

File #:

62-10-116395

Serial Scope:

EBF 752x

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

The Attorney General

September 23, 1965

JUNE

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Miss Holmes
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Cotter
- 1 - Mr. Mossburg

PAKISTANI MISSION TO  
THE UNITED NATIONS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - PAKISTAN (S)

10/19/00  
CLASSIFIED BY SP7AM/ely  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1  
MDR-16

On September 21, 1965, an informant who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that the Pakistani Mission to the United Nations had contacted the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and requested a meeting between the Pakistani Foreign Minister and Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister. It was indicated that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan would be arriving in the United States on the evening of September 21, 1965, and the meeting was requested for 10 p.m. that date. This information was immediately furnished to the Department of State. (S)

At 8 p.m. on September 21, 1965, Mr. Tom Hughes, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, contacted a representative of this Bureau and referred to the earlier information regarding the proposed meeting between the Pakistani and Soviet Foreign Ministers. Mr. Hughes stated that following this meeting between the Foreign Ministers, in all probability, the Pakistani Foreign Minister would attempt to confer with the President of Pakistan by radio telephone. Mr. Hughes said that the Department of State believed that the results of this conversation between the Pakistani Foreign Minister and the President of Pakistan would be of vital importance to the U. S. Department of State in connection with its future planning of action relative to the Pakistan-India dispute, and to the United Nations cease-fire order which had a deadline of 3 a.m. September 22, 1965. Inasmuch as this Bureau does not have technical coverage of the Pakistani Mission to the United Nations, we were unable to supply the Department of State with the vital information requested. (S)

At 10:25 a.m., September 22, 1965, we received information from the above informant that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had arrived in the United States. (S)

AJD/mea (9)

SECRET

see note, pg 2

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAILED 2  
SEP 23 1965  
COMM-FBI

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

The Attorney General

Pakistan would meet with Andrei Gromyko at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, 3 p.m., September 22, 1965. This information was immediately furnished to the Department of State; however, our lack of technical coverage on the Pakistani Mission to the United Nations again precluded our obtaining results of the probable telephonic contact, following this meeting, between the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and the President of Pakistan. (S)

The curtailment of our technical and microphone surveillance coverage has severely restricted us in supplying valuable data to interested Government agencies, relative to the national defense.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" inasmuch as refers to [technical surveillance coverage of foreign diplomatic establishment] (S) the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause serious damage to the national defense.

SECRET

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Casper	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Felt	
Gale	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

TO : Mr. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 25, 1964

J U N E

FROM : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Deegan
- 1 - Mr. Engelstad
- 1 - Mr. Fipp
- 1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

10/19/00  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/lej  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

This is a monthly memorandum setting forth the total number of the Bureau's confidential informants, mail covers and the coverage we are maintaining for other Government agencies as set forth in the attached pages.

Technical surveillances are only utilized when necessary and are discontinued when they are no longer productive. Their number varies and as of this date we are operating 64 investigative-type (security) technical surveillances in Bureau cases. We are operating one investigative-type technical surveillance in connection with the slaying of the three civil rights workers in Mississippi. We are operating 76 intelligence-type (security) technical surveillances restricted to coverage of foreign country, diplomatic and official establishments, which are in addition to those we are operating in Bureau cases.

In addition, at the specific request of National Security Agency, we are maintaining coverage of teletype facilities of 43 diplomatic establishments and at the request of the White House, we are covering the teletype facilities of Tass News Agency in New York.

One hundred and five microphone surveillances are presently installed of which 45 are concerned with security investigations and 60 are installed in criminal matters.

During August, 1964, 16 security informants were added and 16 were deleted, making a total of 1,095 security informants. Potential security informants during the same period increased from 367 to 369.

During August, 1964, 158 criminal informants were added while 109 criminal informants were deleted. This changes the number of approved criminal informants from 3,290 to 3,339. Also, during August, 1964, the number of potential criminal informants changed

Enc.

JDD:k1b  
(11)

ENCLOSURE

OCT 26 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**SECRET**

OCT 22 1964

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO MR. A. H. BELMONT  
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND  
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

from 8,130 to 8,169.

During August, 1964, four racial informants were added and eight were deleted, leaving a total of 118 racial informants. The number of probationary racial informants is 76.

As of September 25, 1964, the Bureau has in operation a total of 79 mail covers. Of this number, three are maintained in criminal fugitive cases and none in criminal cases other than fugitive. The criminal mail covers are handled by Special Investigative Division. There are 76 mail covers in security cases.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

*I suggest that all mail covers be discontinued*

*AK*  
*AB*

*WCB*  
*WCB*

*Q*

*I agree. Also I want no wire taps placed in cases which may thereby become "stunted" for prosecution.*

*A*

SECRET

OFFICE	INV.		INT.		SMC	FMC	OMC	SI	PSI	CI	PCI	RAC	RAC PROB
	TS	MS	TS	TEL									
ALBANY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	2	37	73	0	0
ALBUQUERQUE	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	59	105	0	0
ANCHORAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	38	0	0
ATLANTA	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	55	149	11	16
BALTIMORE	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	20	1	71	141	0	0
BIRMINGHAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	60	10	3
BOSTON	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	15	1	54	162	0	0
BUFFALO	0	6	0	0	2	0	0	14	3	51	115	0	0
BUTTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	51	93	0	0
CHARLOTTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	66	125	14	10
CHICAGO	3	13	3	0	5	0	0	90	15	166	320	3	0
CINCINNATI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	5	61	144	1	0
CLEVELAND	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	31	6	72	194	0	0
DALLAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	5	59	170	2	0
DENVER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	51	110	0	0
DETROIT	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	21	6	116	199	1	0
EL PASO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	23	59	0	0
HONOLULU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	2	11	50	0	0
HOUSTON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	69	57	0	0
INDIANAPOLIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	2	62	106	0	0
JACKSON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	48	5	14
JACKSONVILLE	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	53	151	11	5
KANSAS CITY	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	75	239	0	0
KNOXVILLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	140	5	2
LAS VEGAS	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	57	124	0	0
LITTLE ROCK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	63	75	7	0
LOS ANGELES	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	90	21	116	419	2	1
LOUISVILLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	79	115	0	0

134-11550-511  
ENCLOSURE

INVESTIGATIVE-TYPE TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES (INV) (TS)  
MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES - MS  
INTELLIGENCE-TYPE TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES (INT) (TS)  
TELETYPE COVERAGE - TEL  
SECURITY MAIL COVERS - SMC  
FUGITIVE MAIL COVERS - FMC  
OTHER MAIL COVERS - OMC

SECURITY INFORMANTS - SI  
POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS-PSI  
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - CI  
POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - PCI  
RACIAL INFORMANTS - RAC  
RACIAL INFORMANTS PROBATIONARY - RAC PROB

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DATE 10/19/02 BY SPJAM/ely

OFFICE	INV. TS	MS	INT. TS	TEL	SMC	FMC	OMC	SI	PSI	CI	PCI	RAC	RAC PROB
MEMPHIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	32	129	3	0
MIAMI	1	5	0	0	1	0	0	21	7	108	237	1	0
MILWAUKEE	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	8	5	26	84	0	1
MINNEAPOLIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	5	60	152	0	0
MOBILE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	38	128	9	1
NEWARK	0	8	0	0	4	0	0	40	36	102	300	0	0
NEW HAVEN	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	16	7	35	75	0	0
NEW ORLEANS	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	8	0	25	90	9	5
NEW YORK	33	18	36	21	22	0	0	222	95	176	572	1	1
NORFOLK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	24	85	1	0
OKLAHOMA CITY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	48	181	0	0
OMAHA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	43	68	0	0
PHILADELPHIA	1	7	0	0	1	0	0	38	4	83	182	0	0
PHOENIX	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	14	3	26	126	0	0
PITTSBURGH	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	16	5	78	167	0	0
PORTLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	34	72	0	0
RICHMOND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	62	114	1	1
ST. LOUIS	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	61	168	0	0
SALT LAKE CITY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	2	26	65	0	0
SAN ANTONIO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	5	49	124	0	0
SAN DIEGO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	2	35	121	0	0
SAN FRANCISCO	3	5	1	0	7	2	0	72	21	143	317	0	0
SAN JUAN	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	13	8	30	77	0	0
SAVANNAH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	53	147	6	5
SEATTLE	3	1	0	0	3	0	0	41	4	65	163	0	0
SPRINGFIELD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	58	160	0	0
TAMPA	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	21	25	47	124	13	11
WASHINGTON	9	7	35	23	18	0	0	52	49	69	160	2	0
TOTALS	65	105	76	44	76	3	0	1095	369	3339	8169	118	76

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

J U N E

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 10/6/64

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ahb*

cc Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Conrad

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2AKM/ldj

SUBJECT: SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE  
TECHNIQUES

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
DeLoach	_____
Sullivan	_____
Rosen	_____
Evans	_____
Conrad	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

This is to set forth the procedure being followed, under present conditions, relative to the use of the following special investigative techniques.

### 1. TRASH COVERAGE

By radiogram to all offices dated 9/17/64, the field was instructed that trash covers were not to be used and any in existence must be discontinued.

### 2. MAIL COVERS

By instructions to the field dated 9/30/64, all offices were instructed to discontinue mail covers in existence and to discontinue the use of this technique.

### 3. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES

Technical surveillances are being used only in security-type cases. Any departure from this, such as in a kidnaping case, is presented to the Director for approval.

We are presently examining each of the technical surveillances to insure that this technique is not being used in a case with prosecutive possibilities. The attached proposed instruction to the field stresses the fact that the Bureau will not authorize any technical surveillance in a case with prosecutive possibilities, as we do not want to run into the question of tainted evidence.

REC-31 OCT 21 1964 104-111-29

We disseminate a great deal of information outside the Bureau from our technical surveillances, for example to the White House, State Department, CIA, the military intelligence agencies, and the Department. This is necessary because we secure a great deal of intelligence data on such matters as the plans of various countries regarding issues being considered at the United Nations; the purpose of a pending contact between a foreign diplomat and the State Department, or the White House; plans of the Communist Party to initiate programs, or to deluge the White House with telegrams on a pending issue; attempts of

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

AHB:CSH (8)

XEROX

Enclosure 1 1964 OCT 19 1964



Mr. Tolson  
RE: SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE  
TECHNIQUES

the Communist Party or subversive elements to infiltrate the racial movement; possible racial disturbances; advance planning of Martin Luther King and his associates; demonstrations against Congressional committees, et cetera. We also pick up information regarding Security Index subjects which is included in investigative reports that eventually go to the Department, as the Department passes on Security Index cases.

Our safeguards in the area of technical surveillances are

(a) careful evaluation before they are installed. Current instructions are that they shall not be used in any case with prosecutive possibilities

(b) Paraphrasing or covering up of the source when we disseminate, so that the recipients cannot determine that the source of the information is a technical surveillance.

(c) Should a case develop prosecutive possibilities, despite our efforts not to use technical surveillances in any case which may develop into prosecution, we will insist on a complete understanding with the Department and the US Attorney, so that we will not run into another case, such as the JARO case, handled so ineptly by US Attorney Hoey.

#### 4. MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES <sup>1/2-</sup>

Microphone surveillances are being employed in security cases (44) and criminal intelligence matters (60). Each installation of a microphone must be approved by Mr. Tolson's office.

We are presently going over each of these existing surveillances, in the security field, to insure that they are not being employed where there are prosecutive possibilities, and the same precaution will be used in future installations. The attached radiogram to the field so instructs the field.

Intelligence information coming from these security microphones is likewise disseminated, when pertinent, to outside agencies, with appropriate paraphrasing and coverup of the source so that the recipients will not know the source. As in the case of technical surveillances, valuable intelligence data is derived from these sources.

In the criminal intelligence field microphone surveillances have been a primary source of information permitting us to gain knowledge of the activities in the field of organized crime, and particularly

Mr. Tolson  
RE: SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE  
TECHNIQUES

Cosa Nostra. The information derived has enabled us to know of the organization and planning of leaders of organized crime, and has provided data leading toward our primary goal of infiltrating, penetrating and disrupting organized crime, and provided leads to develop live informants within organized crime. Following the leak from the Department in the Las Vegas case we stopped disseminating to the Department and the US Attorneys any information coming from our microphone surveillances, and since that policy was adopted we have had no further leaks from these sources. The only dissemination we make is when we pick up information about a possible forthcoming murder, or a matter within the jurisdiction of local authorities. We then disseminate to carry out our responsibilities, but we paraphrase and cover the source. We have had no difficulty in this regard. The attached radiogram to the field reiterates instructions that information coming from these criminal intelligence microphones must not be disseminated without prior Bureau authority.

If approved, we will operate along the lines set forth above.

OK.  
WCS

cc Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. DeLoach

Mr. Baumgardner  
Mr. Branigan

August 2, 1965

EX-100

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

66-711-2572

REC-49

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/19/02 BY SP1ALM/felj

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES AND  
THE USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES

On the morning of July 30, 1965, Mr. C. D. DeLoach and Mr. A. H. Belmont, of this Bureau, met with Mr. Harold F. Reis, of your office, and Mr. Howard Willens, of the Criminal Division, with reference to the President's memorandum of June 30, 1965, dealing with technical surveillances and the use of electronic devices.

In view of the fact that this Bureau does obtain authority from you on each technical surveillance, and thus the Department exercises central control over the use of this technique by the FBI, Mr. Reis advised that it would be unnecessary for us to send in the items mentioned in the last paragraph of the President's memorandum.

With reference to the first paragraph on page 2 of the President's memorandum, dealing with technical and electronic devices, as you are aware we also consult with you relative to the use of microphone surveillances, and consequently we meet the requirements of this paragraph.

During the discussion with Messrs. Reis and Willens it was agreed that we would forward samples of the requests we have made in connection with technical surveillances, so that the Department can devise appropriate instructions to other government agencies concerning the format and procedures to be followed in making requests of the Attorney General. As of possible assistance, I am enclosing three samples of actual requests, from which we have eliminated the names of the subjects.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

Enclosures 3  
AHB:CSH (8)

- Belmont
- Mohr
- DeLoach
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

SENT DIRECTO.  
8-2-65

SENT FROM D. O.  
TIME 6:22 PM  
DATE 8-2-65  
BY [Signature]

XEROX  
AUG 17 1965

AUG 2 5 56 PM '65

9-30-64

Airtel

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue

*(Sullivan)*

TO: ALL OFFICES

From: Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10/18/02 BY SP2/AM/ky

MAIL COVERS

The Bureau no longer desires that mail covers be used as an investigative technique. Therefore, this is to advise that all mail covers have been discontinued and the Bureau will not entertain additional requests for mail covers in the future.

JDD:klb  
(121)

*rlk*

NOTE:

See cover memorandum Sullivan to Belmont, captioned "Confidential Informant and Similar Types of Coverage," dated 9-30-64, prepared by JDD:klb.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

2 - CC ALL FIELD OFFICES

SEP 30 6 24 PM '64  
READING ROOM

MAILED 5  
OCT 1 - 1964  
COMM-FBI

REC 4

62-25532-948

OCT 22 1964

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Evans \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*1 Xerox made  
in PCO 4300  
58 OCT 26 1964 10/20/64*

SEP 30 2 16 PM '64

1 - Belmont

OCTOBER 6, 1964

CODE

- 1 - Mohr
- 1 - DeLoach
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Rosen
- 1 - Evans
- 1 - Conrad

REC'D-READING ROOM  
F B I

Oct 6 4 15 PM '64

RADIOGRAM

URGENT

TO: ALL SAC'S  
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/19/67 BY SP2AM/ely

JUNE

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES ARE TO BE USED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY AND, THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD INSURE THAT YOU DO NOT PROPOSE OR REQUEST TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES IN CASES WHICH HAVE PROSECUTIVE POSSIBILITIES. THE SAME POLICY APPLIES TO MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES WHICH INVOLVE TRESPASS. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION FROM TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES MUST BE PARAPHRASED AND APPROPRIATELY WORDED TO PROTECT THE SOURCE. WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO INFORMATION DEVELOPED FROM CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE MICROPHONES, YOU ARE AGAIN INSTRUCTED THAT NO DISSEMINATION IS TO BE MADE OUTSIDE THE BUREAU WITHOUT PRIOR BUREAU AUTHORITY. WFO ADVISED BY MAIL.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
 Unauthorized Disclosure  
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1 - WFO (DSM) *ok*  
AHB:CSH- (10)

*10-7-64*  
*of. advised by Millard*  
*Buffalo*  
*Memphis*  
*Sampa*  
*Philadelphia*  
*Springfield*  
*10-7-64*  
*of. advised by La Rigo*  
*Butte*  
*Houston 66-8160-25*  
*El Paso*

Cover memo  
Belmont to Tolson  
10/6/64 re  
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE  
TECHNIQUES (AHB: csh)

VIA RADIOGRAM  
OCT 6 1964  
7:56 PM

VIA TELETYPE  
OCT 7 1964  
9:00 PM  
ENCIPHERED

REC-35  
OCT 19 1964  
06 2155  
ENC.  
71129  
A

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Evans \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/19/00 BY [Signature]

March 30, 1935

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With reference to the proper controls over wiretapping and the installation of microphones, you will recall that I advised you that back under the administration of Attorney General Clark I recommended that all Government agencies refrain from wiretapping unless there was specific approval in each instance by the Attorney General who is the chief law officer of the Government. I repeated the same recommendation to each successive Attorney General following the administration of Attorney General Clark.

I have always felt that there was a very lax control in the handling of wiretapping by Government agencies. I am the only head of a Government investigative agency who does not have the authority to authorize a wiretap, but under the system which I personally set up. Therefore, requests for wiretaps are sent by me to the Attorney General for his approval or disapproval. I know that no such system is followed in other branches of the Government and, in fact, in many instances subordinates quite far down the line of authority tap telephones without the specific approval of the head of the agency and certainly without specific approval of the cabinet officer in charge of the department.

I still feel quite strongly that no Government agency should tap a telephone unless it is specifically approved in each instance by the Attorney General. This would certainly circumscribe promiscuous wiretapping on the part of Government agencies and would centralize in one place, the Attorney General's office, a record of any phone taps which have been placed by a Government agency.

As you are aware, in the case of the FBI we do not request phone taps except in cases involving kidnaping and espionage. This has been predicated upon my theory that when the life of an individual or the life of the Nation is in peril a phone tap is justified for intelligence purposes and any information obtained over a phone tap cannot be used in the trial of a criminal case.

JEH:RM (6)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to another person without the express approval of the FBI.

SENT FROM D. O. [Stamp]  
BY [Signature]

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

Memorandum for the Attorney General

In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the placement of microphones. In other words, I shall forward to you from time to time request for authority to install microphones where deemed imperative for your consideration and approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have instructed that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the installation of a microphone, you be advised when such is discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontinued in less than six months, that a new request be submitted by me to you for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

