional indictments at a later date. According to Goodwin, the Grand Jury will return indictments against six conspirators named below and seven individuals, including Daniel Berrigan, will be named as unindicted co-conspirators at this time. Those to be indicted are Philip Berrigan, Elizabeth McAlister, Joseph Wenderoth, Neil McLaughlin, Eqbal Ahmad, and Anthony Scoblick.

Philip Berrigan:

Laboratory examination determined he authored letters regarding plots to kidnap a high Government official and to blow up tunnel system which were clandestinely transmitted out of Lewisburg Penitentiary.

Elizabeth McAlister:

Laboratory determined she wrote letters to Philip Berrigan regarding above plots. Investigation, including ADP project, has also established her contacts with other conspirators. Considered a leading activist in the movement.

Joseph Reese Wenderoth:

Leading activist of the movement and reported coordinator of plot to blow up tunnel system, with responsibility for recruiting necessary personnel. Met and discussed plan with informant. Automobile registered to Wenderoth and Neil McLaughlin observed at farm in Northern Maryland reported by informant as training site used by conspirators.

Neil Raymond McLaughlin:

Leading activist in the movement involved with bombing plot. Met with informant to discuss plot.
East Coast Conspiracy

Eqbal Ahmad:

Ahmad is Pakistani citizen and permanent resident alien. He is a principal figure in the kidnapping plot. ADP project has linked him with Wenderoth and McLaughlin.

Anthony Scoblick:

Involved in the bombing plot. He has met with informant and discussed plot and ADP project produced calls between informant and Scoblick's telephone.

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR T. S. MILLER: This case was formally received by the Domestic Intelligence Division on 9/10/70 and responsibility for same assumed by memorandum of R. L. Shackelford to C. D. Brennan dated 9/10/70. It is presently supervised by Supervisor James F. McGuire and overall supervision afforded by Unit Supervisor Fred B. Griffith.

It is acknowledged that it was necessary to issue instructions to the field cautioning them about conducting extensive background investigations on members close to this conspiracy prior to the presentation of facts of this case to the Grand Jury to preclude the possibility of compromising an informant. However, the following suggested investigative action is being set forth for your consideration inasmuch as it is of paramount importance that you continue to press this matter vigorously. These suggestions are not to be considered as all inclusive, but are being set forth for your consideration and appropriate action:

1. You should insure that the field aggressively intensifies its investigation of this conspiracy including detailed comprehensive background investigations on all subjects both directly and indirectly associated with the ECCSL. It should be emphasized, however, that utmost discretion and good judgment should be exercised in the conduct of investigations of the principal conspirators so that unfounded charges of harrassment cannot be leveled against the Bureau.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION 1/18/71
JAA/EFF:maz
During the conduct of these background investigations the field should be particularly alert to every potential opportunity for developing member informants in not only the ECCSL but also in other sympathetic and splinter groups which develop or spin off from the vortex of this group.

It is noted that you have pointed out elsewhere in this report that 97 individuals have been involved in 16 separate and distinct organized incidents and attacks on Government agencies and private corporations. Twenty-five persons were involved in three or more such incidents.

2. The field should be appropriately instructed to keep the Bureau fully advised of all demonstrations, vigils, harassment tactics, etc., conducted by sympathetic groups and followers of the ECCSL. Such vigils and demonstrations should be afforded sufficient appropriate coverage to develop identities and background of leading activists and sponsors of such sympathetic activities.

During these background investigations, particular emphasis should be placed on developing sources of funds and financing of the principal conspirators. A review of this file noted that the subjects appear to travel frequently, make numerous long-distance phone calls, rent cars, etc., yet outwardly, appear to have limited sources of income.

3. The field should be alerted to the distinct possibility that other groups similar to the ECCSL are formed as a result of the indictments returned in this matter. Field offices should also be alerted to other retaliatory actions by sympathetic groups attempting to capitalize on the "persecution" theory thereby exploiting the recent indictments as a sympathetic rallying point for more conspiratorial activities.

Assistant Director note.
EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR - C. D. BRENNAN: The suggestions and comments of the Inspector in this matter are pertinent, appreciated, and are being complied with. Because this case is of national significance and has received nation-wide publicity, you may be assured it will continue to receive expeditious handling, close supervision, and my personal attention.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
CDB:jlm
4-A-1-a
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Briefly set forth the noteworthy accomplishments of your Division, with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 4/17/70. This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplishments. Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplishments on this program. This will give you an opportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertaining to the Bureau's progress, welfare, efficiency or any other items not covered elsewhere in this inspection.

A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to such matters should be in general terms.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached are individual write-ups from each Section in the Division pertaining to the accomplishments of that particular Section.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
4-E
Attached are memoranda setting out the noteworthy accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the last inspection.

This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), its fronts; pro-Chinese communist groups; Trotskyist groups; Klan and white hate groups; protest groups; international organizations affiliated with the world communist movement, the world Trotskyist movement and international New Left movement, individuals affiliated with these organizations and movements, as well as sedition cases. Our purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive organizations and individuals under various statutes relating to the internal security of the nation. This Section also supervises development of security informants in basic revolutionary organizations and, where appropriate, directs counterintelligence operations against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our supervision.
The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves from the case entitled, "Solo, IS - C." Due to the sensitive nature of this case, it will be orally discussed with the Inspector.

In essence, this case involves sources developing intelligence information of the highest quality concerning the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Soviet Union and its satellites, and the world communist movement. Since its inception, 37 successful missions to Communist countries have been completed. Information developed by this operation from high-level contacts in the world communist movement is continually disseminated to the highest levels of our Government and, in many instances, is information not available from another source. Examples include the following: the current struggle among the leadership of the Soviet Union as of Spring, 1970, and early Winter, 1970, particularly in view of the struggle for power during the upcoming 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); a message sent the Government of North Vietnam by the CPUSA, giving suggestions on how North Vietnam could aid antiwar protest groups in the United States; the Soviet reaction to the treaty signed by West Germany with the Soviets, along with secret portions of this treaty which have not yet been made public; the initiation of a worldwide propaganda campaign by the Soviets to counteract and weaken the United States position in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks; and details on the reorganization which is supposed to take place within the CPSU and the Soviet Government after the 24th Congress of the CPSU to be held in March, 1971.

All of this information was furnished the White House and other interested officials of our Government, usually by teletype. Central Intelligence Agency has expressed great interest in information developed by this operation and on July 24, 1970, requested permission to include pertinent data developed by our operation in a "Top Secret/No Foreign/Controlled Dissemination" classified document for senior U. S. Intelligence Board officials.

DID Inspection
1/12/71
RCP: mkl
4-E
The two principal informants in this operation have received the "Order of Lenin," with the title "Hero of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets. This is the highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the international communist movement."

Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were officially members of the CPUSA National Committee. At the present time, this overall number remains the same, but we have exchanged two informants to give us a better geographical breakdown. In addition, we have another informant who is an ex officio member of the National Committee because of the sensitive nature of his Party assignments. This latter source is also a member of the Political Committee which, in effect, runs the Party. This top-level coverage is responsible for furnishing information regarding policy-making matters on a day-to-day basis as they occur.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

This unit was formerly known as the Protest Groups and International New Left Unit. As of December 16, 1970, a separate International New Left Unit was organized which took over investigations pertaining to this particular work. Since the last inspection, the intensified investigation of cases has continued to produce positive results.

Selective supervision has enabled us to have advance knowledge of New Left leaders, conferences, and demonstrations. Through this advance knowledge, we have been able to furnish the White House and other interested Government agencies information on a daily basis regarding pertinent activities of individuals and groups of interest to us. We have disseminated voluminous letterhead memoranda, reports, and teletypes concerning plans of leaders of these groups which were most timely, particularly where violence was a possibility. On the basis of material furnished by this unit, two Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) were published pertaining to the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC).

These investigations furnished complete coverage of the major antiwar demonstrations in May and October, 1970, as well as sectional and national meetings at which plans for these demonstrations were formulated. This coverage afforded detailed knowledge of the major shift in the antiwar movement, and the view of its leadership pertaining to the degree and amount of militant tactics to be employed. We were able to follow closely the emergence of the National Coalition Against War, Racism, and Repression (NCAWRR) out of the once powerful NMC and the attempts of the Trotskyist groups to exercise greater influence within the antiwar movement through the formation of the National Peace Action Council (NPAC). The NCAWRR has proposed a national action for May, 1971, whereby efforts will be made to close down Washington, D. C., by the use of militant tactics. The NPAC plans national demonstrations in April, 1971, which may very well undermine the impact of the NCAWRR action.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
JJS:plm
4-E
-Fig-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT
(Prior to 12/16/70, part of Protest Groups and International New Left Unit.)

A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the intelligence community is to develop intelligence relating to efforts of foreign governments, organizations, and individuals to influence, direct, or dominate the New Left movement in the U.S. In this regard, over the years, there have been a number of international-type conferences often sponsored by international front-type groups frequently under the direction or control of the Soviet Union.

Late last summer this Bureau received information that the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam (SCV), an organization established in 1967 which is controlled by the Soviet dominated World Council for Peace, intended to hold a World Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in Stockholm, Sweden, 11/28-30/70. As the SCV, since its inception, has been a major sounding board for anti-U.S. propaganda, particularly that of the North Vietnamese, we dispatched WP 1777-S to attend the World Conference. The informant's attendance proved of exceptional value. She not only attended preparatory meetings and post-conference meetings, but also participated in all sessions of the World Conference, identifying the entire American delegation, other international organizations involved, and foreign delegations including those representing the Cambodian Government in exile, the Provisional Revolutionary (Communist) Government of South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese, and communists from Laos. Informant was able to develop the activity of the American delegation which was led by David Dellinger, a notorious New Left militant, and the obviously directed plans of the Conference to discredit the U.S. at the Paris peace talks. Informant also developed the nature of the international propaganda attack to be directed at the U.S., worldwide action planned in support of the communist position in Vietnam, and plans to "expose" the "criminal" position and actions of the U.S. as relate to Vietnam.

Our coverage of this Conference was of value to officials of other Government agencies and undoubtedly assisted in the formulation of positive U.S. policies relative to the U.S. position in Vietnam. The excellent coverage also resulted in our being able to directly pinpoint the foreign influence of the domestic subversive movement and resulted in a number of important investigations.

DID INSPECTION
1/12/71
DR: sfw
4-E

NW 55151  DocId:32989638  Page 379
Membership in Klan-type organizations and other white hate groups has experienced a continuous decline for the past four years. The Klan reached a post-World War II membership high of approximately 14,000 in 1966. From that point on, there has been a continuing decline in membership. At the present time, we have 18 Klan organizations made up of 225 Klaverns (units). There are, of course, in addition to the membership, many thousands of sympathizers. Investigation in the white extremist field for organizations other than the Klan is centered around the Minutemen, the National States Rights Party (NSRP), and the National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP). There are numerous other small groups which likewise fall within this category. This reduction in Klan and other white hate group membership is attributable to the continuous attention given these investigations by the Department of Justice and the field, with specific attention given to hard-hitting investigations, counterintelligence programs directed at them, and penetration of these groups at all levels by our racial informants.

The year 1970 showed a continuing decline in the membership and effectiveness of the various Klan and white hate groups throughout the U.S. As of January, 1970, Klan membership totaled approximately 5,300. Our present figures indicate that Klan membership now totals approximately 4,300. The largest Klan group is the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA) under the direction of Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton. The membership of this group in January, 1970, was approximately 4,100 whereas it now numbers 3,500 members, or approximately 80% of the membership of all Klan organizations. These recent figures represent an approximate decrease in overall Klan membership of 17% and 15% decrease in UKA membership. Membership in white hate organizations other than the Klan which has always been relatively smaller membership-wise has likewise experienced a relatively similar decline.

With the arrest of Robert DePugh, National Coordinator of the Minutemen, in July, 1969, and his subsequent conviction for Federal Firearms Act violation and incarceration, this group...
has virtually fallen apart and there is practically no organized activity. Membership is approximately 180, but individuals remain violence prone.

The National States Rights Party under the direction of J. B. Stoner is likewise experiencing difficulty in increasing either membership or activity and consequently is planning to move its headquarters from Savannah, Georgia, to Atlanta, Georgia. In the meantime this organization continues to grind out anti-Negro and anti-Jewish propaganda in crude fashion in their publications and speeches. Membership is approximately 150.

The National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) (formerly the American Nazi Party) has its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, which is the center for its activities. There is moderate activity in Los Angeles and Chicago. Recently a serious split in the leadership has occurred as a result of counterintelligence action taken on the part of the Bureau through use of racial informants. Here again membership continues to decline. They appear to be content with publishing a variety of anti-Negro, anti-Jewish publications and preparing their "White Power" telephone messages. Membership is approximately 125.

The above is set forth to show the general accomplishments made by this Unit in the Klan and white hate field during the past year. Some specific examples of accomplishments are hereafter set forth:

In February, 1970, we furnished information to the White House, the Army, Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit, which we received from racial informants of our Tampa Division who advised that the United Florida KKK had printed 15,000 protest letters which were being made available to the public for mailing to President Nixon in connection with school desegregation. We also furnished a copy of the actual protest letter for the benefit of the White House and other agencies.

On February 20, 1970, Robert DePugh, National Coordinator of the Minutemen, mentioned above, was sentenced to four years imprisonment following conviction for bond default. It is noted DePugh was previously convicted and released on bond for Federal Firearms Act violation.
In March, 1970, we again advised the White House, the Attorney General, the Army, Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Division of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit, of information learned from racial informants of our Mobile Division relative to another letter which was made available to the public by the UKA for mailing to President Nixon as a protest in connection with school desegregation in Alabama. This was similar to the information previously furnished relative to the other letter which was made available to the public by the United Florida KKK. A copy of this letter was also furnished to the White House, the Attorney General, Secret Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit.

In July, 1970, as a result of our investigation, two individuals associated with a paramilitary right wing group called "The Raiders," Ferri Loyd Hayes and Kenneth Ray McMaster, were arrested by Bureau Agents in connection with the bombing of 36 school busses at Longview, Texas, on July 4, 1970. A Federal court had ordered bussing in connection with school integration. A special Federal Grand Jury at Tyler, Texas, on July 23, 1970, returned a true bill of indictment charging the two individuals on two counts; count one, violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 241 (Civil Rights Act, 1964), and count two, violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, S. 1509 (Obstruction of Court Order). These two individuals had also been found to have placed "flashlight bombs" in two Negro residential areas. Both these individuals were held in lieu of $125,000 bond each; later reduced to $25,000 each. They are still awaiting trial.

In July, 1970, as a result of a counterintelligence technique utilized in connection with the counterintelligence program directed at the Klan, Exalted Cyclops Thomas Stipes, of Mascot Klavern 778, Mascot, Tennessee, was eliminated from this top position and subsequently banished from the UKA. As a result of this counterintelligence action, membership in this Klavern has fallen off appreciably.

On 9-25-70 Robert DePugh was found guilty in U.S. District Court, Albuquerque, New Mexico, under Federal Firearms Act for possession of various destructive devices at the time of his arrest in New Mexico. He received a ten-year sentence on 10-9-70 on these charges. He is presently serving his sentence at the U.S. Penitiency, Leavenworth, Kansas.
In September, 1970, as a result of counterintelligence action taken, two of our racial informants in the Little Rock Division were instrumental in successfully causing the defeat of a Klansman who was running for Sheriff in Jefferson County, Arkansas. This unsuccessful candidate was Victor Calvert, Exalted Cyclops, Pine Bluff Klavern, Association of Arkansas Klans. During his campaign Calvert attempted to hide his Klan affiliation because he hoped to receive a good percentage of the Negro vote in his area. Our informants had discreetly spread the truth through the Negro community that Calvert was actually an active Klansman. As a result of this action Calvert was overwhelmingly defeated.

In September, 1970, we advised the President, the Vice President and the Attorney General of current information concerning Klan activity in the U.S.; the decline in Klan membership; techniques the Klan was instituting to attempt to increase its income and the fact that a black box, resembling a coffin, was being shipped to the President by a group called "United Parents of Duval County," Florida. This was being sent to the President in connection with a protest against school integration in Jacksonville, Florida. In furnishing this information, we advised that the individual who paid for the shipping was identified as a member of the U.S. Klans, Knights of the KKK, Inc.

In September, 1970, we advised the President, the Vice President and the Attorney General of the fact that Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton of the UKA was going to request an appointment with the Attorney General to discuss the latest interpretations of civil rights laws. We further advised that Shelton was preparing copies of a "night letter" which he was going to make available to the news media in the Washington, D.C., area to publicize the fact he desired an appointment. This information was learned from a top level racial informant of our Birmingham Office who advised that Shelton was making this request allegedly because it, in Shelton's mind, concerned the welfare of people of Alabama in addition to those of other states. Our informant advised that Shelton would point out in his letter that appointments for black leaders had been granted and he was requesting equal opportunity, treatment and courtesy, on behalf of the white people of his community. Our informant also revealed that Shelton did not expect to receive an appointment with the Attorney General but was doing this merely to receive publicity as a result of this action. The appointment never came about.
In November, 1970, as a result of counterintelligence measures taken, we were successful in causing the resignation of W. Melvin Sexton, the Imperial Kligrapp (National Secretary, UKA). This was of particular importance in that he actually ran the UKA during the time Shelton was in prison.

The 1970 National Klонvocation of the UKA was held at the Ramada Inn, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, on November 28-29, 1970. At this Klонvocation, Robert M. Shelton was again elected Imperial Wizard to serve for three years. During a speech he made at the Klонvocation, Shelton stated (and has since reiterated his feelings to high-ranking members of the UKA who are racial informants of this Bureau) that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and possibly to utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan officials and members in order to ferret out FBI informants. Shelton, in 1967, also had plans to utilize a polygraph machine and truth serum on Klan members in order to learn the identity of FBI informants. At that time, we used counterintelligence techniques in various forms including a press release in order to discourage Shelton in this regard. It is to be noted that many of our sensitive racial informants are in high-ranking positions within the UKA.

In order to again discourage Shelton in his desires in this regard, it was recommended on 1/5/71 that a press release be provided to reliable news sources through Assistant Director Bishop's office. Our desire is that we will discredit Shelton and frustrate his attempts by exposing his desires to the glare of publicity. The news release pointed out that Shelton is losing control of his subordinates and that Shelton is attempting to maintain control of the Klan by threats against anyone who criticizes him. The news release also pointed out that the Klan, which expresses patriotism and democratic ideals, must resort to gestapo-like tactics to hold its members in line.

The above are highlights of results of Bureau investigations into these matters. Many other disseminations made throughout 1970 have resulted in the curtailment of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate group organizations.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: Accomplishments of Research Section since last inspection follow.

Central Research Unit

This Unit has continued to perform a wide range of research and writing assignments, preparing various documents and special reports, most of which have been disseminated outside the Bureau as well as to our field offices. These have included the following:

An extensive special assignment on New Left research for the Director.

Statement by Director for use before President's Commission on Campus Unrest.

Issues (14) of Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL), a periodic intelligence letter summarizing significant items of interest in the security field.

Issues (9) of The Extremist Speaks, a monthly compilation which shows the extremist views of right, left, and racially-oriented groups and individuals in the United States.

Monographs (7) setting out in-depth studies of significant factors in the security-intelligence field.

A comprehensive survey concerning the potential for racial violence, four (4) special reports for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and miscellaneous research assignments for the Division.

In addition, a number of special studies have been prepared in response to requests from the White House. These include:

A "Top Secret" study on domestic intelligence for the Inter-Agency Committee for Intelligence.

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1/12/71
An extensive brief, "Special Report, Nationwide Civil Disturbances," at the request of Vice President Agnew (revised periodically).

A study, "'Stop the Bombing' Campaign: A Communist Cause," at request of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, concerning foreign influence in the 1964-68 campaign seeking a halt to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

"Top Secret" blind memoranda (3) for a special intelligence evaluation committee on extremist and terrorist groups in the U.S.

A "Secret" paper for the U.S. Intelligence Board analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in the Caribbean."

This Unit has also collected and prepared material for various articles, speeches, and surveys, and has prepared special memoranda for the information of Bureau officials. Personnel of this Unit have handled lectures on the subjects of communism, the New Left movement, and racial extremism. These have consisted of classified lectures to Bureau's New Agents and In-Service classes, appearances before other intelligence agencies and National Academy classes, and a number of nonclassified lectures before civic, church, and law enforcement groups. Since last inspection, a total of 42 speeches have been handled involving outside groups.

Special Records Unit

Primarily responsible for records keeping, this Unit is also engaged in emergency planning. In addition, beginning in September, 1970, the Unit has prepared the Division's portion of the "Brief For Director's Use In Connection With Attorney General's Staff Conference," Thursdays, at 5 p.m.

Also beginning in September, 1970, this Unit has prepared the "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities," a weekly summary of racial extremist activities, which is disseminated to the White House, top Government officials, the intelligence community, and each field office. The White House has been highly commendatory of this paper, praising the content, format, and style. The Director approved an incentive award for the Agent who prepares the summary.
New Left Reporting Unit

This Unit, which coordinates covering of all New Left, student, and antiwar demonstrations throughout the country, has handled the reporting of the following major disruptions or demonstrations since the last inspection.

National demonstrations 4/14-15/70 to protest the war and the payment of war taxes.

National Environmental Actions, which was held throughout the U.S. on 4/22/70.

Intensified and widespread student disruptions which occurred throughout the U.S. during the last part of April and during May, 1970.

A March on Washington on 5/9/70 to protest the invasion of Cambodia.

Nationwide demonstrations to protest the military, on 5/16/70.

A Yippies smoke-in at Washington, D.C., on 7/4/70. This also involved attempted disruption by the Yippies of the Honor America Day ceremonies.

The People's Army Jamboree, which was held at Portland, Oregon, 8/28-9/3/70, for the purpose of disrupting the National American Legion Convention.

The March for Victory, which was held at Washington, D.C., on 10/31/70 by Dr. Carl McIntire.

Demonstration against President Nixon, San Jose, California, 10/29/70.

Timely dissemination was made to the White House and the Attorney General, as well as other interested officials and agencies of the Executive Branch, concerning these demonstrations as well as nationwide agitation occurring on a daily basis throughout the country. Frequently, advance information was furnished to such officials and agencies pointing out likely trouble spots and predicting the possibility of violence.
In addition, a timely study concerning disruptive attacks on the courts was prepared and disseminated to high-level officials and interested agencies.

Racial Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly called the Riot and Racial Disturbance Unit, has continued to coordinate all phases of racial disturbances and violence and other racial developments as well as information bearing on the potential for violence throughout the country. Voluminous material being reported on a daily basis by the field offices is reviewed, coordinated, and disseminated to interested officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other high-level officials. In the past year more than 5,500 memoranda and teletypes have been disseminated. Statistical data on racial disorders, school disorders, and attacks on police are maintained in this Unit for use in the preparation of special papers.

This Unit also prepares highly useful research studies concerning developments in the racial field. Since the last inspection, these have included special papers on the black action movement at racially harassed University of Michigan; a review of newly formed black extremist groups; numerous papers concerning provocative articles appearing in the Black Panther Party newspaper; a special paper for the Vice President concerning racial disturbances in Mississippi and Georgia; a study on racial disturbances in secondary schools in the 1969-70 school year; and a detailed account of advance information concerning the potential for violence in support of the Black Panther Party in New Haven, Connecticut, prepared for the Departmental Evaluation Committee. A detailed study on the extent of foreign influence in the black extremist movement, similar to that disseminated just after the last inspection, is presently being prepared for early dissemination.

In addition to the above, instructions in the Manual of Instructions and the FBI Handbook concerning the handling of general racial matters were completely revised and streamlined by this Unit since the last inspection.
SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD: Attached are individual memoranda from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the New Left Section since the last inspection. This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left Movement including terrorist groups and individuals engaging in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus. The development of New Left informants and investigations of New Left publications are also supervised in this Section as are sabotage investigations and counter-intelligence operations against the New Left.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71

4-E
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

The work of this unit concerns Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of Weatherman), other New Left campus groups, the Key Activist program, New Left Movement reports, New Left publications, New Left informants, and the maintenance of a library of "hand-out" material on the New Left for dissemination on a high level to Government officials and responsible citizens.

In 1969 Worker Student Alliance (WSA), Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions of SDS split into separate groups. Accomplishments concerning Weatherman are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYM faction of SDS is now practically defunct. Currently, the largest faction of SDS is WSA faction. WSA is dominated by the pro-Chinese, Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party; and, while not as violent as Weatherman, is avowedly a revolutionary group.

Our efforts to achieve informant coverage in WSA showed results when WSA held its National Convention in Chicago in December, 1970. Approximately 20 Bureau informants attended this convention, and extensive information on activities at the convention was promptly reported and disseminated. Through informants, we have encouraged factionalism in WSA. At the convention, dissident groups led by one of our sources threatened a new split in SDS/WSA which may occur in the near future. Such dissension will reduce the possibility that SDS might once again become a massive student organization as it was before its division in 1969.

Through the Key Activist program, we have focused investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left movement with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible.
At the present time, we have designated 75 individuals as Key Activists. Of this number, 40 are currently the subject of prosecutive action. This has definitely severely disrupted the entire New Left movement as well as component New Left organizations.

Through the New Left Movement reports prepared quarterly by each field office, we have provided to interested agencies timely and informative documents on the activities of the New Left movement, thus making a substantial contribution to the objective that responsible officials be fully aware of the threat the New Left presents to our democratic society.

By closely following a myriad of New Left publications ranging from those merely pornographic to those clearly revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these publications; their propensity for violence and subversive activities; sources of funds; and through dissemination have advised interested officials and agencies. Since these publications frequently appear and disappear within a short time, we are alert to the birth of new publications by following various underground news service lists as well as other documents and books which report new publications in this field.

We have recognized that in the past, informant coverage of New Left groups has not been adequate and accordingly have given great emphasis to this aspect of our responsibility. As a result, informant coverage in this area has been dramatically increased. At present, we have 900 informants and sources of all types providing coverage of the New Left. This number includes 178 security informants and 410 potential security informants.

Since the last inspection, New Left informants have provided information which has: led to the indictment of a number of New Left leaders on Federal and local charges; located fugitives including some Weatherman fugitives; provided advance information on numerous New Left demonstrations including plans for violence; and furnished detailed information on the organization, membership, and activities of a broad range of New Left groups.
The assistance of New Left informants has been invaluable, and we are continuing to emphasize the development of additional quality informants in this field.

Through the maintenance of a repository of "hand-out" materials and publications on the New Left for distribution to Government officials and responsible citizens, we have assisted these important individuals to more fully understand the subversive ramifications of the New Left movement.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - WEST

Since the Summer of 1969, New Left extremists have become increasingly identified as Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, and have utilized extreme violence in effort to achieve their purpose. In the period since the last inspection, the prosecution of these revolutionaries has continued to be one of our primary objectives, to the end that individual terrorists are neutralized and their organizations are isolated; leaderless; and finally defunct. We have had significant accomplishments in this regard. On April 2, 1970, 12 leaders of Weatherman (the most violent faction of Students for a Democratic Society) were indicted in Chicago on Federal Antiriot Law (ARL) charges. Other Weatherman leaders were indicted on local charges and became Bureau fugitives. The Weatherman organization has gone underground and has taken extreme measures to avoid apprehension. Nevertheless, five of these Weatherman leaders have been located by the FBI as a result of investigations by Agents on New Left squads in the field and through the efforts of New Left informants.

On July 23, 1970, in Detroit, Michigan, indictments were obtained against 13 Weatherman leaders for violation of Federal bombing and gun control statutes. Five of these individuals have since been arrested or have surrendered.

Other Weatherman leaders remain in fugitive status and intensive efforts to locate them continue. Already these indictments and arrests have had a noticeable effect on the Weatherman organization. Bernardine Dohrn, a Weatherman leader who in May, 1970, had declared a state of war against the U. S. announced in December, 1970, that Weatherman had made a "military error" in tending to consider only "bombings and picketing up the gun as revolutionary." Weatherman has learned, Dohrn said, that a group of "outlaws" who are isolated from the youth communities cannot grow to include large numbers of people.
Weatherman and their ilk will doubtless try to organize wider support in the broad youth culture, most of which is not presently committed to violence. By the continuation of energetic efforts to prosecute the instigators of violence, we can increase the isolation of terrorist groups and reduce their influence on youth. This objective is being forcefully pursued wherever possible. In Seattle, a group of seven violence-prone individuals with Weatherman connections were tried in November and December, 1970, on Federal ARL; Conspiracy; and Destruction of Government Property charges. A mistrial in this case was declared December 10, 1970; however, due to the defendants' misconduct in court, all seven were cited for contempt. These Seattle indictments were made possible through New Left informant coverage.

The East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives, led by the notorious Berrigan brothers, has been the subject of intensive investigation since the last inspection. This group, which is masked as a religion-oriented peace group, has actually plotted kidnapping and violence. This matter has been presented to a Federal Grand Jury with the result that six individuals, including Philip Berrigan, were indicted on January 12, 1971. Seven other individuals, including Daniel Berrigan, were named by the Grand Jury as unindicted coconspirators.

Information set forth above referring to New Left extremists and the Weatherman organization also applies to work handled by the Special Investigations Unit - East.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
VENCEDEROMOS BRIGADE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST

The Vencederemos Brigade (VB) came into being June, 1969, as a coalition of representatives from various New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic Society, Trotskyist Youth Socialist Alliance, the militant Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organizations including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party.

Three contingents have traveled to Cuba since November, 1969. The first group was composed of 216 young Americans who obtained their own transportation to Cuba in defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that country. These young revolutionaries were returned to Canada at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship. This boat arrived in St. John, Canada, on February 12, 1970, and immediately loaded 687 sympathetic American youths aboard for its return trip to Cuba. This group, like the first contingent, worked in the sugar cane fields until its return by the same means of transportation on April 28, 1970. In August, 1970, the third contingent of the VB, made up of 407 persons, journeyed to the Isle of Youth where they participated in a Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and fertilizing citrus trees. This group returned to the U. S. mid-October, 1970.

Each group worked approximately 7½ hours a day, 5½ days a week, and in their free time were afforded the opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They were reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to show "solidarity with the socialist struggle to smash the U. S. blockade, and to make a breach in the facade of the U. S. imperialist monster."

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Each of the more than 1300 brigade members has been the subject of a security investigation which includes the identification and obtaining of background data as well as a personal interview with each brigade member. These investigations are being made to determine the immediate danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also to ascertain the long-range role they will take in the revolutionary movement in the U. S. Upon completion of the investigation and the interview of each of these individuals, the field must recommend either the inclusion or noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index. In addition the field must continue to report every 90 days for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts of each brigade member.

Five approved Bureau informants accompanied the second VB, and the third VB also included in its ranks four Bureau approved informants. These sources have materially assisted the Bureau in discharging its intelligence responsibilities. While the security investigations of all brigade members are not completed, more than 100 VB participants have been placed in the Security Index and as we conclude these investigations it is anticipated numerous others will also be listed in this Index.

The fourth contingent of the VB is currently being organized and recruiting emphasis is being placed on "quality individuals" who have open outlooks and socialist backgrounds. This group is tentatively scheduled to depart for Cuba March 1, 1971, and is to be comprised of approximately 300 individuals. Information set forth above referring to the Venceremos Brigade also applies to work handled by the Special Investigations Unit - West.
Incidents of Sabotage have been on the rise since the mid-1960's, occasioned primarily by growing opposition throughout the country to the Selective Service System, the Armed Forces, and in particular to the war in Vietnam.

There are under investigation at the present time 7 Sabotage cases with prosecution pending involving 29 subjects who are charged with 43 separate violations including attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government Property, Anti-Riot Law violation, Civil Rights violations, violation of the National Firearms Act, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles, and Conspiracy. In connection with one of the above investigations, one subject in October, 1970, was found guilty and sentenced to five years, which sentence is being appealed, and another subject in November, 1970, pleaded guilty and is scheduled to be sentenced sometime in January, 1971.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRAHIGAN
ESPIONAGE SECTION

1. Persona Non Grata and other Removal Actions

Boris Mikhailovich Orekhov was a correspondent in New York City for the Soviet newspaper "Pravda" from June, 1968, to July 7, 1970. Based on the results of FBI investigation, on the latter date he was expelled after the Department of State informed the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., on June 24, 1970, that Orekhov had engaged in activities incompatible with his status as a journalist. His departure from the United States was requested. Orekhov departed July 7, 1970, depriving the Soviets of the presence in the U. S. of a very active intelligence officer.

In a similar case, also as a result of our investigations, on November 6, 1970, State informed the Soviets of the expulsion from the U. S. of Leonid Nikolayevich Zhgalov, a Washington, D. C., correspondent for the Soviet news agency "Tass." This action was in direct reciprocity for the expulsion from the USSR of a U. S. correspondent.

In an interesting and successful counterintelligence operation, the Soviets were forced to remove Yevgeniy V. Yelshin, a KGB officer, from the United Nations Secretariat and send him home. Yelshin had been in contact with sources under our control in the aerospace field. In September, 1970, the "arrest" of one of our sources during a meet with Yelshin was staged. Subsequently, Yelshin was contacted by our Agents concerning his intelligence activities. Although Yelshin had not completed the term of his contract with the UN Secretariat, he returned home with his family, at Soviet expense, on 11/1/70.

In a pending case, our investigation has established violation of U. S. immigration laws by an individual known to be a KGB agent. He has denied affiliation with the Soviets, but has admitted immigration fraud. INS and State have initiated action to have him dismissed from the UN Secretariat and expelled from the U. S.
Information we furnished to the Department of State apparently has prevented the return to the United States of two Polish commercial officials formerly assigned to New York City. We told State how the one, a Polish military intelligence officer, with the assistance of the other had since mid-1969 been very active in trying to purchase electronic equipment of defense significance and ship it to Poland in violation of export licensing requirements. On 3/27/70, State informed the Polish Ambassador to the U. S. that the activities of these two Poles must cease. Both left the country. We have subsequently learned through our sources that one, expected to return to U. S., has been reassigned and will not return. The other has not returned. Thus, the usefulness of two Polish agents in the U. S. was destroyed by our investigations.

2. Double Agents

One measure of our effectiveness in countering the activities of the intelligence personnel among the hundreds of communist bloc representatives in the U. S. is our ability to continue to develop and operate double agents against hostile agents. This is a matter of vital concern and continuous attention in the Espionage Section. Since the last inspection we have continued to improve our position in this regard, as the following chart shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Active Double Agents</th>
<th>Potential Double Agents</th>
<th>Inactive Double Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4/1/70</td>
<td>12/1/70</td>
<td>Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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It is obvious that despite the sophistication and security-consciousness of the Soviet Intelligence Services, our efforts to direct double agents against them continue to meet with conspicuous success. Examples of the productivity of our double agent operations appear elsewhere herein.

Some declines in the number of double agent operations against the intelligence services of countries other than the USSR handled by this section have occurred since the last inspection. In part, this may be a reflection of a change of emphasis in direction of our efforts, which has resulted in a reduction of the number of supervisors assigned to satellite, Albanian and Yugoslav matters. (In 4/70, nine full-time and one part-time supervisor were handling this work; at present there are four supervisors assigned to this work full-time and three part-time.) However, reference to the above chart shows that the bulk of the drop in the number of active and potential double agents has been in the Czech field. This is attributable primarily to two factors.

Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia (CSSR) by Soviet bloc armed forces in August, 1968, which resulted in the fall of the liberal Alexander Dubcek regime, the Communist Party of the CSSR began a critical analysis of all party members who had supported Dubcek. This analysis included individuals assigned to diplomatic posts in Washington and New York and resulted in the recall of about two-thirds of such personnel. A number were expelled or suspended from the Party. Of those recalled, several have not yet been replaced. The Chief Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) Resident in Washington was one of the latter. An extremely well placed source has reported that the purge, which began early in 1970, caused great anxiety among all the Czech personnel in Washington and New York and that morale dropped to rock bottom and, as consequence, little intelligence work was carried on during the current year. Naturally, with the CIS agents missing or dormant, our opportunities to target double agents against them diminished. This unsettled political situation, together with the overt defection of a CIS officer in Washington on 6/29/70, resulted in the CIS assuming a defensive posture and maintaining contact only with persons considered by them to be fully trustworthy. Indicative of the quality of our remaining double agents is the fact that CIS has held meets with two of our sources in the immediate past.
The above chart, showing numbers of double agents at the time of the last inspection and at present tells only part of the story. It does not show that there is a continual process of review and analysis of double agent matters and close attention to field activity in this regard. We are constantly striving to weed out any "deadwood" and to introduce fresh blood into our counterespionage efforts. Presentation of precise figures on the turnover among double agents during the period since the last inspection is not feasible, because various offices have different reporting dates on which they inform the Bureau of additions and deletions of double agents in the various nationality fields. However, the following available figures clearly indicate desirable turnover. In the Soviet field, from March 1, 1970, to December 1, 1970, we added 41 active and potential double agents; a net increase of 30. In the other countries currently supervised in the Espionage Section, we added 28 active and potential double agents and dropped 17, a net gain of 11. Several of those dropped were used up in counterintelligence actions which terminated their active usefulness, and some left the country.

3. Counterintelligence and Other Significant Operations

In our eyes, counterintelligence activity is activity designed to disrupt and hamper the operations of an opposition intelligence service. Although it may involve harassment at times, it is for the most part much more serious and worthy of our efforts only when it inflicts actual damage on the effectiveness of the enemy. To this end, we employ our own capabilities and, whenever indicated and possible, those of other U. S. and other Government agencies. Following are some examples of this activity since the last inspection.

Upon instruction from us, one of our double agents told his Soviet handler, Vladimir Azaryan, an Amtorg Trading Corporation employee, that the FBI interviewed him and he admitted he had been contacting Azaryan and also his predecessor, Yuri Kitaev, a United Nations Secretariat employee. The double agent blamed Azaryan's ineptness for FBI interest. Azaryan obviously reported the matter to his superiors. Shortly thereafter, both Soviets left the United States, thus disrupting the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).
As a result of Bureau counterintelligence action, an Aeroflot official who was a GRU officer was hurriedly removed from the U. S. under Soviet guard by the Soviets. In addition, an Intourist official, a suspected KGB officer, was also recalled from the U. S. because he was also blamed by the Soviets for the security breach involving the aforementioned Aeroflot official. Thus, one counterintelligence operation caused the removal from the U. S. of two Soviet Intelligence Service operatives.

In another operation a Soviet official assigned to Washington, a known KGB officer, was the principal in a Bureau double agent operation. With State Department clearance we confronted him during a meet with the double agent. He rejected our initial invitation to defect but analysis of information subsequently received indicated that he had not reported the approach. Again we contacted him and that time he acknowledged that he had personal problems and agreed to be contacted in the future. He has returned to the USSR on leave and has agreed to meet with us again when he comes back to the U. S. There are indications that the delay in his return is due to his wife's illness. This operation continues to offer the possibility of his recruitment either here or abroad.

On the basis of information developed through one of our operations, two Argentinians were arrested in October, 1970, in Argentina as illegal Soviet agents. Our information is that they were targeted to ultimately operate in and against the U. S. Our effective handling of this matter stopped them before they entered this country.

Based on information received from a well placed source, we recently identified a U. S. agent of the Soviets. In initial contact he has indicated a desire to cooperate with us and we plan to use him in a counterintelligence action against his Soviet principal. In another case we developed sufficient information concerning the intelligence operations of Yuriy P. Vetrov that the U. S. Ambassador to the UN was able to inform his Soviet counterpart concerning Vetrov's activities. Vetrov was not the subject of persona non grata action because State did not want to give the Soviets the opportunity to expel one of our diplomats from Moscow and Vetrov was due to leave the U. S. However, the detailed information in our ambassador's possession must have caused considerable disruption of Soviet intelligence activities in the United Nations when our ambassador disclosed our knowledge of it.
By letter to the Director 6/10/70, the U. S. Air Force expressed its appreciation for the invaluable contribution of Bureau personnel in supporting an OSI counterintelligence operation involving an East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) officer who came to the U. S. to service an Air Force double agent. We had been cooperating with Air Force in this case since 1965.

Information was obtained by one of our double agents against EGIS that EGIS has for some time been interested in penetrating State Department and is particularly interested in a State Department employee with whom our source is acquainted. We have furnished pertinent details to State and in December, 1970, State indicated that it was taking action to defensively brief the employee without pinpointing or jeopardizing our source. Such action should put us one step ahead in any attempt by EGIS or another bloc intelligence service to approach the employee.
On July 1, 1970, the State Department announced that Antonin Nenko, former Second Secretary, Czech Embassy, Washington, had defected and requested political asylum in the U.S. Nenko's action caused the termination of a highly successful and valuable operation we had been conducting against the CIS for some time. Nenko, a major in the Scientific and Technical Department of the CIS, had been working exclusively in the intelligence field since 1956, both in the United States and abroad. Prior to his overt defection, Nenko had been under our control, furnishing detailed, highly significant information concerning Czech operations against the U.S. Although his overt defection is public knowledge, his activities as our defector-in-place have not been revealed, but the valuable information he furnished has been made available to interested Government agencies.

In 1969 a Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS) agent came to the U.S. as an immigrant. He has been under FBI control almost since his arrival. He was sent by HIS with instructions that he would ultimately take over the direction of HIS illegal agents in the United States. He has had several meetings with HIS handlers and the operation involving him includes the use of clandestine communications, meets in third countries, secret message drops and other sophisticated espionage techniques.

Not all of our responsibilities in the Espionage Section involve activity against hostile intelligence services. Among the immigrants from communist countries are many whose hostility to their former communist homelands is such, that given the opportunity, they would take violent action against representatives of their countries of origin. We have effected coverage of these nationality groups designed to permit us to alert responsible outside agencies to threats from such people. One example of our effectiveness in this regard occurred in connection with the visit of Yugoslav President Tito to Belgium in October, 1970. The Belgian Security Service (BSS) requested our cooperation in its efforts to protect Tito. In November, 1970, through Legat, Paris, we received a letter thanking

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the Bureau for its invaluable assistance in contributing to its successful handling, without serious incident, of the Tito visit. Because of our extensive coverage of anti-Tito Yugoslavs in the U.S., we had been able to furnish considerable information to the Belgians on possible trouble-makers and to furnish prompt responses to specific inquiries.

Returning to our more usual counterespionage work, we developed and operated as a defector-in-place from July, 1969, until November, 1970, a Soviet official assigned to a Soviet establishment in New York City. This source, although not affiliated with Soviet intelligence, was able to furnish information of counterintelligence value and to identify members of the Soviet intelligence community. The source left the United States in November, 1970, but subsequently our New York office received a communication from the source through a special channel. The communication indicated a possibility that the source may be able to cooperate with the U.S. Government in the future. This possibility is, of course, dependent upon the source's future Soviet assignments.

In October, 1970, the Internal Security Division of the Department informed us that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security was concerned with the espionage and intelligence activities of Soviets employed at the United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC). We were requested to prepare a paper concerning such activities. The paper was furnished to the Department and to State during November, 1970. We have now been informed that based on our information U.S. Ambassador Phillips at the United Nations is considering placing certain restrictions in effect concerning the travel of Soviet nationals assigned to UNSEC. Should this take place, our efforts in this matter could definitely lead to more effective and efficient coverage of these Soviet intelligence personnel by the Bureau.

Coverage of a Soviet establishment, Washington, D.C., revealed Soviets had constructed a ten-foot-square opening in the roof, covered by a door on rollers. Monitoring detected a pattern of opening of the roof. Use of

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sophisticated laboratory technical equipment enabled the National Security Agency (NSA) to determine Soviets were using the opening in the roof in an operation to improve accuracy of guidance system of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles targeted against the United States. NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency have stated that this extremely valuable positive intelligence had not previously been developed any place in the world.

Another counterintelligence operation which has been conducted against the Soviets since 1966 took a novel turn since the last inspection. We had been using this operation to pass disinformation to the Soviets using material provided by the Air Force. In May, 1970, we arranged for a Bureau Agent to meet with a Soviet, in place of the former double agent. This May meeting was the product of prior arrangements engineered to have the new Soviet handler accept our Agent as his predecessor’s former contact. The Soviet who appeared at the May meeting had not been previously known to be an intelligence officer. He gave the double agent instructions for future operations and we continued to pass Air Force material. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are interested and involved in supporting this operation. Since we substituted an FBI Agent for the original double agent, we have obtained espionage paraphernalia not previously acquired in our other operations against the Soviets and we have received over $5,000 of Soviet funds.

In another sensitive double agent operation, conducted against the Soviets for almost 12 years, we have been passing disinformation supplied by the Joint Chief of Staff to the Soviets. Army analysis of the results of this operation indicates that it has caused the Soviets to commit one and a half billion dollars to an attempt to counteract the purported U. S. military capability described in the material we have passed. As recently as December, 1970, word has been received from the Soviets that they plan to continue this operation and may use an illegal agent to do so. We have also received from the Soviets in this operation over $42,000.

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4. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Other Prosecutive Action

On April 17, 1970, the Internal Security Division of the Department, based on our investigation, agreed to solicit the registration of Robert Charles Owens III under the FARA, as an agent of the USSR.

On October 21, 1970, the registration of Endre Kertesz under Title 50, U.S. Code, Sections 851-857, in which he described his assignment for the Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS), was secured by the Department. This was the result of our investigation of Kertesz, a Hungarian immigrant who admitted he had been given an assignment by HIS to gather information concerning missile sites in the U.S.

In our exploitation of a defector from the Yugoslav Intelligence Service (YIS), we obtained information that the Yugoslavs had recruited a French military intelligence employee. Based on our information and follow-up investigation by French authorities, the French official, Eugene Rousseau, was convicted of espionage in April, 1970. In December, 1970, the Supreme Court in Paris, France, upheld his sentence of 15 years.

5. Recoveries

In many of our double agent operations the double agents receive payments from the foreign intelligence service well in excess of our expenses in conducting the operations. As such operations are concluded, we turn over the balance of monies received to the U.S. Treasury. Since the last inspection, we have turned over to the Treasury, as a result of these operations, over $16,000.

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ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The key to developing racial information on a regular and current basis is the operation and development of quality informants along with intensified investigation. In this regard we have increased the number of our racial informants since the last Inspection by 1,699 which brings our total number of informants to 7,184. In addition, we are continually intensifying our investigations and in line with our need for closer coverage of key black extremists, we instituted by airtel dated 12-23-70 the Key Black Extremist Program.

Racial informants have been furnishing a steady flow of valuable racial information which information has brought about the apprehension of badly wanted extremist fugitives, the confiscation of explosives and firearms in the possession of extremists, the prevention of violence and the saving of lives. In addition, these informants furnished valuable racial intelligence on a regular basis which intelligence included information concerning foreign influence, the Black Panther Party (BPP) underground as well as discussions by extremists as to South American style kidnapping of government officials and threats to kill the President.

It is significant to note that since the last Inspection racial informants have been responsible for bringing about the arrest of 510 individuals, 342 of which were local arrests and 168 Federal arrests as well as being responsible for the recovery of $330,179.03.

In order to improve our investigations and racial informant coverage in addition to our regular supervision furnished from the Seat of Government we held a two-day conference with racial supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal attaches. The topics discussed at the conference covered the entire spectrum of the problems inherent in investigating and

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developing informants in the BPP as well as related extremist matters. These topics included detailed discussion concerning the need for full penetration of extremist groups to obtain information concerning terrorist activities which may be aimed against Government officials. In addition, the conference took note that maximum attention should be given to the extremist activities in Canada in connection with our investigations as well as intensifying our investigations having international ramifications.

The above items, along with other items affecting counterintelligence against extremists, the BPP underground activities and intensified investigations were fully discussed. Concrete suggestions were obtained from this conference and were subjects of individual memoranda which were approved thereby increasing the efficiency of our investigations and informant development.

Some of the above-approved suggestions are as follows:

1. Proposal to identify escape routes utilized by black extremists to flee the United States by utilizing a Bureau racial informant as a decoy.

2. Intensify BPP underground investigations including making available to select field offices copies of the film "The Battle of Algiers," which sets forth guerrilla warfare tactics used successfully by the National Liberation Front and which is now being studied and copied by the BPP.

3. Granting approval for Special Agents in Charge on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except where such appearances are at educational institutions.

4. Obtaining approval to reproduce an article by Victor Riesel, noted labor columnist, which article was highly critical of the BPP and set forth a proposal by a union member that unions affiliated with the freight handlers who handle the BPP newspaper shipments refuse to handle these papers.
5. Obtaining approval for a racial and New Left extremist activities In-Service classes.

6. Obtaining approval for the deletion of the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List from the Black Nationalist Movement in the United States Racial Calendar and transmitting this to the field by separate letter in order to give greater emphasis to these fugitive investigations.

7. Obtaining approval for revising the Agitator Index by deleting those individuals who are also included on the Security Index.

In addition to the above, there are other suggestions made by the attendees at the conference and approved by the Director which will assist in streamlining the overall investigative and informant development operation as well as making these operations more effective.

Some of the concrete examples of our informant and investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:

Through our investigations, we have currently identified and closely scrutinized the activities of the 43 branches of the BPP which covers an area of 31 states and the District of Columbia. These investigations reveal that the BPP membership has increased to 1,000 hard-core members which is an increase of 250 in the last six months.

As a result of our investigations and informant penetration along with the cooperation with local authorities, 408 BPP members have been arrested on either Federal or local charges during 1970.

Racial informants in the Los Angeles and Chicago Divisions were successful in penetrating the BPP underground and now will be in a position to furnish information on BPP underground activities.

In connection with underground activities, a Dallas racial informant furnished the information which brought about the arrest of Elmer Gerard Pratt, a Los Angeles BPP leader and an alleged leader in the underground. Pratt's arrest along with
the arrest of four other of his associates enabled us to obtain possession of documents apparently relating to the BPP underground and should give us knowledge concerning it and the possible identities of others involved in this underground operation.

In early June, 1970, efforts were made to establish a National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) chapter, which is another name for a BPP chapter in Tampa, Florida. Through aggressive investigation, including thorough interrogation of all known members, the development of a top-level informant and effective use of information provided by this informant, Tampa Office was successful in decimating this group to the point where it is now floundering, nameless and without leadership and there is no indication of support for the BPP in that area.

The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of this group was Alfred Dwight Amos Featherston, an articulate black extremist and an admitted communist who has in the past, visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Through the outstanding informant coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investigative techniques used, this organization for all intent and purposes, rendered inactive by the latter part of 1970. During 1970, BAMM engaged in an intensive recruiting program in the Miami area directed toward young blacks, formed an action group which participated in a number of fire bombings in the Miami area including one such bombing at the University of Miami. Through informant coverage and other investigative activities, the Miami Division developed an excellent case involving the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices and in December the Departmental Attorneys presented this matter to a Federal Grand Jury in Miami resulting in Featherston, Charles Reiley and Jerome Trapp being indicted under the new antiriot laws dealing with the teaching and making of incendiary devices. This is the first such case brought under the new statute charging black extremists with this particular violation.
A Detroit racial informant furnished advanced information regarding planned ambush of Detroit police officers which, when furnished to Detroit Police Department, enabled them to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons. Informant also furnished information resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau Agents of approximately 50 sticks of dynamite available to BPP and likely resulted in saving of lives and preventing possible property damage.

A Chicago racial informant furnished information which identified an individual who is a member of the BPP as the person who raped and shot a middle aged white housewife and then pistol whipped her husband in Chicago on 12-25-70. The same Chicago informant furnished information which resulted in the identification of an individual who was responsible for the murder of a police officer in Carbondale, Illinois.

A Springfield ghetto informant furnished information concerning an individual who was attempting to sell explosives for $2,000. This information enabled local authorities to apprehend the individual and confiscate 100 lbs. of explosives.

A Boston racial informant made a verbatim recording of a speech by a BPP member where he indicated the Panthers should utilize South American style kidnappings in order to effect the release of Panther political prisoners.

A Norfolk racial informant furnished daily information relating to a demonstration at Norfolk State College 5/8-18/70. During this demonstration she reported the Student Government President at the college threatened to kill President Nixon and observed another student burning the American flag. Based on this information, Secret Service is considering prosecution against
the Student Government President and local police are prosecuting the student who burned the flag.

A New York informant furnished the identities of black extremists who were scheduled to depart the U.S. for Al Fatah camp in the Middle East for possible guerrilla training.

In discussing the accomplishments of the Racial Intelligence Section, it is felt that comment should be made concerning the contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division during their analysis of the racial investigations in the various field divisions. In addition to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section, the Inspection Staff through their on-the-spot review of racial intelligence matters in the field are often able to detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and offer constructive assistance to the office involved in strengthening their operations.

In reviewing the racial surveys prepared by the Inspection Division, we regularly note concrete guidance being afforded field offices. Examples can be found in recent instructions given during the inspection of the Mobile Office to direct two existing informants to seek membership in the Nation of Islam (NOI). These instructions were implemented and both informants currently report on NOI activities and have membership applications pending.

During a recent Cleveland inspection, the Inspectors gave instructions for the Cleveland Office to develop informants in a leadership position with the Cleveland National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF). As a result of these instructions, Cleveland has been successful in developing two informants within this organization both of whom are furnishing valuable information on the structural composition of the organization, staff members and proposed activities. One of these informants is a member of the security cadre of the Cleveland NCCF and as such has furnished valuable information concerning firearms in possession of members of this group.
Racial intelligence gathered through our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated to the White House and other high level Government agencies. This document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest of the racial picture.

The quality of our racial informants can also be judged by the fact that since the last Inspection, 26 Special Agents in various field divisions were recommended for incentive awards for their work in developing informants and 15 racial informants were given bonus awards for valuable information they furnished and services performed.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

4-E

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual Units. Specific tangible accomplishments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein.
Nationality Unit

Israeli and Middle East Investigations

Prior to the beginning of the 25th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, this Unit recognized the vulnerability of the large concentration of foreign diplomats attending the Session to acts of terrorism and demonstrations originating with groups dissenting with the incumbent regimes of the countries represented. We issued appropriate instructions to the field to alert sources and provide information immediately which would indicate a threat to the physical security or well being of these dignitaries who were coming to the United States for the Commemorative Session of the United Nations. Subsequent to this action, the White House similarly recognized the potential danger of embarrassment to the United States as host country for the United Nations if incidents occurred, and called on the Bureau to cooperate fully with United States Secret Service to uncover such incidents and provide full security for the chiefs of state and missions resident in New York City during the commemorative celebration. We established a system of liaison with United States Secret Service command post in New York City, as well as intensifying our liaison with New York City police and United States Mission to the United Nations. A flow of information from our sources was furnished to the interested agencies locally and to the intelligence community at a national level which resulted in laudatory comments by Secret Service liaison personnel who commented favorably on the Bureau's assistance in completing the Presidentially ordered mission of United States Secret Service in providing security for the officials mentioned.

During the same period of the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations, we furnished a continuing flow of information to the United States United Nations Mission regarding the the tense Middle East situation and developments related to peace talks instituted by the United States and carried out by United Nations officials. The data furnished to the United States United Nations Mission resulted in the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles W. Yost, advising the Director by letter dated 11/13/70 of his desire to pay special tribute to Agents of this Bureau who had provided him with swift and accurate reports which he had found helpful and which provided him with privileged insight and perspective into the maneuverings during the 25th Session.
In the Israeli field we have continued to furnish information from our sensitive coverage under a program of dissemination which has been assigned the security designation of "SCOPE." "SCOPE" information is furnished only to select individuals at the White House and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the intelligence community. These data relate to attempts by officials of the Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction within United States Government circles for Israeli Government support including economic and military assistance. The personalities involved in these dealings have included prominent members of the United States Congress as well as individuals within the executive arm of our Government. Favorable comment has been forthcoming from Dr. Kissinger at the White House, from the Secretary of State and from other dignitaries within the intelligence community who have been privy to this "SCOPE" information relative to its timeliness and value to them in formulating policy decisions within our Government.

Miscellaneous Programs

This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation with the National Security Agency (NSA) designed to enhance our nation's capability to infiltrate the diplomatic communications of foreign governments. Our first significant breakthrough in this area occurred in 1968 and resulted in NSA estimate of $200,000 annually in evaluating the product of our coverage. We have realized continued success in this sensitive area with two additional successes since the last inspection for a total of four nationality areas being totally covered by the Bureau at this time. Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Acting Director, NSA, by letter dated 11/10/70, commented most favorably on the productivity of our program in this area, noting that our coverage provided information of priority concern to the NSA which would be otherwise unobtainable to the United States Government. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this information, it is suggested that either I or my Number One Man be consulted for further details.

In the miscellaneous espionage area a decided accomplishment was attained with close of investigation relating to Vernon Edward Thompson of Santa Barbara, California. In September and October, 1970, high officials of the intelligence and military communities, cabinet members, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and Mr. Herbert J. Klein
of the White House Staff and other highly placed United States Government officials began receiving cryptogram messages which, after decryption, disclosed implication of bombings of certain major cities on 11/29/70. Content of the messages revealed that the writer was privy to intelligence information and possibly had knowledge of United States nuclear weapon deployment. The receipt of these messages was the object of extreme concern by the recipients and resulted in our investigation.

Through outstandingly aggressive and imaginative investigation and with a dearth of investigative leads, the Los Angeles Office successfully identified the typewriter on which the messages were being prepared as being located in a library in the Santa Barbara area. Discreet and productive surveillance was conducted, which resulted in identification of Thompson and his neutralization as a point of anxiety and concern on the part of the highest level of officials in the executive branch and in the intelligence community. We are now awaiting a decision as to prosecution after review of the details of this matter by the Criminal Division of the Department.

The President has noted the paucity of positive intelligence information available to him for high-level policy decisions. We have recognized our responsibilities in this area through intensified coverage in the nationality fields supervised by this Unit as illustrated in the increase of establishments being afforded sensitive coverage and through the increase of our live informant coverage targeted against the nations involved. Three of the six new foreign liaison posts established recently by the Bureau involve countries within the area of responsibility of this Unit and information from those liaison posts should add to the production of our foreign intelligence information in response to President Nixon's requirements.
CUBAN UNIT

Our sustained pressure on Cuban Intelligence Service (CuIS) operations in the U.S. resulted in the recall to Cuba of three very experienced CuIS officers in April, 1970. They had been serving as officials of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) and their withdrawal was in line with information provided by a CIA source to the effect that the Cuban Government planned to recall any personnel whom it believed were susceptible to persona non grata action by the U.S. State Department.

Based on FBI information, a leading Puerto Rican terrorist in New York City (Carlos Feliciano Vasquez) was apprehended by the New York City Police Department on May 16, 1970, while in the process of placing a bomb in an Armed Forces recruiting station.

After being confronted by us in early August, 1970, a very attractive and sexually permissive employee of the South African Embassy, Washington, D.C., admitted her deep involvement with the CuIS. She had furnished the Cubans data concerning American and foreign officials with whom she was in social contact. After becoming sexually involved with a State Department protocol officer in March, 1970, she was able to gain entree to diplomatic functions where she met ranking officials and employees of the U.S. and foreign governments. Our investigation indicated she was unable to establish contact with her principal to furnish information concerning the dignitaries she met following her involvement with the protocol officer and she voluntarily returned home to South Africa shortly after our interview of her. Her name is Jennifer Enid Miles.

A San Juan Office source was primarily responsible for developing information leading to the conviction on 8/26/70 of four Socialist Workers Party (PSO) leaders in Puerto Rico. The information developed by our source enabled the Police of Puerto Rico to arrest a total of nine PSO members. The PSO has been active in the wave of bombings taking place in Puerto Rico and the arrests were for violations of the Puerto Rican Explosives Law.

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1/12/71
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4-E
During the Summer of 1970 a counterintelligence program aimed at creating dissension was instituted by our San Juan Office against the activist Puerto Rican Socialist League (LSP). On October 10, 1970, a high-placed Miami security informant reported the LSP was showing signs of grinding to a halt and that it recently experienced a severe split away from its youth group. Our counterintelligence move was directly responsible for the havoc occurring in the LSP.

As a result of disclosures made by Jennifer Enid Miles and other corroborative evidence developed by New York and Washington Field Office, we were able to have State Department declare persona non grata the two highest ranking CuIS officials in the U.S. on October 9, 1970. Counsellor Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez and First Secretary Orlando Prendes Gutierrez of the CMUN were the individuals involved and they made a total of seven against whom similar action has been taken by State Department since February, 1966, based on FBI investigations of CMUN personnel.

On October 10, 1970, Filiberto Ojeda Rios, a known Cuban espionage agent and a Bureau fugitive, was apprehended by FBI agents and the Police of Puerto Rico. Ojeda, leader of the Puerto Rican Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA), had been the prime mover behind the wave of violence and terrorist bombings which has occurred for many months in Puerto Rico. Documents found at his hideout definitely confirmed the close collaboration between the Cuban Government and Puerto Rican terrorist groups.

On October 19, 1970, an intensification program was instituted by our Miami Office based on instructions from the Bureau aimed at identifying CuIS agents in the Miami area who are believed to be tipping off Castro concerning infiltration efforts by anti-Castro refugees in the U.S. A coordinator had been made responsible for directing these efforts and progress has been made in eliminating certain suspects as well as developing valuable background regarding other logical suspects.

In December, 1970, an actual member of the clandestine MIRA organization, previously mentioned, was developed as an informant. This is the first informant to be in a position to get inside information regarding the group's plans and we previously had to depend on "fringe" sources to cover this very dangerous terrorist group.
Since our intensification program directed against the CMUN was begun in February, 1970, we have been able to institute some sensitive coverage for a period of six months, have installed equipment which can monitor handie-talkie radios used by CuIF personnel, have learned that CuIF personnel carry arms at all times, and have developed sources in a position to keep us advised as to the activities of such personnel on a 24-hour basis.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT

The President and other policy makers have a continuing interest in current political matters affecting Central and South America. We have provided officials in the Executive Branch of the Government on a continuing basis with information concerning the activities of political figures and leftist groups in a number of Latin American nations. Of particular significance was information concerning the activities of Arnulfo Arias Madrid, deposed Panamanian President residing in Miami, Florida, who is planning the overthrow of the current Panamanian Government. In an effort to provide the President and other policy makers with even more such information, we have recently expanded our coverage in the Chilean, Peruvian and Bolivian fields.

The unit continues to be successful in thwarting plans of militant anti-Castro groups which have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba. Successful development of key informants who have infiltrated anti-Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities and often to have advance knowledge of the plans of these groups enabling us to take appropriate action to prevent such activities. An outstanding example of our success in this area was the thwarting of two militant anti-Castro attempts in July, 1970, to infiltrate Cuba and the seizure of boats, arms, ammunition and miscellaneous military equipment valued at $64,500 by U. S. authorities.

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4-E
As a result of our close cooperation with RCMP, that agency, in 12/70, provided us with details of one of its double agent operations which clearly depicted intensification of Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence efforts directed against the United States. We learned that the Chicom have funded travel of the RCMP source to New York and Washington, D.C., where the source undertook to fulfill intelligence contacts and development of data for the Chicom. As a result of getting this information, we learned that Chicom desire to lay the foundation to get "our people" (Chicom) into the United States under suitable cover, probably when the Chicom Embassy opens in Canada in the very near future. The Director's letter to the Commissioner, RCMP, expressed appreciation for RCMP information. 

During August, 1970, three of our Chinese informants made contacts with Chicom intelligence representatives in Hong Kong and Canada, and it is believed they were affirmatively assessed for recruitment. Another source has made several trips to Vancouver, Canada, and San Francisco where he has made strides to penetrate Chicom groups which would be essential bases for future Chicom operations directed against the United States.

In August, 1970, National Security Agency (NSA) advised of increased interceptions of radio transmissions from Red China directed to illegal agents possibly in the United States. Immediate instructions were directed to appropriate field offices and efforts are under way to pinpoint areas of reception with the expectation that illegal agents will be uncovered.

Investigations have developed data indicating possible Chicom intelligence net formed in New York City utilizing Chinese seamen deserters as mail drops and/or couriers.

We identified a Chinese alien residing in New Jersey as an individual who provided an intelligence report to the New China News Agency (NCNA) representative in Canada. The NCNA representative has previously been identified as a Chicom Intelligence Service officer. The alien indicated he had a sub-agent working for him in New York City.

FXO: dgo
1/13/71
In view of the apparent upsurge in Chicom activity we furnished a detailed memorandum to Dr. Kissinger at the White House and to the Attorney General under date of 9/30/70. Our memorandum outlined the recent activities of Chicom in the intelligence field and pointed out increasing Chicom support for New Left and Black militant revolutionaries in this country.

We furnished information to State, Central Intelligence Agency and Secret Service which led to strengthening of guard and security around CHIANG Ching-kuo, Deputy Prime Minister of Nationalist China and son of CHIANG Kai-shek, who was in the United States during April, 1970. As a result of this increased security, an attempt by two anti-Chinese nationalist individuals to assassinate CHIANG was thwarted.

Our investigations of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) and Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) developed information of growing Chicom interest in these groups indicating Chicoms might desire to cooperate with them to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Positive information has been developed regarding the intelligence activities of pro-Chicom individuals assigned to the United Nations Secretariat. Our close coverage determined that the three most active of these individuals recently traveled to Europe, and coverage of their activities has been requested through contacts of Legat, Bern.

We have initiated an effort in four key field offices to develop sources among ethnic Chinese scientists having security clearance and who are logical Chicom targets. We were assisted in this effort by Defense Industrial Security Office.

We brought to attention of the White House and Secretary of State Rogers information regarding an anti-Chinese nationalist individual who had escaped house arrest in Taiwan, fled to Sweden and who later applied for U. S. visa. His presence in the United States could have adversely affected United States-Chinese Nationalist relations. Secretary of State Rogers took personal note of this information in a letter to the Director 10/28/70.

Other investigations indicated intensified Chicom interest in and support of radicals in the United States.
SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT

During December, 1970, six new foreign offices were established. As a result of personnel moves, 19 Special Agents and 16 clerks were transferred to foreign offices each requiring passport, visa, and Department of State and Embassy notification. The numerous contacts with State and the outgoing letters (two for each person transferred) were handled in this Unit, together with the memoranda and notification to the White House regarding various phases of the operation. A special one-week indoctrination session was arranged and attended by most of the new Special Agent personnel. The Director's instructions that the expansion take place were issued 11-20-70. Each of the new offices was open and operating during December, 1970.

Through liaison with appropriate officials at the White House, the interest of those officials in proposed legislation which would provide increased retirement benefits for FBI personnel has been maintained. The advice of these officials concerning channels to be used in promoting this legislation was secured and has been followed.

Since the last inspection, SA Haynes has expedited and coordinated visits of the Director to the White House on approximately six occasions. This has included meeting the Director, taking him to the meeting site, introducing him to persons present if not known to him, and assuring his return to his car by the most direct route following the meeting.

Through carefully controlled contacts with the Commission on Campus Unrest, it was possible to secure a copy of their report in advance in order to insure that there were no unfavorable comments concerning the FBI. The left-wing staff of this Commission was very active in areas of direct interest to the Bureau, and SA Haynes was able to avoid any conflict and there were no derogatory references to our work made by this group.

Direct personal liaison was established during the period with Washington representatives of two additional countries: The Union of South Africa and Japan. The representative of the Bureau for State Security of the former and of the National Police Agency of the latter are now working directly with representatives of the Unit.
Swiss Police asked Bureau assistance in establishing the location of Joseph Gargy, w.a., who had secured more than $400,000 in an armed robbery of a jewelry store in Zurich. The loot was recovered in Italy, and investigation under the Foreign Police Cooperation character resulted in the location of Gargy in the United States. We arranged for his arrest by other authorities so that he might be held for extradition.

During the calendar year 1970, Agents on the Foreign Liaison Desk handled 822 foreign visitors. These included not only special tours of Bureau facilities but also, in many instances, special conferences with Bureau officials, including the Director, and other courtesies for these contacts of our Legal Attache personnel.
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: You are requested to furnish information regarding various surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This information should include identity of the project or program, background and date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category.

Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you may wish to comment on:

1. Security Index Program.
2. Security Informants.
4. Racial Informants.
5. Technical and Microphone Surveillances.
6. Counterintelligence.
7. Minutemen, Klan and other hate groups.
8. Nation of Islam.
9. Communist infiltration of racial groups.
10. New Left Movement.
11. Espionage.
12. Any other program deemed pertinent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached are write-ups from each Section concerning the above.

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SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY: In connection with the Inspector's request under above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following handled by the Internal Security Section:

(1) Security Index Program
(2) Security Informant Program
(6) & (7) Counterintelligence Program - Disruption of White Hate Groups
(12) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent
   (a) Thumbnail Sketch Program

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SEP: lmj
4-H
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION

Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat to the national security began prior to World War II. The actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of a threat to the national security.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program is field-wide in scope. The goal of the Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals who because of their membership and activity and/or association with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country. The program includes the collection or sufficient information relating to the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION

By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter of temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved a moratorium on certain Security Matter - Communist investigations and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971. By memorandum October 29, 1970, from the Executives Conference to Mr. Tolson, approved by the Director, the moratorium was lifted. At the time there were approximately 10,690 individuals on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types. Virtually no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7,000 of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in 1/12/71

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February, 1969. Many of these persons had changed residence and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive, timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these individuals. Implementation was directed by airtel November 3, 1970, to all offices, and in doing so we took a realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening of these cases so that they would be spread out over the period November 3, 1970, to June 30, 1971. This was considered essential in view of our approximation that it would be necessary to reopen approximately 7,000 of the Priority II and III types.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION

Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section. Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate supervisory personnel. I personally follow this matter closely to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

This is a major internal security program based upon Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION

The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated. The most recent justification is contained in memorandum from Charles D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan dated January 8, 1970, and as of instant date (January 12, 1971) a current rejustification memorandum is in preparation.

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SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

At the time of the last inspection in April, 1970, we had 279 member security informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), while at the present time we have 264 member informants in the CPUSA, a decrease of 15. In addition, there are 31 member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); the number of SWP informants at last inspection is not known.

On December 16, 1970, a reorganization of Sections within the Division resulted in a realignment of informant handling and record keeping, with the result that only informants in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups are now handled in the Internal Security Section. As of December 16, 1970, there were 578 informants in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. The number at last inspection is not known.

There has been continuing recognition of the fact that there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant coverage in basic revolutionary organizations. In this regard, SAC Letter 70-40 dated August 4, 1970, captioned "Racial and Security Informants," pointed out in-depth quality informants in these fields are more imperative than ever under present conditions in view of the upsurge in violence. SAC Letter 70-48 dated September 15, 1970, captioned "Security and Racial Informants," pointed out that never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for informant coverage. This SAC Letter authorized development of informants between the ages of 18 and 21, thus presenting the field with a tremendous opportunity to expand informant coverage not only among violence-prone New Left and radical groups, but also in the basic revolutionary groups as well. There can be no doubt but that these instructions have stimulated development of informants.

Security informant development receives continuous supervision. It is not technically a program justified annually, but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative operations that requires and receives vigorous day-to-day attention.

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HEM: mk1

4-H
BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program was initiated in September, 1964, for the purpose of exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing activities of white extremist organizations, their leaders and adherents. There are currently 17 field offices regularly participating in this program and as specific situations arise other divisions also participate.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED

The following are highlights of accomplishments achieved through this program since last inspection: A racial informant of the Birmingham Division has been able to influence Robert Shelton, leader of the largest Klan group, United Klans of America, Inc., (UKA), to be more moderate in his speeches by opposing violence and stressing need for law and order as well as continuing his acts against communism. This has been effective in toning down Klan violence.

Midwest coordinator of National Socialist White People’s Party, formerly known as American Nazi Party, was expelled from that organization after publicity furnished under this program disclosed he was of Jewish descent.

Through manipulation of informants, anonymous letters and utilization of friendly press services we were successful in creating a split in the UKA in North Carolina. This split was brought about when a rally of dissident Klansmen in September, 1969, showed their disaffection with the UKA leadership by burning their Klan membership cards. This split was highlighted in front page news stories in North Carolina newspapers.

During 1970 National Klanvokation, Robert Shelton, who was again elected Imperial Wizard, made a speech indicating his feelings that high ranking members of the UKA may be disloyal and that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and

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possibly utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan officers and members to ferret out FBI informants. As a result, we recently furnished reliable news sources with information in belief that public exposure will deter considerably from any future enactment of these plans. It is too early to determine results of this move at this time.

As a result of counterintelligence action taken through racial informants in the Knoxville Division, we were successful in having the Exalted Cyclops of Mascot Klavern #778, Mascot, Tennessee, Thomas Stipes, eliminated from this top position and were able to have him subsequently banished from the Klan. This was brought about by having our racial informants create dissension within the ranks of this Klavern.

Through the use of two racial informants of our Little Rock Division, we were successful in causing the defeat of a Klansmen who was campaigning to be elected as sheriff of Jefferson County, Arkansas. This individual, Victor Calvert, Exalted Cyclops, Pine Bluff Klavern, Association of Arkansas Klans, in conducting his campaign attempted to hide his Klan affiliations because he hoped to receive a good percentage of the Negro vote in his area. Our informants were successful in discreetly letting out the word of his secret Klan membership.

As a result of counterintelligence action taken, W. Melvin Sexton, Imperial Kligrapp (National Secretary) of the UKA, the largest Klan organization in the country, resigned from his position. Both Sexton and his wife, in addition to being Klan members, were employed in the National Office of the United Klans of America. This is particularly significant in that for many years Sexton had been "number one man" to Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton of the UKA and actually ran the UKA while Shelton was in prison following his conviction for Contempt of Congress. This resignation was brought about by our informants planting the seeds of distrust regarding Sexton and exposing the fact that Sexton had a serious drinking problem.

CURRENT SUPERVISION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

The counterintelligence program requires little additional manpower since these extremists are under continuous

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investigation. All counterintelligence proposals are submitted to the Bureau for approval and positive results achieved from this program, when balanced against the relatively small expenditure of Agent and supervisory time, indicates that its continuance is justified. This program is re-evaluated annually and was last re-evaluated by memorandum G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan dated July 20, 1970.
THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM

This program was initiated and authorized by SAC Letter 53-72(J) dated October 27, 1953, to insure that the field is using current characterizations of subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing such organizations. Those characterizations deemed to be of field-wide interest are now to be furnished to the field by letter to all offices on an annual basis rather than by SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, in accordance with approval of suggestion in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr dated December 7, 1970.

The background and value of this program is the same as it was at the time of the write-ups for the 1970 inspection. Upon receipt of the annual letters from the field in June, 1970, 422 separate characterizations were received and reviewed by appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of field-wide interest were furnished to the field by SAC Letter 70-62 dated November 3, 1970. The remaining characterizations were returned to interested field offices following their approval by the Bureau. This program was last reviewed and analyzed and its continuance approved by memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
HEM:1md
4-H
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS, 4-H

New Left Movement
Section Chief: R. L. Shackelford

The following surveys, projects and/or intensification programs are in effect against the New Left movement:

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices, dated 10/23/68, the field was instructed to expand its Key Activist programs and these programs were intensified. Each office was instructed to submit its recommendations on individuals considered as Key Activists. The field was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage on these individuals. The purpose of this program is to render Key Activists ineffective and thereby drastically reduce their influence in the New Left movement. At the present time there are 75 Key Activists under intensive investigation. A Key Activist Album which contains photographs and biographical data on each Key Activist has been assembled and has been furnished to all offices. The Key Activist Album is maintained in a current status, 40 are subjects of prosecutive action. The Album has proven to be invaluable in following the activities and travels of New Left activists, both for the Seat of Government and for the field.

By airtel dated 3/10/69 to SAC, Albany, and all offices, the field was instructed to submit summary reports every three months on those individuals designated as Key Activists. The field was also instructed to prepare an appropriate communication suitable for dissemination in the event any of these individuals held a speaking engagement and whenever they made a statement indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation. The purpose of this program was to develop information in respect to the securing of testimony and evidence concerning violations of statutes within the Bureau's jurisdiction in connection with leaders involved with campus disorders.

By letter to all offices dated 5/5/69, the field was instructed that when it is ascertained that a Key Activist is scheduled to speak on campus, in addition to the coverage of his appearance, they should determine through established sources the amount received by him and the source of the funds.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
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The purpose of this is (1) to provide for a centralized reporting of New Left activity in this field; (2) to enable us to keep abreast of funds utilized to finance these inflammatory speeches; (3) to enable us to take advantage of situations which could embarrass the New Left or stifle future activity; (4) to facilitate the necessary evaluation and analysis by the Bureau and other interested agencies. By letter dated 12/23/69 to all field offices, information concerning financial aspects of the New Left were emphasized, and the field was instructed to develop solid information concerning the travelling of Key Activists.

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 10/28/68, a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their territories. The purpose of these reports was to obtain a comprehensive study of the movement in order to assess its potential dangerousness. Following the submission of the original summary reports, offices were instructed to submit such reports on a quarterly basis with an appropriate breakdown of the material in the report. These reports enable the Bureau to maintain recent and comprehensive information concerning various aspects of the New Left movement. These reports are disseminated to interested agencies to enable them to maintain a clear picture of New Left movement.

SAC Letter 70-11 (E) dated 3/3/70 instructed field to discontinue submission of quarterly letter listing identities of New Left movement groups under investigation, coverage afforded each group and programs of each office to develop necessary coverage. This information in order to streamline paper work is now to be set forth in cover pages of New Left quarterly report.

By airtel to all offices dated 12/9/70 instructions were reiterated to the field concerning the preparation and content of New Left movement quarterly reports. The organizations to be included in this report were noted as well as the subheadings to be utilized. A brief analysis of the current status of New Left activity in each Division is to be included in the cover pages of the report as well as the number of individual cases opened and closed concerning SDS members as well as members of pro-communist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence.
By letter dated 11/5/68, to SAC, Albany, and all offices, under the caption of "New Left Movement, Publications, Internal Security - Miscellaneous," the field was instructed to cover the principal propaganda mills of the New Left which are described as the "underground" newspapers. The field was instructed to conduct a detailed survey of these publications and to submit information concerning these obscene, seditious and inflammatory newspapers. At the present time, there are over 200 such publications being circulated. Cases on various of these newspapers which are deemed important to the New Left movement have been opened.

By airtel dated 3/16/70 to all offices, a survey was instituted to determine the amount of financial support given to New Left groups by tax-exempt charitable foundations, prominent or wealthy individuals, and politically oriented groups. The field was instructed to furnish results of this survey in form suitable for dissemination.

By letter to all Special Agents in Charge, dated 2/13/70, the field was advised that the militant and violence-prone Weatherman faction of the SDS planned to go underground and to direct "strategic sabotage" at military and police installations. The field was instructed to advise appropriate local police agencies of the aims of the Weatherman faction and of the necessity to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group.

By airtel to all field offices dated 3/19/70 the field was advised of the plans of the Weatherman faction of the SDS to form commando-type units to engage in bombing, arson and assassination. The field was instructed to make every effort to locate and identify Weatherman communes and their activists. A list of major Weatherman activists was furnished to the field which instructed intensive investigation to determine their whereabouts and to advise the Bureau and office of origin on a weekly basis. The field was instructed to utilize a caution statement that Weatherman activists should be considered dangerous for their known propensity for violence.

Bureau airtel to select offices handling bulk of Weatherman investigations dated 3/24/70 reiterated instructions in airtel to all offices 3/19/70 and specifically noted that New Left communes were to be located and participants identified to determine if they were violence prone. The offices were instructed to have Special Agents assigned to these investigations to be reminded of their prosecutive potential and to consider establishing a special squad to fully comply with Bureau instructions to intensify these investigations.
Bureau airtel to Chicago 3/24/70 instructed that office to promptly initiate investigations and interview all individuals who were arrested in Chicago during National Action week 10/8-11/69 if such investigations not already undertaken. Over 280 individuals were arrested, most of which were either members of or closely associated with Weatherman group. Chicago airtel to numerous offices 4/9/70 restated Bureau instructions.

SAC Letter 70-18 (C) dated 4/7/70 under caption "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Bombing Matters" set forth instructions to be followed in bombing and attempted bombing matters. In those instances of bombing or arson which appear to have New Left or black extremist connotations or motivation and where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists or the Department has advised no investigation is warranted, the Bureau is to be immediately advised setting forth pertinent data regarding involvement of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident as well as a recommendation for any additional investigation warranted.

Teletype to all SACs 4/17/70 set forth specific areas of investigations to be covered by field in its investigations against New Left terrorist groups and individuals and also set forth the definition of a commune for purposes of Bureau investigations and instructed field to conduct sufficient investigation of all members of the commune when they are members of a commune falling within Bureau standards for investigation. The field also was instructed to develop that informant coverage necessary of all communes and/or groups so that advance knowledge of any planned violence could be obtained to insure preventive action be initiated and executive action brought to bear where possible.

By airtel to all offices 5/11/70 the field was authorized to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members on SAC authority on completion of investigation except in those instances where the subject is under 21, currently a student, professor, has some connection with an institution of learning or is a journalist. Bureau approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals.
Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 instructed the field to begin implementation of investigations of New Left terrorism promptly with available manpower and scale of implementation should be as rapid as possible. All adherents to Weatherman ideology of advocating a Marxist-Leninist revolution now and use terrorist tactics in furtherance of revolution are to be subjects of these investigations. All of these subjects are to be considered for Priority I of the Security Index, interviewed and the Bureau advised every 45 days by letter of those placed in Priority I of their current residence and any other pertinent information developed. To facilitate handling at the Bureau, all reports and other communications within defined categories are to include word (Weatherman) in character. This airtel also instructed each office to submit monthly airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities and locations of communes or organizations under investigation; (2) number of cases opened during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of individual cases under investigation; (4) informant coverage used against communes or organizations; and, (5) brief summary of New Left-oriented violence in area during preceding month and action taken.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 concerning the VB instructed all offices to immediately intensify investigations of all returnees from Cuba with this Brigade, ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt interviews and submit current reports with Security Index recommendation. In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to a violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90 days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III and non-Security Index returnees. In case of Priority I Security Index subjects, this information is to be furnished the Bureau every 45 days.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 forwarded the field a copy of a Departmental letter concerning the specific areas of interest to the Department in campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action. The field was specifically instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and all agitational activities prior to and during violent campus disorders by subversive groups and such information must be fully determined and reported.
SAC Letter 70-30 (D) dated 6/2/70 reiterated prior instructions of moratorium on Security Matter - Communist investigations. Recent field inspections indicated some offices needed clarification of this moratorium. The SAC Letter noted instructions concerning moratorium only applied to routine communist investigations and not those individuals belonging to such groups as the Weatherman, Progressive Labor Party, Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance.

Bureau airtel to all offices 7/16/70 noted that New Left terrorism is continuing through bombings, arsons and other forms of violence and each SAC must personally insure sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these matters as well as investigating individuals involved and those following Weatherman ideology of utilization of violent revolutionary tactics against our Government.

Bureau airtel to select offices dated 8/20/70 handling Key Activists were instructed to promptly submit to the Bureau sufficient handwriting specimens of each Key Activist and the specimen is to be placed in the National Security File maintained by the Laboratory. This was done in view of the propensity for violence of these individuals and the fact a number of them are currently Bureau fugitives.

SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70 captioned "New Left Movement - Violence, Internal Security - Miscellaneous (Weatherman)" refers to strategic sabotage plans of Weatherman against military and police installations and "Declaration of War" by Weatherman underground and instructs all security personnel to develop better informant coverage. This development should concern informants and sources who can furnish advance information regarding activities of Weatherman and other terrorist groups and was specifically stressed.

By airtel to all offices dated 9/3/70 captioned "Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity" the field was instructed, because of increased attacks on police, that it can be expected there will also be physical attacks against the FBI and it should be insured that all Special Agent personnel are fully cognizant of this possibility. If information is received targeting police, appropriate
investigation must be immediately instituted and informants directed to develop full facts concerning the attack. The purpose of these investigations is to obtain complete intelligence data concerning any extremist influence.

SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70 under caption "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Informant Coverage" instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations, their collectives, communes and staffs of their underground newspapers. Constructive plans to implement this program are to be included in Item 4 of the monthly airtel on "New Left Movement-Violence" which was outlined in Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70.

Bureau airtel to all offices 10/1/70 instructed the field to replace the word (Weatherman) as noted in Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 with the word (Extremist). This was done to insure prompt and efficient routing at the Bureau as well as proper handling in the field. A new caution statement was also to be included in all correspondence in respect to those individuals involved in Weatherman and other New Left extremist activities.

SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70 captioned "New Left Movement - Police Training Matters" advised the field that in view of recent developments concerning violence caused by New Left terrorists, the Bureau will consider requests from the field for SACs or ASACs to brief local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel regarding New Left extremism and violence at law enforcement meetings and conferences where attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law enforcement officials.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/3/70 advised the field that the moratorium of suspension of report writing in Priority II Security Index cases and suspension of verification of residence and employment in Priority II and Priority III cases is rescinded. Offices were instructed to reopen a proportionate number of cases each month and insure all were open by 6/30/71. Furthermore, residence and employment on all of these subjects is to be verified, annual reports submitted in Priority II cases and LHM submitted in Priority III cases where necessary.
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/4/70 instructed the field to initiate investigation of all members of SDS and members of pro-communist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence. Each individual under investigation should be considered for the Security Index.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning informant development in New Left groups noted that each SAC was to make this matter his personal concern in order that penetration of these groups by top quality informants will be accomplished in the immediate future. Each SAC was directed to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete analysis of his informant coverage in New Left groups clearly setting forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken to rectify these weaknesses.

Current Bureau instructions require development of adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative responsibilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal security fields can be properly discharged. Semiannual reports are submitted by each office having a Strategic Air Command Base or an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Base within its territory. A review of semiannual reports submitted by the field as of 7/1/70 disclosed that a total of 1,281 informants have been developed.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised field that special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and other New Left terrorists has been started. Field is instructed to immediately review files for identity of individuals who fit category of a New Left terrorist and whose fingerprints should be included in this special single fingerprint file. Names of these individuals were to be submitted to Bureau with sufficient identifying data and as new names come to attention of office promptly furnish the Bureau.
Section Chief R. D. Cotter: Following are applicable activities of Research Section.

Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence

This survey program was formerly under the title "Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas." The program was initiated in 1964 in order that the Bureau would be aware of potential danger spots in the U. S. The present program requires each field division to conduct a continuing survey in their respective territories covering all localities having a potential for racial violence based on current racial conditions. The objective is to insure that the Bureau receives a realistic and comprehensive picture of existing racial conditions in these areas on a current basis and to obtain advance information of any impending racial developments which clearly point to the possibility of mob violence.

Quarterly reports submitted by field in line with this survey represent information obtained through contacts with local government and police officials, leaders of racial groups, and a cross section of informants and sources. The survey enables us to be thoroughly knowledgeable of racial developments and potential trouble spots and provides timely and pertinent information which is disseminated to the White House, Attorney General, and other Government agencies. Information developed is also used for an analysis of the potential for violence in the U. S., which is prepared in the spring of each year, just prior to the most active months, in this field, and which is disseminated on a high level.
Security Index (SI) Program

Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security Section (4-H), which has investigative responsibility under this program. Research Section, Special Records Unit, maintains records applicable to the SI and is responsible for coordinating program. In line with this responsibility, Research Section prepared a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan, dated 1/12/71, re-evaluating SI.

As of 4/15/70 there were in the Index 2,794 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,352 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 11,146. Of these, 848 and 4,770, respectively, are communists—a total of 5,618 or 50.4 percent. As of 12/15/70 there were in the Index 3,450 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,614 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12,064. Of these, 831 and 4,718, respectively, are communists—a total of 5,549 or 46 percent.
Emergency Detention Program

The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is field-wide, involves the planning for apprehension and detention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of a national emergency and for the search and seizure of contraband. The EDP is not a program as such but is based on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950. The basic responsibility for the operation and implementation of the EDP rests with the Attorney General. Detailed plans regarding the EDP are drawn up and included in the "Attorney General's Portfolio," copies of which are in the Bureau's possession.

This program has been maintained in an up-to-date status. Administrative plans for the implementation of the program in each office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro Survey." Lists of individuals to be detained are furnished to the Internal Security Division of the Department each month and the listing of places to be searched under authority of the Master Search Warrant are maintained on a current basis. The Seat of Government and all field divisions, with the exception of Honolulu, maintain essential records at safe locations for successful implementation of the EDP. Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to the U. S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.

This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit, Research Section. Primary responsibility rests with the Department and changes can be made only upon approval of the Department. We merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable changes. Periodic checks are made to insure that all records connected with the EDP, stored away from Headquarters cities, are current. Field division surveys are kept up to date and the Bureau is advised semiannually of the status.

Legislation was previously introduced in Congress to repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. When the 91st Congress ended, no affirmative action had been taken in this regard. In the event Title II should be repealed at a future date under new legislation, the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally will continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsibility for protecting this Nation's internal security.

This program is under constant supervision and re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining may be made. A memorandum justifying the continuance of this program was last submitted on 1/12/71.
Security Informants

Special Records Unit maintains an up-to-date index of Security Informants and Potential Security Informants. It correlates personal and operating data (such as name, address, code, file and symbol number) concerning these informants, which it receives from the Division's investigative sections, and places such material on FD-348s, three by five cards that constitute the index. This index is maintained on discontinued as well as current informants.

At the time of the inspection in April, 1970, a total of 1,141 Security Informants were being operated. As of 1/12/71 the number had increased to 1,159 for a total increase of 18. During the same period, the number of Potential Security Informants had increased from 616 to 765 for a total increase of 149.

Technical and Microphone Surveillances

There has been no significant change regarding the utilization of these techniques in the internal security field since the last inspection. As of 1/12/71, we have 40 telephone surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau's internal security cases and seven awaiting installation. We also have six tesurs in operation at the request of the State Department.

We are conducting six microphone surveillances (misurs) in internal security field, and four misur installations are being operated at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA). In addition, 64 teletype facilities are being covered at the written request of NSA.
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section

The following programs discussed immediately hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the Espionage Section: Alem Program, Bureau file 65-69532; Banpop Program, Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program, Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program, Bureau file 65-70719; DESECO Program, Bureau file 105-71688; East-West Exchange Program, Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.

Following the inspection of April, 1970, the Counterintelligence Program was discontinued and a GS-14 Supervisor was made available for assignment elsewhere. No write-up has been submitted for the Rega Program since this is now being phased out.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-13-70
WAB:hke
4-H
1. ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. S. under assumed identities as 1. alien husbands of American wives or 2. as male immigrants on first preference petitions because of certain professional and technical skills. The basis of this program is information furnished by the Fedora informant. This program was initiated in August, 1965. Individuals entering the U. S. under the above two categories have been determined through a machine run of Immigration and Naturalization Service Form G-188 punch cards. The Bureau has reimbursed the Immigration and Naturalization Service for expenses incurred in sorting these cards for immigrants entering the U. S. between the years 1960-1965.

2. Approximately 1960 cases have been opened under this program since its inception, of which 106 are now pending. We have not uncovered any "illegals" to date although we have been able to identify through this program a valuable KGB agent who went to the U. S. as an immigrant from Belgium (Buckboard case, Buffie 65-68188).

3. ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SAAP, Litrento. The responsibility of reviewing the pertinent G-188 cards and initiating investigations is placed with the Washington Field Office. The procedures followed in opening cases do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.

4. According to the Fedora informant, the KGB has used the techniques set forth above in dispatching KGB "illegals" to the U. S. During 1960-1965, four KGB "illegals" reportedly arrived in the U. S. under category number one according to information the Fedora informant was able to obtain from a KGB officer in the New York Residency.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis.
1. CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet illegals who may have arrived in Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered the U. S. on immigrant visas obtained at one of the American consulates in Canada. This program is based on the Cowslip case which involved a Soviet illegal husband and wife team who used this method of entry. Legat, Ottawa, effected arrangements with various American consulates in Canada to obtain the Immigration Visa and Alien Registration (IVAR) forms filed by European immigrants prior to their destruction by the consulates. It is consulate practice to retain these forms for 16 to 18 months then to destroy them. Legat, Ottawa, forwards these forms to the New York Office where they are reviewed. To develop suspects, the New York Office uses criteria developed from analysis of the Cowslip case.

2. Since inception of this program in June, 1966, 27 cases were opened. There are no cases pending. No illegals have been uncovered to date. The procedures followed in this program do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the New York Office.

3. CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA A. P. Litrento.

4. The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security field. It is felt this program still has a good potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical and has a sound basis. Past experience has shown that Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi continuously, if successful.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis.
The Deseco Program (program for development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) was conceived in an espionage conference in December, 1957. Its objective was to intensify the development of informants and double agents to penetrate Soviet-bloc intelligence and for use in sensitive defection approaches.

Between the last inspection and December 1, 1970, approximately an 8-month period, 37 Deseco subjects were placed in contact with Soviet-bloc officials and 8 of these have developed to the status of security informants or double agents.

The majority of work is concentrated in the New York, Washington, D. C., and Chicago areas where Soviet-bloc establishments are located. A Soviet Consulate General is scheduled to become operative in San Francisco during 1971, and a skeleton staff of four Soviet officials with five dependents is seeking appropriate buildings for this establishment.

San Francisco and other West Coast offices are currently developing a "pool" of Deseco sources for eventual use against Soviet intelligence officers who will operate out of the Soviet Consulate General. Due to the increased number of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States and their relative freedom of travel, particularly to technical and scientific conventions, a total of 19 offices have been authorized to conduct "sounding-out" interviews of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority. Follow-up interviews with potential Deseco sources are conducted on a UACB basis. Unusual and highly sensitive cases are routed to the division front office for approval.

The New York, Washington Field and Chicago Offices submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of the program. The other 16 offices submit summaries on a semi-annual basis. This program substantially assists us to penetrate and neutralize Soviet-bloc intelligence. The results achieved thus far warrant the program's continuance. It is the best means of penetration available considering the

DESECO PROGRAM
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DESECO PROGRAM

limitations on other sensitive investigative techniques. It affords us a pool of human resources available for use against Soviet-bloc intelligence personnel in political, economic and particularly scientific fields in which the intelligence services of the bloc have shown extreme interest. This program has been reevaluated on an annual basis. It was last justified by memorandum dated 10/22/69, but by the action of the Executive Conference approved by the Director on memorandum of 10/29/70, Washington and New York were instructed that every Special Agent in those offices handling investigations of Soviet personnel should immediately open on and develop two completely new Deseco subjects. These instructions were sent to the field by airtel of 11/2/70.

The program will next be justified by memorandum in March, 1971, when progress letters summarizing the results of the program will be due from all participating offices. This program is correlated in the Espionage Section Coordination Unit by Special Agent L. Whitson.
This Program originated in 1955 to provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence regards visits of the East-West Exchange Agreement participants as opportunities to promote intelligence activity.

As a result of the last inspection SAC Letter 70-25 was prepared which set forth revisions of our investigative action in the field. This change was made as a result of other manpower commitments. The instructions in that SAC Letter provided that no investigations will be conducted of groups or individuals participating in the East-West Exchange Program in the absence of any information indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles are checked on all Soviet participants and where information is developed showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then opened and the field is instructed to conduct the necessary investigation.

During the period of June-December, 1970, 525 individuals entered the United States under the provisions of this exchange agreement and of this number, we had information indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 28 of these individuals.

With regard to Soviet exchange students there are currently 31 in the United States. Based on information furnished by defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously in the United States, we have determined that the Soviet Intelligence Services utilizes these students in an intelligence capacity, principally as "spotters." In view of this, we afford these students active investigation. We have also found that a number of these students return to the United States for assignment at one of the Soviet establishments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in the United States as students are generally reactivated. For example, Mikhail Eomichev, currently assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations as a Third Secretary, was in the United States as an exchange student in 1966. Through a defector source we learned that he had recruited an American agent for the KGB and extensive investigation under the code word "Nikotine" (Bufile: 65-70250) has resulted in the identification of this agent in December, 1970. He has admitted his recruitment and
EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM

meetings with Fomichev since his return to the United States. One of the possibilities being considered by the KGB for this individual is to have him obtain employment as a Bureau Agent.
BANPOP PROGRAM
Bureau: 65-70741

1. BANPOP is the code name for a Bureau program through which an attempt is made to identify Soviet illegal agents who may be utilizing a Swiss bank to transfer funds to themselves. The program is based on an analysis of four Soviet illegal agent cases between 1955-1966 in which funds were furnished through the Banque Populaire Suisse in Switzerland. The transfers of funds are reviewed with the following criteria: (1) the person or individual beneficiary is named; (2) the amount of the transfer is between $300 and $5000 and (3) the last name of the person ordering and receiving the funds is the same or the money is directed to a specific bank account. The program was initiated by Bureau letter of August 26, 1966.

2. The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago and Philadelphia offices. The Philadelphia Office originally had the program in effect from September, 1966, until May, 1968, when it was discontinued. However, it was renewed in that office in February, 1970.

3. When an office locates an individual who might be considered a subject, it writes a letter to the Bureau with a copy to the appropriate field office and requests that investigation be undertaken to identify this person. The title includes the name of the subject and the code name of the program in order that all cases will be handled by the same supervisor. At the present time, there are six pending cases. The New York Office utilized 12 Agent hours per month in handling 10,100 records for a six-month period ending August 31, 1970. The Philadelphia Office utilized four Agent hours per month and the Chicago Office utilized three Agent hours per month in handling its program.

4. This program is supervised by S.A.J.P. Lee of the Special Cases Unit, Espionage Section.

5. All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the program on a six-month basis, submitting letters by March 1 and September 1 of each year.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
JPL:tdp
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4-H
COKMA PROGRAM

65-73750

1. Title is code word for physical surveillance coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelligence in the past several years. The New York Office instituted this program in July, 1970.

2. New York Office has catalogued known meeting areas as a result of past physical surveillances of Soviet intelligence officers and information received from detectors-in-place and double agents operating against Soviet intelligence officers. Soviet intelligence officers are trained to detect surveillances and accordingly are extremely astute in detecting such coverage. It is almost impossible to conduct a discreet physical surveillance of them which will result in uncovering an intelligence operation. This program places our Special Agents in areas where there is likelihood of Soviet meeting without hazard of prior surveillance which would thwart meeting. Almost all Soviet intelligence officers spend approximately one to three hours in "dry cleaning" themselves to insure they are not under surveillance when meeting an agent. When the Soviet arrives at the meeting area, he is confident that he is not under surveillance. Our objective in this program is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence officers under clandestine circumstances.

3. New York, utilizing one team consisting of four Special Agents, afforded physical surveillance coverage to three consecutive subway stops in Queens, New York, which were known to have been frequented by Soviet intelligence officers in the past. From July through October, 1970, six Soviet intelligence officers were observed in these areas on 16 occasions. Two significant cases have been developed out of this coverage and New York has current authority to interview one of the subjects observed in clandestine contact with a known Soviet Committee for State Security officer. On 11/10/70, New York was authorized to further implement this program and advised that it intended to cover two other known meeting areas in Queens, New York, during early evening hours on weekdays and on Saturdays which is similar to the coverage previously afforded.

4. Program supervised by Special Agent George M. Quinn, Officials Unit - New York, Espionage Section. Expenses and time in handling program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since program in field consists of surveillance activities, there must be close supervision at field level.
5. Program offers excellent potential on basis of results achieved during short period it has been in operation. It must be noted that Soviets were not as active as usual during September – November, 1970, because of Twenty-Fifth United Nations Anniversary celebration and meeting of United Nations General Assembly. Soviet intelligence has in the past been extremely reluctant to engage in intelligence activities during such periods because detection at such time could be extremely embarrassing to Soviet Government. Manpower limitations have restricted our full utilization of this investigative technique. Special Agent personnel assigned to this program must be familiar with Soviets assigned to the New York area and must also be experienced in surveillance procedures.
RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS

105-36365

1. Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have central repository for information developed in connection with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to radio and technical equipment purchased by them.

2. Washington Field and New York Offices furnish information developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis. Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, and Bureau of International Commerce, United States Department of Commerce. Material submitted includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description and cost of the items purchased. It involves maintenance of three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and New York Offices. Program established to achieve following objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the United States by Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control list; and to permit discreet markings by FBI Laboratory of certain technical equipment furnished to Soviets through overt or covert means which would permit its identification at some future time.

3. Since April, 1970, Program has disclosed continuing purchases by Soviet nationals of Grundig Satellite Multiband portable radios. During 9/70 one KGB officer in Washington purchased 30 of these radios at one time. Soviet husband and wife illegal team recently in U. S. used one of these radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which contained their operating instructions. Program made it possible to secure serial numbers for possible future identification. Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments and security devices being operated. Program also disclosed type of transmitting equipment and antenna system purchased by Soviets, apparently for installation at Consulate General in San Francisco when that establishment becomes operational. This information is of interest not only to FBI Laboratory but to State Department and National Security Agency in connection with its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities.

4. Program supervised by Special Agent Eugene C. Peterson, Officials Unit - Washington, Espionage Section. Expense and time
utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of material submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor and no weaknesses in program are apparent. Administrative tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Officials Unit - Washington, Espionage Section.

5. Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination of material developed. Possession of some equipment on which discreet markings were previously placed by FBI Laboratory could serve to identify possessor with involvement in Soviet intelligence activity. Program is evaluated annually to determine justification for continuance.

6. Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971. Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS  4-H

SECTION CHIEF  W. R. WANNALL  

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION:  There are attached separate write-ups regarding the following programs supervised in the Nationalities Intelligence Section:

1. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments

2. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States and Chinese Entering the United States Claiming United States Citizenship

3. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries

4. Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States (Chicoin)

5. Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV)

6. Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas

7. Security Index - Cuba

8. American Repatriate Program

9. International Organizations - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc
PROGRAM

VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

(Bufile 105-144424)

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.

Program was initiated in 8/65 in connection with efforts to cover Chinese Communist (Chicom) activities in the United States. Through cooperation of both United States intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services, the identities of United States residents are furnished to us who attempt to enter Communist China or contact People's Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic establishments in certain countries throughout the world.

This program is field-wide and not directly connected with any other investigative program. The objectives include identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom establishments. The identity of these visitors is absolutely necessary in order to determine if they have access to classified material or if they could be utilized effectively by the Chicom when they return to the United States. Some of these individuals have excellent potential for informant development. We have utilized contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments in the development of selected sources who are attractive to the Chicom and have been developed as double agents. By SAC Letter No. 70-26 dated 5/12/70, we restricted our investigations to cover actual visitors to China. This procedure was initiated to conserve manpower inasmuch as State Department had relaxed travel restrictions to China on 3/16/70 in order to allow travel to PRC for any "legitimate purpose." The President recently directed that a committee prepare recommendations for additional steps which may be taken to relax restrictions on travel to and promote further trade with the PRC. This highly confidential directive, if accepted, will permit many people to be eligible to travel to China if the Chinese will grant travel permits. Up to the present time, however, the Chicom have only granted travel permits to pro-Chicom propagandists such as Edgar Snow.

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2. **Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.**

Investigations since the last Inspection have totaled 95. Many of these individuals were interviewed; however, it has been determined that none were allowed to enter Communist China. During the cultural revolution which ended during 1970, very few United States residents were allowed to enter Communist China including a number of United Nations employees who had previously made numerous trips to Communist China. There is every indication, however, that the Chicoms have taken on a "new look" internationally and are attempting to gain the friendship of the western world. This program has not reached its great potential due to the xenophobia which existed during the past three years. Communist China is expected to open an embassy at Ottawa, Canada, in 1/71 as result of Canadian recognition. This will make it far easier for United States residents to cross the border into Canada and either seek a travel permit to visit Communist China or make contact with Chicom intelligence representatives at the embassy in Ottawa.

3. **Extent and Nature of Current Supervision.**

This program is handled by one Bureau supervisor who correlates information as received from either United States intelligence agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services and directs the office covering the individual's residence and employment to conduct necessary investigation according to the Manual of Instructions. Investigations are conducted to fully identify the individuals, determine current residence and employment and ascertain whether he has access to classified information. In absence of any unusual circumstances indicating need for further action, the case is closed. Each case is closely supervised and evaluated on its individual merits.

4. **Current Justification for Continuation.**

The potential of this program is far greater than what has been realized in the way of results to date. As mentioned above, the Canadian recognition of the PRC has given Communist China a foothold in North America. **RCMP advices that they feel that 50 percent of the Chinese Communist intelligence effort will be directed toward the United States.**
At the present time, the restrictions for crossing the border from the United States to Canada are practically nonexistent for a United States resident with proper documentation. Therefore, it is imperative that we continue such a program so that when RCMP reports individuals contacting the PRC Embassy in Ottawa we may fully identify these individuals.

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification.

This program is evaluated annually and was last justified on 12/31/69. At that time, it was stated that the program would be evaluated and justified during 1/71; this is currently being undertaken.
CHINESEaliens entering the united states 4-H
(Bufile 105-135923)

Chinese entering the united states
claiming united states citizenship
(Bufile 105-12752)

These two programs have similar criteria for
investigation and, therefore, are being handled under
one write-up.

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives

The alien program was instituted on 1/26/65
and the program concerning Chinese entering the united states
claiming united states citizenship began on 9/14/65.
Both programs were originated in an effort to identify
Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence operatives who
may be sent to the United States in deep cover. In 1955,
Chicom intelligence emphasized the need to deploy deep
cover illegal agents abroad and specifically in the
United States. The number of cases currently investigated under
the citizen program has been approximately 15 to 20 annually;
only one, however, has been opened since last inspection.
These individuals offer the Chicom an ideal situation for
placing an illegal into the United States who has assumed the
identity of a Chinese whose father or grandfather was a
United States citizen. These individuals, once they arrive in
the United States, are never checked on by any agency. The
Chinese aliens, a number of whom are students "temporarily,"
entering the United States to attend universities, have
decreased in number during the past two years from approximately
2,000 per month to 600 per month. Recent relaxation of immigra-
tion regulations will now permit a great increase in the numbers
allowed to enter the United States during 1971. Since the
inception of both programs, we have simplified the criteria for
investigating citizens and aliens keeping in mind the necessity
for conserving manpower in our investigations, but also
fulfilling our responsibilities. The scope and investigation
of these two programs are identical. The prime objective of
these two programs is the identification of intelligence agents;
however, the two programs have been responsible for the
development of positive intelligence information as well as a
continuing increase in source coverage of Chinese matters, not
only in our heavily populated Chinese localities, but also
covering the lesser Chinese communities throughout the
United States.

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2. Positive Results Achieved Since the Last Inspection

Since the last inspection 151 cases have been opened on Chinese aliens and only one case on Chinese claiming United States citizenship. During this period 197 alien cases have been closed and eight cases involving citizens were closed. Information developed during these investigations has been disseminated to the intelligence community. To date, no Chicom intelligence agent has been uncovered by these two programs; however, we have steadily increased our source coverage and collected positive intelligence which has been disseminated to the intelligence community. This is a long-range program and it is expected it will pay dividends during the coming year with the establishment of a Chinese Communist embassy in Canada.

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The alien cases, most of which originate from our Legat in Hong Kong, are supervised by three supervisors according to the geographic location the alien is destined to in the United States. The citizen cases are also supervised by three supervisors according to geographic location and these cases are furnished to us as a result of Passport Records being checked by WFO. Cases in both programs are closely supervised to make certain that each subject falls within the criteria and that when the cases are reopened for investigation after two years the case is evaluated to determine if the subject may possibly be an intelligence agent.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

These two programs cover two vulnerable areas whereby the Chics could penetrate the United States by utilizing either aliens or individuals claiming United States citizenship who have been fully trained in Communist China and entered Hong Kong subsequent to 1/1/55. The screening process at United States Consulate General's office in Hong Kong is meager and current proposals for relaxation of rules will make it easier for the Chics to filter agents into the United States through the easiest route, that is, an alien or a citizen fully documented. These two programs also are one of the best sources for the development of informants and the gathering of positive intelligence information. These programs are fully justified.
for continuation and no additional manpower or expenditure requests are needed at this time for the continuation of these two programs.

5. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

These programs are evaluated annually. The alien program was last justified on 1/22/70 and the citizen program will be justified with the alien program on 1/22/71. On 9/18/70, a memorandum was submitted indicating that the citizen program would be coordinated with and justified with the alien program during January, 1971.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOM)
(Bufile 105-135614)

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. Background and Date of Inception

Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence service, lacking base from which to operate in United States, must rely on illegal and third-country operations to develop intelligence data in U. S. Chicom was instituted in May, 1965, to combat these efforts.

2. Scope and Desired Objectives

To create situations and place our informants in contact with known Chicom agents in foreign countries, with ultimate aim being Chicom recruitment of our assets for illegal operation within U. S., resulting in penetration of Chicom intelligence activities inside our borders.

3. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection

In August, 1970, we directed Los Angeles informant, code name DINA, to travel to Canada to initiate contact with representatives of New China News Agency (NCNA) who are known Chicom intelligence agents. Source succeeded in making such contact and arousing interest of NCNA personnel. As bonus, source also encountered a double agent (code name ICED TEA) operated by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) who has assignment from NCNA principal to recruit illegal agent in U. S., and who now intends to propose recruitment of DINA to Chicom.

Seattle source, code name JUDD, has developed close association with key Chicom sympathizer in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, and during period was invited to visit two Chicom ships in port at Vancouver. Source also made trip to

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San Francisco for his Chicom friends, taking with him books and messages for individuals there from pro-Chicom individuals in Canada.

Two other sources, NY 5896-S and SF 2739-S, maintained personal contact with personnel of China Travel Service (CTS) in Hong Kong during period. CTS is Chicom agency specializing in arrangement trips to mainland China and front for Chicom Intelligence.

4. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Chicom Program is handled by one Bureau Supervisor who correlates activities of field offices involved to insure proper direction of informants and control of specialized double agent operations. Close supervision of cases is maintained.

5. Current Justification for Continuance

Counterintelligence and penetration of Chicom intelligence operations is long-term process. Sources developed to date under this program present excellent potential for such penetration, especially in light of fact Chicos expected to open Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, in next thirty to sixty days, with strong possibility Consulates will also be opened in border cities such as Vancouver. RCMP expects at least 50% of all future Chicom operations in Canada will be directed against United States and present sources loom large in penetration of such operations. Further, strong possibility exists Red China will finally gain admittance to United Nations during Fall, 1971, a move which makes development of quality sources in this field most imperative.

6. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program justified annually, last justification being on 5/7/70.
BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION

BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948 to fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25 mile border zone south of the U. S.-Mexican border by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

Three border offices, El Paso, San Antonio and San Diego, as well as the office of the Legal Attache, Mexico, participate. Ten Agents and two Assistant Legal Attaches devote a portion of their time, directing some 212 sources and informants. The population of the zone areas involved is approximately 1,700,000 individuals of which 2,371 are either members or sympathizers of major Mexican subversive groups.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION

Program has furnished valuable information relative to threat against U. S. by Mexican subversives residing in the border area. Investigative results are furnished to all levels of interested U. S. Government intelligence community. Program continues to keep us advised of potential trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures.
Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Periodic reports on individuals and organizations as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed and correlated by SA Joseph E. Gauzens, Jr. Involved is review of incoming letters, memoranda, reports and semi-annual progress letters detailing informant coverage and subversive strength. Analysis of this material provides a basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for counter-intelligence moves.

Cutbacks initiated by the Bureau for the purpose of conserving manpower and streamlining operations have substantially reduced manpower and number of informants utilized. Agents and Legal Attaches participating were reduced from 16 to 12; informants and sources utilized from 312 to 212. These reductions resulted in annual savings of $19,934.65 and total manpower currently utilized on the program is 172 Agents. Effectiveness of BOCOV and our ability to re-expand the program should future circumstances warrant were not impaired by the cutbacks cited.

Current Justification for Continuance

BOCOV continues to fill the above-described intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with other intelligence programs originating in the border area, in particular the SECOMEX program.

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified 10/2/70.
BOCOV

Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive elements entering the U. S. Although this operation is no longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also in investigating criminal matters of an international nature. Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing abroad.
NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS

This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of foreign officials where their activity requires such action.

The basis for this program is found in the procedure by Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results being channelized to the FBI. We correlate this information with data from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In those instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions to the field for active investigation.

Since the program was initiated, 617,290 Immigration and Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have undertaken 452 investigations based on results thereof.

The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program, the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures. The program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security threat to the United States.

The program is justified annually, with the last justification having been made February 9, 1970.

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SECURITY INDEX - CUBA  
(Bufile 100-358086-210)

Background and Date of Inception

This program was instituted in November, 1960. By that date it was obvious that Cuba, whose Government had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959, was a communist state posing a real and present threat to the internal security of the U. S. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, a Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for administering this program to assure the apprehension and special handling of the individuals included therein in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba.

Scope and Desired Objectives

As of 12/15/70, there were 419 individuals included in the Security Index - Cuba Program, divided into two categories:

1. Individuals placed on the Security Index solely on account of their pro-Cuban activities. (Cuban Special Section - 96 persons).

2. Persons already on the Security Index because of other subversive connections and activity who would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban" - 323 individuals).

Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date record of location and activities of individuals included therein, by means of established Security Index procedures and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of these persons become necessary.
Positive Results Achieved

Determination as to the validity of an individual's inclusion in this program is constantly under review. Since the last inspection, critical attention has been given this matter with the result that the number of persons on the Cuban Special Section of the Index has been reduced from 193 as of 3/16/70 to 96 as of 12/15/70. These 96 persons are judged to be the hard-core pro-Cubans, action against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory. Of these 96, 27 are Cuban aliens. Each subject of pending security investigation with Cuban ramifications is considered for inclusion in the Index.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The Supervisor responsible for this program is required to review each investigative communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether the individual meets the criteria for inclusion in the Index, as outlined in the Manual of Instructions. He must make a decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the field's recommendations regarding these matters. He initiates procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Voucher Statistical Section of the Administrative Division regarding the placing of an individual on the Index, his removal, and assignment or change in Priority.

If the individual involved is an alien, correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre-positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and Naturalization Service. Action is also taken with the Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index.

On 10/29/70, the Director approved the lifting of the moratorium on report writing and certain investigative procedures in security cases on individuals. This will require the field to reopen by 6/30/71 and conduct investigation in cases on some 372 individuals involved in this program who have not received recent investigative attention. The Bureau will receive in the upcoming months summary reports, letterhead memoranda and other communications in virtually all of these cases. The moratorium, in effect
since February, 1969, has limited investigative and reporting activity in this field. As of 1/11/71 there were 18 active and 78 inactive case in the Cuban Special Section of the Security Index (19% of the 96 case total) and at the time of the last inspection there were 25 active and 168 inactive cases (13% of the 193 case total).

Current Justification

The threat to the internal security of the U. S. from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years. A workable priority apprehension system which receives current and continuing attention is mandatory. Instant program, as presently organized and handled, is fully justified.

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation

This program is evaluated on a semi-annual basis. The most recent semi-annual review and evaluation was dated 10/8/70.
AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION - Program was instituted on February 28, 1962, to specify procedure to be followed upon receipt of information that U. S. citizen residing in Cuba had been issued a Swiss Protection Passport by Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba, for travel to U. S. Few Americans, however, received such passports prior to 1966 when the State Department estimated 800-900 U. S. citizens were still in Cuba and desired to return to the U. S. In February, 1967, when it appeared these U. S. citizens might be permitted to leave Cuba en masse, instructions were issued to field outlining investigation to be conducted relative to individual repatriates.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES - Specific objectives of program are verification of repatriate's identity; ascertaining whether the individual has or had Cuban intelligence contact, training or assignment, or possesses intelligence information; and instructing individuals to alert us to any future intelligence contact. Program is field wide.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED - From August, 1969, to July, 1970, eleven flights brought an average of 18 citizens out of Cuba per flight. These repatriates were accompanied by a total of 425 relatives and/or close friends, all of whom were Cuban aliens. Some 300 U. S. citizens remain in Cuba awaiting repatriation. There have been no repatriation flights since July 31, 1970.

Program has alerted us to return to this country of Security Index subjects, Castro sympathizers, individuals who traveled to Cuba without State Department authorization and individuals affiliated with Communist Party, USA. As a result of interviews conducted with repatriates, worthwhile data concerning conditions in Cuba has been obtained and disseminated to the U. S. Intelligence Community.

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EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION - Program is supervised by one Seat of Government Agent who devotes a portion of his time. All cases are afforded careful supervision in an effort to detect presence of a repatriate who may have been recruited by the Cuban Intelligence Service for activity in this country. Thirty-two cases are pending.

CURRENT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE - Fidel Castro has consistently used the mass exodus of individuals from Cuba to infiltrate intelligence agents into the U. S. Program offers excellent potential for detecting such individuals who reenter this country under the protective coverage of their citizenship. We feel that the program is fully justified.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION AND DATE OF LAST JUSTIFICATION - An annual evaluation is made. The program was last justified on September 1, 1970.
CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM

The Cuban Refugee Program, which had as its objective the detection of Cuban intelligence agents possibly being infiltrated into the U.S. via refugee channels, was discontinued by SAC Letter 70-25, dated 5/5/70, paragraph C.
SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

RACIAL MATTERS

Racial matters investigations were intensified through establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67. This Section handles racial matters investigations involving black extremist organizations and individuals. Objectives are to identify organizations and individuals that are involved in extremist activities, that advocate or had actually committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal laws. The dangerousness to the United States of such individuals must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index or the Agitator Index. The extent of foreign influence or influence of the Communist Party or other domestic revolutionary groups among racial extremists, especially black extremist organizations, is a prime objective. To accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerning individual extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources likewise have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled the Bureau to stay on top of the racial situation. These sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of alerting local authorities and to keep other Government agencies dependent upon us for information informed of pertinent developments including information concerning potential violence.

Our informant coverage has made it possible for us to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House, the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an interest. Additional information pertaining to racial intelligence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the Research Section.

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Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Government.

The Director on 11/27/70 in testimony before the Senate Appropriation Committee for the purpose of securing additional Special Agents emphasized again the violent and revolutionary nature of the Black Panther Party (BPP). He testified there has been an alarming increase in the number of black extremist attacks against law enforcement officers; BPP publications consistently advocate violence, including assassination and kidnappings, to achieve overthrow of the Establishment; BPP leaders have participated in crimes of violence; and Black Panthers have substantial connections with hostile foreign elements, notably the communist regime in North Korea and Arab terrorists in Algeria. Increasing ties between Arab terrorists and Black Panthers, according to the Director, raise the ominous possibility that militants may seek to ape Arab tactics, including airplane hijackings, to gain the release of jailed Panther members.
Since 1/7/69 all offices have submitted semiannual reports presenting concisely a complete picture of black extremist activity in its area. This enabled us to identify groups and individuals involved in black extremist activities, to develop quality informants who report on such activities and to initiate intensified and penetrative investigations of such individuals and groups. Since the desired objectives for which these reports were originally designed had been realized, since field informs us on a timely basis in substantive cases of pertinent data concerning this movement and to insure manpower is utilized on priority matters, the Director on 7/6/70 authorized discontinuance of these reports.

On 3/8/69 the Black Nationalist Photographic Album (BNPA) was established to assist in identification of militant black extremists who travel extensively.

The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist organizations and militant black nationalists who are known to travel. Each office prepares a form on such individuals within its territory and the form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete album. In the event of travel by any of these individuals, the office covering the area being visited already has a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately available. The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa and Mexico City and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel. Over 300 extremists are currently carried in this album.

In view of importance of an individual's fingerprint classification for identification purposes, the field by letter dated 5/8/70 was instructed to include such data in biographical...
sketch concerning each individual included in the BNPA and to amend those sketches then included in the Album to show such data.

The BNPA was also broadened to include black extremists who are Bureau fugitives. This insured each office having a photograph and biographical sketch immediately available for use in conducting investigation to locate such fugitives or in apprehending them.

By SAC Letter 70-65, item (D), dated 11/17/70, the field was advised that, henceforth, deletions of individuals from the BNPA would require Bureau authorization since Bureau did not agree with some deletions made by field which resulted in unwarranted action by all field offices.

To insure broad circulation among investigative personnel and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization of informants especially racial sources, we initiated the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitives list in June, 1970. This list, which is prepared monthly and sent each field office and selected Legats, identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations are black extremists. Currently there are 45 fugitives carried on the list, 9 of whom are IO fugitives. Twenty of these fugitives are reportedly living outside the U.S. This list has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents handling racial matters and racial informants and has been effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives among racial informants. Fifteen of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was initiated, with 5 being arrested in December, 1970. One of those arrested in December is the reported leader of the Black Panther Party (BPP) underground.

Racial Intelligence Section prepares monthly a Racial Calendar pertaining to the Black Nationalist Movement in this country. This Calendar identifies scheduled racial events throughout the country which are more than local in nature as well as all major scheduled events which could
logically develop into a racial event. Purpose of the Calendar is to assist field in coverage of these events in view of widespread travel on the part of black nationalists in attendance at such affairs and to take part in demonstrations commemorating certain anniversaries of interest to blacks. A listing of recently published publications and articles concerning the black nationalist movement is also set forth in the Calendar. Publications included are public source and are identified to assist the field in keeping on top of writing by and about black nationalists and the black nationalist movement.

Black extremist activities are concentrated in organized activities of over 66 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities throughout this country. The violence-prone Black Panther Party, for example, has 48 branches throughout U.S. Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals about 9,600. This membership figure, however, disguises real following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities and extent of influence and leadership they exercise. These organizations, and particularly BPP, have substantial sympathetic support, especially from young blacks, which is frequently surfaced during confrontations with police.

Extent of black extremist strength is illustrated by Louis Harris Poll which was set forth in 4/6/70 issue of "Time." The Poll projects that nine per cent of all blacks, some two million Americans, call themselves "revolutionaries" and believe only a "readiness to use violence" will achieve equality. Twenty-five per cent have "a great deal" of respect for the BPP. Most alarming is that 40 per cent of those in the age group 14-21 years old believe violence is necessary to achieve equality.

The following pages set forth summaries concerning the key black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation.
The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California, for the ostensible purpose of patrolling the black community to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.

It expanded rapidly throughout the United States during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969. Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s it has again currently expanded until today there are approximately 48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported by many thousands of sympathizers. It also has an international office in Algiers, Algeria. The branches include 17 chapters and 31 affiliated groups that masquerade under the names of National Committee to Combat Fascism or Black Community Information Center.

The ultimate goal of the BPP is the violent overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist system. The BPP openly advocates urban guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government leaders and other forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and particularly local police. "Off the pigs," BPP jargon for "kill the cop" is the battle cry of the organization. The weekly Panther newspaper, "The Black Panther," and its other publications and propaganda paraphernalia are abound with articles and cartoons encouraging lethal attacks against police and other forms of authority.

Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967 and since that time has expanded as the organization itself expanded.

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By letter to all offices dated 2/27/70, approved by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions. Previously offices were submitting quarterly reports on the BPP. The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to eliminate some paper work in the field.

All field offices having a BPP investigation are also required to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary data required by the Department. Original instructions in this regard were issued by Bureau airtel 12/3/68 and the continued submission of this monthly report is necessary in view of possible prosecution of the BPP.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968, and changed to a monthly summary on the approval of the Director by letter to all offices dated 2/27/70. This change is a result of a recommendation by the Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to cut down paper work in the field. The monthly summary relieves the field of some paper work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the field up to date on BPP developments.

San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP. Because of the excellence of this summary and the need for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau airtel 1/21/70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental offices which is the current practice.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were instructed by airtel 6/17/70 to submit a monthly summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch. This financial summary includes data on sources of income, foreign funding, expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations,
and the steps being taken by each office to develop full financial data. This summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all financial developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis.

By airtel to all continental offices 11/6/70 all field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were instructed to submit a biweekly airtel containing specific comments regarding underground BPP operations within the area of each field office. This includes progress in the identity and interviewing of expelled BPP members who, it has been determined, are the logical candidates for membership in the BPP underground. The underground operation of the BPP has an ultimate goal of terroristic guerrilla warfare. It is a recent development in the operation of the BPP which is the subject of an intensive investigation. The biweekly summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all developments in the underground and to intelligently coordinate the investigation thereof.

In recent months the Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc. (SCPI) to control all BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser and/or lessee of any property utilized by the BPP. The corporation and its activities are under intensive investigation which has revealed that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York. By airtel 1/7/71 to San Francisco and New York, these offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary in form suitable for dissemination of all pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the previous week. This summary keeps the Bureau aware of SCPI operations and also enables us to regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements.

It is noted that there are currently 32 field offices conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed information concerning its operations and activities including
organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by headquarters and foreign support. In addition, evidentiary information that could support prosecution is regularly furnished to the Department.

Our ultimate objective is of course the prosecution of the BPP for violations of Federal criminal, civil rights and security statutes. A secondary objective is to more completely develop details of the BPP for intelligence purposes.

In July, 1969, the Attorney General established a special task force for the specific purpose of developing a prosecutive theory against the BPP. Attorneys of this task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this purpose and have instituted a continuing Federal Grand Jury in San Francisco. Ten of our informants have testified before this Federal Grand Jury and its is anticipated that others will be called.

It is recommended that the intensive investigation of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as above be continued.
CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)
157-16554

The CAP was formed as an international revolutionary organization as the result of the convening of the fourth annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States in Atlanta, Georgia, September 3-7, 1970. This gathering was unique in that it was attended by approximately 2,500 blacks of so-called moderate and militant persuasion, as well as a large number of extremists. Representatives attended from 35 states and 21 different nations, including Canada, Australia, various independent nations of Africa, and the Caribbean area.

A number of the workshops at the CAP were dominated by extremist elements who urged the creation of massive cooperative programs and institutions designed to destroy any progress made toward integration of the races by complete rejection of white society, the formation of a separatist black nation, national African parties, and, ultimately, a World African Party.

These objectives are to be achieved through the unification, cooperation, and interdependence of blacks wherever they reside, regardless of their "imposed" nationalities, and under the revolutionary ideological banner of Pan-Africanism of the well-known black extremist Stokely Carmichael.

Specifically, CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black revolutionaries Hayward Henry and LeRoi Jones, from Newark, New Jersey, calls for extensive use of disruptive tactics against all segments of white-dominated institutions and organizations, including the police and the military.

Since its founding in Atlanta, CAP has held a number of regional meetings in various sections of the United States for the purpose of setting up its national organization and in furtherance of its revolutionary programs. As a result, CAP is currently activating in at least 17 different cities with its national headquarters and Chairman Hayward Henry located in Boston, Massachusetts. LeRoi Jones, however, appears to be the dominant figure in the organization.

Current CAP planning indicates the organization intends to move aggressively through deceptive programs.

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to establish black political power through four basic activities which are:

(1) influencing of black political candidates;

(2) organization of the black community;

(3) formation of coalitions with all dissident and extremist groups whether white or black so long as CAP benefits from same; and

(4) the massive use of disruptive tactics.

CAP has emerged as yet another deadly threat to racial harmony and, as a result of its programs and ties with foreign extremist elements and well-known revolutionary Stokely Carmichael, must also be considered an imposing threat to the national security.

Investigations of the CAP, its leaders, and extremist affiliates are receiving most close supervision. Pertinent data developed in regard to their activities is being disseminated to the Department and to interested Government agencies and officials.
The Republic of New Africa (RNA), formed in Detroit, Michigan in March, 1968 by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist, has chapters in ten U.S. cities and a current hard-core membership of 100-130 individuals.

RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard Henry, black extremists of long standing in the Detroit, Michigan, area. When first formed, the RNA named as its President in exile Robert Franklin Williams, violence-prone black extremist then residing in China. Williams has since returned to the U.S. but has resigned from his position as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems and dissension existing within the organization.

RNA was established to create a black nation within the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, in addition to individual reparations of $10,000 per black citizen as payment for 400 years of ancestral slave labor.

RNA's organizational structure was designed to be revolutionary in character and its founders proposed that efforts be made for international recognition and financial assistance from Cuba, Red China and the black nations of the world. RNA established a black army known as the Black Legion whose duty was to protect the persons and property and to attack the enemies (the police) of that nation. Training programs were instituted and uniforms complete with the leopard skin epaulets were designed as the official dress for the Black Legionnaires.
High point in the RNA's activities occurred during a national convention in Detroit, Michigan, in March 1969, when members of the Black Legion engaged in armed confrontation with Detroit police resulting in the death of one policeman and the serious wounding of another. The RNA is currently split with dissension with two distinct factions. The Richard Henry Faction with headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana, is the most active and militant of the two groups. The other faction is headed by Milton Henry with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. Current plans of Richard Henry call for an intensification of RNA activities throughout the U.S.
SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael as its Chairman in May, 1966, the organization operated as a nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and black participation. Carmichael, on assuming the Chairmanship of SNCC, immediately eliminated all whites from participation and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a position which the organization maintains today.

H. Rap Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black extremist who served as National Chairman for a time following Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969. At that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word "Nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City.

Under Brown's direction, SNCC moved to restructure and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence as a black extremist organization. The national leadership issued directives on the reorganization of the national office in New York City, as well as the local organizations and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary Economic Council, an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a Research Council, and others which make up a body within SNCC known as the Revolutionary Political Council.

Included among new organizational procedures are plans for raising the number of active participants in local cadres, the obtaining and training in the use of weapons, the purchase of land for ostensible use in an Agrarian Reform Plan to aid black tenant farmers but which will also serve as a weapons training site. Training manuals on revolutionary activities, including guerrilla warfare and the medical care of wounded or injured persons, have been prepared and are to be disseminated to local SNCC chapters in furtherance of this reorganization.

As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970, to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local
Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt. Hunt also serves as head of the organization's Revolutionary Political Council.

Hunt has successfully directed the opening of a "coffeehouse" known as the Third Eye Lounge in Augusta, Georgia. This facility, in line with SNCC's historical anti-Vietnam War posture, is to serve as a propaganda center from which to foment anti-Vietnam War sentiments among black military personnel at Fort Gordon, Georgia, as well as among the black civilian population in that area. In addition, Hunt has initiated publication and distribution of a revolutionary news organ known as "National SNCC." Aggressive programs are underway to obtain new SNCC activists, and in an effort to capture the support of black females, the organization recently formed The Third World Women's Alliance under the leadership of Fran Beal, a member of SNCC's Revolutionary Political Council.

Strong evidence of progress in connection with the organization's plans to initiate guerrilla warfare tactics is given by development of recent information indicating Hunt and other SNCC leaders are in the process of selecting a number of candidates to receive such training in North Korea. These individuals, on completion of training, will serve as instructors in various parts of the country, thus providing SNCC with a well-trained, hard-core cadre of personnel capable of initiating acts of terror against individuals and institutions of Government in furtherance of their revolutionary objectives.

Investigations of SNCC, its leaders, affiliates, and their activities continue to receive close supervision. Information of pertinence concerning the organization continues to be disseminated to the Department and other interested Government agencies and officials.
The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black extremist organization with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida. It is the leading organization for all black militant groups in Florida. JOMO was founded in St. Petersburg during May, 1968, with 85 ghetto youths, who believed liberation of black people will not come about through "normal channels." The organization has affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky and Gainesville, Florida. During December, 1970, leaders of JOMO decided to expand their operation throughout the nation. Attempts are currently being made to create chapters in Boston, Massachusetts and Miami, Florida. Joseph Waller, Jr., the articulate founder of JOMO, and present chairman of the organization intends to have all black militant groups in Florida designated as organization chapters.

The organization's voice and propaganda are carried out through the publication "The Burning Spear." This publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white America. In this connection, JOMO members have participated in racial demonstrations, used fire bombs and have been involved in attacks on police through use of violence. Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida, and recently participated in a plot to break out two black political prisoners from a Florida prison. Eight members of the organization were arrested in 1970 for committing three murders and 15 armed robberies. One of the murders was committed to obtain money to pay a water bill for JOMO headquarters.

The organization is in the process of accumulating weapons and making plans for members to be taught guerrilla warfare and firearms training. In this connection leaders are interested in establishing contact with revolutionary African groups. Waller desires to create within the organization "Simba Warriors" who would act whenever violence might be necessary in order to "bring down the white man." During December, 1970, Waller reportedly had in his possession two Thompson sub-machine guns.

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Junta of Militant Organizations
Bufile 157-9903

JOMO receives extensive contributions from all over the United States. It has association with the Black Panther Party and other black extremist groups as well as other New Left groups.
NATION OF ISLAM
Bufile 25-330971

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an all-Negro, semireligious organization headed by Elijah Muhammad, self-proclaimed messenger of Allah. Under Muhammad's leadership, the NOI has grown up into a nationwide organization with a well-disciplined and devoted membership of almost 6,000 comprised of approximately 50 numbered mosques and approximately 50 unnumbered groups.

The NOI continues to teach antiwhite, anti-United States philosophy of hate aimed at a complete separation of the races. It opposes any form of integration and at the same time has remained aloof from other black extremist groups who favor violence. During racial disturbances, NOI members are given instructions to not get involved in the rioting. The NOI also opposes the war in Vietnam as a war against other non-whites and implies in its teachings that members should not serve in the United States Armed Forces as they can only serve one master, Elijah Muhammad. It also supports the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East. The NOI also publishes a weekly newspaper known as "Muhammad Speaks," which contains vicious antiwhite propaganda. An average of 475,000 copies of this newspaper are distributed each week in the black communities and ghetto areas throughout the United States.

We have conducted a continuous security and/or racial-type investigation of this organization since 1953 in accordance with directives of the Department. Each active NOI group is reported on semiannually and the functionaries and leaders of the organization are those being investigated. The Department by letter dated 7/28/66 requested our investigation of this organization be continued.

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Communist Influence of Racial Groups
100-442529

This intensification was initiated in August, 1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume and importance of this information made it necessary to follow this communist influence in a separate investigation. This investigation includes not only the influence of the Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups, splinter groups and others including the New Left.

The overall objective in this and related investigations is to protect the internal security of the United States by submitting information relating to possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop intelligence information and disseminate to interested Government agencies. Where feasible, certain counter-intelligence measures are employed to neutralize the communist influence in the racial field.

Reports are submitted quarterly and the investigation is evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent information is disseminated to the White House and the Attorney General.

The year 1970 saw continued influence by communists and other subversives in extremist groups. In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist Party. This has not diminished in any way the Communist Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers whether they want it or not.

One illustration of the communist influence on the violence-prone Black Panther Party is the situation in which Huey Newton, Panther Supreme Commander, found himself.
in connection with a film on Angela Davis, the communist and black revolutionary being held in California on murder charges. The Communist Party, USA, sponsored a motion picture on Davis and invited Newton to film the introduction to the film. Newton conferred with Eldridge Cleaver, exiled Information Minister of the Panthers, and told Cleaver he positively would not film the introduction because it appeared he would be required to follow the Communist Party line and, according to Newton, the Panthers did not follow anyone's line. Despite Newton's seemingly hard stand on this, the Communist Party found ways to make him relent, and three days later he agreed to the communist request, muttering that he would be "damned if he did and damned if he didn't." As violent as they are, the Panthers are no match for the sophistication of the experienced communist intrigue.

The communist hoodwinking is not confined to the Black Panther Party. The Communist Party's well-oiled propaganda machine has started to artfully transform Angela Davis, the accomplice in the brutal murder of a judge in California, into a national monument and into a growing source of funds. Not new at this sort of thing, the communists are well on their way to surpassing the monetary returns they have received from other racial and ethnic causes they have exploited, such as the Scottsboro boys, nine young blacks convicted twice in the 1930s in Alabama for raping two white girls on a freight train.

The communist influence in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the organization of the late Martin Luther King Jr., has continued since King's death. Although Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a communist, amicably terminated his position as aide to the SCLC President in December, 1970, his influence continues as does that of Stanley Levison and Harry Wachtel who also have communist backgrounds. Levison handles the SCLC fund-raising. In the past Levison and Wachtel operated behind the scenes; today they are listed in SCLC literature as directors of the SCLC.

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In the past year, as anticipated, there has been a continued merging of racial activists and extremists with pro-Chinese communist groups, Trotskyites, the Students for a Democratic Society, and similar groups. In October, 1970, Elbert Howard, a Black Panther Party functionary, stated that the Black Panther Party is composed of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and no longer confines its interest to black power or black nationalism. He added that in the future the Panthers will encompass all revolutionaries regardless of race. We can expect this merger to continue.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - BLACK EXTREMISTS
File 100-448006

Counterintelligence in the black extremist field is a supplement to our investigative activities that cannot be identified as a function of this Bureau because of its clandestine nature. The goals of it are to prevent violence and other illegal activities by black extremists and black extremist organizations, to prevent the growth and/or unification of black extremist groups, to prevent such groups from gaining respectability and to preclude the rising of a leader who might unify and electrify various extremist factions and individuals.

To achieve these objectives, techniques are employed to neutralize organizations and individuals involved in extremist activities that are a threat to the internal security of this country. These techniques are aimed to embarrass, expose or otherwise neutralize these organizations and individuals.

Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70.

Counterintelligence operations are supervised on individual case desks as a logical adjunct of our investigative activities. In addition, one supervisor is designated coordinator to insure that operations initiated in different offices do not conflict. A quarterly letter is submitted for each participating division showing operations under consideration and results gained. All communications authorizing the institution of any counterintelligence operations are routed through Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan; no operations are initiated by the field without Bureau approval.

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Counterintelligence operations and techniques were thoroughly discussed with field representatives attending the October 22 and 23, 1970, conference at the Bureau concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP). The conference concluded counterintelligence was an effective tool and there was a definite need for counterintelligence operations to neutralize black extremist activities.

The effect on black extremists of some authorized counterintelligence operations are difficult to assess, but a substantial number effected since last inspection have had measurable consequences and some of these included the following:

Four articles revealing extremist nature of BPP based on information furnished a news media source in Mississippi resulted in the closing of the BPP chapter in Cleveland, Mississippi. Agents of the Jackson Office were commended by the Director for this operation.

Following the arrests of BPP leadership in New Haven after torture-murder of BPP member in May, 1969, a Black Panther from Boston was sent to New Haven to rebuild that chapter. He proved to be an energetic organizer who built a closely knit and highly disciplined organization that effectively brought about mass demonstrations, attracted additional membership and which posed a serious threat to established Government. To neutralize this dynamic leader, New Haven was authorized to forward an anonymous letter to national BPP headquarters in California alleging he had embezzled BPP funds. Since then, numerous reports have been received indicating he had fallen into disfavor with BPP leaders and his motives were suspect. This resulted in his transfer to an insignificant BPP chapter in North Carolina.

In Rochester, New York, an anonymous letter sent to the Superintendent of Schools resulted in cancellation of subscriptions to the obscene, hate-filled, extremist newspaper of the BPP by a high school. These newspapers had been used
in classrooms and costs of subscriptions had been charged to the school system.

Philadelphia division was authorized to send a letter to BPP national headquarters bearing an excellent facsimile of signature of a former BPP officer in Philadelphia who had been expelled a week previously due to problems with BPP leadership in Philadelphia. The letter accused Philadelphia BPP members of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for poor children. All of these accusations, incidentally, were true. Since this letter was sent, Philadelphia BPP chapter has experienced severe problems with BPP headquarters, has been chastised repeatedly and prevented from participating in some BPP activities. Several members were disciplined by transfers. Subsequently, this situation was exploited by an authorized mailing of an anonymous letter to Huey P. Newton, Supreme Commander and co-founder of BPP, which criticized the meetings held under BPP auspices in Philadelphia September 5-7, 1970, concerning the planning for BPP-sponsored Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention. These counterintelligence operations were primarily responsible for expulsion of head of the Philadelphia BPP and many of his followers from BPP on 10/16/70. These individuals have formed an independent local group in Philadelphia which contends with BPP for local support in that city. Thus, another result of this operation has been the splintering of Philadelphia BPP chapter.

To exploit a split in BPP leadership in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Charlotte was authorized to prepare and send a leaflet to residents in vicinity of BPP headquarters. The leaflet insinuated the head of one BPP faction had pocketed donations secured for BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The leaflet caused consternation among BPP personnel and resulted in young Negro males poking fun at this BPP leader and accusing him of being a parasite. A decrease in financial donations to BPP followed the distribution of this leaflet.

Los Angeles set up a television expose of BPP in which George Putnam, newscaster KTTV-Los Angeles, California, noted that spread of Panther hoodlum-type revolutionary activity
was a serious internal security threat, with law enforcement as its immediate target. He utilized the Director's comprehensive testimony on the BPP before the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations on 3/5/70 in bringing out the revolutionary and terroristic threat presented by BPP and its leaders. He concluded the program with the opinion that "we are subsidizing our own destruction if we allow this to continue."

To drive a wedge between BPP and many of its contributors, data concerning the anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic nature of BPP was furnished a news media source. As a result articles were published during June and July, 1970, in various newspapers throughout U.S., including "Long Island Press," Long Island, New York; "Daily News," Springfield, Massachusetts; and "Mobile Register," Mobile, Alabama. These articles discussed the close alliance developed between BPP and Al Fatah, an Arab terrorist organization waging guerrilla warfare against Israel. These articles emphasized that numerous pro-Arab and anti-Israeli articles have been published in the BPP newspaper and some of the latter articles called for the complete destruction of Israel.

The above articles as well as many other counterintelligence operations authorized since last inspection have contributed materially to drying up of contributions to BPP. Loss of revenue is one of the BPP's greatest problems and perhaps the best illustration is the drop in the size and circulation of the BPP newspaper, the Party's primary propaganda device. This paper has declined from 20 or more pages to 12 in its 1/2/71 issue and circulation at the end of the year was less than 100,000 after a high of 183,000 in October, 1970.

Counterintelligence action has also contributed or led to disruptions, dissension and factionalism in the BPP, the most important of the black extremist organizations. Sources have reported internal strife has developed among top BPP leaders and there is a growing distrust among them of one another. For example, Albert Howard, national leader who has been supervising BPP activities on East Coast, and Robert Bay, a BPP leader in New York, have been recalled to national BPP
headquarters in California, where they were disciplined and severely criticized. In addition, SF 3421-R* on 12/26/70 reported a degree of dissension between Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information who is fugitive from justice and residing in Algeria, and Huey P. Newton. Informant learned Cleaver was extremely upset because BPP headquarters and particularly Newton are not keeping in touch with him and are not keeping him advised of key developments. This matter is being closely and aggressively followed for purpose of additional exploitation of these circumstances under this program.

Effective means of neutralizing black extremist groups is by drying up their sources of funds. We authorized the New York division to advise the Episcopal Church Center by anonymous letters that a $67,000 requested grant from the Episcopal Church Screening Board in New York, New York, to finance the Liberation School in Atlanta, Georgia, was in fact intended for use of Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as the school was an operation of SNCC, a black extremist organization, and SNCC in seeking the grant had concealed its connection with the school. This operation resulted in the Church placing such low priority on this request that financial assistance for the school was precluded and the Liberation School was so advised. Since SNCC is in poor financial condition, this denial of funds was a blow to its endeavors to revitalize itself. The Director noted "excellent" on 9/3/70 memorandum which advised of this successful counterintelligence operation.

A highly successful counterintelligence operation exposed to college administrators the unethical and deceptive use made of college funds by Back Student Organization, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, to purchase literature concerning the creation of explosive devices and concerning guerrilla warfare. As a result of this operation, college confiscated such literature, admonished Black Student Organization leaders and tightened administrative procedures to preclude similar misuse of its funds.
The Jackson Office was authorized to furnish data concerning Republic of New Africa (RNA), a violence-prone black extremist separatist organization, to a cooperative newspaper source, resulting in the publication of an excellent article exposing the violent nature of this organization on the front page of the only state-wide evening newspaper in Mississippi. This publicity on the evening before the RNA regional conference was to begin, jolted RNA leaders. In addition, Negro participants from Jackson area were shocked to learn of the violent nature of this group and withdrew their support. The scheduled agenda was shelved and the conference was completely disrupted. Agents of the Jackson Office and Domestic Intelligence Division Supervisor were commended by the Director for this operation.
THE KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

On December 23, 1970, the Key Black Extremist Program was initiated, with the Director's approval, to intensify our coverage of certain black extremists who are extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence. As the program started about 90 were included. With Bureau approval others may be added by the field. This program is to provide intensified coverage of the day-to-day activities and future plans of these people and to assure that all possible violations of law on their parts are vigorously investigated when they are within our jurisdiction and are referred promptly to the appropriate agency when they are not.

An investigative summary report on all these people is due by February 15, 1971. Thereafter an investigative report is to be submitted every 90 days.

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BLACK STUDENT GROUPS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

On October 29, 1970, the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources, on Black Student Unions and similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to determine if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant further active investigation. On November 4, 1970, instructions were sent to the field to implement this program. The number of campuses involved is about 500, representing approximately 750 black student groups. The officers will represent about 2,500 cases and the key activists another 250. The potential for new cases in this program will approximate 3,500 cases. This program includes junior colleges and two-year colleges as well as four-year colleges.
RACIAL INFORMANTS

The prime purpose of development and utilization of racial informants and sources is to provide intelligence and evidentiary information concerning black and white racial extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are also called upon to furnish information concerning the general racial situation in all parts of the country.

Supervision of racial informants at State of Government includes review and approval of new informants and confidential sources, review of progress of informant every six months, review of payments being made to informants, analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nationwide informant coverage of an organization, coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as the national convention of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and supervision of special projects such as development of top echelon BPP informant, using informant to develop information concerning a black extremist underground escape route and coordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision and assistance with a minimum of paper work.

As of 1/12/71 we are operating a total of 7,184 racial informants, compared with a total of 5,485 at time of last inspection. This is an increase of 1,699 informants. 584 informants report on black extremist organizations. 376 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan. (In line with recent reorganization of Domestic Intelligence Division, supervision of racial informants furnishing information on white extremists will shortly be transferred to the Internal Security Section.) We are operating 6,224 ghetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities.

Informant coverage of black extremist groups has been increased since the last inspection with a significant increase being noted in our coverage of the BPP. At the time of the last inspection we operated 119 informants reporting on BPP as compared with 173 as of 1/12/71, which represents an increase of 54 informants.
Our ghetto informants have materially increased from 4,605, at the time of the last inspection to 6,224 as of 1/12/71, which represents an increase of 1,619.

At the time of the last inspection we were operating 438 informants furnishing information concerning white extremist organizations and as of 1/12/71 we are operating 376 such informants, which represents a decrease of 62. This is to be expected as a result of the continuing decline of Klan and other white extremist activities.

By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Racial Informant Development, Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters," it was recommended and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a top-level informant in the BPP. It was also approved that $1,000 could be expended for the purpose of developing a top-level informant. As part of this program we have been in contact with a national BPP leader on several occasions, and while he has not agreed to cooperate with this Bureau he remains friendly to the contacting Agents and further efforts are contemplated to induce his cooperation. In addition, we have been successful in obtaining the cooperation of another national BPP leader's wife, and through her cooperation we have made contact with this leader. Again the leader has not indicated a willingness to cooperate; however, additional contacts will be initiated with him. This operation was specifically designed to develop top-level informant in the top echelon of the BPP which is critically needed. We will continue to pursue the development of a top-level informant until it is accomplished.

GHETTO INFORMANTS

Ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67 to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. Ghetto informants were those persons living or working in the ghetto areas who furnished information concerning general racial conditions in their areas. As the field has gained experience in the handling of ghetto informants their value has steadily increased. Ghetto informants today are being utilized by field offices to attend public meetings held by extremists, to survey extremist
bookstores, to verify residences and employments of Agitator and Security Index subjects living or working in ghetto areas and to identify individuals responsible for extremist activities tending to increase racial tensions in the ghetto areas. We are also noting numerous instances wherein ghetto informants are being converted by the field to regular racial informants furnishing information on black extremist organizations and individuals. As a valuable by-product we are also picking up criminal statistics through our contacts with ghetto informants. The ghetto informant program was last justified by memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 7/17/70, captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial Matters," and is scheduled to be rejustified in July, 1971.

TRAINING

A two-day conference of field supervisors handling racial matters investigations was held at Seat of Government 9/17-18/70. Representatives from 39 offices and two Legal Attaches attended. The conference dealt specifically with investigation of the BPP and informant development therein. A number of recommendations and suggestions resulted from this conference and were implemented. Suggestions approved as results of the conference are the subject of a separate write-up. Those in attendance were in agreement that the conference had been most beneficial to both field and Seat of Government personnel participating.
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
ESPIONAGE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: This program is designed to develop double agents who can give us vital information from their knowledge of plans and illegal operations of our enemies within the United States. A potential double agent by your definition is one in contact with representatives of a foreign government under Bureau control but has not been requested to give information or given assignments.

During the course of this inspection, the Inspector asked for and received a list of 238 active potential double agents. A review of 237 files (90%) indicated the following:

a. These files deal primarily with PSIs and some SIs who have limited social, situational and business contacts with Soviet and Satellite nationals. Most of these nationals are allegedly intelligence agents, suspected intelligence agents or persons who are contacts of these nationals.

b. Generally the people selected for development as potential double agents are correspondents and journalists who come in contact with Tass news agency officials and employees; American businessmen who purchase Russian products or sell American products through Amtorc or other Russian companies operating in the United States; neighbors and building managers where nationals reside; naturalized American citizens of Slavic derivation who are contacted by suspected intelligence agents; naturalized American citizens who travel to Russia and satellite countries; leaders of Slavic-American societies, organizations and publications; American citizens taking educational and business tours in Russia and other Iron Curtain countries; and prominent members of technical and scientific societies who have an interest in similar scientific work and publications by Russian and satellite country professionals.

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c. Generally a thorough background investigation is completed on each individual selected to be a potential double agent before the Bureau authorizes him to be interviewed to determine if he is receptive and willing to assist and cooperate with the Bureau. These investigations are not completed within a specified period. Several instances were noted wherein the national returned to his native country before the informant could develop suitable rapport. Review indicated several of these cases remain active although the national returned to his native country.

d. After the Bureau has authorized the field office to develop the potential double agent, the field office sends in progress reports each 6 months (FD-401). In most instances only a slight social acquaintance with the Bureau. Field and SOG supervision of these cases appears to be mechanical and perfunctory and lacks imaginative, aggressive and timely direction.

e. During the year 1970 there was an average of three communications per file received from the field. Most of these were semiannual reports. Communications from SOG to the field averaged less than one letter per file and in almost all instances this was a very short letter authorizing investigation and development of potential double agent. There were less than 10 cases noted where specific instructions, directions or other guidance was furnished to the field in developing these potential double agents.

f. 110 of the cases were reviewed at random for the specific purpose of determining generally how long they had been pending. 4 cases had been pending prior to 1960; 3 were open in 1961; 6 in 1962; 7 in 1963; 6 in 1964; 5 in 1965; 10 in 1966; 12 in 1967; 10 in 1968; 22 in 1969; and 25 in 1970. The average case has been opened 3 1/2 years and there has been an average of one piece of outgoing correspondence from the Bureau in each file.

Very little outgoing correspondence concerning instructions or directions were noted in these 110 files. For example, 5 of the files reviewed had no outgoing correspondence in them since 1967. One file was reviewed in which the last outgoing correspondence was in 1962. 65 of these 110 files did not have any outgoing correspondence in the last 12-month period (1970).

Review of this program as indicated by the above observations, reveals that virtually no direction is given the program. Separate write-ups have been prepared on two individual cases where supervision has been most inadequate.
As a general consideration, it is felt that you have 298 cases pending in what appears on the surface to be an important program but in reality are mere "numbers" from a supervision standpoint.

You are requested to explain why this condition exists, what is your justification for this type of handling, and what action you anticipate necessary to correct.

Comments of Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.
The comments and observations of the Inspector dealing with a "POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM" have been carefully reviewed and the following comments are responsive to the questions raised:

For purposes of clarification it is important that the terminology and designations used be defined. The designation "Potential Double Agent" (PDA) is a descriptive term denoting an individual usually already approved by the Bureau as a Potential Security Informant (PSI) or as a Security Informant (SI). The approval of a PSI or SI is based on his current or potential capabilities to furnish information of intelligence or security interest. If individuals in either of these categories have an association with a Soviet-bloc official, for statistical purposes they are considered as PDA's. This labeling is incidental to their primary designation as a Bureau-approved PSI or SI, and their administrative handling at the Bureau conforms with overall Bureau policy and instructions relating to all Bureau approved sources, whether or not they are considered to be PDA's, and this designation does not alter the administrative handling of these cases.

Justifications for Bureau-approved PSI's and SI's are required on a six-month basis following definitely established form. The primary purpose of this justification is administrative in nature to insure the individual involved continues to meet Bureau standards. Substantive information which may have been furnished is reported in detail in the 134 file maintained by the Office of Origin as required by Bureau regulations. This information is then reported to the Bureau under appropriate substantive captions. Normally the only occasion when substantive data received from a source appears in the informant case file is in the semi-annual justification letter in extremely abbreviated form. See Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13, Manual of Instructions which states,

"Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption."
Regarding specific comments in paragraph c., as pointed out, the primary designation of an individual as a PSI or SI is his ability to furnish information of intelligence interest, which may or may not depend upon his association with one Soviet-bloc national. This association almost without exception becomes productive only when the Soviet-bloc official initiates action to exploit this relationship. The fact that the Soviet-bloc national departs this country, first, does not end their relationship, and secondly, does not end the potential that exists in the relationship. Very often there is a follow-up contact by another Communist-bloc official based on the apparently disrupted initial relationship. Characteristic of the patient, long-range planning and execution of Soviet-bloc intelligence, this reactivation may occur at some indeterminate future date. We must be alert to this concrete possibility in order to fully exploit the potential that exists in such cases. Therefore, contacts with the source, in cases of this type, must continue for a reasonable period.

Concerning paragraph d., in cases where the potential for development of an individual as a double agent is based exclusively on a social acquaintanceship with a specific Soviet-bloc official, the initiative for this development rests almost entirely with that Soviet-bloc official. Experience has taught us that attempts on our part to manipulate our sources to hasten his development are most often recognized by the hostile intelligence officer as a provocation. When direction is necessary and practical, it must be developed in the overall context of the Soviet-bloc official's investigation, and such direction is apparent in the substantive case files. These factors will account for what appears to be "mechanical and perfunctory" supervision which "lacks imaginative, aggressive and timely direction," in the informant case file.

Paragraph e. refers to the lack of communications in the informant files reviewed. The nature and purpose of the informant file has been previously explained, and in this context it can be understood that operational instructions usually appear in the substantive files and not in the administrative file of the informant.
Paragraph f notes many instances of cases concerning "PDA's" have been opened for varying periods of time, and, again, the lack of extensive outgoing communications noted. It is again stressed that the designation of "PDA" is an arbitrary one; these files are evaluated and administered on an individual basis in accordance with Bureau requirements related to PSI's and SI's, and not solely on their double-agent potential. These requirements are met in these cases.

The Inspector has commented in his Survey that "virtually no direction is given the program." The foregoing comments have established 1.) the designation of PDA to a SI or PSI does not require administrative supervision or handling by SOG over and above that required for any SI or PSI, 2.) if direction and instruction is necessary and practical in a particular case, such is given in the overall supervision and handling of the substantive case file of the Soviet-bloc national involved, 3.) in accordance with current Bureau policy and instructions relating to the handling of these files, they contain a minimal amount of information relating to the productivity of the source, and 4.) the labeling and designation of a SI and PSI as a PDA is an administrative device adopted for the purpose of emphasizing the need for Double-Agents. There is no program as such, for the handling of these cases.

To the general consideration expressed that the 298 cases are mere numbers from a supervisory standpoint, the above comments clearly indicate such is not the case. These cases are not opened and maintained as a program. They are opened on individual merit and maintained in accordance with Bureau standards under the same requirements as all other PSI and SI cases at the SOG.

In summary, it appears that the criticisms leveled in this particular Survey are due to a misconception involving terminology. "PDA" is a label. It carries no requirement for administrative handling over and above supervision afforded the case as a PSI or SI. These cases are basic and vital investigative tools. Administration of such cases are guided by rigid Bureau standards; the comments made by Inspector do not indicate these standards have been breached. Thus, no corrective action is considered necessary and none is recommended. This does not mean that I will not continue to exert every effort to see that qualified informants will continue to be developed and that carefully considered and logical means will be employed to have these informants
developed to the point they are accepted by Soviet-bloc officials and become operational Double-Agents. I am pleased we have increased the number of active Double-Agents since the last inspection and will closely follow our progress in this field.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNA\(\)N (DEM:ekn 1-24-71)

I have carefully noted the comments of the Inspector and also those of Mr. Moore. I certainly am aware that Double-Agents active against Soviet-bloc officials are a vital part of our counterespionage work. I share the views expressed by Mr. Moore and assure the Inspector I will closely follow the development of informants in this field and see that proper guidance is given the field to increase the number of active Double-Agents.

ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER (ESM:mjt 1/25/71)

Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have in the Bureau today and during this inspection our review of your program was made with this attitude. I have reviewed with great interest the accomplishments and progress which you have made; however, there were certain aspects of your operation which have caused concern. Specifically, your handling of "Potential Double Agents" does not nearly result from a review standpoint with the feeling that this phase of work is compatible with the challenges presented. Elsewhere in this inspection we have discussed development of Double Agents in place as being highly desirable goals in our work, yet, we have lacked success in this as evidenced by an extended "dry" period of almost nine years.

I feel that perhaps foreign intelligence may not be that good and that by improving ourselves we may be able to accomplish our goals. In the above write-up it was my feeling that your Potential Double Agent program needs considerable attention from a critical self-analysis standpoint for the purpose of strengthening it consistent with its potential for providing valuable assistance both here and in the field.

Assistant Director note.
The comments of the Inspector are noted.

I most certainly share the Inspector's view that Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have in the Bureau today. I have and am continually stressing the development of good double agents. The Inspector referred to "Double Agents-in-place," and in view of the context of his remarks, I concluded he is referring to "Defectors-in-place," and I know of no higher goal in our work than developing them.

To my knowledge, the first Soviet Defector-in-place the Bureau ever developed was Kaarlo Tuomi, an illegal agent who was a Captain in the Soviet Army and who was developed in March, 1959. We operated him for approximately four and one-half years. Next, in 1961-1962, we developed Tophat, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Army who operated in this country until his return to the Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Soviet Union, he cooperated and furnished valuable information which was recovered by the CIA from deaddrops in Moscow. In 1966, Tophat was assigned to Burma and was contacted by the Bureau in that country. With the Director's approval, he was turned over to CIA and operated by them (and also for us since they serviced requirements for us) until 1969. Tophat has now returned to the Soviet Union, and to our knowledge, he is still a cooperative Defector-in-place and may come to the West again.

In October, 1961, we developed through investigation and interrogation the Gunson Defector-in-place, who was a member of the illegal apparatus for the Soviet Military Intelligence Service. In May, 1962, he returned to the Soviet Union, and if he can leave that country, we can expect that he will be in contact with us again.

In 1962, we began operations with the Fedora source, a Colonel in the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). He furnished voluminous information on KGB operations, including the data which resulted in the arrest and conviction of Igor Ivanov and John William Butenko. In May, 1967, he returned to the Soviet Union but was again contacted by the Bureau in Canada, in 1968, where he was visiting for a short period. In September, 1969, Fedora visited in New York and was again in touch with
Bureau Agents. To our knowledge, Fedora is still a viable source, and if he will not be reassigned in the United States, certainly we can anticipate contact with him at scientific symposiums elsewhere in the Western world.

In 1962, we developed the Nicknack Defector-in-place, who was a technical man connected with Soviet military intelligence. Nicknack returned to the Soviet Union in 1964, anticipating that his next overseas assignment would be with the Soviet Military Office in Washington, D.C.

In 1963, we compromised the Miter source, who was a co-opted agent of the KGB and who furnished political information which was disseminated at the highest level. He returned to the Soviet Union in October, 1964.

Contact was first made with the __JFK Act 6 (J)__ source in January, 1967. At one time he was the Acting Resident of the KGB in New York. He furnished information concerning 102 KGB operations. Based upon information furnished by __JFK Act 6 (J)__ the identification of an illegal agent husband and wife team has been effected. They are presently located in Argentina.

During the summer of 1969, an Agent of the New York Office successfully developed the Harlo source, who acted as a Defector-in-place from July, 1969, to November, 1970. The Harlo source was in a position to furnish information of value and to identify members of the Soviet intelligence community. The source left the United States in November, 1970, under circumstances which may indicate a willingness to further cooperate if the opportunity presented itself.

While the above is a listing of Defectors-in-place achievements in the Soviet field, we have been equally successful with the Satellite intelligence services. Commencing in 1963, we developed the Prime source, who was a Polish code clerk at the Polish United Nations Mission. He furnished cipher pads and keys which enabled National Security Agency to break the Polish code. That Agency described his operation as the intelligence superfluous of the century.

In addition to two Defectors-in-place during the ensuing years, we now operate the Panther source, who is presently in-place in the United Nations Secretariat in New York.
We developed Gimme, a member of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, in 1962 and operated him until he returned to Czechoslovakia in November, 1963. Thereafter, he was in continual clandestine contact with the CIA until his return to Washington in January, 1969, where he was again operated successfully until his overt defection in June, 1970.

JFK Act 6 [4] was a Yugoslav diplomat and intelligence officer who was successfully recruited and operated from July, 1962, until September, 1965. He was believed to be the first professional intelligence Yugoslav officer recruited anywhere in the world.

From early July, 1966, through the first week in November, 1966, we were in contact with an extremely sensitive Defector-in-place in the Washington, D.C., area. Knowledge of this Defector-in-place is and has been limited to very few Bureau personnel. Only four men in the Espionage Section are aware of his past cooperation. While in contact this Defector-in-place furnished extremely valuable counterintelligence and has the potential for reassignment to the United States. We are currently operating a double agent developed by this source in an effort to bring about his reassignment to this country. In addition, we have taken action against those Soviet intelligence officers in the same department as this source in an effort to force their recall, thus opening up the way for source to be reassigned to the U.S. as their replacement. Should we succeed his knowledge would give us an insight into the KGB legal apparatus in the U.S. that we have never previously had.

In addition, we have been in contact with numerous Soviet-bloc officials both through double agents who were carefully directed by us and by Bureau Agents. At the present time we are in contact with Henryk Cieslak, an employee of the Polish Embassy. Agents have talked to him several times and have an appointment to clandestinely meet with him this Saturday, January 29, 1971, at National Airport. He has indicated willingness to cooperate with us but has some reservations in view of his family situation. We expect to overcome this. In addition, in New York, Alexander Adam Messing-Mierzejewski, Chief of the Representation and Liaison Unit, Office of Interagency Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, (a Pole) has been contacted and expressed agreement to cooperate and we are continuing our contacts with him and hope to develop him fully.
These are just two of many contacts we have made during recent years in the Satellite field.

In the Soviet field we have been particularly anxious to develop Defectors-in-place and have made numerous contacts. During 1970 we had an Agent meet clandestinely on three occasions with Balentin P. Nizhelskiy, third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, who is a known KGB officer and we had several brush meetings with him. He returned to the Soviet Union on normal home leave in late September, 1970, but prior to his departure arrangements were made for subsequent meetings with him when he returned. He has not returned and information recently received indicates this is due to serious illness of his wife in the USSR. While the reported illness of his wife may be only a cover by the KGB to keep us from knowing he reported his contacts, the illness of his wife may be very real and if so and he returns to this country subsequently we have excellent ground work already laid.

After a long period of working against Yuriy P. Lisnevskiy, a known GRU Agent and head of AEROFLOT Office in New York, we developed excellent information about him and established a close relationship with him. We secured very detailed personal information about Lisnevskiy and in October contacted him and while he was badly shaken because of the detailed operation we had run against him he did not commit himself to cooperate and after thinking about the matter for a period of time apparently decided to report to his superiors and was whisked back to the Soviet Union.

Lisnevskiy and Nizhelskiy are examples of efforts we have made and are continuing to make in this field. I am setting forth this very sensitive information so that the Inspector will be aware that we have been and most certainly will continue to do everything possible to accomplish our goals. I feel we have very dedicated and knowledgeable men working in this field and we are constantly analyzing the overall field in the light of changing world conditions to see that we take advantage of every opportunity. The Inspector may be assured we will continue to do so.
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS - (CONMA) PROGRAM

During the course of this inspection, a volume of material was reviewed, part of which were cases and investigations dealing with the above program in the New York Office. The program was instituted in July, 1970, by a team of Special Agents in the Jamaica-Queens area in an effort to observe clandestine activity there based on an analysis of previous activity in that area. SPIA letters dated 8/14/70 and 9/4/70 from New York reported the observation of numerous Soviet intelligence officers in the area during July and August, and three individuals were identified in contact with Soviet intelligence officers under suspicious circumstances.

It appears that the successes of the recent and current New York efforts in these matters still have not been brought to the attention of the Washington Field Office, in the form of instructions or directions to analyze their situation for possible implementation of the program (if not already being done) in the Washington area.

For this reason, you are being requested to advise of supervisory procedures you have to insure the dissemination of new techniques and the "cross-fertilization" of ideas to appropriate offices.

It is realized that New York furnishes copies of communications to Washington Field Office. What provisions do you have at the Seat of Government to insure adequate, aggressive attention and supervision is provided to the field in matters such as this?

Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan, Inspector Donald E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

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1/21/71
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS - (COKMA) PROGRAM

Section Chief W. A. Brannigan
Espionage Section

The Inspector's comments regarding the success of captioned program in the New York Office have been noted and are valid. Bureau has furnished New York a communication offering suggestions and asking for its comments and recommendations regarding expansion of the program. No instructions or directions have been issued to WFO concerning possible implementation of this program in that office, although as the Inspector notes WFO has been made aware of the activity conducted by the New York Office, since the conditions on which the program is based are applicable only in the New York area by reason of conditions peculiar to that office alone; i.e., fact that analysis of activities by Soviet intelligence officers has disclosed they use areas in the vicinity of certain subway stops for meetings with agents either for the convenience of their sources or the security offered to both by the subway in traveling to or from meet areas. No subway exists in Washington, D.C. Travel in the Washington area is primarily by automobile, due to the lack of any appreciable rapid transit system. While in New York the primary means of transportation is the subway system. Since conditions peculiar to New York do not exist in Washington, D.C., it was not deemed necessary to issue instructions or directions to WFO concerning this particular program.

Another factor considered by Bureau was knowledge of prior use by WFO of programs directed against geographic and other known factors regarding Soviet intelligence operations peculiar to Washington as opposed to New York. Several years ago a program was used wherein all thoroughfares from the District, where Soviets resided almost exclusively at that time, were checked during hours we knew they conducted meets in the suburban areas and might be detected traveling to such areas via these routes for this purpose. This was discontinued due to lack of productivity. More recently, WFO used a "Sweeper Program" wherein all Special Agents assigned to Soviet investigations checked all shopping centers in the metropolitan area (District, Virginia and Maryland suburbs) after an analysis disclosed a preponderance of usage by Soviets of such locations for intelligence meets. This is the same concept on which the COKMA Program is based. It
operated from about 1967 to 1968 and was implemented on the basis of conditions detected as existing in WFO, but which were not applicable in New York; therefore, instructions were not issued to New York for implementation of similar program but it was kept informed of developments in the same manner that New York is now informing WFO of developments occurring in instant matter. "Sweeper" was discontinued due to lack of positive accomplishments such as those which have been disclosed in the COMMA Program. From about 1968 to 1969, "Blitz Program" was used by WFO to check residences of the more active Soviet intelligence officers to determine the presence or absence of their automobiles with the expectation of disclosing patterns which might be afforded more intensive attention to ascertain nature of activity being conducted during these periods when their presence could not be accounted for. "Blitz" program was also discontinued during weekdays by WFO due to lack of positive accomplishments and, incidental thereto, manpower limitations or need to apply personnel to areas offering more firm possibilities for producing positive results; however, the principle is still utilized in connection with weekend physical surveillance scheduling.

Recognizing the value of accounting for all Soviets during as much of the day as possible, especially when they were away from our sophisticated coverage at the establishment where they are assigned, Bureau pointed out to both New York Office and WFO the valuable information disclosed through "Blitz" of their residences and instructed both offices to develop established neighborhood sources who could furnish information regarding arrivals and departures, use of automobile and odometer readings, as a means of insuring continued receipt of the information which would no longer be available following reevaluation and modification of the program. This instruction was also based on the fact that Soviets now reside throughout the periphery of suburban D. C. due to changing socio-economic conditions making it practically impossible to cover these widespread locations with any degree of sufficiency without some added technique.

During December, 1970, Espionage Section recommended distribution to all Bureau personnel at Seat of Government, WFO and the adjacent Resident Agencies of Baltimore and Alexandria of small card appropriately coded listing license numbers of vehicles used by the ten most active Soviet intelligence officers. This was approved by Director. Rationale here was to add several hundred pairs of eyes to cover individuals who are extremely conscious of and adept at detecting surveillances. Personnel observing these cars would not conduct any activity other than to
report pertinent information concerning observation of the vehicle to WFO by routing slip for compilation and determination of suspicious patterns which should be resolved through concentrated surveillance coverage on the basis of available information (again the basic COKMA philosophy). This is being used on a trial basis in WFO to test its productivity and value. If found to be of assistance, consideration will be given to implementing in New York Office; however, in this instance again, the program is designed to exploit conditions prevalent in Washington, D. C., rather than New York where Bureau personnel do not reside in same general area as Soviets and therefore, might not be expected to produce positive results. Means of transportation available in both areas, previously mentioned, was also considered.

SPIA letters themselves are a vehicle for "cross-fertilization" of ideas between recipient and submitting offices. They contain monthly, detailed summaries of intelligence activities which have occurred in the submitting offices. They are routed to each Espionage Section Supervisor for review. If significant information is contained in submission from WFO which might be applicable to New York, or vice versa, Bureau Supervisor directs attention of appropriate office to the information by means of communication in the substantive file involved. Weekly Section Conferences allow for a more current discussion of significant or unusual developments as they occur in individual cases providing a more immediate vehicle for directing attention of one office to developments in another which might be applicable to a current or prior investigation.

Periodically, Espionage Section learns from other intelligence organizations, foreign and domestic, of new intelligence techniques or changes in MO by Soviets which should

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be considered by offices having a Soviet establishment or particular investigative situation. This information is immediately furnished to interested offices by Supervisor having responsibility for coordination of the SPIA-SATPIA matters or by the substantive supervisor handling the particular investigation to which it pertains. Determination in this regard is made by Section Front Office which issues appropriate instructions and follows prompt compliance. Examples are notification from British and CIA regarding Soviet capability to use "dial-a-message" telephones (time, weather, prayer, AA etc.,) with sophisticated device on their telephone as means of clandestine communications. On another occasion British told us about Soviet use of compact broad-band scanning receiver by personnel supporting intelligence officer during meet as means of detecting radio transmissions in area which might indicate counterintelligence service interest in that particular activity. Both New York and WFO were alerted to these circumstances for consideration in their coverage of Soviet establishments and covering double agent meetings.

All matters pertaining to programs such as captioned are routed through Section Front Office to insure adequate and aggressive attention and supervision is provided to field, and make certain no possibility is overlooked to exploit such situations for maximum counterintelligence benefits on field-wide basis, consistent with feasibility or applicability.

Inspector D. E. Moore
DEM:1mb
1/23/71

I share Mr. Branigan's views that Cokma is not applicable to WFO in view of the different conditions existing in the two cities. Noting the other comments of the inspector and the information set forth by Mr. Branigan, I would like to advise that in communications I read, in contacts with personnel of New York and WFO and supervisors at the Seat of Government and in contacts with representatives of cooperative foreign intelligence agencies, I am most alert to situations and procedures that can be adopted by us. In conferences with Section Chiefs in the Branch, I stress the need to be alert for procedures that may have worked in one area of our operations and can be adopted to other areas.

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Assistant Director C. D. Brennan

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I have carefully noted the inspector's comments and also the comments of Mr. Branigan and Mr. Moore. I am most alert to the development of new ideas and the need for "cross-fertilization" of ideas and stress this in my conferences with all Section Chiefs at the Division. I not only seek ideas about the operations of a Section Chief within the Section, but for ideas of operations anywhere within the Division and throughout the Bureau. I am constantly alert in my many contacts with representatives of other Government agencies, foreign liaison contacts and representatives of business for ideas which can be successfully utilized in our work and will continue this. In discussions with SACs, I constantly stress the challenging conditions the Bureau faces and the need for new ideas and new applications. I most certainly will continue to stress this.

ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:sjr - 1/25/71)

It is my understanding that the COKMA concept is not "new" in the New York Office but, as indicated has had recent successes. It is realized COKMA deals with subway travel of our subjects; however, the concept was that to which I alluded in the above write-up. It was my feeling perhaps due to internal conditions in the Soviet Union and the Polish situation etc., that Soviet Intelligence may now be more active and consequently "pressing" for some reason thus making it possible for us to have significant success in New York in a relatively short period of time.

For this reason, it was my feeling that the matter should have been highlighted by SOG which has the responsibility for coordination and direction of field activities.

I do not agree with the concept that one field division is different from another when we are dealing with as important a topic as Soviet espionage.

Assistant Director Brennan and Inspector Moore note.
I certainly agree with the Inspector that one field division is no different than another in connection with the topic as important as Soviet Espionage. The point that Mr. Branigan and I were attempting to make is that we have to recognize the difference in methods of operation in Soviet intelligence officers in New York and WFO. The Inspector may be assured that I will follow the operations of Soviet-bloc intelligence officers in New York, WFO and also in San Francisco in view of the establishment of a consulate there. I will continue to be most alert to any successful procedures utilized in one office that may be productive in another and will certainly see that the procedures are applied where feasible.

I concur with Inspector Moore.
INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER: In addition to review of work performance, various personnel, by reason of supervisory position held, were interviewed during the course of this inspection by a member of the Inspection Staff. The interviews and review of work performance of these personnel have disclosed no substantial delinquencies of matters requiring recommendations for any specific action. The personnel are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard D. Cotter</td>
<td>Section Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Moore</td>
<td>Section Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert L. Shackelford</td>
<td>Section Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Raymond Wannall</td>
<td>Section Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conrad W. Thompson</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambert L. Anderson</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank B. Still, Jr.</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert C. Putnam</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Ryan</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph M. Sizoo</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ervin L. Reeser</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis J. Brune, Jr.</td>
<td>Approved Bureau Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Edwin Enright</td>
<td>Recommended for Advancement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assistant Director Brennan please note.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

INSPECTOR E. M. MILLER: Please tabulate by Sections and Units the current Agent and clerical personnel complement of your Division as of the close of business 1/8/71. Show actual and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the Division Front Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be considered in the overall tabulation.

1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority has been obtained to fill.

2. Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Division as of 1/8/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as of that date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of resignation.)

3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized personnel as of 1/8/71.

4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.

5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.

6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.

7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall Divisional write-up.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

1/8/71

ESM: wmj

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached find the Section write-ups concerning each category of information requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel. These comments are current as of 1/8/71:

The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office consists of one Assistant Director, two Inspectors, two Special Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and 19 clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division teletype room, Mail Room and messenger service, the Security Patrol Force in addition to five Agents. I have not as yet requested a replacement for a GS-4 clerical position in the Front Office, which was created with the resignation of James A. Pettingill on 12/24/70. I am attempting to absorb the work of this position with the present personnel complement in the Front Office. This is on a trial basis and if it isn't satisfactory, I will recommend a replacement.

The overall authorized personnel complement of the Division at the beginning of the inspection was 116 Special Agents and 190 clerks compared to an authorized complement of 126 Agents and 186 clerks at the time of the last inspection. We now have assigned to the Division 116 Agents and 188 clerks. The clerical vacancies being the aforementioned GS-4 position in the Front Office and a vacancy in the Mail Room, which was created when a clerical position in the Internal Security Section was filled.

At the present time we have outstanding requests for two Agents to replace Special Agents George M. Quinn and C. Edwin Enright, who are under transfer to the Inspection Division. We also have requests for two GS-2 Mail Clerks for the Division Mail Room to replace the clerk who was transferred to the Internal Security Section and the second to replace the GS-3 clerk who will be reassigned or rotated when the replacement is made available to the Division. The Racial Intelligence Section has submitted a request for an additional clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit. In addition, this Section is now making a request for two additional Agent Supervisors because of the heavy increase in the case load in the black extremist field. (Justification in Section write-up attached).
The request for a clerk by the Internal Security Section for a newly approved clerical position mentioned in its write-up has been filled. The Espionage Section may find it necessary to request an additional clerk to handle extra duties assigned to a clerk who is already heavily assigned, if the present system (now on a trial basis) proves unworkable. The New Left Section may find it necessary to request an additional Agent and clerk if the present trend of heavy increase in case load continues. We are watching this closely. As you will note in the write-up by the Nationalities Intelligence Section we are making a request for two additional Agent Supervisors at this time. This is necessary due to the recent increase in foreign legats from 11 to 17, increasing our legat personnel from 60 to 88.

To recapitulate, our requests for additional personnel are:

Front office

Racial Intelligence

Espionage Section

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Two GS-2 clerks

One GS-4 clerk

One Agent Supervisor to replace Supervisor Enright.

Two additional Agent Supervisors.

One Agent Supervisor to replace Agent Quinn.

Two additional Agent Supervisors.

I firmly believe that our limited requests for additional personnel at this time are fully justified. As you will note in the attached write-ups, we are not asking for additional personnel until, after on a trial basis, we have found it absolutely necessary and fully justified. The increase of terroristic tactics by the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society and militant organizations such as the Black Panther Party and the Jewish Defense League has made it absolutely imperative that intensive investigation be conducted to identify, locate all members of these militant organizations and secure evidence for prosecution, if we are to meet our grave responsibilities in the extremely vital field of internal security. This has increased the work load of the Racial Intelligence Section, the New Left Section, and the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Because of this increase
in work and my interest in conserving manpower. where possible, we recently reorganized the Division in order to make the most efficient use of our manpower. I conscientiously believe I have now trimmed my manpower to the bone. Under my direction, Branch and Section Chiefs continually evaluate personnel adequacy in order to assure we get the job done with a maximum amount of efficiency with the minimum amount of personnel. I conscientiously believe I have done this and I will continue to pursue this policy.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

SECTION CHIEF A. W. GRAY: As of 1/8/71 the authorized personnel of the Internal Security Section was 15 Special Agents, 7 Secretaries, and 9 Clerks. A breakdown by Units follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRONT OFFICE</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS OF 1/8/71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number One Man</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

| Supervisors | 3 |
| Secretary   | 1 |
| Clerks      | 2 (1 new requested but not yet assigned) |

SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT

| Supervisors | 3 |
| Secretary   | 1 |
| Clerks      | 2 |

PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

| Supervisors | 3 (1 - McGuire temporarily assigned New Left Section) |
| Secretary   | 1 |
| Clerks      | 2 (1 - Hanning temporarily assigned New Left Section) |

INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT

| Supervisors | 2 |
| Secretary   | 1 |
| Clerk       | 1 |

KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT

| Supervisors | 2 |
| Secretary   | 1 |
| Clerks      | 2 |

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SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1. In Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit, one Special Agent Supervisor (McGuire) and one clerk (Hanning) temporarily assigned New Left Section. Supervisor in Charge of same Unit (Griffith) also spending majority of his time in New Left Section assisting on special. An additional Supervisor from International New Left Unit (Benedict) and one clerk from Klan and White Hate Groups Unit (Dean) are also working majority of their time on New Left Section special.

2. No pending transfers or resignations.

3. See number 1 above.

4. We have requested one additional clerical employee for the Communist Party, USA, Unit (request not yet filled) because of substantial need due to increase in Unit case load from 572 to 1076 as a result of reorganization. We are currently assessing need for another clerical employee in Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to handle large volume of mail involved in supervision of several hundred Klan and White Hate group informants.

5. Considering that Internal Security Section, as it is now constituted, was established December 16, 1970, approximately three weeks ago, no meaningful comments regarding manpower savings as related to this Section can be made. We are carrying a substantial case load, with increases in several areas. For example, the case load of the Communist Party, USA, Unit as a result of the reorganization increased from 572 to 1076 with no increase in personnel. Additionally, two Supervisors assigned to this Section (Griffith and McGuire) are on temporary loan to the New Left Section along with a clerical employee (Hanning). Additionally, a third Supervisor (Benedict) and a second clerical employee (Dean) are spending the majority of their working time on assignment to New Left Section special. For all practical purposes, the work of three Supervisors and two clerical employees is being absorbed on a daily basis within the present personnel complement which, of course, is a tangible manpower savings. In all Units we are constantly involved in attempting to eliminate or curtail the volume of paperwork being handled, reducing programs and projects to bare essentials and wherever possible, keeping the case load volume at a manageable figure.

Another example of manpower conservation exists in the Subversive Individuals - Basic Revolutionary Groups Unit

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which handles approximately 1,400 pending cases and is responsible for over 7,000 subjects on the Bureau's Special Indices. A moratorium on routine communist investigations in effect at the time of the last inspection, which curtailed the work of this Unit, has been removed and the case load increases daily. The removal of the moratorium warranted the expansion of this Unit from a two to three-man Unit at the time of reorganization but for all practical purposes, the Unit has functioned as a two-man Unit with the third man (Schwartz) on loan for the majority of the period to the Research Section for a special project.

6. When Special Agent supervisory personnel currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections, are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle existing case load.

7. In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:

- case load
- mail count
- name checks
- complexity of cases and supervision involved
- deadline matters
- special assignments
- experienced supervisors

Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in Charge (reviewing mail, conferring with employees, organizing Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments handled.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
NEW LEFT SECTION 6E

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: There is set forth below a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the New Left Section as of close of business, January 8, 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Left Groups Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Agents</td>
<td>6 Agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Super Clerk</td>
<td>1 Super Clerk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversive Individuals -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Agents</td>
<td>4 Agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Investigations -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Agents</td>
<td>2 Agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Investigations -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Agents</td>
<td>5 Agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td>1 Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assignment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Agent*</td>
<td>1 Clerk*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Agents</td>
<td>2 Agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Secretaries</td>
<td>2 Secretaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Agents</td>
<td>21 Agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Clerks</td>
<td>17 Clerks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Super</td>
<td>1 Super Clerk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Secretaries</td>
<td>6 Secretaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 employees</td>
<td>45 employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section.

2. Two Agents under transfer in: SA J. L. Hogan assigned to Special Investigations - West Unit and SA R. M. Perez assigned to Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit. No resignations.

*One Agent and one clerk on temporary assignment handling major case involving East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives.

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3. Special Investigations – West Unit has one Agent and one clerk on loan from the Internal Security Section.

4. Activities by New Left terrorists during the past year has been marked by an increase in acts of violence and conspiracies toward violence. The Weatherman group and other such groups have made it imperative that we institute continuing intensive investigations. By approved airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 11/4/70, the field was instructed to initiate investigation of all members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of procommunist militant New Left type campus organizations which follow SDS advocacy of violence and revolution. It is estimated that this will involve some 6,500 new investigations. If this trend continues, it will be necessary to obtain an additional clerk in the future; however, we are not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time.

5. At the time of the last inspection, this Section had 22 Agents and 27 clerical employees authorized of which 22 Agents and 25 clerical employees were assigned. As a result of the realignment of the Division in December, 1970, this Section currently has 22 Agents and 23 clerical employees authorized.

6. As noted in number 4 above, the increase in terroristic activities by New Left militants has increased the burden of this Section. On the basis of the above, if this trend continues, it appears that it will be necessary to obtain one additional Agent in the future.

7. Personnel adequacy in the New Left Section is constantly evaluated on the basis of the productivity of each unit, requests received from the Department and other agencies and the overall objectives of the Section. The delinquent work in each unit is closely followed and in special situations where an excessive amount of work is assigned to one unit supervisory personnel from other units are utilized.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: As of close of business 1/8/71, the complement of this Section was as follows: Special Agents 13, secretaries 5, and clerks 15, for a total of 33. This is broken down by unit as follows:

Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (Stenography), 1 secretary (typing)

Central Research Unit - 5 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 2 supervisory clerks (technical publications writers), 1 clerk (publications coordinator), 1 clerk (typing)

Racial Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 1 supervisory clerk (technical publications writer), 2 clerks

New Left Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 1 supervisory clerk (technical publications writer), 1 clerk

Special Records Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (assigned but not authorized, see #3 below), 6 clerks

The following responses are numbered to correspond with Inspector's specific questions:

1. There are no vacant positions.

2. There are no personnel on transfer into or out of Section at this time and no pending resignations.

3. Only shortage or overage of authorized personnel is in Special Records Unit. Position of secretary in this unit has been approved by Director contingent upon final action by Position Classification Office which is now pending.

4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive.

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5. Since last inspection we have reduced one Agent from the complement of the Racial Reporting Unit as a result of various streamlining measures adopted relative to reporting requirements. This streamlining involved the elimination of a substantial number of letterhead memoranda and airtels previously required from each field office with regard to racial conditions and the elimination of daily cover memorandum to our outgoing racial teletype to the White House.

6. The authorized Agent complement for Section is considered adequate but not excessive at this time.

7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section includes a number of diverse factors. Case load figures are not applicable to work of this Section nor are there any other simple, quantitative measurements of Section's work. Work of this Section involves primarily research and evaluation and the preparation of a variety of documents aimed at providing intelligence to the White House, the Attorney General, other interested agencies and Bureau officials. This Section seeks to summarize into comprehensive and meaningful "package" form information relating to current topics of intelligence interest and concern. The finished product is provided not only to other intelligence agencies and policy-making officials of the Government but, where appropriate, to our field offices for their information and guidance. The type of documents prepared varies from daily teletype summaries regarding racial disturbances and student agitation, to detailed monographs containing in-depth research into various facets of our work.

During the past year there has been a continuing demand for various intelligence summaries and this Section has been faced with a number of expedite projects on behalf of Bureau officials, including the Director, the White House, the Vice President's Office, and the Attorney General. Basis for this heavy work load has primarily been interest and concern in the explosive issues concerning racial and student disorders. The great majority of our projects have revolved around the preparation of material either for internal FBI use or for outside dissemination with respect to these issues.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN
ESPIONAGE SECTION

(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section as of January 8, 1971, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AGENT</th>
<th>CLERK</th>
<th>SECRETARY</th>
<th>CLERK-STENO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials Unit - Washington</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials Unit - New York</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Cases Unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination Unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2****</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite Unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**SA George M. Quinn, under transfer to Inspection Division, to depart close of business January 22, 1971. Replacement requested.

***Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary E. Triplett, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

****Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

(2) By letter dated December 22, 1970, Special Agent George M. Quinn was transferred to the Inspection Division. He will depart by the close of business January 22, 1971.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

Barbara Ann Holland and Keith R. White submitted resignations close of business January 8, 1971. Replacements were received as enumerated in item one above.

(3) As of January 8, 1971, there was a shortage of two GS-4 Clerk in the Officials Unit - Washington, but this was remedied on January 11, when replacements were received as indicated in item one above. A replacement has been requested for Special Agent George M. Quinn in the Officials Unit - New York, but none has been designated at this time. There is no overage of authorized personnel in the Espionage Section.

(4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate at the present time. With the reorganization of the Division, and combining Soviet and Soviet-bloc investigations in the Espionage Section, an extremely heavy burden has been placed on the clerical personnel handling the assignment cards for the Section (there are now 5,046 cases). This situation is being watched and it may be that it is unworkable to place the responsibility for maintaining the assignment cards in a GS-4 employee who is already heavily assigned. If this proves to be a fact, a recommendation will be made to add a Clerk at a GS-3 level who would exclusively handle the assignment cards.

(5) Following the 1970 inspection, personnel handling Soviet investigations was reduced by two Special Agents, GS-14. Following the inspection, personnel handling Soviet-bloc investigations were reduced by one Special Agent, GS-14, and one Clerk, GS-4. At the time of the reorganization of the Division in December, 1970, personnel handling Soviet-bloc investigations were reduced by four Special Agents (one GS-15; three GS-14) and five clerical personnel (one GS-5 and four GS-4).

(6) Special Agent personnel is considered adequate.

(7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity of the cases, and the importance of the investigations.

In the Officials Unit, both Washington and New York, we handle the greatest volume of complex investigations since
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

these cases include the bulk of our double agent operations. As of December 1, 1970, there were 74 active double agents in the Soviet field. This is the largest number of double agents we have ever achieved. At the time of the last inspection as of April 1, 1970, there were 67 active double agents. The current number of 74 is compared most favorably with the number of actual double agents three years ago (12/1/67), when there were 47 active double agents. At that time there were 18 case Agents handling Soviet matters. At the time of the last inspection, there were 16 case Agents in the Soviet field, and the current load is being carried by less than 14 case Agents. Three of the 14 are assigned part time to the handling of Soviet-bloc matters.

With the reorganization of the Division in December, 1970, the volume and work load for the Supervisors in the Espionage Section were materially increased. Four Agent Supervisors who were formerly assigned to the Sino-Satellite Section were transferred to the Espionage Section and brought with them in excess of 2,000 cases. The only possible way that this volume could be handled was by redistributing the work within the Coordination Unit and the Special Cases Unit. The volume of investigations in these Units is extremely heavy considering the number of special projects and special operations which are normally assigned in the Units.

In the Satellite Unit handling Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav investigative matters, we currently have 1,293 active cases divided among four Special Agents. In our Soviet-bloc counterintelligence work, we were as of December 1, 1970, operating 64 active double agents. This should be compared with the figure at the time of our last inspection, April 1, 1970, when there were 61 active double agents.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The current authorized personnel complement of the Racial Intelligence Section as of the close of business, January 8, 1971, is 21 Agents and 22 clerical personnel with a request pending for one additional clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit. This is broken down as follows according to Units within the Section:

Front Office

Section Chief - 1
Number One Man - 1
Secretary of
Section Chief - 1
Secretary (Stenography) - 1
to Number One Man

Black Nationalist Unit - East

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
7 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist Unit - Central

4 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge*
3 clerical personnel
*one Supervisor under transfer to Inspection Division

Black Nationalist Unit - West

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel

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Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel

1) There are no clerical vacancies in the Section; however, as it was noted previously, a request has been submitted for an additional clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit which would increase our complement to 23 if approved.

2) Special Agent Supervisor C. Edwin Enright is under transfer to the Inspection Division, transfer letter dated January 8, 1971. A replacement is being requested.

3) With the transfer of Special Agent Enright there will exist a shortage of one Supervisor in the Black Nationalist Unit - Central.

4) The clerical personnel complement is inadequate and will be barely adequate if the request for one additional clerk is approved. The workload of the Section continues to increase and shows no signs of tapering off. We will continue to closely watch the clerical situation and make appropriate recommendations as required by any substantial change in the clerical workload.

5) The streamlining of our operations wherever possible to effect manpower savings is under continual evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since the last Inspection include: 1) The discontinuance by each field division of semiannual reports concerning the black nationalist movement (Bureau file 157-8415). This was accomplished July 6, 1970. 2) On November 3, 1970, the Agitator Index was revised to delete those who were also included on the Security Index. 3) On November 5, 1970, existing instructions were modified concerning recordings of black
and New Left public appearances to allow the SAC to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or a proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except such appearances at educational institutions. Previously, prior Bureau approval was necessary.

In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype dissemination facilities to the maximum extent possible.

6) The Special Agent complement of 21 is the same as at the time of the last Inspection.

The Division was reorganized December 17, 1970, on the basis of approximate caseload per Supervisor of 279. This figure was based on the October 1, 1970, caseload figures. Since that time there has been a heavy increase in the caseload in the black extremist field where at present the average caseload as of January 1, 1971, stood at 349 per Supervisor. At the time of the last Inspection, the caseload of the Section stood at 5,946 including Klan and white hate-type cases. Under the reorganization this Section lost the Klan and white hate cases and as of January 1, 1971, the caseload encompassing black extremist individuals and organizations including racial informants in these organizations stood at 6,642, an increase of 696 cases since the date of the last Inspection.

There is a dire need for additional Special Agent supervisory personnel to handle our heavy responsibilities in the black extremist field, if we are to afford these cases the attention that they deserve. Based upon the Division reorganization figures, an additional four Supervisors would
be required; however, we have tightened our belt and taken streamlining measures wherever possible and are requesting only two Special Agent Supervisors at the present time. We will attempt to accomplish our objectives with two additional Supervisors.

There are several factors that would indicate our work in the black extremist field will continue to increase. The increasing militancy of black extremists on college campuses caused us to require the field (by airtel 11/4/70) to open cases on all black student groups on college campuses as well as cases on the leaders thereof. There are numerous such groups throughout the United States. The Black Panther Party is growing and in September, 1970, opened up an international section in Algiers. In addition a grand jury is sitting in California with witnesses being heard in efforts to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther Party. The work in connection therewith and other aspects of the Black Panther Party investigation consumes almost the full time of one Supervisor.

Black extremist activity in this country is rapidly developing more and more in international aspects. Residents of other countries, including United States citizens and non-citizens, are involved in clandestine and overt operational and propaganda activity among racial extremists. We have targeted CIA as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the development of data regarding foreign influences in the black extremist movement. The National Security Agency has vast capabilities in developing the type of information needed and we have alerted that Agency to our basic needs and have made arrangements for future assistance.

A prime factor in the rapid increase in our caseload has been our technical coverage of the Black Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection we had six such technical surveillances in operation. We presently have 12 installed, one awaiting installation,
and one awaiting approval. This special coverage provides on a daily basis a wealth of intelligence information and is most productive source for the opening of numerous new cases in the black extremist field. With the added coverage we can expect a continuing increase in the caseload.

In view of the above factors, there exists a dire need for two additional Special Agent Supervisors at this time.

7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into consideration not only the caseload which is compiled on a monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts taken on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures in the black extremist movement such as David Hilliard, Huey P. Newton, Elbert Howard, Le Roi Jones, Eldridge Cleaver, Emory Douglas, and others require a considerable amount of supervisory attention.

As previously noted, the Department is attempting to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther Party and as a result it has been necessary to assign one Supervisor almost exclusively to handle investigation of this organization. The investigations of other organizations require a great deal of supervisory attention and direction. Analyses of current developments in the racial field, special requests from other Government agencies, preparation of special studies, and initiation of special projects all require the expenditure of considerable supervisory time and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy of personnel.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

As of close of business 1/8/71 Section complement was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Agents</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries (Steno)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary (Typing)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stenographer (Supervisory)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical (Supervisory)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stenographers</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno) and one Secretary (Typing).

Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno), one Clerk (GS-5) and one Clerk (GS-4).

Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno), one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4).

Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three Secretaries (Steno), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and two Clerks (GS-4).

Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno) and three Clerks (GS-4).

Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor (Steno), one Assistant Supervisor (Clerk) and 26 Clerk-Stenographers, GS-4.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WRW:ams
6-E
(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 1/8/71, although one resignation was pending (described in item 2 below).

(2) Miss Agnes M. Klima, Clerk-Stenographer, G3-4, assigned to Stenographic Pool, submitted her resignation effective 1/14/71 and acknowledgement of same was dated 1/6/71. This stenographic position was approved to be filled by assigning a G3-4 Clerk (Miss Barbara A. Hatcher) who had passed the stenographic test and request for replacement for Miss Hatcher dated 1/8/71 was submitted. Miss Hatcher actually was transferred to the stenographic position in the pool as of beginning of business 1/11/71 when her replacement, Miss Cheryl D. Carpenter, reported to this Section for assignment.

(3) There was no shortage or overage of authorized personnel as of close of business 1/8/71.

(4) Authorized clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive.

(5) As result of last inspection authorized Agent complement was reduced from 17 to 15. This manpower savings was effected by discontinuing two programs and streamlining a third one. Supporting memoranda in this regard have been submitted as attachments to yellow write-up 5-A-4 on Section and Unit Analysis dated 1/12/71.

Memorandum to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors 70-13 dated 7/29/70 noted that the Liaison Section of Domestic Intelligence Division was being abolished effective immediately. This resulted in a cut-back of one Section Chief plus eight supervisory Special Agents who were engaged in domestic liaison functions. Calls from other U. S. agencies formerly handled by these nine men are now handled by Agent personnel throughout the Bureau who are principally concerned with the subject matter of the call. By far, the majority of such calls are handled by Agent personnel presently assigned to Nationalities Intelligence Section. In addition, representatives of other agencies who were contacted in their offices prior to discontinuance of Liaison Section frequently call at Domestic Intelligence Division for consultation. Arrangements were made for couriers representing certain other sensitive agencies, such as National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, to call at Domestic Intelligence Division for the purpose of delivering or receiving mail requiring protective services of armed couriers.
Thus, many of the functions formerly performed by Special Agent personnel are handled by currently assigned personnel within the Division, resulting in the savings of the time of the nine Agents released.

As a result of the Division-wide reorganization effected 12/16/70 this Section absorbed without offsetting Special Agent personnel work relating to Chinese matters formerly assigned to three Special Agent Supervisors in the Sino-Satellite Section (now abolished). This resulted in an increased case load of over 25 percent.

(6) While there are 20 Agents assigned to the Section, two are assigned to the Section Front Office and five to the Special Coordination Unit, which handles remaining domestic liaison functions and all foreign liaison functions; thus, there are 13 Agents assigned to desks on which cases are handled. The case load per Agent since the last inspection has increased from 193 to 278, a 44 percent increase. This has been the result of cutting back two Agents as result of the last inspection and the assignment of Chinese work to the Section effective with the Division reorganization 12/16/70. There has been insufficient time since the latter date to establish whether the significant increase in case load per man will adversely affect the efficient operation of the Section. At this time, however, no additional Agent personnel is being requested for assignment to desks handling cases but the matter will be closely followed and if recommendations in this connection are considered appropriate in the future they will be submitted with justifying data.

At the present time there are five supervisory Special Agents assigned to the Special Coordination Unit and the heavy increase in work load on the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD) in that Unit (to which two of the five Agents are assigned) has resulted in a situation warranting the assignment of two additional Special Agents to the desk. In connection with this, following is submitted:

In December, 1970, our foreign liaison offices were expanded from 11 to 17. It has come at a time when the two FLD Supervisors have been barely able to keep up with the flow of paper let alone actually examine and analyze it in order to afford active and constructive supervision to our foreign offices. This problem arises from two causes, (1) the heavy demands made on the time of these two Supervisors in welcoming and personally supervising the visits to the Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who are valuable and cooperative contacts of our Legal Attaches--such visitors
currently average 27 per month; and (2) the appreciable increase (62 percent) in the past ten years of the Foreign Police Cooperation cases we handle.

The Legal Attache expansion in December, 1970, increased Bureau personnel abroad from 60 to 88, of which latter number 42 are Special Agents. The latest case load figures available for the 11 Legal Attache offices then existing are for 10/31/70, at which time the 11 offices carried a total of 3,020 cases. In October, 1960, five Special Agent Supervisors were assigned to the FLD, one of whom devoted a portion of his time to Buphans matters, which matters have now been transferred to another Section. At that time the case load for all foreign offices was 1693.

In October, 1960, we had 166 Foreign Police Cooperation cases on the FLD. In October, 1970, there were 273. This large increase in Foreign Police Cooperation cases was absorbed as a result of the delegation to a clerical employee of supervisory responsibility for about 95 percent of the cases. This clerical employee, who is in Grade GS-7, is most efficient and quite capable but cannot be expected to have the experience of an Agent to recognize promptly potentially embarrassing situations arising.

As we now have six new Legal Attache offices, we can expect both the case load and the Foreign Police Cooperation requests to increase substantially.

The FLD Supervisors should be watching mail flow to determine the promptness with which Legal Attaches respond to requests; the thoroughness of handling such cases; and the adequacy of foreign agency contacts in a position to afford the Bureau the desired degree of cooperation. The FLD Supervisors should be preparing memoranda reflecting Legal Attache accomplishments in order to keep the Director fully apprised of the truly excellent work being done by our Agents abroad. As the situation now stands, the two present FLD Supervisors just do not have time to do this and we are incurring the risk of failing to afford direction and guidance in this very important area of the Bureau's operations.

To comply with Bureau requirements our 42 men abroad must seek cooperation of foreign agencies. In reciprocity they must accept requests for investigations in the U. S. regarding matters as simple as running down bad debtors to complex investigations involving the location of murder suspects. The two present FLD Supervisors at this time, because of the
heavy demands on them, are unable to afford the necessary direction and assistance to the clerical employee handling Foreign Police Cooperation cases.

To afford the necessary and proper guidance to our foreign operations, particularly to the six new offices which have now been established and which will make heavy demands for immediate support, and to overcome the present heavy work load described above, two additional Agent Supervisors, preferably men having potential for foreign assignment, should be approved for the FLD at this time.

(7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts, complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and intelligence requirements, patterns of delinquency, personnel capabilities, and past experience in shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: During the course of this inspection
(ESM:wmj 1/22/71) thorough analyses of work were performed
which have given some insight in the
supervision of work in your Division.

Taken into consideration was your recent reorganization of the Division
which appears to have accomplished a better balance of work between branches.

In this write-up you have requested replacement Agents for SAs C. E. Enright and G. M. Quinn, both assigned in your Espionage and Racial Branch. In addition, you have requested two additional Agents for the Racial Intelligence Section and two Agents for the Special Coordination Unit.

Division case load was surveyed by categories from the field administrative reports for a 12-month period (January through December, 1970) to establish trends over this period. Basically, pertinent trends indicated increases of 70.2% in Internal Security and New Left cases during the 12-month period; a 57.4% increase in racial matters; 34.9% in Security Informants; a decline of 33% in Espionage (65) and decline of 13.3% in Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (105) cases.

In addition, case loads by Section were reconstructed (in view of Division reorganization) and compared with case loads at the time of the last inspection as indicated in the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Inspection</th>
<th>Current Inspection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Espionage</td>
<td>5846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>4746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>2944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security</td>
<td>3658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left</td>
<td>6551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>No cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To further analyze case and work load the Research Section and Special Coordination Unit were excluded from computations and manpower was considered on the basis of 50 men in the Espionage Racial Intelligence Branch and 33 men in the Internal Security Branch (Section Chief and Number One Men also excluded).

Total case load in Espionage Branch currently is 15,300 and 11,739 in Internal Security; case load per supervisor in Espionage determined to be 14% lower than
his counterpart in Internal Security (306 vs. 356). It is noted in this regard that the Racial Intelligence case load raises the Espionage Branch figures, since the Nationalities Intelligence Section has an average of only 278 and Espionage Section of only 280 cases per man. The average in Racial Intelligence Section is 350.

We next conducted surveys to determine whether the complexity of cases in Espionage and Nationalities work was appreciably more complex to justify the above-noted differences in case load.

All pending 65 classification cases (total 327) were reviewed and it was determined a total of 539 items of correspondence containing instructions or direction emanating from SOG were contained in these files or an average of 1.6 pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period. Over half of this was somewhat routine and very short.

We also reviewed the 100 most important (105s) cases and determined an average of 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at SOG in these files. 62% of this was considered somewhat routine.

We reviewed over 90% of your 298 Potential Double Agent cases and determined the average case was 3 1/2 years old and contained only 1 piece of correspondence in over 3 years (subject of separate write-up).

Other surveys revealed current active cases in these categories had an average of only 3+ pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period.

It is felt that degree of supervision and the amount of instruction and direction given our cases can be measured in one way by the frequency of correspondence necessitated by the individual cases.

Another survey of mail signed out at Section level revealed that approximately 57% of your outgoing mail emanates from the combined efforts of your New Left and Racial Sections. Espionage Section contributed about 8.7% and Nationalities Intelligence about 15%.

On the basis of the above studies and reviews of files, I conclude that, if anything, due to the intensity of the action that it requires more input to supervise Racial and New Left than it does cases assigned in the Espionage and Nationalities Sections.

For this reason, I feel you still have an imbalance in your Division which should be corrected. That is, you still have 5 men working Espionage and Nationalities
work who should be shifted to other work to balance your assignments. I do not feel that you need two more men in the Special Coordination Unit at this time since increased work load considerations due to the additional Legats has not yet happened. When and if it does, you should make necessary intra-Branch transfers.

I agree with your recommended replacements for SAs Enright and Quinn; however, replacement for Quinn should be assigned to the Racial Section and not the Espionage Section. I am submitting separate recommendations regarding this.

Any further additions to the Racial Intelligence Section should be made from within the Espionage Branch from the pertinent Sections.

To recap, I feel as a result of this inspection that your present quota of 116 men is adequate. I feel the replacements requested are justified but I do not agree with your request for 4 additional Agents.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested:

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: The Inspector has noted our recent reorganization to accomplish a better balance of work between branches.

The reorganization was based on memorandum 10/9/70, Sizoo to Brennan, requesting 6 additional Agent Supervisors and memorandum 10/14/70, Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, denying this request. Mr. Felt's memorandum noted there were 18921 cases (excluding large volume of informants and Communist Party, USA, matters) and based on our set up at that time the average case load per Agent was 305 in the Internal Security Branch and 225 in the Espionage Branch.

Details of the approach utilized in our reorganization, 12/16/70, are set forth in the attachment. With 116 Division Agent complement and 83 desk agents (same figures utilized during current inspection) we distributed the Division caseload (22,857 as of 10/31/70, or an average of 275 per desk agent) as equitably as possible. This resulted in apportionment of caseload among the six present sections as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Desk Agents</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Average Cases Per Agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3627</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalities Intelligence</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3692</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Intelligence</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4948</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5491</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espionage</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5099</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
<td><strong>22857</strong></td>
<td><strong>275</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the reorganization all work as well as cases formerly handled in three sections in the Espionage Branch was consolidated into two sections. All cases and work formerly handled in two operational sections in the Internal Security Branch were spread among three sections with the creation of the New Left Section as a separate entity. This resulted in additional Agents for New Left work.

Since 10/31/70 (caseload figures utilized for reorganization purposes) caseloads in each section have changed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>10/31/70</th>
<th>Current Inspection</th>
<th>Net Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Espionage</td>
<td>5099</td>
<td>5038</td>
<td>-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Intelligence</td>
<td>4948</td>
<td>6642</td>
<td>+1694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalities Intelligence</td>
<td>3692</td>
<td>3620</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security</td>
<td>3627</td>
<td>5318</td>
<td>+1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left</td>
<td>5491</td>
<td>6421</td>
<td>+930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The slight reductions in caseloads in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections have left the average cases per Agent at 280 and 278, respectively, both above the norm of 275 established for reorganizational purposes.

The Inspector has noted the number of outgoing pieces of correspondence in the 65 classification cases, the 100 most important 105 classification cases, and a review of 80 percent of 298 "potential double agent" cases. The vast majority of the cases handled in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections are 105 classification cases. Recognizing the Inspector reviewed the most important cases and determined that on an average 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at the Seat of
Government in these files, I would estimate that a conservative minimum of over two pieces of correspondence originated at Seat of Government in each of the 105 classification group as a whole. With an average caseload of 280 per Supervisor, this would mean that 560 outgoing communications would be submitted each year. Minus weekends and holidays, there are 252 workdays in a year and I would estimate an average of 32 days per man would be accounted for by annual leave, sick leave, inspection assignments, tour assignments, firearms and physical examinations. This would leave 220 days for productive work per Supervisor. This would mean that each Supervisor would be required to review the necessary files and dictate approximately two and one-half communications per day. I feel this is perhaps a conservative estimate inasmuch as many of the cases involved relate to foreign diplomats and in each case, at the inception, we have to prepare a communication to Department of State setting forth basic facts about the individual and obtaining authority to investigate, and, thereafter, issue appropriate instructions to the field. Thus, in these cases, there are two outgoing communications prepared at the very inception.

In addition to measuring work on the basis of outgoing correspondence, I think note must be taken of the fact that the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections have a responsibility with regard to over 130 countries. The vast majority, of course, are of concern to the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Supervisors on the various desks have to be aware of conditions existing which affect the Bureau's responsibilities in the intelligence field and this encompasses the review of much intelligence material which shows up in the incoming mail count, all of which must be properly reviewed and coordinated.

During the inspection a mail count was kept for five days and the results, of course, are available to the Inspector. In this connection, during the five-day period, each Supervisor in the Espionage Section received an average of 255 pieces of regular incoming mail (such as, Seat of Government memoranda, letterhead memoranda, teletypes, airtels, cables, letters from field, and letters from outside agencies) for a total of 378 pages. Other incoming mail (such as intelligence reports and cables from other agencies, Bureau Source 6 and Bureau Source 200 items, publications, visa notifications and similar such items) averaged 40 items per Agent in the Espionage Section and the pages totaled 213. With regard to outgoing mail, there was an average per man of 11 items and 18 pages of dictated material and 79 items and 157 pages of outgoing nonddictated, all of which involved preparation of material for dissemination to other agencies. In the Nationalities Intelligence Section, the comparable average figures per Supervisor were 213 items and 416 pages of incoming regular mail, 109 items and 440 pages of other incoming mail, 22 items and 40 pages of outgoing dictated mail, and 68 items and 169 pages of outgoing nonddictated mail.
SUPERVISORY NON-INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL

Special Coordination Unit 5
New Left Report Unit 4
Racial Report Unit
Special Records Unit 2
Central Research Unit 5

Front Offices (Sections & Division) (Proposed 12-8 man) (4-12 shift) 17
TOTAL NON-INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL 33

TOTAL DIVISION COMPLEMENT 116
Less Total Non-Investigative Personnel 33

TOTAL AVAILABLE INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL 83

DIVISION CASE LOAD AVERAGE (10/41/70)

Total Division Case Count 22,857
Total Investigative Personnel 83
Division Average Case Load 275
## INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party, USA Unit</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Revolutionary Individual Unit</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International New Left Unit</td>
<td>26**</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klan &amp; White Hate Groups Unit</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Informant Unit* Est.</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One additional man

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>332***</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                | 3627  | 15  | 279     |

*GIC from Research Section
** Ad Hoc, etc.
*** Does not include 268 routine CP informant cases.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Unit</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle &amp; South American Unit</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalities Unit</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups Unit (Incl. CH.)</td>
<td>1487</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Coordination Unit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3692</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Net Case Supervisors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Black Nationalist Units</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Informant Unit</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4948</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### New Left Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Informant Unit (Est.)</td>
<td>567*</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Left Individuals Unit</td>
<td>1484</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Left Groups Unit</td>
<td>952</td>
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<td>2341</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabotage</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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* 600 (Est) cases to Internal Security Section with those organizations transferred.
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<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<tr>
<td>Front Office</td>
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<td>Four Soviet &amp; Two Satellite Units</td>
<td>5099</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>5099</td>
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<td>283</td>
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# RESEARCH SECTION

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<th>Men</th>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Research Unit</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Racial and New Left</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting Unit*</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Special Records Unit*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Combining two units frees one SIC to handle informants in Internal Security Section.

**Will assume record keeping function for Security Informants.

***This low complement of Agent personnel should stand up when super clerks (4) are taken into account.*
The fact that the work on a desk is measured by more than just caseload can best be illustrated by citing figures of incoming and outgoing mail for Special Coordination Unit, Nationalities Intelligence Section, for which no case load is reported. In that Unit there were 1173 items consisting of 1777 pages of regular incoming mail; 52 items consisting of 137 pages of other incoming mail; 117 items consisting of 233 pages of outgoing dictated mail; and 290 items consisting of 456 pages of outgoing nonddictated mail.

As can be seen from the above, since the time of reorganization when equity in caseloads was established and manpower assignments made, there has been no decrease in the amount of work responsibilities in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections. The December, 1970, reorganization resulted in the assignment of significant extra work to those two Sections. The substantial increases in caseloads in Racial Intelligence, Internal Security and New Left Sections have resulted from the opening of new investigations on members of basic revolutionary groups and the removal of the moratorium on Security Index reporting, approved by the Director, plus increased efforts in these areas by the field.

I feel a strong responsibility in our work in the Domestic Intelligence Division in connection with the national security of our country and am concerned with the ever increasing number of officials from communist countries assigned to the U.S. In addition, the President has recently expressed his urgent need for better high-level coverage which has resulted in expansion of our operations abroad and where possible in the U.S.

Foregoing was taken into consideration in connection with my request for additional personnel and you may be assured that whatever decision is reached I and the men in my Division will do our utmost to fulfill our responsibilities in all areas.

ADDENDUM

INSPRCTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:djr 1/25/71)

The information furnished by you will be taken into consideration in further evaluating your request for additional men and you will be advised of the Bureau's decision in this matter.

Assistant Director note.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNA Noted.

1/25/71

DEM:mjt
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

ADDITION OF SUITABLE DESIGNATION TO CAPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS PERTAINING TO CERTAIN RACIAL INFORMANTS TO INSURE PROPER ROUTING OF SUCH CORRESPONDENCE AT SOG.

INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER: Prior to the reorganization of the Domestic Intelligence Division on 12-16-70, all informants reporting on racial matters and white hate groups (including Ku Klux Klan) were supervised by the Racial Informant and White Hate Unit of the Racial Intelligence Section. All such informants are designated as Racial Informants. Subsequent to the reorganization of this Division, supervision of substantive matters pertaining to white hate groups and corresponding informants (566) is handled by the Klan and White Hate Groups Unit of the Internal Security Section. Supervision of black nationalist organizations and related informant cases (564) continues to be handled in the Racial Intelligence Section.

As a result of the above, the Racial Intelligence Section is receiving mail concerning racial informants who are reporting on white hate group activity. This mail should be reviewed and handled by the Internal Security Section. At the present time, it is not possible to determine to which section such mail should be routed without reviewing the content of the incoming correspondence since the caption of communications pertaining to all racial informants indicate only that a racial source is involved. The type of activity on which the informant reports — black nationalist as opposed to white hate groups — is not set forth in the caption.

In view of the fact that over 40% of the cases pertaining to racial sources involve white hate groups, it would appear desirable to identify such matters clearly in the caption of communications submitted to the Bureau by the field. This will permit such mail to be routed directly to the Internal Security Section and will save an appreciable amount of time in getting the mail to the section where it

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/22-71
HRH:1jw

NW 55151 DocId:32989638 Page 574 206
will be handled. Such an addition to the caption will also preclude the necessity for the content of communications of this nature to be reviewed in the Racial Intelligence Section.

It is believed the desired routing could be effected by adding a characterization, such as White Hate Group (abbreviated WHG), to the caption of correspondence concerning informants who are reporting on the activities of such groups. Under existing procedure communications concerning racial informants reporting on white hate groups are submitted under a caption such as: CO 1234-R. Under the suggested procedure the communication would be captioned: CO 1234-R (WHG).

Comments of Section Chiefs Gray and Moore and Assistant Director Brennan are requested.
SECTION CHIEF A.W. GRAY: Inspector's suggestion is a good one and should be adopted. However, in conformance with both existing "character" structure of Bureau case titles and a recommended change regarding security informant titles (memorandum A.W. Gray to C.D. Brennan, captioned "Security Informants; IS - Communist; New Left," dated 1/21/71), it is proposed that the character designation Racial Matters be included. Incoming communications concerning white hate group informants only would thus bear the title: CO 1234-R
RM - WHG

The Internal Security Section, if the Inspector concurs, will implement this change with appropriate instructions to the field.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
AWG:bcw

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE: With respect to the Klan and white hate informants I concur with the above.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
AWG:dib
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
ARTICLES CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF
RACIAL EXTREMISTS
RESEARCH SECTION

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Research Section prepares a number of timely monographs and other studies dealing with the activities of racial extremists. These papers, as well as the daily teletype summary and the weekly "Summary of Extremist Activities," serve to keep Bureau personnel, appropriate government officials, and the intelligence community advised on the up-to-date situation involving these matters.

Much information received is from public sources or otherwise of a non-confidential nature. The Bureau is in a unique position to collate and place in perspective the information concerning activities of these violence-prone extremists. This data could be used for preparation of articles for publication in magazines, journals, and newspapers which would serve to expose these individuals and organizations for what they are. Such articles would give the public an insight into the true nature of these extremists who would destroy our system of government and our society. This would serve to diminish public sympathy and support for their activities and would strengthen public support of law enforcement in general.

Although the Bureau has prepared and/or been instrumental in the publication of a number of articles concerning the campus revolutionaries of the New Left and of white hate groups, the only recent material we have made available to the public concerning racial extremist activities is that set forth in the Appropriations testimony. There is a definite need for good, timely articles for public consumption placing in perspective and showing the true nature of the activities of racial extremists. The Crime Records Division has sources available to facilitate publication of such material.

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that Research Section, with the assistance of and in coordination with the Crime Records Division, correlate the preparation and publication of articles dealing

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
MSR:mcm/mkz

[Handwritten signature]
Suggestion Memorandum
Articles Concerning Activities of
Racial Extremists
Research Section

with the activities of racial extremists. Care should be
taken to use only material of a non-confidential nature which
would not be detrimental to Bureau operations. Consideration
should be given to a study of the Black Panther Party along
the lines of the article entitled "A Study of Marxist Revolutionary
Violence; SDS, 1962-1969" which effectively exposed the SDS.
Other articles, perhaps shorter and more limited in scope, on
specific activities and groups also should be considered at an
early date.

Comments of Section Chief R. D. Cotter and
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: The Inspector's suggestion
(TJS/mea 1/21/71)
has merit. It is believed that
Research Section would be able
to gather together material which would be of value in educating the public
to the real nature of extremists such as the Black Panther Party. Research
Section will, consistent with current work assignments, begin preparation
of material which, in coordination with Crime Records Division, can be
made public.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
MSR:mcm/mkz
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I think the Inspector's suggestion is very worthwhile. We believe that wherever possible the true nature of extremists should be publicized. Within the limits of available manpower, we will furnish Crime Records Division with as much unclassified material as possible for public consumption.
CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP

EOBAL AHMAD
SECURITY MATTER - MISCELLANEOUS
BUREAU FILE: 100-448675

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: This case was originally opened on 1/25/68 based upon Albany letter to the Director dated 1/19/68, requesting Bureau authority to institute an investigation of the subject based upon his antidraft and anti-Vietnam protest activities. At the time, subject was also considered to be a campus leader and agitator at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, where he was employed as an assistant professor in the school of Industrial and Labor Relations.

Ahmad has subsequently become involved in the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL) and is presently under indictment as one of the coconspirators in this matter. (The ECCSL involves a conspiracy by a dissident group of priests, nuns, teachers, students and former students who have displayed opposition to the Vietnam War by committing acts of violence against Government agencies, including selective service boards and private corporations.) The leaders of the ECCSL, one of whom is Ahmad, planned to destroy underground electric and heating systems serving Government buildings in Washington, D.C. The group also has reportedly planned to kidnap a high Government official and Ahmad was a key figure in this phase.

Set forth below is a brief summary of background information taken from the subject's file:

Personal History

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) records at Buffalo, New York, indicate that Eobal Ahmad was born December 30, 1930, at Irki, Bihar, India, and is a citizen of Pakistan. His parents are listed as Ataur Rahman, father, and Khatoon Rahman, mother. Subject is described as male, 5'7 1/2", 135 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, brown complexion, scar on left hand. In 1969 he was single and was assigned Alien Registration Number (ARN) A13183502. INS records disclose that on February 3, 1967, Ahmad's status was adjusted to that of a permanent resident alien.
Eqbal Ahmad

INS records further indicate that Ahmad first came to the United States in September, 1957, on a trip financed by a Fulbright Travel Grant and that Occidental College at Los Angeles, California, provided this fellowship. His sponsor was the Institute of International Education. In September, 1958, Ahmad transferred to Princeton University on a university fellowship and remained there until September, 1961, when he left the United States to take up residence in North Africa. INS records indicate that Ahmad last arrived in the United States at New York City on September 21, 1963, destined for Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, on a teaching fellowship. INS files also set forth prior residences at Lahore, Pakistan; Los Angeles, California; Tunis, Tunisia; Urbana, Illinois, and Ithaca, New York. Former employments include "lecturer in Modern History" at Forman Christian College and the Pakistan Military Academy in Pakistan as well as teaching assignments at Princeton University, University of Illinois and Cornell University.

He was registered in absentia during 1961 and 1962 and during this time was in Morocco and Tunisia. He was awarded a Ph.D. degree on June 13, 1967, by Princeton University.

On January 14, 1969, the Chicago Office determined that Ahmad was employed at the time by the Adlai E. Stevenson Institute of International Affairs (ASIIA), 5757 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Ahmad was listed as a recipient of funds for study in Vietnam for the period 1968-69.

In July, 1968, the Albany Division reported that information was developed indicating that the subject proposed to travel to North and South Vietnam. It is further noted that Ahmad was leaving Cornell University because of failure to have his contract renewed. He indicated in a published article of the "Cornell Daily Sun" that he would travel to North and South Vietnam during the 1968-69 academic year as a fellow of the Center for International Studies of the University of Chicago. The article further reported that Ahmad would carry press cards from a Pakistani newspaper and two Algerian newspapers. He was identified as a person active in the antiwar movement at Cornell University.
Eqbal Ahmad

On July 12, 1968, Ahmad's former landlord at Ithaca, New York, advised that the subject told him that he would travel to Vietnam in September, 1968, in order to study and report upon the war. Ahmad reportedly said that this study would be within his field of interest since he has been conducting research on guerrilla warfare and revolutions.

Language Ability

Subject reportedly speaks fluent English, Urdu, French, Arabic, Persian and Hindustani.

Revolutionary Background

On May 8, 1965, an issue of the "Daily Illini," a daily student newspaper published at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana campus, Illinois, listed the participants in a local "teach-in" on the war in Vietnam to be held on May 15, 1965. One of the speakers was identified as Eqbal Ahmad, assistant professor of political science who was described as an expert on guerrilla and internal warfare who had worked with the anti-French FLN guerrillas during the Algerian independence struggle and who reportedly had studied guerrilla movements all over the world.

Ahmad's file cites numerous instances of Ahmad's involvement in antidraft and anti-Vietnam demonstrations and activities as well as numerous anti-American statements made by him. During his subsequent association with the ECCSL, Ahmad has been one of the prime movers in the plot to kidnap a high Government official and appears to have played an increasingly important role as a leader and advisor of the ECCSL.

In view of the foregoing information, the following suggestions are set forth for your consideration and appropriate action:

1. Eqbal Ahmad appears to have the potential qualities (background, intelligence, education, experience and linguistic ability) of a foreign intelligence agent.
Eqbal Ahmad

It is suggested that consideration be given to issuing instructions to the field to institute an intensive full field investigation of this subject particularly with respect to his national origin, travel and residences in foreign countries and involvement in foreign political activities.

If investigation abroad so justifies, it is suggested that consideration be given to intensifying our investigation of the subject to include the establishment of sources or informants close to him. Physical surveillance and the development of highly confidential sources should not be overlooked in effecting full coverage of Ahmad's current activities.

This background investigation should insure that emphasis is placed on developing information concerning Ahmad's income and financial affairs, verification of subject's travel to South and/or North Vietnam in 1968-69 and subject's activities in the Los Angeles, California, area during the period of his attendance at Occidental College at Los Angeles.

You should insure the field aggressively intensifies this background investigation, yet it should be emphasized that utmost discretion and good judgment should be exercised to avoid unfounded charges of "harassment" being directed against the Bureau.

The above suggestions are not to be considered as all-inclusive; however, you should insure that this matter receives close personal supervision.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.
Suggestions of the Inspector have been noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be pursued and the field will be instructed to intensify its investigation in this matter, utilizing the utmost discretion in view of pending prosecution against the subject. For this reason, no effort will be made, pending prosecution, to institute sensitive coverage or other overt activity which might prejudice the prosecution, result in a charge of harassment or otherwise be a source of embarrassment to the Bureau. Following final prosecute action of subject, all investigative measures and techniques will be considered in line with the Inspector's suggestions to determine the nationalistic orientation and activities of the subject.

Suggestions of the Inspector have been noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be pursued and the field instructed to intensify its investigation of subject, consistent with the fact that at this time prosecution is pending and therefore discretion must be exercised. This matter will be closely followed.

Inspector's comments are noted and appreciated and prompt action will be taken to implement his suggestions along the lines set forth above by the Supervisor and Section Chief.
INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The DESECO Program (development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) has been operated with considerable success since it was implemented as a result of an espionage conference in 1957. As a result of this program, a substantial number of security informants and double agents have been developed.

Simultaneous with the imminent opening of the Chinese Communist (Chicom) Embassy in Canada in early February, 1971, we can expect more intelligence operations by the Chicom in the U.S. Information already furnished by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police indicates that possibly fifty percent of the intelligence activity generated by the Chicom in Canada will be directed at the U.S.

It is recognized that certain steps have previously been taken with a view toward developing double agents and informants among the Chicom. These include contacts with certain Chinese scientists working in strategic technical fields in the U.S., as well as efforts to develop some ethnic Chinese sources who might be targeted against the Chicom. It would appear that these programs should be expanded and intensified with a view toward developing an aggressive effort directed at the Chicom and patterned after the DESECO program. This program should include persons who by the nature of their occupation, national origin, or otherwise might be logical targets of the Chicom or would have occasion or opportunity to be in touch with the Chicom. This program would include journalists, students, educators, politicians, librarians, travel agents and the like.

Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.
The intelligence/espionage threat posed by the Chicom, particularly in view of the opening of the Chicom Embassy in Canada during 2/71, is recognized.

In line with the Inspector's suggestion, we will intensify our current efforts aimed at penetration of Chicom intelligence through development of methods and techniques similar to those utilized in the DESECO Program. We will extend this operation on a highly selective basis and will strive to come up with sources who will be in a position to disrupt or neutralize Chicom intelligence efforts directed against the U.S.

In connection with possible operations in Canada, we will, of course, work closely with RCMP which has been most cooperative with us in the past.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
1/20/71

DE: mjt

The Inspector's suggestion will certainly be followed. In addition, with the strong probability the Chicom will be admitted to the United Nations in the near future, DESECO's in the Chinese field will be most useful to target against Chicom officials who will be assigned to the Chicom United Nations Mission and who will be employed in the Secretariat.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
DEFECTOR PROGRAM

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The development of a Soviet intelligence officer as a defector-in-place who will advise us of hostile intelligence activities and plans is an urgent and paramount requirement of the Bureau.

We have failed to achieve this objective in almost ten years despite our programs and investigative activities. This suggests we take a fresh approach to the problem.

The present "Defector Program" operates as follows: "Defector committees" consisting of Espionage desk Supervisors in both the New York and Washington Field Offices select five Soviet intelligence officers (with Bureau approval) as defection targets. This selection is based on a variety of reasons which indicate the Soviets have defection potential. These Soviets are then marked for priority attention and "defection teams" consisting of four men in each office are exclusively assigned to assist the five case Agents in conducting physical surveillances and to apply increased investigative attention to these Soviet targets which will hopefully lead towards a successful defection approach.

It is unlikely that only four men and five case Agents would be able to obtain complete information relating to the daylight, evening and weekend activities, contacts and behavior of the five Soviet targets to present a true picture of their character and psychological makeup essential to a successful defection approach.

It is suggested that serious consideration be afforded to decreasing the number of selected Soviet targets to two or three and to increase the number of Special Agents on each "defection team." It is more likely that ten to fifteen highly motivated Agents can be successful in a total all-out team effort to bring about the defection of the targeted Soviet. This effort would include physical surveillances; the placing of Deeco, social, and double agent informants close to the target; the development of a close friendship with the target by an Agent under appropriate cover; thorough psychological study; and whatever other imaginative and unorthodox procedures may be required to

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

HDC: mk1
1/20/71
create the best possible situation to enable the Soviet target to defect. This all-out effort on the part of each team should be highly professional and treated as a Bureau "special" with resolve and overriding determination to succeed.

It is fully realized that your manpower directed against Soviet intelligence has been decreased. It is also realized that it is an extremely difficult job to defect a trained Soviet intelligence officer. Extremely difficult jobs require extraordinary and sometimes unorthodox methods. You should afford this proposal serious consideration and survey the New York and Washington Field Offices for their ideas regarding this proposal.

Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF WILLIAM A. BRANIGAN 1/21/71  (WAB:hke)

The suggestion of the Inspector is appreciated, and it is our feeling that it has merit. Steps will be taken to promptly initiate the survey of the New York and Washington Field Offices.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN 1/21/71  (DEM:mjt)

We are certainly cognizant of the importance of developing a defector-in-place in the Soviet field and will immediately initiate the survey suggested by the Inspector.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF Ghetto INFORMANTS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Since the implementation of the Ghetto Informant Program in 1967, it has developed into a productive source of accomplishments for the Bureau. Experience has shown that in addition to being mere listening posts for black extremist action, these informants, when motivated by specific assignments, also furnish valuable criminal information. As a result of conferences held at the Seat of Government, the field was instructed in March, 1970, to give more positive assignments to ghetto informants. The Director noted, "This is most important."

The number of ghetto informants now stands at more than 6,200, and it is essential that we continually make certain we are achieving maximum results from this vast reservoir of information. It is believed one additional step toward this goal would be the giving of more specific assignments to these ghetto informants, especially concerning black extremists living in their locality, such as subjects on the Security Index and selected Agitator Index subjects with extremist tendencies. Such assignments would include the development of detailed information concerning black extremist targets such as data relating to their daily activities, sources of income, and information as to whether the black extremists are operating in violation of Federal or local statutes. Ghetto informants would be assigned to black extremist targets with whom they are acquainted or who reside or work in the same area. It is also probable that in many instances ghetto informants could also be targeted against similar subjects of interest to the New Left Program.

Based on our experience to date, there appears to be little doubt but what these additional specific assignments, if fully implemented throughout the field, would not only increase our intelligence coverage of black extremists, but could also be the vehicle for putting more of these militants in jail on criminal charges. The success of this approach would, of course, be commensurate with the enthusiasm of the individual Agents in the field and it is necessary that pressure be kept on it. A suggested means for checking on the Program's progress at the Seat of Government would be to amend Form FD-405 under the heading "Racial Informant Accomplishments" to require the field to specifically list major accomplishments attributable to ghetto informants during the previous month.

Comments of Section Chief G.C. Moore, Section Chief R.L. Shackelford, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennen requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ADDENDUM
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE 1/21/71

I agree that the suggestion made by the Inspector has merit and should further strengthen the productivity of our Ghetto Informant Program and increase our concrete accomplishments. Necessary instructions will be issued to the field to implement the suggestion as set forth by the Inspector.

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: I concur with the above suggestion.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above suggestion and as stated above the appropriate suggestion will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
JGD:dlb
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
REVISION OF RACIAL INFORMANT
STATUS REPORT FORM FD-405

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Racial Intelligence Section
currently utilizes Form FD-405 (copy attached), captioned
"Status Report, Racial Informants, Extremist Groups
(White-Black); Racial Matters." The form is submitted by
the field quarterly, and it requires a detailed breakdown of
militant black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates
the specific informant coverage, including member informants,
for each group and area, in addition to information required
for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished
quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the
field as they occur during interim months.

The FD-405s are handled centrally by the Black
Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit and are
furnished to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive
case on each organization listed for timely evaluation of
informant development and coverage in each field office.
This enables the Bureau Supervisor to detect weaknesses quickly
and take appropriate corrective measures.

It is suggested that in order to provide tighter
accountability for member informant development and coverage,
FD-405 be revised to include an additional section to state
as follows:

"Explain why you do not have member informants in
those groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.

"Indicate what specific action is being taken to
develop member informants in those groups and advise when
member informant coverage is anticipated for each group."

Comments of Section Chief George C. Moore and
Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
HDC:mmk
**Memorandum**

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC.

SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT
RACIAL INFORMANTS
EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK)
RACIAL MATTERS

Re: ________________________________

1. Informants
   a. Listed at beginning of month
   b. Added
   c. Deleted
   d. Listed at end of month

2. Informants (Probationary)
   a. Listed at beginning of month
   b. Added
   c. Deleted
   d. Listed at end of month

3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to the development of racial informants

4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and individuals under SAC authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases

6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5)

7. Subjects Located, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6)

8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies

9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local

10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases

11. Merchandise Recovered, State and Local

12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies

NOTE: Items 1 through 9 list total numbers; items 10 through 12 list dollar value; furnish details FD-403b
Furnish complete listing quarterly - by the 10th of January, April, July, October; remaining months furnish only pertinent changes.

| Name, location and number members of black extremist & white hate groups including identities of local chapters & groups on college campuses. | Identities of informants & sources providing coverage. Underline member informant. | Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning acts of racial violence. | Identities of informants and sources providing coverage of the individual or groups in preceding column. | Identify ghetto areas & estimate the population in each area. | Furnish the number of ghetto informants furnishing coverage of each area. |
RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
(Summarize Informant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence Information.)

DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405
(Include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or File #; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)
ADDENDUM
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
1/20/71

The suggestion made by the Inspector will definitely enable the Racial Intelligence Section to afford closer supervision to the important task of developing quality racial informants especially member informants in extremist organizations.

Our present practice of reviewing the FD-405 and then communicating to the field when it is noted there is no member informant in extremist organizations will be streamlined by the suggestion made by the Inspector. In view of the above, appropriate instructions will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above views and as stated above the appropriate instructions will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/19/71
JGD:pdr
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY
INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY
INTERNAL SECURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Each field office currently
submits an annual report on all security informants and
confidential sources, advising which informants are paid
regularly. The report lists the subversive organizations
currently under investigation by that office and includes
the following basic information: address of organization,
character of case, field file number, Bureau file number,
approximate membership. The report also lists informant
coverage of each organization as follows: officers -
Rank and File - other.

In addition, quarterly reports on the "New Left
Movement" are submitted by the field. These reports list
informant coverage of New Left groups but do not specify
which are member informants.

Additionally, Bureau airtel to all offices dated
11/5/70, captioned "Informant Development, Black Panther
Party, New Left Groups," ordered a complete analysis of
informant coverage in the Black Panther Party and New Left
groups by each office in the field. This is not a regularly
scheduled analysis.

It is noted that the Racial Intelligence Section
currently utilizes FD-405s (copy attached), captioned
"Status Report, Racial Informants, Extremist Groups (White-
Black); Racial Matters." It is submitted by the field
quarterly and requires a detailed breakdown of militant
black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates the
specific informant coverage, including member informants,
for each group and area, in addition to information required
for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished
quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the field
as they occur during the interim months.

The FD-405s are handled centrally in the Black
Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit and are routed
to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive case on each
organization listed for timely evaluation of informant development
and coverage in each field office. This enables the Bureau
Supervisor to detect weaknesses and take timely corrective measures.
The immediacy of the need for member informant coverage in all extremist organizations is obvious if the Bureau is to be forewarned of plans for bombings, kidnappings, demonstrations, and other acts of violence in this country.

It is suggested that the New Left and Internal Security Sections devise a form similar to the FD-405, designed to fit the unique requirements of those Sections, which will assist Supervisors to more accurately evaluate and control informant development and coverage in the field. The form should require specific information on member informant development and coverage in each revolutionary, New Left, extremist, and protest group under investigation in each field office. In devising the new form, the New Left and Internal Security Sections should bear in mind the suggestion which has been proposed separately for the Racial Intelligence Section to revise FD-405 by adding a section to read as follows:

"Explain why you do not have member informants in those groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.

"Indicate what specific action is being taken to develop member informants in those groups and advise when member informant coverage is anticipated for each group."

FD-405 also lists statistical accomplishments attributable to racial and ghetto informants. FD-374 is used for criminal informants. This information is tabulated by computer in the Voucher-Statistical Section and is available for immediate reference, including use by the Director in his Budget Testimony.

While not ordinarily engaged in criminal activity to the same extent as criminal, racial, or ghetto informants, it is nevertheless true that security informants, especially in the New Left field, are increasingly responsible for statistical accomplishments each year. These include location of Bureau fugitives, recovery of stolen merchandise, and other similar data. It can be reasonably anticipated that they will be responsible for additional statistical accomplishments in the future. There is no current procedure for compiling and recording this type of statistical data by the New Left or Internal Security Sections.
It is suggested that in order for the Bureau to receive full credit for statistical accomplishments attributable to all FBI informants, the new form devised by the New Left and Internal Security Sections should include statistical accomplishment data as currently required on FD-405.

Comments of Section Chiefs Arbor W. Gray, Robert J. Shackelford and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are requested.

SECTION CHIEFS SHACKELFORD, WANNALL AND GRAY: The Inspector's suggestion appears to have merit. The New Left, Nationalities Intelligence and Internal Security Sections agree that FD-405 could be adapted to fit security informant evaluation in the New Left movement and in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. It is proposed that representatives of each of these three sections implement the Inspector's suggestion by revising the form for security use and preparing the necessary instructions to the field requiring quarterly submission of this informant status report concerning organizations under investigation. Coordination, routing and statistical compilation of the incoming forms would be the responsibility of the Special Records Unit of the Research Section which maintains security informant records but the substantive sections involved would be responsible for evaluation and any necessary action on the basis of their content. It is believed further that should this procedure meet our needs for evaluation of member security informants, we should consider the elimination of the annual security informant report now submitted by each field office. It is proposed, therefore, that this suggestion be implemented for a six-month trial period (two submissions) to determine its feasibility and whether it does meet our needs for member informant evaluation. At the end of that trial period, the results will be analyzed and a commensurate recommendation submitted.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I agree that it would be desirable to carry out this suggestion at least on a trial basis to determine its feasibility. I will follow this matter and at the end of the trial period the procedure will be carefully analyzed to determine whether or not it should be continued.

- 3 -
# Memorandum

**TO**: Director, FBI  

**FROM**: SAC  

**SUBJECT**: STATUS REPORT  
RACIAL INFORMANTS  
EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK)  
RACIAL MATTERS

Re:

1. Informants  
   a. Listed at beginning of month  
   b. Added  
   c. Deleted  
   d. Listed at end of month  

2. Informants (Probationary)  
   a. Listed at beginning of month  
   b. Added  
   c. Deleted  
   d. Listed at end of month

3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to the development of racial informants

4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and individuals under SAC authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases
6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5)
7. Subjects Located, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6)
8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies
9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local
10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases
11. Merchandise Recovered, State and Local
12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies
RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(Summarize Informant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence Information.)

DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405

(Include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or File #; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)
ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Your concurrence with this suggestion on a trial basis is considered forward-looking, particularly since you have used this type of handling with marked success in your Racial Intelligence Program.

It is felt, however, that a six months' period is not an adequate period to measure the effectiveness, considering the time required to reach full implementation of the program in the field. For this reason, it is strongly suggested you make your trial period at least one year.

Comments of Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN. (JAS:sjr - 1/22/71) In line with the Inspector's suggestion, we will implement the program involved and evaluate it at the end of one year.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

HDC: mkl
1/22/71
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Venceremos Brigade (VB) originated with a group of Americans who traveled to Cuba in January, 1969, to take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Cuban revolution. The national organization of the VB obtained support from a wide spectrum of leftist organizations including the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, and the Progressive Labor Party, as well as violent revolutionary groups such as the Black Panther Party, La Raza (a militant Mexican-American civil rights group), and the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society.

The idea of aiding Fidel Castro in meeting his proposed quota of harvesting ten million tons of cane sugar for 1970 quickly took the fancy of the young revolutionaries. Two hundred sixteen young Americans went to Cuba in November, 1969, to cut sugar cane and returned on February 11, 1970. The second contingent of 687 American youths left New Brunswick, Canada, on February 13, 1970, aboard a converted Cuban cattle boat and returned on April 28, 1970. The third contingent of 407 individuals sailed for Cuba aboard the Conrado Benitez on August 25, 1970. They returned to New Brunswick, Canada, on October 21, 1970. Presently a fourth group is being formed to leave on or about March 1, 1971, to stay in Cuba until approximately May 15, 1971.

While no evidence has been received that those persons who traveled to Cuba received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, they were constantly told that they were the vanguard of the revolution in the United States. They were told the only way to defeat the imperialistic Government of the United States, which must be overthrown, is through revolution.

Under the current instructions individual cases are opened to locate, interview, and recommend placement on the Security Index on each person who traveled to Cuba. The SAC may authorize the interview except where the person is under 21 years, is currently a student or professor, has some connection with an institute of learning, or is a journalist. In these instances Bureau authority must be obtained for the interview. Investigation of these persons, under the current instructions, is that the case remain open for one year with 90-day verifications of residence and employment after their interview. The purpose is to determine whether their inclusion on the Security Index after the interview is warranted.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
PJD:ma
Venceremos Brigade

To date, less than half of the VB members have been located and a large portion of those located have been uncooperative insofar as the interview is concerned. Over 100 of these persons have been placed on the Security Index, and it is anticipated that numerous others will be listed. Many have been arrested for engaging in acts of violence since their return, have participated in anti-Vietnam demonstrations, or demonstrated at trials involving members of the Black Panther Party or the persons involved in the October, 1969, "days of rage" indictments in Chicago, Illinois.

It is proposed that prior to closing any of the VB cases after the interview and a year of following the individual's activity on a 90-day reporting basis, he be interviewed a second time. For those who were initially cooperative, we should make every effort possible to convert these persons as informants. Those who were initially uncooperative should be considered for Priority II handling, and those who have met the requirements for Security Index inclusion in the initial stage should be re-evaluated to insure they still meet those requirements.

Since the members of the VB have made blatantly false statements in their passport applications by not disclosing their true destination, a technical violation of the law exists. In addition, many of the applications contained either false or out-of-date information including incorrect or old addresses and places of employment. These technical violations and items of incorrect information should be brought to the attention of Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian who has recently been appointed in charge of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. He, together with Attorney General John N. Mitchell and James O. Eastland, United States Senator from Mississippi, has publicly indicated they were considering some antisubversion bills making it a crime to give aid and comfort to the enemy, particularly the North Vietnamese who had representatives in Cuba to meet the VB, and toughening the law against advocating the overthrow of the Government. The passport violations could certainly be reviewed and brought under their consideration for prosecution under current laws or for new legislative proposals.

Inasmuch as some of the VB members have indicated they were going underground and the fact that a majority have
Venceremos Brigade

not been located for interview, you should consider placing
name stops in the Identification División so that if these
persons are arrested or an inquiry is made by local law
enforcement authorities this fact will be immediately brought
to the attention of the Bureau. In addition, a stop file is
now being set up by the NCIC Unit for persons other than
fugitives concerning whom the Bureau has an interest. This
file will require, in addition to the name and birth date of
the individual, as many other items of identification as
possible such as his fingerprint classification, Social
Security number, military service number, Selective Service
number, and the like.

Every effort should be made to utilize stops with
the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit on these persons.

We should continue to impress upon the field the
need for informants among the VE groups and insure that
coverage of the fourth contingent is at least at the level
of the second contingent (five informants) and the third
contingent (four informants). Be sure that all efforts are
made to have informants previously refused for passage with
the prior contingents, as well as those nine informants who
have previously traveled with the second and third contingents,
be considered for the currently proposed trip. Also, sufficient
other new informants should be proposed so that coverage of
this latest contingent will be adequate for the Bureau's
intelligence needs.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D. BRENNAN: The Inspector's keen analysis and thoughtful suggestions in regard to the investigation of the Venceremos Brigade (VB) is sincerely appreciated. In connection with the above, the following observations by this Division are set forth:

1. As the Inspector is aware, security investigations are being conducted concerning each participant of the VB. These investigations require that background data including any prior subversive activities be ascertained, each individual participant be considered for interview, and that the field make a recommendation as to the inclusion of each VB subject on the Security Index (SI). Upon conclusion of the above, the field is to advise the Bureau each 90 days for a period of one year as to the whereabouts and activities of Priority II, Priority III, and any non-SI subjects who are VB returnees. Priority I VB subjects are regarded as extremists and this Bureau is notified each 45 days of their activities and whereabouts.

2. As to the difficulty in locating VB returnees, it is to be noted that the first and second contingents of the VB were comprised of approximately 900 individuals made up of young revolutionaries who were college dropouts leading nomadic and communal existences. This mode of living inherently makes the Bureau's job of locating these subjects for purpose of interview more difficult. In contrast, investigation to date of the third contingent, which was composed mostly of established college students, indicates that these individuals will be more easily located. Since the third contingent returned to the U.S. approximately 90 days ago, these investigations as to background data are now being completed and the initial interviews will be promptly conducted.

3. The suggestion that these subjects be reinterviewed upon the expiration of above-mentioned one year period, will be given serious consideration and instructions to this effect will be issued to the field upon approval of the Director. Efforts will be made to develop as informants those VB subjects who are cooperative and the need for further investigative attention regarding uncooperative individuals will be evaluated on the merits of each individual case.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
TJM: cae
Venceremos Brigade

4. Regarding foreign travel such as that in which the VB is engaged, it is recognized that the best interests of this country would undoubtedly be served by prohibition of such travel. The Internal Security Act of 1950 contained sanctions restricting travel on the part of Communist Party members. After extended litigation, the Supreme Court in June, 1958, ruled in the Kent and Briehl vs. Dulles passport case that the State Department could no longer deny passports to individuals with past history of subversive affiliations. In June, 1964, the Supreme Court in the Flynn - Aptheher passport case ruled that the right of U.S. citizens to travel abroad is protected by the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. In January, 1967, in the Laub decision specifically dealing with travel to Cuba, the Supreme Court ruled that the State Department could not confiscate an individuals passport simply because the individual traveled to Cuba without State Department sanction. In December, 1967, in the Lynd decision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, ruled that anyone can travel to a restricted country if they did not use their passport to enter that country.

A number of bills have been introduced into Congress in recent years to remedy the above situation, most of which have never cleared committee. The Senate currently has a bill, the Eastland Bill, before the Senate to impose criminal penalties for violation of travel restrictions. A pending bill, H.R. 1493, was in December, 1969, introduced to restrict travel in violation of area restrictions. This bill has been sponsored by approximately 20 Congressmen. In view of the above, this Division has not considered it warranted to suggest additional legislation along these lines.

5. As to technical violations regarding false or erroneous statements made by members of the VB on passport applications, all information developed along these lines has been furnished both to the Department of Justice and the Department of State for whatever action they deem feasible. To date neither Department has requested that additional action be taken in this matter.

6. The Inspector's suggestion regarding the placing of name stops with the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit for information concerning hard-to-locate VB members, is well taken. This Division will coordinate this matter with NCIC to determine what information is necessary to place such stops and the manner in which this can best be effected. Instructions will be issued to the field regarding
Venceremos Brigade

implementation of this suggestion.

7. The VB is currently formulating plans for a fourth contingent to travel to Cuba approximately March 1, 1971. By airtel dated January 6, 1971, interested field divisions were instructed to immediately initiate an aggressive campaign to obtain informants to travel to Cuba as part of this contingent. These offices were instructed to advise the Bureau no later than 1/29/71 and weekly thereafter as to their progress in this matter. This Division is acutely aware of the importance of such informant coverage and will afford this program close attention.

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: You should bear in mind that the attitude and instructions expressed by the President, the Director, and many of the legislators in Congress have been to curtail the militant actions and the violent activities on the part of a significant group of young people in the United States today. The thinking of the Supreme Court of the United States with its several recent changes may be along the lines of suppressing the activities of those who so openly espouse the overthrow of all forms of democratic authority in the United States. In addition, the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice has been specifically enlarged and strengthened to deal with these matters. It is recognized that individual violations of the passport laws have been brought to the attention of the Department of Justice in prior times. It might be well to consider presenting the matter in its entirety to the Department showing the number and frequency of violations for their consideration and study.

We cannot overlook or minimize the fact that over 1,300 individuals have willingly and freely gone to Cuba, contrary to the State Department's specific instructions. These persons left in many instances with the impression that they would be trained in the use of revolutionary weapons including explosives and incendiary devices. They were subjected
during their Cuban stay to all manner of propaganda. On their return to the United States many have gone underground and disappeared completely; others have become involved in crime, violence, and general disruptive activities; still more have refused to cooperate in any manner with the duly constituted authorities as they were so instructed by the leadership. We cannot afford to overlook these known 1,300 potential Cuban insurgents.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan please note.

ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: The Inspector's observation (JAS:sjr - 1/22/71) with reference to the VB cases has been noted and the Bureau may be assured that these matters are being pressed, and we will press the field to furnish these cases vigorous investigative attention.
SUBSTANTIVE WRITE-UPS
SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP.

ROBERT P. BOKINSKY
PSI - PO
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD
WFO FILE 134-9096
BUREAU FILE 134-19651

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The Washington Field Office by letter to
the Bureau dated 12/31/69 advised that the
subject, a body shop mechanic employed by Amatucci Chevrolet Company, Wheaton,
Maryland, was interviewed on 12/30/69, concerning his recent contact with Jan
Adam Klasa, Assistant Military, Naval and Air Attache, Polish Embassy,
Washington, D. C., who has been designated a known intelligence agent with
defection potential. The subject appeared to be frank and cooperative during the
interview and indicated his desire to assist the FBI. Accordingly, the
Washington Field Office felt the subject had definite informant potential.

In the same communication the Washington Field Office furnished the
Bureau with sufficient background data relative to subject and his wife and
requested the Bureau to check indices.

The Bureau advised the Washington Field Office on 1/7/70 that Bureau files
contained no record of the subject or his wife.

The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 3/17/70 furnished
results of background investigation concerning the subject and requested authority
to recontact the subject and attempt to develop him as an informant in the Polish
field.

The Bureau by letter to the Washington Field Office dated 4/1/70 granted
authority to recontact the subject in accordance with provisions of Section 107
of the Manual of Instructions. The Bureau further instructed the Washington
Field Office to furnish results of recontact with the subject along with recommenda-
tions concerning future utilization of subject.

The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 6/30/70 advised
the Bureau that the subject had not been recontacted by Klasa of the Polish Embassy,
but due to subject's continued cooperative attitude and willingness to assist the
FBI, again requested the Bureau to grant authority to develop the subject as a

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71

ESM:wmj
PSI in the Polish field.

The Bureau by letter to Washington Field Office dated 7/7/70 designated the subject as a Bureau-approved PSI and again instructed that he be developed in accordance with instructions contained in Section 107, Manual of Instructions.

The above comprises a summary of all correspondence to date in 134-19651 file.

JAN ADAM KLASA
IS - PO
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD
WFO FILE 105-92157
BUREAU FILE 105-186986

The U. S. Department of State advised the Bureau in October, 1968, that the subject was scheduled to be assigned to the Embassy of the Polish People's Republic, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Military, Naval and Air Attaché. Subject subsequently arrived in Washington, D. C., on May 4, 1969.

By communication to WFO dated 6/20/69 the Bureau instructed that coverage of subject be intensified to determine the identities of any Agents he may be operating.

By communication dated 8/4/69 WFO advised Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles and Seattle Field Offices concerning identity and background of subject, furnished each office with a photograph of subject, and set forth additional investigative leads. The same WFO communication requested Bureau authority to conduct active investigation of subject including Fisurs when deemed appropriate, following clearance with U. S. Department of State.

On 9/2/69 the Bureau, with approval of U. S. Department of State, instructed WFO to proceed with the investigation.

Subsequent to 9/2/69 WFO and those offices listed above conducted active investigation of subject and promptly furnished results in a form suitable for dissemination to the Bureau.

In a progress memorandum to the Bureau dated 6/8/70, WFO advised that "PSI Bokinsky has agreed to attempt to contact Klasa on a social basis." This information is not substantiated in the PSI file (134-19651) nor was the proposal to use the PSI acknowledged in any communication from the Bureau.
Bokinsky, is now employed by Fenner Pontiac in Rockville, Maryland. It is noted that this information is not in the PSI file, the Baltimore Division was not advised, and no action was taken by the Bureau.

It is noted that the last Bureau communication to WFO in this matter is dated 9/2/69 granting authority to conduct Fisurs as may be necessary to determine if subject is engaged in intelligence activities.

It would appear that this entire investigation to date has lacked proper supervision at the Bureau level.

You are requested to advise the following:

1. Explain your overall supervisory policy in directing the development of Potential Double Agents directed against a known intelligence agent.

2. Why you failed to promptly and aggressively instruct the Washington Field Office to fully utilize PSI Bokinsky against Klasa, a known intelligence agent.

3. Why you failed to properly instruct the office of origin to disseminate to Baltimore Office and verify a change in employment by PSI Bokinsky.

Explanations Requested:

1. Unit Chief Howard H. Wallace, Jr., is requested to explain why in his overall supervision of these cases he failed to detect the above delinquencies.

2. Comments of Section Chief Arbor W. Gray, Inspector D. E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.
UNIT CHIEF HOWARD H. WALLACE, JR. 1/22/71. The Inspector's comments relate to the attempted development of a security informant, an automobile mechanic, for the purpose of providing better coverage of the activities of a Polish intelligence officer assigned to the Polish Embassy. This development is proceeding because the mechanic is in contact with the intelligence officer in connection with repair of the officer's automobile.

It is our policy to develop as many assets of all types as necessary to provide coverage of the activities of active Polish intelligence personnel. The Manual of Instructions, Section 107A, page 3, defines various types of sources (confidential sources, potential security informants, security informants, and double agents) developed for use in these types of investigations. The term "potential double agent" is not a status defined in the Manual. It is rather an administrative term used to distinguish a source being used against an intelligence officer when the source has not as yet been solicited to handle assignments for that officer but appears to have the potential for such functions if requested.

Bokinsky was designated a potential security informant by the Bureau on 7/7/70. The Manual of Instructions, Section 107K, 7, page 13, provides that correspondence in security informant and potential security informant cases should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under the substantive case caption. The six-month justification for the subject's status as a potential security informant (per SAC Letter 68-47, 8/20/68) is contained in WFO letter 1/19/71.

The relationship of Bokinsky to Klasa is developing in a normal pattern and at a pace consistent with avoiding suspicion that he is under our control. Bureau supervision has determined this through the case on Klasa, the Polish intelligence officer against whom the potential security informant is targeted. In that regard, a 90-day evaluation letter in the Klasa case was submitted by WFO on 9/8/70 which stated that attempts were continuing to have the potential security informant placed in contact with Klasa. The potential security informant was to contact Klasa and advise him of his new employment at Fenner Pontiac, Rockville, Maryland. Again, by 90-day evaluation letter dated 12/7/70 WFO advised the potential security informant had been in contact with Klasa concerning an automobile repair. As a result, Klasa had requested potential security informant to handle the repair of Polish Embassy's automobiles whenever necessary. It was stated that the potential security
informant would attempt to maintain contact with Klasa through the entree of automobile service. It is respectfully submitted that a review of both cases, the potential security informant and the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted, shows that these matters were afforded proper supervision at the Seat of Government.

2. The field has and must have the primary responsibility for development and direction of potential security informants against communist intelligence officers. The nature and intensity of the direction of such potential security informants must be commensurate with the apparent authenticity of the informant's relationship to and course of conduct with the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted. Over the years it has been firmly established from both investigative experience and information obtained from defectors that anyone who is aggressively cultivating an intelligence officer is automatically suspected as being under the control of opposition intelligence and, therefore, a provocateur. In instant case Bokinsky's logical entree to Klasa is Klasa's need for mechanical work on his and the Embassy's automobiles. Given time and cultivation as is being done according to 90-day letters being received in the Klasa case he may develop a rapport or relationship with Klasa that could result in his being upgraded to a security informant. Reviews of the Bokinsky file and the 90-day letters in the Klasa file show this matter is progressing normally and at a tempo in line with the facts of the relationship existing as well as normal experience in these matters. Therefore, it is believed there is no lack of proper supervision at the Seat of Government.

3. It is respectfully submitted that there was no necessity for the Seat of Government to instruct the office of origin to disseminate to Baltimore information concerning Bokinsky and to obtain verification of his employment change as these items were covered in investigation. As a matter of long-standing policy WFO has the responsibility for developing and handling source coverage against communist intelligence officers assigned to diplomatic establishments in the Washington, D.C., area even though the source may live or work in suburban Maryland or Virginia. Review of the Bokinsky file shows that WFO by letter dated 3/17/70 to the Bureau stated that there was no record of information concerning Bokinsky available to the
Baltimore Office. This indicated to the Bureau Supervisor at the time that an interoffice communication had been sent to Baltimore by WFO. A check with WFO on 1/22/71 disclosed that by interoffice letter 11/6/69 it had advised Baltimore that Bokinsky was being considered for development as a potential security informant by WFO. His employment, residence and date of birth were set forth and indices check was requested. By interoffice letter 12/12/69 Baltimore advised WFO that its indices were negative. Subsequent verification of Bokinsky's change of employment was unnecessary when same was brought to the attention of the Bureau in 90-day evaluation letter submitted under the Klasa caption on 9/8/70, and again in 90-day evaluation letter of 12/7/70. No separate communication was required for the informant file regarding the change of employment because that information would be furnished in the normal six-month justification submitted by WFO and it does appear in the six-month justification dated 1/19/71.

SECTION CHIEF A.W. GRAY
I concur with the explanation of
AWG:bcw 1/22/71 SA Wallace. In accordance with existing instructions, normal procedures and at a pace consistent with security require-
ments and our experience in these matters, I respectfully submit that there was no lack of proper supervision at the Seat of Government.

Inspector D. E. Moore
1/23/71
DEM:1mb

I concur with the above comments of SA Wallace and Section Chief Gray. I feel that PSI Bokinsky must make any cultivation of Klasa appear entirely normal and WFO, by letter dated 12/7/70 in the Klasa caption, stated that Bokinsky will continue to contact Klasa concerning auto repairs and will attempt to establish a social relationship.

Assistant Director C.D. Brennan
1/23/71
DEM:1mb

I concur with the above comments.
SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP

ERIC NELSON, PSI
IS - R
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - NEWARK
NEWARK FILE - 134-3757
BUREAU FILE - 134-19669

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Captioned investigation was instituted
by the Newark Division based upon a
communication to the Bureau dated 12/18/69 in the case entitled "Vladimir G.
Azaryan; IS - R (ATC - KGB); Bureau file 105-184321; Newark file 105-25293."
This communication seeks Bureau authority to interview subject to assess
his potential as a security informant or double agent.

The subject, a naturalized American citizen, is employed as the chief chemist
at Kaysam Corporation of America, Paterson, New Jersey, and reported to
have had numerous contacts with Azaryan, who is chief engineer at Amtorg and a
known KGB officer.

By communication to Newark, the Bureau on 1/6/70 instructed that office
to interview subject "in accordance with existing instructions relating to
interviews of security subjects" to evaluate his potential with regard to furnishing
information regarding Azaryan. The Bureau further instructed Newark in the
same communication to furnish results in a form suitable for dissemination.

Newark by communication to the Bureau dated 2/12/70 set forth background
information relative to subject (in memorandum form, not suitable for dissemination
as instructed by the Bureau) and stating information contained therein would be
furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption.

On 3/31/70 the Newark Office advised under the Azaryan caption and not the
case caption, that Nelson had been interviewed.

The above constitutes a summary of all correspondence contained in
captioned file to date.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
ESM:wmj
The subject of this investigation first came to the attention of the Bureau in August, 1968, via a U. S. Department of State communication advising that the subject had been issued a visa to enter the U. S. as an employee of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, NYC, New York. At that time Bureau communication to NYO dated 8/14/68 instructed that office to be alert to subject's arrival and handle in accordance with Section 105 K, Manual of Instructions.

Subsequent to that time the NYO and auxiliary offices conducted extensive investigation including discreet Fisurs and kept the Bureau advised of their progress by letter dated 12/9/68. In this same communication, a request was made of the Bureau to contact U. S. Department of State for authority for intensified investigation of subject including surveillances when necessary. The Bureau by communication to U. S. Department of State dated 1/3/69 sought such authority which was subsequently granted by State 1/22/69. The subject has been under constant investigation by the NYO since that time with a free exchange of information between the NYO and the Bureau.

The Newark Office advised the Bureau by communication dated 3/31/70 that Nelson, the PSI, had been interviewed, the results of which were furnished the Bureau in LHM form dated 4/8/70. The results of the interview were furnished U. S. Department of State, CIA, Commerce and the U. S. Information Agency.

On 4/17/70 Newark Office again furnished results of contact by PSI Nelson with the subject in LHM form suitable for dissemination.

On 6/17/70 Newark reported another contact by PSI Nelson with the subject.

The NYO advised the Bureau by LHM dated 6/26/70 that on the evening of 6/14/70 the subject was observed boarding Aeroflot for a flight to Moscow.

Although a concentrated investigative effort was put forth by the New York and Newark Offices in the investigation, it is noted that no specific directions were given PSI Nelson by the New York or Newark Offices or the Bureau from January, 1970, to the time subject left for Moscow in June, 1970, in spite of the fact that Nelson and the subject had mutual professional backgrounds (chemists) and from a review of the files appeared to speak the same language.
It is noted that this case was originally opened as a PSI and potential double agent case. It is still in a pending status and is still being reported by you as a potential double agent case, when in fact the individual (Azaryan) against whom Nelson was directed departed the U.S. in June, 1970.

A review of the Nelson file fails to contain any instructions or directions regarding the development of Nelson as a double agent and in addition a review of the Azaryan file similarly contains no information or instructions from the Bureau in this regard. There appears to be a definite weakness in the overall administration and supervision of this "potential double agent" at the Seat of Government.

You are requested to advise the following:

1. What is your overall supervisory policy in connection with developing potential security informants directed against a double agent?

2. Why you continue to carry this case (Nelson) in a pending status when the subject whom he was directed against (Azaryan) left the U.S. for Russia in June, 1970.

3. Why you failed to instruct and aggressively direct the office of origin in the Nelson case against the double agent target Azaryan.

4. Why you have the Nelson case listed as a potential double agent when in effect he was being developed as a PSI.

Explanations Requested:

1. Case supervisor and Unit Chief Bowen F. Rose for failure to detect the above delinquencies in your overall supervision of the Nelson matter.

2. Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan, Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.
The case of Eric Nelson, PSI, IS-R, was assigned to me on 12/17/70, therefore, I was not responsible for instruction or direction of the office of origin in this matter prior to that date and it has not come up for review on tickler as yet. With regard to the case of Vladimir G. Azaryan, IS-R, this case is closed and has never been assigned to me.

With regard to questions raised by the Inspector, the following is set out.

It is presumed question one relates to our supervisory policy with regard to the development of informants to be targeted against Soviet officials and/or Soviet agents, not against our double agents. It is our policy to encourage informant development of as many individuals as possible against a Soviet target to provide the widest spectrum of information concerning his social, business and personal life in order to develop data essential for in depth defection analysis. In addition, we seek to identify those individuals whom the Soviets appear to be selecting for recruitment and to develop them to act in our behalf against the Soviets. Such highly controlled actions serve either to involve the Soviets in time consuming and costly operations in which they can only receive carefully selected and screened information or disinformation or may provide us the basis for effective counterintelligence actions against the Soviets, as is so well illustrated in the Azaryan case. Our supervision in the development of informants is accomplished through the close review and analysis of the periodic progress letters submitted on Soviet officials; the direction which we afford to contact cases and to the cases resulting from the DESECO Program.

As the result of an excellent counterintelligence effort formulated and carried out by the New York Office with Bureau guidance and direction, a defection approach was made to Azaryan by NY 5179-S on 6/4/70. This informant had previously been handled by Yuriy K. Kitaev, another experienced, aggressive KGB officer. As a result of this action, both Soviets departed the U.S. almost immediately. The loss of these two experienced operatives most certainly caused a serious disruption in the activities of the New York Residency of the KGB.
We have learned through defector sources that in instances such as described above, the entire activity of the KGB officers involved as well as the Residency as a whole are subjected to most careful scrutiny to determine if there has been a penetration; if the operation was mishandled and what, if anything, can be salvaged from other operations which were being run by the officers involved. Such a review may take many months. No doubt Azaryan's contacts with Nelson have been the subject of such careful study. Inasmuch as we did not involve Nelson in our approach to Azaryan, there is no reason to believe that the KGB does not still consider Nelson as a potential agent.

It would be logical for the Soviets to have Nelson's development continued by Azaryan's replacement, who would by now have been in the U. S. for a relatively short period of time. Historically, a newly arrived KGB operative takes some months to get acclimated to the environment in which he will work and, therefore, does not jump right in to take over a net of agents.

The Nelson case has been maintained in a pending status as it was felt he still possesses potential as a source against the Soviets. At this point the only ones who know if this is true are the KGB. If we were to attempt to initiate contact between Nelson and the Soviets, they would be convinced he is a plant and lose all interest in him. The only course of action we can pursue at this time is to wait for the Soviets to make a move.

Newark's most recent communication in this matter advised that Nelson is alert to our interests and they are maintaining contact with him. This is essential to insure we have full knowledge and control of any future Soviet initiatives. Experience has shown the Soviets will allow situations such as this to remain dormant for as long as eight years. It is not suggested that this matter will be kept pending for this length of time; however, for reasons indicated it is incumbent upon us to continue to follow this matter for a reasonable period of time.

A review of the Azaryan file will show aggressive supervision by Seat of Government supervisors, including specific instructions to the field. As a prime defection
target, all facets of the investigation of his activities were carefully considered. NY 5179-S was selected as the vehicle to carry out our defection approach. Nelson, a contact of Azaryan, was interviewed and was cooperative. His operation as a source against Azaryan was proceeding in proper fashion, and having decided on the utilization of NY 5179-S to make the approach to Azaryan, there was no need to expedite Nelson's development. By not involving Nelson in this operation we have not unnecessarily revealed our interests in him and preserved a potential asset.

With regard to question four, the designations of an individual as a Potential Security Informant and as a potential double agent are not mutually exclusive. Potential Security Informant is the term defined in the Manual of Instructions for an individual in position to become active in intelligence activities and administrative supervision is in accord with provisions of the Manual of Instructions. On the other hand, potential double agent is merely an arbitrary designation we apply to an individual who is in contact with a Soviet-bloc official, but in which the relationship has not yet developed into one of a covert intelligence nature. Such a relationship is well illustrated in Azaryan's overt business contacts with Nelson on behalf of Amtorg, the Soviet trading company. That such a relationship may abruptly change in character to a covert intelligence operation is well documented in countless cases which have arisen out of "innocent" business oriented contacts. For this reason the arbitrary designation of potential double agent was given to Nelson.

In connection with the observation that the Bureau instructed the Newark Office to interview Nelson and furnish results in a form suitable for dissemination the Newark Office furnished background information and advised information would be furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption. The only occasion when substantive data received from a source appears in the informant case file is in the semiannual justification letter in abbreviated form. See Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13, Manual of Instructions, which states:

"Correspondence in security informant and potential informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption."
I have noted the Inspector's comments and I will continue to provide the type of direction and supervision to which those comments are directed.

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
(1/22/71 - WAB:hke)

I have noted the explanation of Unit Chief Bowen E. Rose together with his comments, and these comments are in keeping with long-established policies for following field investigations in individual counterintelligence investigations.

Inspector D. E. Moore
1/23/71
DEM:1mb

I have carefully noted Mr. Rose's comments and agree with them. Eric Nelson is a chemist who has been in contact with the Soviets and I feel he will be of continuing interest to them and that he presents potential for use against Soviet intelligence.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
1/23/71
DEM:1mb

I concur with the above comment and wish to assure the inspector: I will closely follow our progress in developing informants to use against Soviet intelligence and the direction of their activities.