

File #:

62-HQ-116464

Serial Scope:

EBF 312

November 28, 1975

RE: CONTACTS BETWEEN WEATHERMAN AND THE
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (IPS)

The following is submitted in response to a request of Congressman Dellums for information in the files of the FBI which shows contacts between the IPS and Weatherman, the information to be inserted at line 25, page 4286, of the transcript of the hearings concerning FBI surveillance activities, November 18, 1975.

Information was furnished to the New York Office of the FBI, in May, 1968, showing a contact between Arthur Waskow of IPS and Jeff Jones of the New York Regional Office of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Jones was then a leader of the SDS and is currently a fugitive from justice being sought by the FBI for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution - Aggravated Battery and Bail Jumping, as a result of his participation in the "Days of Rage" on the part of the Weatherman at Chicago, Illinois, October, 1969. Jones is also a leader of the Weather Underground Organization (WUO) by which name the Weatherman is now known.

On August 13, 1969, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on the afternoon of August 12, 1969, William Charles Ayers, a leader of the Weatherman operating out of Chicago, Illinois, was in Washington, D. C., for the purpose of soliciting money. The amount of money being sought and the reason for such is not known at this time, nor was it determined at that time. Ayers reportedly obtained money from Arthur Waskow of the IPS, Washington, D. C. This same source advised that after Ayers obtained the money, he left Washington, D. C., on the same night, destined for Chicago, Illinois. This same source also advised that Ayers was scheduled to meet on August 14, 1969, with Bobby Seale of the Black Panther Party (BPP). The source advised the purpose of the meeting concerned the relationship between Weatherman and the BPP.

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GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

November 28, 1975

RE: STATEMENT OF PETER CAMEJO BEFORE
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, NOVEMBER 18, 1975

Peter Camejo, as the Presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), testified that his organization has been victimized by FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities since 1945. He briefly explained the nature of the SWP and its position on election campaigns, advocacy of violence, and foreign influence. Numerous references were made by Camejo and others to 30 years of investigation of the SWP by the FBI. Since the SWP was founded only 37 years ago in 1938, a desire to avoid discussion of the early years of the SWP was apparent and ignored the fact that 18 members of the SWP were convicted 32 years ago for violations of Federal statutes dealing with conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States and to advocate insubordination in its armed forces.

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In Dunne v. United States, 138 F 2d 137 (1943), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered statements of the SWP on the same topics that were discussed by Camejo. Of particular significance to the court was the Declaration of Principles and Constitution of the SWP which was adopted at its founding convention in Chicago from December 31, 1937, to January 3, 1938. The 1938 Declaration of Principles sets forth the goals of the SWP to be:

1) "The main specific task of the S.W.P. is the mobilization of the American masses for struggle against American capitalism, and for its overthrow."

2) "...take control of state power through the overthrow of the capitalist state and the transfer of sovereignty from it to their own Workers' State -- the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

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3) "The 'Workers' State is a temporary political instrument making possible the transition to the class-less, socialist society."
"...The noblest objective of the human race--communism, the classless socialist society--inaugurating a new era for all of mankind, will be realized."

4) "...The revolutionary party in this country does not aim merely to lead the working class of the United States in revolution, but to unite with the workers of all other countries in the international revolution and the establishment of world socialism."

The current position of the SWP is contained in evidentiary material in FBI files. Included in this material are official SWP documents such as "The Decline of American Capitalism; Prospects for a Socialist Revolution" which was approved by the 26th National Convention of the SWP and appeared in a special issue dated November 7, 1975, of the "International Socialist Review," monthly supplement of "The Militant," the SWP newspaper. The 1975 Prospects for a Socialist Revolution states, "The Marxist model for constructing a revolutionary program in the imperialist epoch is the founding document of the Fourth International, the world party of socialist revolution, founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938." The 1938 Declaration of Principles also includes this program.

The following is a comparison of specific portions of Camejo's testimony with other material concerning the SWP, most of which is from court decisions and official SWP documents:

AIMS AND PURPOSES

Camejo testified, "I think it is important that I briefly explain exactly who we are and what we stand for." He described the SWP as a "political party based on the working class" or as a "workers movement" and SWP members as "Marxists" or "internationalist."

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The explanation of what they stand for included, "On the question of establishing socialism, however, we are in a minority. Our goal is to win a majority to our point of view." At no point in his statement did Camejo acknowledge the SWP is a revolutionary, Trotskyist-communist organization which has as its purpose, as stated in its Declaration of Principles, the overthrow of the U. S. Government, the institution of a dictatorship of the working class, and the eventual achievement of a communist society.

In Dunne v. U. S., the court considered the Declaration of Principles and said,

"The Declaration sets forth the program of action to effectuate this overthrow of the existing capitalist society and the Government which supports it. The first step is to build the strength of the party so that it can have a majority of the exploited classes back of its leadership. The final step is to overthrow the existing Government by force."

The 1975 Prospects for a Socialist Revolution states, "The world crisis of capitalism does not favor extensive and effective long-term capitalist reform in the United States but the development of the requisites for a revolution."

ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

Camejo states, "we think a political party based on the working class is needed. That is why we are offering candidates in the 1976 elections."

The 1938 Declaration of Principles also discusses election campaigns and says,

"While relying primarily on mass actions, propaganda and agitation as the means for furthering its revolutionary aim, the Party will also participate in election campaigns though at all times contending against the fatal illusion that the masses can accomplish their emancipation through the ballot box."

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FOREIGN INFLUENCE

Camejo denies that the SWP is run by a foreign power or organization and states that SWP members are "internationalists" who "maintain a relationship of fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International."

The 1938 Declaration of Principles states,

"The revolutionary party in the United States collaborates in the fullest measure with all groups, organizations and parties in all other countries standing on the same fundamental program as our own; and cooperates with them in the elaboration of a complete world program. The S.W.P., therefore, is affiliated with the Bureau for the Fourth International as its section in United States."

Camejo stated, "And although we strongly disagree with the Voorhis Act, since it was passed in 1940 we have not been affiliated to the Fourth International." In Dunne v. U. S., the court discusses an attempt to suspend and withdraw the Declaration of Principles and quotes defendant James P. Cannon (founder and leader of the SWP until his death in 1974) as follows: "The principal reason, I may say, was the passage by Congress of a bill known as the Voorhis Act, which penalized parties belonging to international organizations." The court then concluded, "Even as to the Voorhis Act, this action was merely a subterfuge and smoke screen." Another quote from Dunne v. U. S. seems particularly appropriate when considering the SWP's denial of membership in an international organization while also following Trotsky's teaching that communism cannot be established with lasting success as an isolated phenomenon in one country alone. The court said,

"When they use words which may or may not mean the forbidden thing, they intend just one thing and that is to squirm through the statute leaving a haze which they hope will make it impossible or difficult to find any fracture by their passage."

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The Fourth International continues to be the worldwide Trotskyist revolutionary organization and is presently headquartered in Brussels, Belgium. Although claiming to have withdrawn from formal affiliation in 1940, the SWP continues to maintain a close association with the FI and participates and votes as a "sympathizing group" in FI meetings.

The 1975 Prospects for a Socialist Revolution states:

"The Marxist model for constructing a revolutionary program in the imperialist epoch is the founding document of the Fourth International, the world party of socialist revolution, founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938."

"The Socialist Workers Party is internationalist to its core. Not only are world developments shaping the coming struggles at home, but the American workers' enemies are the exploiters on a world scale. The perspective of the Communist Manifesto--'Workers of the world, unite'--remains our fundamental goal. While reactionary legislation precludes formal affiliation to the Fourth International, the Socialist Workers Party, since its founding, has been an integral political component of the world party of socialist revolution."

ADVOCACY OF VIOLENCE

Camejo stated that the SWP "doesn't advocate or engage in violent or illegal activity. The FBI has never produced any evidence to the contrary." Mr. McClory asked Camejo if the SWP hadn't originally advocated the overthrow of the Government by force of violence. Camejo answered, "Never in its history."

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the House Select Committee on
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The 1938 Declaration of Principles states,

"The belief that in such a country as the United States we live in a free, democratic society in which fundamental economic change can be effected by persuasion, by education, by legal and purely parliamentary methods, is an illusion."

The court in Dunne v. U. S. considered the above and other quotes from the Declaration of Principles and concluded that the SWP believed the "final step is to overthrow the existing Government by force."

The SWP does not publicly espouse violence or terrorism at the present time; however, material obtained by the FBI does dispute Camejo's statement that, "We believe, as Marxists have always believed, that the philosophy and the methods of terrorism are damaging to the workers movement"; and that "Advocacy of terrorism is incompatible with membership in the SWP." In 1974, a minority faction within the SWP, the Internationalist Tendency (IT), supported the majority position of the Fourth International (FI) and was expelled from the SWP. The IT followers were not expelled for their support of the FI position which favors the current use of guerrilla warfare in Latin America and elsewhere if local conditions indicate that such violence would enhance the revolution. Rather, they were expelled for operating in secrecy in violation of SWP directives governing its own operations. In fact, the majority of the SWP did not reject violence per se but refused to support the FI position because they felt the use of violence was then premature. Some of the followers of the IT position have been reaccepted into the SWP by renewing their unconditional acceptance of the leadership bodies of the SWP.

The 1975 Prospects for a Socialist Revolution states,

"While powerful world forces are laying powder kegs under American imperialism, only forces inside the United States can take power away from the American capitalists and disarm them."

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"To protect their struggles and gains against murderous attacks by goons, cops, and fascist bands, the workers will have to organize and train their own forces and use them in the most effective way. Starting with defense of picket lines and the right to strike, the protection of their demonstrations or those of their allies, and proceeding to workers defense guards, workers militias, and the requisite arming of the working class, the working masses will learn from their own experiences what measures to take. The lessons of history, incorporated into the general strategy of the workers movement will prove invaluable on this life-and-death question."

In addition to his statement, Camejo apparently turned over to the Committee a list of some 225 incidents of alleged FBI harassment which have taken place since April, 1971, when Cointelpro was discontinued. The SWP and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance, have filed a lawsuit against the Government. A large number of Bureau documents have been released to the SWP through pretrial discovery proceedings. The bulk of these documents concerned Cointelpro but some have included the files on individual plaintiffs. In the lawsuit, approximately 150 "investigative incidents" have been alleged as examples of harassment by the FBI. These have also included such items as interviews of SWP and YSA members, and their relatives, neighbors, associates and employers. These allegations have been answered in the discovery proceedings in the lawsuit and none has been admitted to be, or should properly be, interpreted as a Cointelpro action. Since the list of 225 items has not been furnished to the FBI and since it apparently concerns a matter in litigation, it would be improper to make further comments at this time.

Courts which have considered the role of the Government with regard to organizations such as the SWP have held that investigation of them is warranted. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the court stated,

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the House Select Committee on
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"Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required. The argument that there is no need for Government to concern itself, for Government is strong, it possesses ample powers to put down a rebellion, it may defeat the revolution with ease needs no answer. For that is not the question. Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or powers of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt. In the instant case the trial judge charged the jury that they could not convict unless they found that petitioners intended to overthrow the Government 'as speedily as circumstances would permit.' This does not mean, and could not properly mean, that they would not strike until there was certainty of success. What was meant was that the revolutionists would strike when they thought the time was ripe. We must therefore reject the contention that success or probability of success is the criterion."

The Supreme Court additionally noted that, "If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added." The Court of Appeals which has considered a portion of the current SWP lawsuit has stated, "The FBI has a right indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime; it is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention." (Socialist Workers Party, et. al. v. Attorney General of the United States of America, et. al.; 510 F 2d 253 (1974).)

November 28, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF ROBERT GEORGE SILVERMAN
BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, NOVEMBER 18, 1975

Mr. Robert George Silverman, President of Peer Enterprises, Ltd, testified on November 18, 1975, that during the Fall of 1972, two men who identified themselves as Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) contacted him and his father at the office of Peer Enterprises, inquiring about Bruce Bloy and one other employee. Mr. Silverman stated that in response to his question as to the purpose of their inquiry he was told that Bruce Bloy and this other employee were members of a political party in which the FBI had an interest. He also stated that as an employer, he had no interest in the political beliefs of his employees and he felt the FBI had no right to inquire at an individual's place of employment. He characterized the approach of the Agents as presumptive, mysterious and aggressive.

Regarding statements made before this Committee by Mr. Silverman, a review was made of files of FBI Headquarters, Washington, D. C., and the Chicago Office of the FBI, concerning this matter. It was determined that Robert George Silverman was never contacted or interviewed by any Agent of the FBI concerning Bruce Bloy. Mr. Silverman was interviewed on April 28, 1975, concerning an ongoing criminal investigation.

Records of the Chicago Office also revealed that Bruce Bloy and another individual, both of whom were members of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), youth group of the Socialist Workers Party, were reported by a source to be employed by Peer Enterprises, Chicago, Illinois.

Records of the Chicago Office of the FBI also contain a memorandum dated October 30, 1972, which states that an investigator for a committee of the U. S. House of Representatives reported on that date that he had interviewed J. M. Silverman (father of Robert George Silverman), Owner, Peer Enterprises, regarding the other YSA member who was employed at that company.

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November 28, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF MARCUS G. RASKIN BEFORE
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
NOVEMBER 18, 1975

The FBI's observations concerning allegations made by Mr. Raskin in his testimony are set forth below.

Mr. Raskin alleges the Bureau rifled the trash and garbage thrown out each day by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS).

On August 23, 1972, a Special Agent of the FBI's Washington Field Office retrieved some of the contents of IPS trash abandoned by a trash truck at a Washington, D. C. sanitary dump. This was the only occasion where IPS trash was retrieved by FBI personnel.

Mr. Raskin also alleged IPS Fellows were targets of the Boston grand jury investigation of the Pentagon Papers, an investigation which never resulted in indictments. By letter dated August 31, 1971, the then Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice, requested the FBI conduct additional investigation of IPS pointing out a possible connection between IPS and the unauthorized disclosure of the "McNamara Papers," a possible violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Sections 792-98, (Espionage).

Mr. Raskin stated, it was clear that IPS Fellows had their conversations intercepted by many warrantless wiretaps, although it is not yet known on whom the taps were placed. Although conversations of individuals previously identified by the IPS as associated with the Institute have been overheard through national security electronic surveillances conducted by the FBI directed at other persons, a review of FBI records of the IPS investigation fails to reveal that the IPS organization or any known IPS Fellow was ever the subject of electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI. The FBI has, however, received information relating to such individuals as a result of electronic surveillance conducted by another Federal agency, which information did not mention the IPS.

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Testimony of Marcus G. Raskin Before the Select
Committee on Intelligence, November 18, 1975

Raskin also claimed "IPS came to the attention of the D. C. Police and their political intelligence unit. The D. C. Police employed the same informer used by the FBI against IPS, and perhaps several others. Several mysterious break-ins took place at IPS over a course of two years."

Earl Robert Merritt has publicly admitted that he is a former informant of the FBI. Merritt was, in fact, an informant of the FBI. He first contacted the Washington Field Office of the FBI on October 1, 1971, and advised he wished to furnish information to the FBI concerning criminal matters and what could be termed "New Left" activities. Merritt also advised that he was a former source of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C. Merritt was discontinued as an informant of the FBI on June 1, 1972, after it became apparent that his credibility was doubtful. At no time was he directed to perform any criminal act by Agents of the FBI, and, in fact, was advised to the contrary. The FBI neither conducted nor directed any break-ins against IPS.

November 28, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR MURTAGH BEFORE
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
NOVEMBER 18, 1975

Among the allegations made by Murtagh during the November 18, 1975, hearings before the HSC was that at one time he was asked to obtain through his informants hand-writing samples of Andrew Young of Atlanta and other assistants of Dr. Martin Luther King in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), for what he believed was to be used for illegal purposes.

In 1973, the time Murtagh originally made this allegation, a check of FBI Headquarters files as well as those of the Atlanta Office of the FBI was made. A communication was directed to FBI Headquarters by the Atlanta Office on August 13, 1973, which advised that a review of files disclosed no information to support Murtagh's allegation and that personnel, who would be knowledgeable of such a request of Murtagh, had no recollection of any such request. FBI Headquarters files did not contain information which would substantiate Murtagh's allegation.

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Mr. Murtagh alleged the FBI used illegal activity to compromise the "movement" and that Mr. Hoover had no sympathy with any "racial movement." Presuming that Murtagh is referring to the Civil Rights Movement, our investigations were aimed at determining the nature and extent of communist influence in the racial movement and not to deter the movement itself. The FBI promptly and vigorously handled investigations relating to Civil Rights violations and our excellent record in this area speaks for itself.

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Mr. Murtagh alleged that Mr. Hoover threw a veil of secrecy over the Bureau's internal operations making it impossible for the public or Congress to know of Bureau operations.

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Mr. Murtagh is well aware that annual appropriations were based on Mr. Hoover's testimony before Congressional Committees which were at liberty to examine all areas of the Bureau's operations in conducting their inquiry for budget justification. As members of Congress and representatives of the people, Committee members have always been in a position to know of the Bureau's internal as well as external operations and to make Congress and the general public aware of their observations within their prescribed mandate and subject to the rules of confidence.

Mr. Murtagh alleges that the Bureau uses harsh disciplinary measures. The standards of conduct of the FBI are based on and are in accordance with the Department of Justice Order 350-65 and the Code of Federal Regulations. Administrative action for failure to meet these known and established standards is handled promptly and fairly. No administrative action is ever taken without first obtaining an explanation from the employee involved. Disciplinary policies of the mid-1960s were no different than in previous decades and little different than at present. Mr. Murtagh's allegation that disciplinary measures had so eroded Agents' confidence in Mr. Hoover by the mid-1960s that the policy "tell the man nothing" reached the point where Bureau supervisors did not furnish Mr. Hoover with information that had come to their attention for fear of reprisal, is without factual basis, is not documented, and appears to be a matter of Murtagh's personal opinion.

Mr. Murtagh alleged Agents under Mr. Hoover had no avenue through which they could air grievances involving unethical or illegal practices. This is not true. If asked or required to take part in something illegal or unethical or outside the Agent's job description his obvious initial recourse would be to report same to the next higher supervisory authority. Since Murtagh insinuated that internal channels would not be responsive to accepting or forwarding such grievances, it must also be pointed out that Agents could always seek recourse by writing or going to higher authority, such as the Attorney General.

Testimony of Arthur Murtagh before the Select
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Mr. Murtagh alleges that the FBI has carefully selected Agent personnel who were politically disposed to the right.

The FBI is excepted from the competitive Civil Service in our employment of both Special Agents and clerical personnel. Our employees are selected based on educational qualifications, personal interviews, appropriate testing and rigid background investigations. No instructions have ever been issued to determine the political affiliation of applicants for employment with the FBI. Political affiliation or persuasion is not now and has never been a prerequisite for employment.

Additionally, Mr. Murtagh alleges that thousands of Agents have been forced to leave the Bureau in "utter disgust." This is not corroborated by the facts. Percentage comparison studies reveal that the turnover rate of Special Agents is consistently below that in the Federal Government and private industry. In the first place, large numbers of Agents have not resigned and no information has come to our attention that would in any way indicate that large numbers of Agents have resigned in "utter disgust."

He also suggests that either the salary scale for Special Agents should be reduced or that we should establish educational requirements to justify our high pay standards. The starting grade for a Special Agent in the FBI is GS-10. The U. S. Civil Service Commission has found this position to be correctly classified in grade GS-10, based on a thorough study of all pertinent background information including the educational, physical and other qualification standards for recruitment, training courses and facilities, examination of typical, practical case problems and a study of the scope of FBI jurisdiction and the numerous duties and responsibilities of Special Agent personnel. Classification standards for the criminal investigating series GS-1311 were revised in February, 1972, and information therein continues to support GS-10 as the entrance level for Special Agents.

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Mr. Murtagh recommends that to insure against re-establishment of uncontrollable power within the Bureau that Agent selection be a legislative process so that future personnel would represent the full spectrum of American society instead of only a narrow segment as it now does.

Our current Special Agent complement is made up of a cross section of Americans representing all walks of life, races and creeds. All applications received are thoroughly reviewed and treated in a like manner without regard to an individual's station in life.

Equal opportunity is, and has been, an established policy of the FBI. The Bureau has applied an unqualified policy of considering each applicant for employment without regard to race or any other discriminatory factor. Over the years we have emphasized and reemphasized not only the need but the desire to attract minority applicants to our ranks in order to be representative of the American people and fulfill our responsibilities.

In support of his allegation that the FBI practiced institutional racism in hiring, Mr. Murtagh also attributed to Mr. (James B.) Adams of the FBI a statement to the effect that Murtagh's hiring of blacks for the Bureau's work force, would have to be stopped.

Mr. Adams categorically denies having made any such statement and the FBI's record of affirmative action in recruiting black employees belies any such statement.

November 28, 1975

RE: STATEMENT OF KATHY SLEDGE-LOVGREN BEFORE
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
NOVEMBER 18, 1975

On May 15, 1974, the FBI received a request for a National Agency Check from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on Kathy Camille Zahraie, nee Sledge, who was employed at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Seattle, Washington, on March 31, 1974.

A review of FBI files disclosed information concerning Mrs. Zahraie's activities and membership in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) from 1972 to March, 1974. FBI files also disclosed information that Babak Zahraie, Mrs. Zahraie's husband, was also a member of the SWP and YSA. The SWP was at that time cited on the list of organizations designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 10450. The YSA is the youth arm of the SWP.

EO 10450, in its preamble, states that the interests of the national security require all persons privileged to be employed by the Government shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States.

Section 2 of EO 10450 requires the agency head to maintain an effective program to insure employment or retention of applicants and employees is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

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Statement of Kathy Sledge-Lovgren Before the House
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Section 8 of EO 10450 lists guidelines for developing information which is of investigative and by inference, adjudicative interest.

A full-field investigation covering the above standards was initiated by the FBI concerning Kathy Camille Zahraie.

Concerning the statement furnished by Kathy Sledge-Lovgren to the HSC on November 18, 1975, persons interviewed during the FBI full field investigation furnished the following information:

She was an active and participating member of the SWP and YSA from 1972 through the time of the investigation in 1974.

Her co-employees and supervisors were interviewed, one at a time, and were questioned concerning her suitability and loyalty. At no time during or since the interviews have any of these persons complained of having been "upset" at being "brought into the matter."

No complaint has been received, either written or oral, from a Dr. Tremann or from Kathy Sledge-Lovgren's chief supervisor concerning any "disruption," nor were any of her co-employees "ordered" to "come up" and answer questions. The FBI has conducted and continues to conduct numerous investigations of various matters coming within its investigative jurisdiction at the United States Veterans Administration Hospital in Seattle, Washington, and has received no complaint concerning our investigation of Kathy Sledge-Lovgren.

The FBI contacted a total of 5 tenants in four units of the 17-unit complex managed by her. The persons contacted were also questioned concerning her suitability and loyalty.

Her "best friend," could be identical with an individual who was interviewed at an FBI office at her suggestion and by appointment. Her former boss in Chicago was not "called in" for an interview and was not interviewed in an FBI office. Neither complained of "intrusion" nor exhibited "anger" and both furnished information concerning her.

Statement of Kathy Sledge-Lovgren Before the House
Select Committee on Intelligence, November 18, 1975

Persons interviewed advised that she and her husband, Babak Zahraie, mentioned the advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government. Her mother, Mrs. James M. Sledge was not interviewed during the investigation. Neither Dr. Sledge nor Mrs. Sledge have made any complaint to the FBI, oral or written, that they were caused embarrassment by the FBI.

The FBI is unaware of the family relationship of the Sledge family.

The FBI has received no complaint, oral or written, from Kathy Sledge-Lovgren, or from any persons contacted during the course of the investigation as to the manner in which the investigation was conducted.

November 28, 1975

RE: TESTIMONY OF LORI PATON BEFORE THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, NOVEMBER 18, 1975

Regarding statements before the United States House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (HSC) made by Lori Paton, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would like to place the FBI's inquiry on Paton in proper perspective. It is important to note that the inquiry stemmed from the FBI's investigation of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the largest Trotskyist-communist party in the United States.

Paton states she was subjected to public exposure and suffered embarrassment and humiliation. While the FBI did, of course, conduct an inquiry to determine Paton's identity, the FBI did not publicize that fact. The FBI prepared no formal report on Paton and no information on her was disseminated. The FBI has maintained throughout the course of the civil action instituted by Ms. Paton that it did not cause any of the alleged notoriety and publicity following the inquiry. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in its recent opinion, "It would appear that a factfinder could conclude from this record that the investigation first became publicized through the efforts of Gabrielson." Mr. Gabrielson was the chairman of the high school's social studies department but was not the teacher of the class for which Paton wrote her letter to the SWP.

Paton said she felt she should have been contacted by the Agent. This was not possible until she was identified. Once she was identified and the purpose of her contact with the SWP was known, there no longer existed any reason to contact her. The reason for her contact with the SWP became known during the investigation. It was concluded that she was not involved in subversive activities, and her case was closed.

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Testimony of Lori Paton before the Select
Committee on Intelligence, November 18, 1975

She states she was concerned about the Government keeping a record on her as she might some day seek Government employment. She then filed suit to find out why she had been investigated and to have her file destroyed. The Government argued that her file was an accurate record of a lawful inquiry, and thus the FBI was prohibited by Federal laws from destroying her file. This matter is still in litigation.

Regarding Paton's attorney's request, on June 13, 1973, a letter was directed to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Newark Office, FBI, with copies to the Acting Director, FBI and the Attorney General by Frank Askin, utilizing the letterhead of Rutgers University, School of Law, Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Newark, New Jersey. In this letter, Askin stated he was making inquiry on behalf of Ms. Lori Paton and William Gabrielson, Chairman of the Social Studies Department, Mendham High School. He said the inquiry was prompted by a letter sent by Ms. Paton to the Socialist Labor Party in New York, seeking information for a school project. He also said that she and her family were concerned over the fact that this letter could prompt an FBI investigation. He demanded to receive an answer from the SAC, Newark, to the following questions within five days, threatening to take further action if a satisfactory answer was not received by June 20, 1973.

"1. How did the FBI learn of Ms. Paton's letter to the Socialist Labor Party?

2. Does the FBI maintain a general policy of surveillance of correspondence with the Socialist Labor Party and other minority political groups? Are all such correspondents investigated? If not, why was Ms. Paton selected for investigation?

3. Under what circumstances will correspondence with a political party inspire an FBI investigation? (Mr. Gabrielson needs this information so he can advise students when such correspondence might cause them to be investigated.)

Testimony of Lori Paton before the Select
Committee on Intelligence, November 18, 1975

4. What records or notations have been made in the Bureau's files regarding Ms. Paton, Mr. Gabrielson or any other person connected with Mendham High School as a result of this incident and investigation? What reports were filed in regard to this matter and to whom were copies transmitted?"

On July 16, 1973, Mr. Askin received his response over Mr. LaPrade's signature. It is noted Mr. LaPrade is not the Director of the FBI, but at that time was the SAC of the Newark Office of the FBI. The contents of that response are a part of current litigation and further comment is inappropriate at this time.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

11/28/75

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

☒

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

N/A

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Surveillance

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Corrections and additions regarding testimony of FBI personnel before HSC on 11/18/75 made regarding FBI surveillances.

62-116464

AJD:1hb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH HOUSTUDY 75.

TREAT AS YELLOW

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8: SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
 1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
 1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
 1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

62-116464

November 28, 1975

U. S. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)
 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

RE: CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS
 TO THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE
 NOVEMBER 18, 1975, HEARINGS
 OF THE HSC CONCERNING FBI
 SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

Attached are the following:

The copy of the transcript of captioned hearings which was made available to Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall for review and corrections to be made directly on the transcript.

Please note that corrections have been made directly on the transcript at lines 2 and 13, page 4140-C; line 5, page 4148; lines 23, 24 and 25, page 4152; line 7, page 4163; line 3, page 4165; line 21, page 4167; lines 1 and 14, page 4244; line 13, page 4260; lines 1, 2 and 4, page 4265; lines 12 and 13, page 4286; and lines 17 and 25, page 4288.

A memorandum captioned "Basis for Investigation of the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance" with attachments, for insertion at line 4, page 4247, of the transcript of the November 18, 1975, hearings.

A memorandum captioned "Contacts Between Weatherman and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)" for insertion at line 25, page 4286, of the transcript of the November 18, 1975, hearings.

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir.: _____

Six memoranda which address the statements submitted to the HSC on November 18, 1975, by Messrs. Camejo, Silverman, Raskin, and Murtagh; Mrs. Sledge-Lovgren and Miss Paton for insertion at line 14, page 4285, of the transcript of the November 18, 1975, hearings.

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A memorandum concerning Hardy will be submitted by separate communication.

FJC:lfj/jmn jmn
 (14)

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U. S. House Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities (HSC)

Re: Corrections and Additions to the
Transcript of the November 18, 1975,
Hearings of the HSC Concerning FBI
Surveillance Activities

It is requested that all of the above information
be made a part of the official record of the November 18,
1975, hearings.

Enclosures - 14

1 - The Attorney General

November 28, 1975

RE: BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION
OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
AND THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

During the NSC hearings concerning FBI surveillance activities, November 18, 1975, it was requested that the FBI submit for inclusion in the transcript of the proceedings at line 4, page 4247, documents showing the basis for the investigation of the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance.

Attached are documents responsive to that request.

Enclosures (4)

FJC:cap *cap*

new

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Dep. AD Inv. _____
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Director Sec'y _____

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In the United States District Court

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, et al.,)

Plaintiffs,)

v.)

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED)
STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,)

Defendants.)

73 CIV. 3160 (TPG)
AFFIDAVITAFFIDAVIT

Hugh Mallet, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am employed as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington, D. C. I am assigned to a supervisory position with the FBI at Headquarters and am familiar with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA).

2. The continuing investigation of the SWP and of its youth arm, YSA, is conducted to determine whether SWP, YSA and their members are violating any Federal statutes, including Title 18, U. S. Code, 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy), 2385 (Advocating Overthrow of the Government), 2386 (Voorhis Act), or Title 50, U. S. Code, 781-798 (Internal Security Act of 1950), as well as to obtain security intelligence information.

Information concerning the activities of SWP and YSA has been received by the FBI from numerous sources, including informants of the FBI, who have been in attendance at SWP and YSA meetings, conferences and national conventions both early in SWP and YSA history and continuing to the present time. In summary, this information is: The SWP and YSA are revolutionary Trotskyist-communist organizations which have as their purpose the overthrow of the United States Government, the institution of a dictatorship of the working

SWP was founded in the United States in 1938 as the American section of the worldwide Trotskyist-communist revolutionary organization named the Fourth International (FI), which is headquartered in Europe. The FI was founded in 1938 in Europe and embodies the ideology of Leon Trotsky concerning the application of Marxism and the need for continuing revolution in the world to achieve communism.

In 1940, SWP withdrew its formal affiliation with the FI to escape application of the Voorhis Act, which regulates certain types of organizations subject to foreign control. Since 1940, however, SWP has conducted a close association with the FI (a majority of which endorses and supports the current use of violence) and SWP participates and votes as a "sympathizing group" in FI meetings. See SWP Internal Information Bulletin, dated April, 1974, and International Internal Discussion Bulletin, dated April, 1974, annexed hereto.

While the SWP and YSA are not known by the FBI to publicly advocate the use of violence at the present time, these organizations maintain that eventual violent revolution is inevitable. SWP and YSA seek to precipitate revolution when conditions are perceived by them to be ripe, and seek to seize control of and direct the revolution when it occurs. Specifically, SWP and YSA are not known by the FBI to have rejected the use of violent and illegal means to achieve their purposes. Rather, information received by the FBI indicates that SWP and YSA would use violent and illegal means to achieve their purposes if such means were considered by SWP and YSA as being expedient. An important minority faction within the SWP intends to take all necessary steps to effectively implement FI decisions. See SWP Internal Information Bulletin annexed hereto.

Regarding the Bolshevik party on which SWP is modeled, it is noted that Lenin described the task of that party as: "To place upon the order of the day armed insurrection in Petersburg and Moscow, conquest of power, overthrow of the government...." (Quoted from "The Russian Revolution," by Leon Trotsky, Doubleday Anchor Books, at page 266.)

SWP has stated that it is based on the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. Karl Marx wrote in the Communist Manifesto that "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."

Leon Trotsky, whose doctrines guide the SWP and YSA, has written concerning means to be used in the revolution. Trotsky said, "the revolution does require of the revolutionary class that it should attain its end by all methods at its disposal - if necessary, by an armed rising: if required, by terrorism." (Quoted from "Communism: Basic Writings," edited by Anne Fremantle, a Mentor Book, at page 252.)

More recently, SWP leaders have commented concerning revolution and the role of their party. The SWP National Committee in March, 1971, adopted a report concerning the building of the Socialist Workers Party which stated that "It must be a mass revolutionary socialist combat party on the Leninist model...." (Quoted from "A Revolutionary Strategy for the 70s, Documents of the Socialist Workers Party," Pathfinder Press, 1972, at page 92.) George Novak, an SWP theoretician, stated with respect to the "coming American revolution" that "it can be anticipated that the direct struggle for power between

the armed camps will be exceedingly ferocious, hard-fought and protracted. It will require extraordinary efforts, tenacity and discipline to dislodge and dispossess the monopolist matters of America." (Quoted from "Democracy and Revolution," by George Novak, Pathfinder Press, 1971, at page 271.)

The SWP newspaper "The Militant," in its issue of May 17, 1974, on page 25, includes an article by an SWP member which states that "The only model of a successful strategy for socialist revolution was that of the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917."

James P. Cannon, longtime leader of SWP who was named as a plaintiff in this case, has stated that "It is the opinion of all Marxists that it (social transformation) will be accompanied by violence." (Quoted from "Socialism on Trial," by James P. Cannon, Pathfinder Press, 5th Edition, 1973, at page 135.) With reference to this very lawsuit, Cannon subsequently stated "We exploit the cracks and crevices in the bourgeois-democratic system without paying the slightest respect to it." (Quoted from the SWP newspaper "The Militant," issue dated January 25, 1974, at page 7.)

It may also be noted on February 20, 1974, Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, appeared before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, and testified concerning the domestic intelligence gathering function of the FBI. A copy of Mr. Maroney's statement is attached hereto.

HUGH MARLEY
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this _____ day of
December, 1974.

International Internal Discussion Bulletin

Volume XI Number 5

April 1974

FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS SINCE REUNIFICATION (Tenth World Congress) February 1974

1. Minutes	3
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3. Attachments to the Minutes	15
4. Statement of the Majority Tendency at the Conclusion of the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International, submitted March 17, 1974	24
5. Statement of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, submitted April 3, 1974	26

price 40 cents

The International Internal Discussion Bulletin is the English-language edition of the internal discussion bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

It is published by the Socialist Workers Party as a fraternal courtesy to the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Bulletin Department, 14 Charles Lane, New York, N. Y. 10014

Fourth World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) of the Fourth International February 1974

MINUTES

First Session

Chair: Aubin, Crandall.

Convened: 10:40 a.m.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS

Congress convened by Walter.

The congress pays tribute to the comrades who have died since the last world congress, including: Tomás Chambl, member of the Central Committee of the Bolivian section, killed while leading the La Paz peasant column that took part in the August 21, 1971, battle against the Banzer coup; Luis Mamani Limachi, murdered by the Bolivian military dictatorship; Eduardo Merlino, murdered by the Brazilian military dictatorship; Nelson de Souza Knoll, murdered by the Chilean military dictatorship; Luis Pujals, Pedro Bonnet, the other Trotskyist leaders of the PRT-Combatiente (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers Party), and their comrades, including those in Trelew, murdered by the Argentine military dictatorship; Peter Graham (Ireland), murdered; José Zuniga, peasant leader of the FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario—Front of the Revolutionary Left] in Cuzco, Peru, murdered; Seki (Japan); Georg Moltved (Denmark); Renzo Gambino and Libero Villone (Italy); Edith Beauvais and Charles Marie (France); Vincent Raymond Dunne and Constance Weissman (U.S.); Joe Baxter (Argentina); Lazaris (Greece); Maureen Keegan (Ireland); Keith-Ake Andersson (Sweden).

Motion by Walter: That an honorary presidium be elected consisting of comrades being held in prison under imperialist or Stalinist repression in Spain, Chile, China, Bolivia, Greece and Uruguay. Those whose names are known include Cheng Chi-lun, Cheng Chin-tung, Yin Kwun, Lau Sau, Lau Peng-chil, Lee Lok-ming, Mui Yui-tun, Chau Ten-sun, Lam Ching kai, and Wang Kwok-lung. That Luis Vitale, now being held by the military dictatorship in Chile, be named honorary chairman.

Motion carried.

Motion by Ghulam: To send solidarity greetings to Rohanna Wijeweera and other imprisoned militants of the JVP in Sri Lanka as follows:

The Tenth World Congress salutes Rohanna Wijeweera and his comrades, who are at the present time incarcerated in Sri Lanka's prisons and are being tried for high treason. We assure them that we will continue to wage a campaign for their unconditional release throughout the world. We assure them that the continuing repression against them by the Bandaranaike coalition government shall be brought to the notice of the entire workers movement. We assure them of our continuing solidarity.

Motion carried.

Procedural motions from the outgoing United Secretariat, Hans reporting:

- a. To accept the following rules:
 1. Time limit for reports, 45 minutes.
 2. Time limit for contributions to discussion, 10 minutes.
 3. Time limit for summaries, 15 minutes.
 4. On disputed procedural points and points of order, one speaker for and one against, 3 minutes each.
 5. No second round of speakers until all who want to speak on first round have spoken.
 6. Contributions to discussion to alternate, beginning with IEC Majority Tendency, then the IEC Minority Tendency, then the Mezhrayonka Tendency, Japanese delegation, and delegates not associated with either of the two main tendencies.
 7. Limit congress to two daily sessions.
 8. That all delegates present have one vote on procedural questions; no votes to be taken on political resolutions until the final session.
5. Presidium to be composed of the following 12 members: The 4 members of the United Secretariat Party Commission (Hans, Walter, Fourier, Juan), 3 each from

the IEC Majority Tendency and the IEC Minority Tendency (Lars, Moss, Thinvilla, T.T. Roy, Lorenzo, Dunder), and one each from the Japanese delegation and the Mezhrayonka Tendency (Sakai and Karew).

c. That there be 4 secretaries: Benny, Roba, Dugger, and Chino.

d. That a Security Committee be constituted by the Prelidium.

e. That a Mandates and Recognition Commission be constituted with five each from the IEC Majority and IEC Minority Tendencies, and one each from the Mezhrayonka Tendency and the Japanese delegation (Werner, Martine, Rooth, Petersen, Manuel, Stateman, Dunder, Alberto, Cesar, Fireman, Herb, Sakai).

f. That an auditing commission be constituted consisting of Martine, Darnelle, and Jensen for the Majority, and Aubrey and Thérèse for the Minority.

g. That Aubin and Crandall chair the first session.

h. To approve the following discussion schedule:

1. Three reports, discussion and summaries on World Political resolution—10 hours.

2. Two reports, discussion and summaries on Bolivia—8 hours.

3. Two reports, discussion and summaries on Argentina—8 hours.

4. Three reports, discussion and summaries on Armed Struggle in Latin America Resolution—4 hours.

5. Three reports, discussion and summaries on European resolutions—8 hours.

6. Statutes, mandates and recognition of sections, voting, election of IEC.

Motions on organization of convention carried.

II. IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION by Walter.

IEC MINORITY REPORT ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION by Hans.

Session recessed for lunch at 1:20 p.m.

Session reconvened at 3:05 p.m.

Chair reads statement from Swedish delegation: The Swedish delegation protests against the presence of Comrade Anders at this Congress who is not a delegate. The leadership of the Swedish organization has neither been informed nor consulted prior to this accomplished fact. This shows that the so-called Leninist-Trotskyist Faction places its own factional interests and discipline above the interests and discipline of the sections of which they are members.

Motion from Italian delegation by Edgardo: Not to permit Luigi to report on World Political Situation for Mezhrayonka Tendency because he is not a delegate.

Declaration of vote of Italian delegation:

The Italian delegation protests Comrade Luigi's participation in the proceedings of the Tenth Congress:

1. Because the delegation does not feel that a minority declaration is sufficient grounds for having the right to

be seated and have voice at the world congress, especially when insufficient votes were cast to elect a delegate; this right is reserved for delegates and members of outgoing leaderships;

2. Because the motion put forth by Comrade L.'s tendency at the congress of the Italian section asking approval to send one member of the tendency to the world congress was rejected by the vast majority of the delegates.

The Italian delegation feels that the Compass Tendency's statement acknowledging its erroneous method was completely superfluous:

1. Because it involved the repetition of an error—L.'s attendance at the congress of the Walloon section having gone against the advice of the section itself—while at the same time a meeting of the Italian Central Committee, of which L. is a member, was being held;

2. Because it isn't worth very much to make a self-criticism that has no consequences. Given the situation, the consequences should have included the refusal to admit Comrade L. and the rejection of a policy of making fait accompli decisions.

Unanimous decision of the Italian delegation.

Discussion Against Herb.

Chair read statement from United Secretariat recommending that Luigi be permitted to be a reporter:

1. Normal procedure requires that at a world congress the reporters should be either delegates or members of the IEC.

2. In case of small but recognized international tendencies that have declared themselves as such on the basis of a written platform, and in order to prove their right to full democratic participation in the discussion, the congress can make an exception and grant them the right to designate nondelegates as reporters if they think it is in the best interests of defending their political positions to do so. However, such proposals must be made through normal organizational channels and the leadership of the sections involved must be consulted prior to submitting their proposals to the congress.

3. In the case of the International Compass Tendency which has just indicated its programmatic basis in a written form (see attachment #1) and which has designated Comrade Luigi as their reporter for the political resolution at the world congress, the United Secretariat regrets that this procedure was not followed. The United Secretariat notes that the International Compass Tendency has itself recognized that it made a mistake by not doing so. But in order to underline the widest application of tendency rights at this congress, the United Secretariat suggests granting the International Compass Tendency its request.

Vote on Edgardo motion:

For, 45; against, 108; abstentions, 23.

Motion defeated.

MEZHILAYONKA TENDENCY REPORT ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION by Luigi.

Discussion on World Political Situation: Roman, Calola, Sakai, Ghulam, Raúl E., Krasno, Jaber, Alberto, Chandra, Gabriel, Thérèse, Almouen, Moss, Norma, Mikado, Key.

Session adjourned at 7:45 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:30 a.m.

Discussion on World Political Situation continued: Darmelle, Ahmad, Montes, Duret, Juan, Domingo, T.T. Roy, Enrique, Jake, Mike, Roberto, Fourier, Josefina, Tom, Jeff, Dumas.

Summary of Mezhrayonka Tendency report on World Political Situation by Luigi.

Summary of IEC Minority report on World Political Situation by Hans.

Summary of IEC Majority report on World Political Situation by Walter.

Session recessed at 1:50 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:10 p.m.

Recommendation from Presiding Committee: No afternoon session to allow IEC Majority reporters time to prepare reports.

Recommendation adopted.

Chair: Thawilla and Susan

III. IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON BOLIVIA by Serrano.

IEC MINORITY REPORT ON BOLIVIA by Lorenzo.

Discussion on Bolivia: Alejandro, Antonio, Heredia, Sebastian.

Session adjourned at midnight.

Session reconvened at 9:25 a.m.

Discussion on Bolivia continued: César, Chandra, Tous-saint, Chino, Nagai, Raúl A., Pedro, Krasno, Miguel, Blanco, Herb, Raúl B., Paille, Janes, Charbonneau, George, Dudi.

Session recessed for lunch at 1:00 p.m.

Session reconvened at 2:40 p.m.

Discussion on Bolivia continued: Martine, Lee, Juan B., Scott, Claudio, Atwood, Manuel, Alberto.

Summary of IEC Minority report on Bolivia by Lorenzo.

Summary of IEC Majority report on Bolivia by Serrano.

Session recessed at 5:10 p.m. on request of IEC Majority Tendency for caucus meeting.

Session reconvened at 6:25 p.m.

IV. IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON ARGENTINA by S. Lopez.

IEC MINORITY REPORT ON ARGENTINA by Arturo.

Session adjourned at 8:10 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:35 a.m.

Discussion on Argentina: Gallego, Hans, Heredia.

Motion by Presidium: To grant Heredia a 10-minute extension.

Motion carried.

Discussion on Argentina continued: Nestor, Efraim, Krasno, Fidel, Paille, Sakai, Carlos, Chino, Anna, César, Peledo, Norma.

Session recessed for lunch at 12:50 p.m.

Session reconvened at 2:40 p.m.

Discussion on Argentina continued: Ramiro, Blanco, Segur, Bundy, Karew, Claudio, Jorge, Beto, Alberto, René, Mario, Sebastian, Atwood, Walter, Ernesto, Fourier, Pedro.

Summary of IEC Minority report on Argentina by Arturo.

Summary of IEC Majority report on Argentina by S. Lopez.

Session recessed at 6:40 p.m.

Session reconvened at 6:55 p.m.

Chair: Scott and Sylvia.

V. IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA by Roman.

Session adjourned at 7:43 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:15 a.m.

IEC MINORITY REPORT ON ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA by Juan.

Motion by Juan: To extend time for reports, discussion and summaries on Armed Struggle in Latin America from 4 to 8 hours. Following Mezhrayonka report the tendencies should caucus to consider this proposal.

Discussion: Walter.

MEZHRAYONKA TENDENCY REPORT ON ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA by Willie.

Session recessed for caucus meetings at 10:47 a.m.

Session reconvened at 12:23 p.m.

Motion by Presidium: To extend discussion on Armed Struggle in Latin America for rest of the day with 11 speakers each for the IEC Majority and IEC Minority, and five for Mezhrayonka, Japanese delegation, or other unaffiliated delegates. One speaker each from the IEC Majority and IEC Minority tendencies to be allowed to speak twice.

Motion by Presidium:

a. To continue with European reports, discussion and summaries as scheduled.

b. No interruptions by tendency caucuses during sessions on Armed Struggle in Latin America and Europe.

c. Limit time on reports and discussion for final session to 5 1/2 hours.

d. Schedule for final session to be as follows:

1. Statutes.
2. Mandates and Recognition Commission Report.
3. Status of groups in Argentina, Spain, Canada.
4. Voting on resolutions.
5. Election of IEC.

Vote on motions

For, 106; against, 43; abstentions, 22.

Motions carried.

Discussion on Armed Struggle in Latin America: Walter, Blanco, Thomas, Nestor, Bundy, Anna, Roberto, David, Nagai, Manuel, T. T. Roy, Chandra, Domingo, Blanco, Carlos, Sabawa, Heredia, Claudio, Pedro, Serrano, Jorge, Enrique, Lorenzo, Claudio, Hans.

Summary of Mezhrayonka report on Armed Struggle in Latin America by Willie.

Summary of IEC Minority report on Armed Struggle in Latin America by Juan.

Summary of IEC Majority report on Armed Struggle in Latin America by Roman.

Session adjourned at 8:15 p.m.

Session convened at 9:35 a.m.

Chair: Paille and Brewster.

VI. IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON EUROPEAN RESOLUTION by Claudio.

IEC MINORITY REPORT ON EUROPEAN RESOLUTION by Roberto.

MEZHRAYONKA TENDENCY REPORT ON EUROPEAN RESOLUTION by Herb.

Discussion on European resolution: Jesús, Scott, Allen, Walter, Fireman.

Session recessed for lunch at 1:00 p.m.

Session reconvened at 3:00 p.m.

Discussion on European resolution continued: Edgardo, Adair, Thinvile, Willie, Susan, Mintoff, Nagai, Friedrich, Jensen, Sakai, Dunder, Brewster, Mario, Dumas, Ned, Krasno, Williams, Lebrun, Raúl E., Rudl, Crandall, Enrique, Thérèse.

Summary of Mezhrayonka report on European resolution by Herb.

Summary of IEC Minority report on European resolution by Roberto.

Summary of IEC Majority report on European resolution by Claudio.

Session adjourned at 8:05 p.m.

Session reconvened at 5:50 p.m.

Chair: Claudio and Stateman.

VII. IEC MAJORITY TENDENCY REPORT ON MEASURES TO HELP MAINTAIN UNITY by Fourier.

IEC MINORITY TENDENCY REPORT ON MEASURES TO HELP MAINTAIN UNITY by Hans.

Motion from the Presidium: To adopt the following recommendations:

Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain Unity of the Fourth International

Unanimously adopted by Presiding Committee—
February 14, 1974

1. No exclusion of any groups or members now belonging to the tendencies or factions in the Fourth International.

2. No reduction in status of groups currently recognized as sections or sympathizing groups.

3. Adoption of a general formula to determine status in the following special situation:

In countries where adherents of the Fourth International are divided into two or more groups acting publicly apart from each other, no group shall be recognized as a section, but all groups shall be recognized as sympathizing groups. But if the groups in any of these countries fuse before the next world congress, the International Executive Committee is empowered to recognize the united group as a section.

These are exceptional measures not to be taken as setting a precedent of any kind. It is not the purpose of these measures to encourage splits by giving minority groups the hope that they will receive recognition from the International if they leave a section and set up a public formation.

4. No recognition of challenges to mandate claims placed before the mandate commission by sections, sympathizing groups, or groups applying for recognition.

5. The vote cast on the counterposed political resolutions shall be taken as the criterion in determining the approximate proportional representation in membership.

of the different tendencies or factions on the incoming International Executive Committee and Control Commission.

6. Enlargement of the membership of the incoming International Executive Committee to reflect the growth in size of the Fourth International since the last world congress.

7. Adoption of the following two categories in the membership of the incoming International Executive Committee:

a. Full status for members of sections.

b. Consultative status for members of sympathizing groups.

Full members and consultative members shall have the same rights in everything except voting. Full members shall have decisive votes; consultative members consultative votes. For purposes of replacement, alternate members shall be listed according to tendency or faction and placed in numbered rank.

8. Reaffirmation of the ten-point agreement defining the preconditions for an authoritative world congress that was unanimously adopted by the United Secretariat September 19, 1973. (See attached.)

9. As part of the implementation of this agreement, each of the tendencies or factions shall make statements at the close of the congress proclaiming their firm support to maintaining the unity of the Fourth International.

Attachment

Recommendations to the Delegates of the Coming World Congress

Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat
September 19, 1973

The fear has been voiced that the differences under discussion in the Fourth International and the organizations in sympathy with it could lead to a split. To counteract this danger and to strengthen the unity of our movement, the United Secretariat reaffirms its statement "The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress" that was unanimously adopted on April 9, 1973.*

In addition, the United Secretariat unanimously recommends to the delegates of the Fourth Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) that they adopt the following proposals:

1. That there be no expulsions or suspensions or application of disciplinary measures against sections of the Fourth International or any of its sympathizing groups.

2. That all sections and sympathizing groups be granted full voting rights at the next world congress in accordance with the number of their members in good standing, as specified in the statutes of the Fourth International.

3. That the present temporary statutes of the Fourth International be adopted without change.

4. That in those countries where two or more groups exist because of splits or other reasons, the united moral authority of the Fourth International be brought to bear for the earliest possible fusion of the groups on a principled basis.

5. That only resolutions and counterresolutions on the following points be placed on the agenda of the coming world congress for a vote: (a) the world political situation; (b) the question of orientation in Argentina;

(c) the question of orientation in Bolivia; (d) European perspectives; (e) statutes of the Fourth International.

6. That the international discussion on these points be closed following the world congress for one year unless the IEC decides to reopen the discussion earlier.

7. That the following points be considered in commissions or panels at the coming world congress: (a) the "cultural revolution" and China; (b) youth radicalization; (c) women's liberation; (d) Middle East; (e) Vietnam; (f) Eastern Europe.

8. That votes on these topics not be taken at the coming world congress.

9. That the international discussion on the questions listed in point No. 7, excluding analysis of conjunctural events in Vietnam and Eastern Europe, be continued in literary form following the coming world congress in a monthly bulletin not to exceed 48 pages.

10. That the Fifth Congress After Reunification (Eleventh World Congress) be held within two years following the coming world congress.

September 19, 1973

The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress
Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat
April 9, 1973

In view of the backlog of translations still to be done of documents submitted to the preparatory discussion for the next world congress and the number of documents already announced for presentation in the coming weeks, it appears unlikely that these can be placed in the hands of the rank and file before the conferences of the sections are held to choose delegates for the next world congress.

To overcome this difficulty and thus help to assure a fully democratic discussion and election of world congress delegates, the United Secretariat therefore unanimously recommends to membership of the I.E.C. postponement of the world congress. In accordance with the new date it also recommends that the final date for submission of material be set approximately three months in advance of the world congress. The United Secretariat is not bound to translate and publish material submitted after that date.

All national pre-world congress conferences should be rescheduled to be held as close to the world congress as practical, but not earlier than 6 weeks before the congress.

Some comrades have expressed fear that the delay in translating documents might be part of a process that would bring into question the authoritativeness of the next world congress.

The United Secretariat is of the unanimous opinion that fulfillment of the following conditions, regardless of the date of the congress, will assure recognition of the statutory authority of the decisions of the next world congress by all sections, sympathizing groups and international tendencies of the Fourth International.

1. A fully democratic preparatory world discussion.

2. Translation and circulation at least into English, French and Spanish of all documents submitted before the final deadline.

3. The democratic election of delegates to the world congress.

4. Democratic conduct of the congress.

Recommendations of Presidium

New Sections

Antilles
Colombia
Denmark
Ireland
Israel
Lebanon
Luxemburg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Sweden
Venezuela

New Sympathizing Groups

Brazil POC
Brazil Ponto de Partido
Finland
Iran
Iraq
Norway
Portugal
Uruguay

Particular Split Situations

Application of Point No. 3 of Agreement

Argentina:

PST sympathizing group.
FR sympathizing group.
FB sympathizing group.

Australia:

SWL sympathizing group.
CL sympathizing group.

Mexico:

GCI sympathizing group.
LS sympathizing group.

Spain:

LCR/ sympathizing group.
ETA VI
LC sympathizing group.

Application of Points No. 1 and No. 2

Canada:

LSA/LSO section.
RMC/GMR sympathizing group.

Application of Point No. 2

Peru:

FIR (Combate)

section, two public factions.

FIR (Comission Reorganizada)

Hand vote on the motion:

For, 138; against, 4; abstentions, 21.

Motion carried.

VIII. REPORT ON STATUTES by Duret.

Motion from the outgoing United Secretariat To adopt the current statutes without change.

Motion carried unanimously.

IX. VOTING ON RESOLUTIONS

Motion by Hans: That this congress not vote on the International Majority Tendency resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America; and that the incoming IEC be instructed to organize a discussion in the ranks on this question as part of the preparatory discussion for the next world congress.

Vote on the motion:

For, 56; against, 101; abstentions, 6.

Motion defeated.

Motion from the Presidium: That each tendency have one minute to specify what it is asking the delegates to vote for.

Motion carried.

Walter for the International Majority Tendency: To vote for the following resolutions and against all others:

1. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Political Resolution."
2. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on Bolivia."
3. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on Argentina."
4. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America."
5. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on the Construction of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe."

Hans for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction: To vote for the following resolutions and against all others:

1. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Draft Political Resolution."
2. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Two of 'Argentina and Bolivia — The Balance Sheet.'"
3. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Three of 'Argentina and Bolivia — The Balance Sheet.'"
4. For the counterreport by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction to the "Draft Resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America."
5. For the counterreport by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction to the "Draft Resolution on the Construction of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe."

Herb for the Mezhrayonka Tendency: To vote for the following resolutions:

1. For general line of "Why we reject the draft political

resolution, a question of method and contents," by CLC, Kompass and T.M.R.

2. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Two of 'Argentina and Bolivia — The Balance Sheet.'"

3. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Three of 'Argentina and Bolivia — the Balance Sheet.'"

4. For general line of "On the Orientation of the Fourth International in Latin America" (IIDB No. 22) by Kompass Tendency (Germany).

5. For rejection of the IMT draft of the European document and its concept of the "new Mass Vanguard," a criticism which is outlined in the draft for revision of the EPD by the Kompass Tendency (IIDB No. 25) and the contribution "New vanguards or building of the revolutionary party" by Nemo, Roc, Eieonore, Lesueur, Varlet (Wallonia).

Discussion: Aubin, Herb.

Mandated votes on Political Resolution:

International Majority Tendency:

For: 142 (sections, 114; sympathizing groups, 28)*

Against: 124 (s, 20; sg, 104)

Abstentions: 4 (s, 3; sg, 1)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 118 (s, 14; sg, 104)

Against: 147 (s, 119; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 4 (s, 3; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Mezhrayonka:

For: 7 (s, 7; sg, 0)

Against: 259 (s, 127; sg, 132)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

Mandated votes on Bolivia Resolution:

International Majority Tendency:

For: 137 (s, 109; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Abstentions: 7 (s, 6; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Against: 141 (s, 113; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

Mandated votes on Argentina Resolution:

International Majority Tendency:

For: 137 (s, 109; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Abstentions: 7 (s, 6; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Against: 140 (s, 112; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 4 (s, 4; sg, 0)

Mandated votes on Armed Struggle in Latin America:

International Majority Tendency:

For: 142 (s, 114; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 18; sg, 107)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 2 (s, 2; sg, 0)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 118 (s, 13; sg, 105)

Against: 143 (s, 115; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 6 (s, 5; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

Mezhrayonka:

For: 9 (s, 9; sg, 0)

Against: 259 (s, 126; sg, 133)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Mandated votes on European Resolution:

International Majority Tendency:

For: 144 (s, 116; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 118 (s, 13; sg, 105)

Against: 149 (s, 121; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 2 (s, 1; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Mezhrayonka:

For: 5 (s, 5; sg, 0)

Against: 259 (s, 126; sg, 133)

Abstentions: 3 (s, 2; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

*Sections are those groups recognized as such by the 4th World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress). Sympathizing groups include those who owing to reactionary legislation in their own countries (such as Argentina and the United States) are not able to affiliate to the Fourth International and cast consultative votes only.

X. ELECTION OF IEC

Motion by Presidium:

That the International Executive Committee be composed of a total of 127 members having the same rights in everything except voting. Full members having a decisive vote, and alternate members having a consultative vote are to be chosen from sections. Replacements of full members are to be made from the body of alternate members listed according to tendency or faction and placed in numbered rank. Members of sympathizing groups elected to the IEC have a consultative vote.

The composition of the 127 members of the International Executive Committee shall be as follows:

Full members, 51. Of these, 27 to be chosen by the International Majority Tendency; 20 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction; plus Herb chosen by the Mezhrayonka Ten-

dency; Bala of the Sri Lanka section, and 2 chosen by the Japanese section.

Alternate members, 24. Of these, 12 to be chosen by the International Majority Tendency; 10 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction; 1 by the Japanese section, plus Chandra chosen by the Mezhrayonka Tendency.

Consultative members, 52. Of these, 31 to be chosen by the International Majority; 21 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

That the Control Commission be composed of 6 members. Of these, 4 to be chosen by the International Majority Tendency; 2 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

Motion carried.

International Majority Slate presented by Duret

To nominate as full members: Walter, Rudi, Jones, Petersen, Ghulam, Ned, Thinvilla, Fourier, Georges, Roman, Aubin, Segur, Duret, Karl, Jens Frey, Claudio, Fideil, Barmann, Serrano, Felipe, Mintoff, Kurt, Valdez, Mikado, Iaber, a comrade from the Antilles to be chosen by the section.

To nominate as alternate members: Brewster, Werner, Domingo, Moss, a comrade from the Antilles to be chosen by the section, Fred, Metz, Mogens, Carlos, O'Leary, Herman, Sylvia [ranking to be submitted].

To nominate as consultative members: [list to be submitted].

To nominate as Control Commission members: Tantalus, Hoffman, Lars, Eduard.

Leninist-Trotskyist Slate presented by Hans:

To nominate as full members: Marcel, Adair, Scott, Abel, Crandall, Peng Shu-tse, Friedrich, Mohan Gan, T.T. Roy, Key, Blanco, Tuco, Atwood, Celso, Galois, Johnson, Pepe, Stateman, Thérèse, Antonio.

To nominate as alternate members: 1. David, 2. Fireman, 3. Pedro, 4. Ronald, 5. Anders, 6. Williams, 7. Mitchell, 8. Lee Ser, 9. Asgar, 10. Susan.

To nominate as consultative members: Alfredo, Eduardo.

Guillermo, Hector, Jorge, Luis, Ricardo, Dunder, Ken, Martin, Fernando, Otto, Ahmad, Cyrus, Josephina, Roberto, Carmen, Raoul, Roberto, Trude, Juan.

To nominate as Control Commission members: Bundy, Gormley.

Japanese delegation slate presented by Sakai

To nominate as full members: Sakai, Kihaza.

To nominate as alternate member: a comrade to be chosen by the section.

Nominations approved unanimously.

Statement by the Mezhrayonka International Tendency read by Herb:

The comrades and tendencies who have formed the Mezhrayonka Tendency announce the dissolution of this third international tendency at the end of the Tenth World Congress. They reaffirm their common agreement with the principles outlined in the Frankfurt Communiqué of November 17-18, 1973. They intend to continue further collaboration and communication in order to clarify and homogenize their common political basis.

The dissolution of the Mezhrayonka International Tendency in no way concerns the four national tendencies: Kompass-GIM (German section), Kompass-RSF (Danish section), Revolutionary Marxist Tendency-GCR (Italian section), "Against the Stream."

Kompass-GIM
Kompass-RSF
TMR-GCR

Krasno, member of the steering committee of
CLC tendency
Kallas Chandra

Concluding remarks by Juan.

Concluding remarks by Walter.

Congress adjourned at 8:30 p.m.

VOTING RECORD

Political Resolution

Country		Mandates	IMT	ITF	Mez.
Antilles		2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Argentina	PST	72	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag
	FR	6	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
	FB	4	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
Australia	SWL	2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
	CL	1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Austria		2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Belgium		5	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
Bolivia		6	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
Brazil	POC	1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
	PdP	Absent			
Britain	Majority	10	10 F	10 Ag	10 Ag
	Minority	1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Canada	LSA/LSO	4	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag
	RMG/GMR	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
Ceylon		1	1 F	1 NV	1 NV
Chile	PSR	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
	LCR	1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
China		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Colombia	Majority	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
	Minority	Consultative	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Cyprus		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Denmark	Majority	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
	Minority	1	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
Germany	IMT	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
	Mez. Thomas	1	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F
	Karew	1	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 F
	Willv	1	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
	ITF	1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Greece		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
India	Kailas	1	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F
	T.T.Roy	1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Iran		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Ireland		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Israel		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Italy		5	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
Japan		4	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
Lebanon		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Luxemburg		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag

R az.	Bolivia		Argentina		Armed Struggle			Europe		
	IMT	LTF	IMT	LTF	IMT	LTF	Mez.	IMT	LTF	Mez.
	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
2 Ag	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag
2 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
6 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
4 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
2 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
2 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
5 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
6 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag										
	10 F	10 Ag	10 F	10 Ag	10 F	10 Ag	10 Ag	10 F	10 Ag	10 Ag
10 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 Ag	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag
4 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
3 Ag	1 NV	1 NV	1 NV	1 NV	1 F	1 NV	1 NV	1 F	1 NV	1 NV
1 NV	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
3 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	1 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
2 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
2 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
1 F	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
3 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
1 F										
	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F
1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
4 Ag	4 Ab	4 Ag	4 Ab	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag

<u>Country</u>		<u>Mandates</u>	<u>Political Resolution</u>		
			<u>INT</u>	<u>ITF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>
Mexico	GCI	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
	IS	2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
Netherlands		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
New Zealand		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Peru	FIR (CR)	2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
	FIR (Combate)	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Portugal		1	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab
South Africa		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Spain	LCR/ETA VI	7	7 F	7 Ag	7 Ag
	LC	5	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag
Sweden		5	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
Switzerland		6	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
U.S.A.	Majority	22	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag
	Minority	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Uruguay		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Venezuela		2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
Wallonie	Majority	48	48 F	48 Ag	48 Ag
	Krasno	2	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F
	Dumas	2	2 Ab	2 Ag	2 IV
<u>Totals</u>					
	For		142	118	7
	Against		124	147	259
	Abstain		4	4	1
	No vote		0	1	3

n Mez.	<u>Bolivia</u>		<u>Argentina</u>		<u>Armed Struggle</u>			<u>Europe</u>		
	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>
Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab
Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 NV	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Ag	7 F	7 Ag	7 F	7 Ag	7 F	7 Ag	7 Ag	7 F	7 Ag	7 Ag
Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag
Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
Ag	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag
Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
Ag	48 F	48 Ag	48 F	48 Ag	48 F	48 Ag	48 Ag	48 F	48 Ag	48 Ag
F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ab	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 Ab
NV	2 Ab	2 NV	2 Ab	2 NV	2 NV	2 NV	2 F	2 F	2 Ag	2 NV
7	137	125	137	125	142	118	9	144	118	5
59	125	141	125	140	125	143	259	125	149	259
1	7	1	7	1	1	6	1	1	2	3
3	1	3	1	4	2	3	1	0	1	3

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1: Declaration of the International Mezhrayonka Tendency

With this declaration the undersigned tendencies and comrades of different sections of the 4th International announce the official formation of an international tendency for the 10th World Congress (4th since Reunification) of the 4th International.

This third international tendency is the outcome of the political struggle of these tendencies and comrades in their sections during the Pre-World-Congress discussion period against the political and methodological errors and insufficiencies which, as we see it, are involved with key important draft resolutions of the World Congress. This common political struggle laid grounds for intensive communication and cooperation between these tendencies to elaborate their position on the issues under discussion. This common agreement was expressed in the Communiqué of Frankfurt from Nov. 18, 1973 (IIDB 24). In this situation, the formal declaration of a third international tendency for the 10th World Congress based on political agreement in key important questions, is a necessary step,

- to assure equal rights at this Congress in comparison with the already existing international tendency and faction;

- to defend the unity of our movement against the danger of a split in an organized way.

This international tendency is based on the following positions:

1. For general line of "Why we reject the draft political resolution—a question of method and contents" by CLC, Kompass and T.M.R.

2. For general line of "On the Orientation of the 4th International in Latin America" (IIDB No. 22) by Kompass-Tendency (Germany).

3. For rejection of the IMT-draft of the European document and its concept of the "new Mass Vanguard," a criticism which is outlined in the draft for revision of the EPD by the Kompass-Tendency (IIDB 25) and the contribution "New vanguards or building of the revolutionary party" by Nemo, Roc, Eleonore, Lesueur, Varlet (Wallonia).

4. The Communiqué of Frankfurt for the defence of democratic centralism and the unity of the 4th international against the danger of a split.

The voting formula of the international tendency includes also to give critical support to the balance sheet of the LTF on our experience with the 9th World Congress line in Argentina and Bolivia, e.g. to vote for the general line of part 2 and 3 of "Argentina and Bolivia—The Balance Sheet."

Kompass-Tendenz/GIM (Germany); Kompass-Tendency/RSF (Denmark); T.M.R./GCR (Italy); Krasno (member of the steering committee of Contre le Courant-tendency/Wallonia).

Attachment 2: Why I Did Not Join the Third International Tendency

1. The creation of 4 national tendencies (Kompass—GIM, TMR—GCR, CLC—wallonia, Kompass—RSF) and the perspective of creating a third international tendency were based, in the second half of 1973, on the following elements:

- a) the analysis made by the 4 tendencies of the *blind alley* into which the LTF and the IMT had led the IVth International—notably on the level of the functioning of its leadership.

- b) an extremely critical appreciation of the analyses offered by the IMT on Europe and even more on a world scale; we have already emphasized the *erroneous method* of these analyses—objectivist and catastrophist.

- c) the incapacity of the IMT to offer a *serious political and organizational balance sheet* of the orientation adopted by the 9th World Congress on Latin America; the succession of three or four documents on Argentina and Bolivia; the final submission for vote at the Tenth World Congress of a text entitled "Balance Sheet of the Armed Struggle in Latin America" which is not a balance sheet and *even less*

an orientation for the militants of the Fourth International in Latin America.

- d) the incapacity of the LTF to counterpose to the failures of the IMT an orientation and perspectives offering our movement the possibility to face up to its tasks and to overcome its current internal crisis.

The lateness and the content of the LTF world counter-resolution; the partial character of its positions on Europe and on the perspectives of revolutionary Marxists on this continent; its circumspection—which tends to make one suspicious—concerning the dubious politics of the PRTU and the PST—despite the correctness of many criticisms it makes of the IMT's Latin American positions; its erroneous conception of political debate in a Leninist organization which applies democratic centralism (forming a faction) all this has convinced us of the objective need to break the IMT/LTF 'duo' and to begin to present to the militants of the FI a problematic and perspectives which have been brought to the fore by the 3rd international tendency.

II. But the actual creation of the 3rd International tendency has in its turn seen the classic dialectic objective necessity/subjective capacity come into play.

a) Two of the four tendencies within it (Kompass/GIM and TMR/GCR) were formed in the context of a national debate prior to the preparation of the 10th World Congress. This partly explains the lateness of the two others (CLC and Kompass/Denmark) with respect to the working out of a program.

b) Although a national tendency may legitimately be formed around a single issue, for an international tendency it is obligatory to define itself not merely critically but also positively in relation to the two currents which at present monopolize debate within the Fourth International; obligatory, in other words, for it to be capable of beginning the process of defining its own perspectives and its own line. Without this, ultimately, it would limit itself to a parasitic attitude to the leadership—an attitude which is incompatible with the traditions and norms of Bolshevism.

c) It is now clear that although the "Frankfurt Communiqué" of November 17 and 18 was a first step in the regroupment of comrades who could not and would not identify with the two international tendencies, the comrades who signed this "communiqué" neither had the time nor the capacity to qualitatively go beyond the threshold of an initial criticism—itsself most welcome and positive—of the IMT. Neither the written contribution ("Why We're Voting Against the World Political Resolution") nor the adoption of a largely negative "voting formula," common to the four tendencies (and on which there still remain differences: "critical" support of points 2 and 3 of the Argentine Bulletin balance sheet of the LTF) constitute a sufficient base for the responsible formation of the third international tendency.

III. This impossibility of creating at the 10th World

Congress, a third international tendency that is anything but a passing circumstance, is confirmed by a certain number of "tactical adjustments" which end up modifying the initial basis on which this third international tendency was founded.

a) For a certain number of comrades in the four countries, the dynamic of the tendency struggle has given their "democratic" battles (?) against the IMT/leadership a very excessive, politically erroneous (and not very profitable) priority.

b) Because of this (?) the political differentiation with the LTF diminishes to the point of practically disappearing in the oral reports and in the written contributions. This results in totally and unilaterally falsifying the necessary debate and the specific function of the third tendency.

CONCLUSION. The third tendency was not meant to be neutral, "centrist"—i.e., at equal distance between the positions of the IMT and those of the LTF. But the disappearance of any consistent criticism of the positions of one of these two tendencies makes the comrades who signed the platform appear in fact as a sub-tendency of the LTF. Since there are tactics involved in the international debate it would be much more healthy if they clearly took this position. It is a position with which certain comrades of the "Against the Stream" (Wallonia section) will continue to disagree until the internal debate within the Wallonia section renews the terms of the discussion with, probably, a cleavage in the tendencies, permitting them to contribute more clearly the common tasks of the construction of our organization.

7 February
Jean-Francois Dumas
(secretariat of the Against the
Stream of Wallonia)

Attachment 3: Letter to the World Congress from the Bolchevik-Leninist Group of Vietnam

Dear Comrades,

The Bolchevik-Leninist Group of Vietnam (BLV), sends you its fraternal greetings and wishes the Congress great success in keeping with our great hopes.

We know that serious subjects are presently being discussed in the International, especially the Vietnamese problem. We deeply regret that for material reasons (date of the Congress became known too late, passports, visas . . .) the BLV is absent from your debates. We regret it all the more because our group does not have the same position as the International nor the comrades of the opposition. We could contribute original ideas as Vietnamese Trotskyists, having been able to read many Vietnamese documents hardly known outside of the country.

Our BLV group was constituted as a section of the International in 1947, by joining the International. It has a long history behind it. It was our group that had successfully led, during the 1946-1953 period, the movement of 20,000 emigrant workers in France. During this period, it was able to train new cadres (500 cadres) who for the most part were sent to North Vietnam. Our group was able to resist the most brutal repression of French im-

perialism during the first war in Vietnam.

Since the departure to Vietnam of most of our comrades, a small group remains in France and carries on in spite of a thousand difficulties. It is the present defender of Vietnamese Trotskyist traditions and ideas.

Although for tactical reasons we don't officially identify ourselves in our press as Trotskyists, all the Vietnamese political circles in France know of our existence, especially the North Vietnamese ruling circles. We are seeking to constantly intervene in the struggle against American imperialism through all sorts of actions taking many different forms.

In the very special historical conditions in Vietnam, where the enormous weight of the VCP crushes all the organisations to its left, maintaining a Trotskyist group, even a propaganda group, is an extremely difficult task. We have been able to do this during these last years with no help whatsoever from the International or from the Ligue Communiste.

In the political debate now unfolding in the International, we note two opposite errors. The first consists of preying up the VCP to the point of labeling it a Revolutionary

Party; thus forgetting the entire past historical development of this party, and not taking into account its present opportunist and empirical policy which could cause serious setbacks for the Vietnamese Revolution. The second error is wanting at all costs to stick to the old schemas and refusing to see the evolution of this party in the new conditions and the fact that it has successfully led the national liberation struggle.

The BLV group is constantly careful to not fall into either of the two errors. It constantly attempts to keep in touch with reality, to understand it and to draw the lessons from it for action, never losing sight of the fundamental principles of Trotskyism and Leninism.

Comrades,

We request that you make our existence known to the sections and that you debate out the following questions:

1) Should the International concern itself with a Vietnamese Trotskyist group which has remained loyal to the International and which has carried on against great obstacles, in the most difficult of conditions?

2) Should we work towards the creation of a section of the Fourth International in Vietnam?

An answer to these two questions would already resolve half the debate under way on the Vietnamese problem.

Our very fraternal greetings,
the BLVG

February 5, 1974

Attachment 4: Letter to the World Congress from Peng Shu-tse

Dear Comrades,

I regret very much not being able to attend the congress. I would like to make three points:

1. I protest the fact that the technical preparations for the congress were made the exclusive responsibility of only one side in the debate. As you know, the country where the congress was held has racist restrictions making entry especially difficult for some nationalities. A certain amount of time is required to get the necessary visas. Because the committee in charge of technical preparations did not provide us with sufficient notice, it was impossible to get the visas. Thus we were unable to attend the congress.

2. The resolution on Latin America passed at the last world congress, which included an orientation toward guerrilla war, has been proved by events to have been completely wrong in the two countries where it was tested out—Argentina and Bolivia.

Recent developments in Bolivia further underscore this: the new rise of a peasant movement and the strike actions of the miners and other sections of the workers.

The question is posed: Are the Bolivian Trotskyists to continue with the line of guerrilla war, or are they to

participate in this new mass movement in accordance with the Transitional Program and the methods it outlines for building a mass revolutionary party?

3. The resolution on the Chinese question adopted at the last congress has also been proved bankrupt by events. According to that resolution the Chinese Communist Party was objectively playing a revolutionary role and would not capitulate to imperialist pressure at the expense of the colonial revolution. But the CCP did exactly that.

According to the latest document presented by the IEC Majority Tendency, the CCP showed that it was not Stalinist in character because it transformed property relations in China.

If this criterion were to be taken seriously, then Stalin himself was not Stalinist inasmuch as he transformed property relations in Eastern Europe following World War II.

I call on the congress as a whole to oppose this alarming new revisionism.

February 6, 1974

Peng Shu-tse

Attachment 5: Letter to the World Congress from Luis

Comrade Delegates to the Tenth World Congress

Comrade Hansen has involved me personally in the pre-World Congress debate, and the 1961-62 Peruvian situation has been used as a polemical argument.

For this reason I feel obliged to respond. I have not done so before because Hansen's document only reached me recently and it has been difficult for me to gather the minimum documents I needed to write these pages. I would have preferred to participate in person, but for various reasons that is impossible. The presence of a comrade from the organization will make the understanding of my position easier. There are two points to which I will refer: one is the Peruvian experience itself; the other is the context in which the present discussion has unfolded, since, according to Hansen, my intervention and influence goes far beyond the events in Peru.

1. The Peruvian Experience

Since 1960, all the revolutionary organizations in Latin America have been influenced by the victorious Cuban Revolution. This influence was two-fold and contradictory: there was the positive side of resurrecting the role of armed struggle and rejecting the Stalinist theories of coexistence and there was the negative side, wherein the method of guerrilla warfare, and more concretely the *foco*, was elevated to the category of a panacea. Our Argentine organization could not remain free of this influence. In 1961, the military apparatus was created, led by members of the Political Bureau, who had no experience. The Peruvian comrades who, faced with the growing peasant mobilization, went to Buenos Aires seeking aid, had no greater experience. At the beginning of 1961 a task was undertaken which some of us comrades have continued up to

today, with various ups and downs, but whose central objective I believe to be correct: the application of armed struggle as a fundamental method of action, an indispensable tool for building the revolutionary party in Latin America, in order to join with the masses in their struggles and advance toward the taking of power.

Armed struggle must be added to all the means used by revolutionaries. It does not negate or replace all those that have been used up to now. On the contrary, armed struggle strengthens and insures them. It must not substitute for the masses, but rather it must be an indispensable instrument of their struggles. The organization must see to its implementation, in this way taking on a vanguard role.

In order for the proletariat to be able to arm itself and struggle for power, we revolutionaries must prepare ourselves beforehand, so that we are not surprised by events. This preparation is political and military. To leave the military preparation to the moment when the masses are ready to fight with arms in hand is criminal negligence. It is to forget the lessons of Marx on the insurrection. *Today in Latin America, in order for an authentic revolutionary organization to insure its permanent existence, to elude the repression, to be able to take its propaganda and agitation to the proletariat without ups and downs, and to aid the masses in their struggles around their demands, which are so often drowned in blood, the organization must necessarily have recourse to the use of armed struggle along with all the other means we revolutionaries rely on.*

Beginning from this point of departure, to the extent that the class struggle sharpens and the consciousness of the masses grows, the party will be strengthened and the armed struggle will be the indispensable instrument for the taking of power by the proletariat.

In 1961 we were just beginning to understand these problems; the experiences were very costly but they could and should have been used to advance to a deeper understanding of the question. Unfortunately conservative leaders used the errors, which were many, to absolve themselves from responsibilities and not to aid in overcoming the errors critically. Thus we see leaders like Moreno who, after pushing military preparation, after approving expropriations, and after sending comrades to get military training in Cuba, faced with those who have fallen and the defeats, don't know how to do anything but beat a retreat and avoid their responsibility; a leader who never intended to personally take on the undoubtedly difficult task of correctly applying armed struggle. How different from the example of Trotsky who, at 40 years of age, threw himself into organizing an army and placed himself at its head.

The truth is that in 1961 we didn't know anything about military problems; when we look at Peru, we had nothing resembling a line, only the conviction that we had to organize the military task, because the mass movement had made it indispensable; but in Argentina, where rather than a rise in activity among the masses instead there had been an ebb since 1959, we also believed in the need to organize the military task, and in the possibility of guerrilla struggles. Thus the work in the North, in Tucuman, was begun, with the sending of comrades there; an expropriation was carried out. P. was in Peru and at the beginning of 1962 the party was de facto militarized, with

some comrades being sent to Cuba for training.

This entire task was carried out, of course, with the general agreement of Moreno. Moreno's work, *The Latin American Revolution*, which is characterized by its clear praise of guerrilla warfare, dates from this period.

One of the party leaders of that period, Valencia, who now shares the political position of the PST, said in this regard: "The boldest promoter of the framework of armed struggle is the leadership itself (Moreno). By formulating theoretical and political premises that involved great concessions to Guevarism, they sowed confusion and uncertainty among the cadres, and did nothing but stimulate the dynamic that in the long run made them lose the majority in the Central Committee, strengthening the tendency of the new leaders."

That is, the deviations that developed in Peru have their origins in Argentina and in Moreno's guidance.

I believe that there were militarist deviations in Argentina, that they should have been overcome patiently through political struggle and experience, overcoming the errors but without abandoning the apprenticeship and the use of a method that is indispensable for revolutionaries.

Nothing like this took place in Argentina, and when Bangochea's group returned from Cuba, Moreno operated behind the back of the organization until Bangochea dropped out of the party, without any serious discussion. There is not a single document from the period which records any such discussion and collective elaboration, at a time when one of the major leaders and a group of comrades left the organization.

The same attitude was taken with respect to Peru. Moreno gives verbal encouragement, promises aid of all kinds, and then launches a war against the comrades who had to apply the resolutions.

P. was accused of being a putschist, as were all the Cuzco people. Moreno refused to hold meetings in Cuzco, despite the fact that the main leaders were unable to travel because they were totally or partially underground. To the repeated requests that he remain in Peru, Moreno answered that he had to go to Argentina to resolve financial problems and aid Peru, aid which never arrived.

Were errors and deviations committed in Peru? Yes. We overestimated our own forces, and hoping for too much from a young and weak party, military tasks were undertaken which the comrades were not sufficiently prepared for.

These deviations did not at any time signify the desire to substitute guerrilla warfare for the party, as Hansen says; all the activity was carried out from the FIR.

It isn't true that the Tupac Amaru group was created. What was involved was just a diversionary maneuver in the face of the identification of various members of the FIR who were part of the military team. The Tupac Amaru group never existed. Of course no one sought to substitute for the masses either. It was precisely the peasant masses of Cuzco who pressed us, asking our members for help; and also, our conviction, based on the experience of the struggles in Peru, that a bloody showdown, a harsh repression was approaching.

We committed many errors, yes. But before making hasty comparisons and deductions, it would be preferable to try to explain how one should have proceeded, given the situation and forces in Peru in 1961-62. Unfortunately, rather than drawing from the experiences and going for-

ward, our Argentine party, like Hansen, dedicated itself to censuring the "crazy adventurers," in whom it had a short time before reaffirmed its confidence by voting it huge tasks to carry out.

In Lima, at the SLATO [Latin American Secretariat of Orthodox Trotskyism] conference in February 1962, gigantic politico-military tasks were unanimously approved. Moreno participated and approved. The tasks began to be carried out. When the collapse came, all the blame was placed on those of us who were on the front line. There was no serious explanation nor a word of self-criticism from Moreno.

Hansen takes Moreno's version, and motivated by a factional spirit, paints him as the standard-bearer of 100 percent correct positions against the "militarists."

But the reality is something different. We were members of a party. We fought politically. Hugo Blanco, whose position in the international dispute I do not share, asserted in his book *Land or Death*: "The arrival of Pereyra and other militants of the Peruvian POR in Cuzco [in December 1961] strengthened our work enormously."

"The FIR began to grow in Cuzco. It had already been constituted on a national scale. Mass peasant work was intensified significantly, as much on a provincial scale (La Convención and Lares) as on a departmental scale (Cuzco). The FIR apparatus in the city, led by Pereyra and Antonio Aragon, energetically helped the peasant movement, recruiting students who went to the countryside to organize, printing leaflets and newsletters needed there. . . .

"In addition, it gave serious impetus to the preparation for armed struggle. Although preparation had begun earlier, it was clearly becoming urgent to step it up in view of the advanced level of the class struggle in the countryside." [pp. 38-39].

Every Peruvian militant knows these things. So why caricature reality? Is it because the arguments are not sufficiently sound?

2. The Present Framework of the Polemic

Today the role of armed struggle, among many other things, is being debated in the International. I place myself within the majority current, but I believe it has shortcomings and errors that have facilitated the minority's arguments. After the IX World Congress resolution on Latin America, the United Secretariat did not push ahead in the exploration and study of the forms in which to apply a line that was totally new, around which there had been few experiences. It was a line formulated in generalizations which did not examine the possibilities in each country in depth, which led to errors of analysis regarding the Latin American political situation.

It was a resolution that had the great merit of raising the question of armed struggle, which constituted a great step forward, but one that stayed within general formulations.

In the concrete case of Argentina, this led the United Secretariat into an impressionism regarding the PRT (C) wherein the United Secretariat only saw successes, ignoring the problems that arose in the party around the application of the armed struggle, problems that led to the split of the PRT. The withdrawal of the section from the ranks of the FI compelled the United Secretariat to go into the

question more deeply, seeking the cause of the errors that were committed, which will have to be done with a deep spirit of self-criticism. From this, various lessons will emerge regarding the best way to use armed struggle without falling into militarist deviations. But this self-criticism cannot be made from the reformist point of view of rejection of the use of a fundamental means of action for revolutionaries. Those who, while supporting the use of armed struggle in words, are opposed to its use in all the countries in which they carry out their activity, and in all the countries that are being discussed, can scarcely help to correct our errors. This is the basis of the present debate. Supporters and opponents of armed struggle are facing each other. In the debate the minority uses the errors and deviations that we must overcome.

We mustn't fall into a trap. We won't defend any errors or deviations, and we will continue seeking the correct application of a basic tool for revolutionary struggle. Let's be clear. The difference with the minority is fundamental. It has to do with the essence of revolutionary work in Latin America.

In Argentina, after the Peruvian experience, this polemic was again raised in 1966 after the Onganía coup. It wasn't P. who raised the question, because he was in jail, but rather a growing number of militants. Moreno tried to maneuver among them. A military team was appointed (yes, in 1967) with representatives in each cell, but, as always, without accompanying this organizational resolution with a serious and deep-going focus regarding the objectives and forms of carrying this delicate task out to the end.

When the polemic unfolded in 1967, Moreno tried some fancy footwork; he placed himself in the ultraleft, called for saving him, placed himself under the discipline of OLAS to fight . . . in Bolivia.

This was seen by the majority as a maneuver and therefore rejected: the majority was in favor of armed struggle and that was why he lost the majority. There is no mystery as Hansen hints. Moreno broke with the party and the discussion remained inconclusive. The party resumed its course with little clarity. This was the source of the later crisis and split. Within the PRT those who were partisans of armed struggle and those who weren't coexisted: all rejected the methodology of Moreno. And among the partisans of the armed struggle there was confusion, many undeveloped shadings under the surface. Only practice would refine them, until it led finally to the split in 1970 where the Santucho faction, with a majority, imposed its thesis on initiating revolutionary warfare. It was an undeniable militarist deviation, which we had participated in in its beginnings, and from which a segment of the organization had to divorce itself.

One of the United Secretariat's biggest errors is not to have given importance to the discussion which developed at this time in Argentina among the three tendencies that were established. So, can one deduce from Santucho's militarist deviation, which the United Secretariat supported for some years, that the use of armed struggle is not valid? *Absolutely not.*

One can and must deduce that it is necessary to eliminate the deviations, that one must be very careful, that the use of armed struggle must answer the needs of the class struggle and the needs of party building. The minority's response ignores the problem. It says what one must not

da. It offers the activity of the PST as a response that is, the full utilization of legality, headquarters, union activity, dialogue with governmental authorities.

The PST's activity is not a revolutionary response to the problems of the Argentine working class. It is reformist activity, based on the propaganda of the general ideas of Trotskyism. There's been experience with this in the history of our movement.

To be revolutionary in Argentina involves the obligation to build a combat organization, capable of, as Lenin said, struggling against the political police and, we might add, against the fierce repression that is already beginning to be again unleashed by the official repressive bodies and the para-political and bureaucratic commandos. And it also means being prepared to join with and lead the masses in the use of violence, which is inevitable in the stage that is opening up.

Comrades, when Hansen declared me guilty of being a partisan of armed struggle he was right. I am guilty. I have committed plenty of errors and I will try not to

fall into them again. When Hansen accuses me of rejecting party building, of being a partisan of the foco, of shortcuts, he is wrong. I am innocent. In order to build the parties that we need in Latin America, we will necessarily have to determine the correct way to employ armed struggle if we don't want to follow the proletariat in its defeats and massacres with our posthumous analyses. This is not the only problem but it is one of the fundamental ones, and it is certain that neither Moreno nor Hansen is going to help us overcome them. The FI must give fundamental importance to this problem and deal with it with the maximum seriousness, study the experiences, and move forward. The defeats and deviations must not hold us back, but rather must spur us on to overcome them.

Fraternally,
Luis

January 31, 1974

Attachment 6: Statement by Claudio

I vote in favor of the resolution on armed struggle in Latin America. However, I don't agree with certain aspects of this resolution and certain statements contained in Comrade Roman's report.

Claudio

Attachment 7: Statement by Heredia

Concerning the Unity Agreement

Since there was no discussion at the Congress on a series of theoretical, programmatic, and political questions that are of great concern to the proletarian vanguard and decisive for the future of the world communist movement, any split based on administrative or organizational questions would be injurious to the International and an obstacle to the process of its overcoming the crisis in which it finds itself. Such a split would be an unprincipled one.

For this reason, while understanding that this agreement maintains a federal mode of functioning contrary to the program and principles of a democratically centralized world party, I am voting for it so as to prevent a split.

Political Resolution

General agreement, along with the criticisms contained in the document submitted by my faction to the pre-Congress discussion, as well as reservations on "The New Yalta," "On the Chinese Cultural Revolution," and on the evaluation of "workers states," and Cuba in particular.

European Resolution

General agreement, with the criticisms contained in the document submitted by my faction to the internal discussion.

Bolivia

General agreement, in addition to the reservations I expressed in my remarks to this Congress.

Argentina

General agreement, with the additions and criticisms contained in my report to the Congress.

Armed Struggle

General agreement, with the criticisms made in my remarks to this Congress.

Heredia, Fracción Bolchevique
(Argentina)

Attachment 8: Statement by PST Delegation

To the Presiding Committee of the Congress:

The delegates of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) of Argentina vehemently protest the discrimination to which our party has once again been subjected in not being recognized as an official section.

This criterion for classifying as a sympathizing organization what may be the strongest orthodox Trotskyist or-

ganization in the Fourth International and is certainly the predominant revolutionary Marxist organization in the Argentine Republic, is the culmination of a series of bureaucratic maneuvers carried out by the so-called majority of the International designed to secure its control of this Congress.

This becomes obvious if we compare the criterion used

here with the one adopted at the Ninth Congress for recognizing sections. At that time, when the situation of the PRT (Combatiente) and our organization were being debated, Comrade Livio Maitan based the position for recognizing the PRT (C) exclusively on the number of militants, without considering the political positions of each of the organizations.

This criterion furthermore reflects putting factional interests ahead of those of the World Party and provides a basis for judging the factionalist attitude that has given this Congress its undemocratic character.

We expressly request that all the delegations be informed of this protest, as the leadership of the Fourth International must stop committing errors of this kind, where it has

gone to the length of openly discriminating against an organization that in its political development method and practice stands on the ground of orthodox Trotskyism. We have been subjected to this discrimination precisely because our entire course shows that we will continue our fight to build the World Party of the Socialist Revolution, and that in this fight we will oppose any maneuvers by a leadership thrown up by an accidental majority that jeopardize the future of world Trotskyism.

Fraternally,
Mario, Chino, Arturo, Alberto,
Fierro
For the PST delegates to the
Tenth World Congress

Attachment 9: Protest Against Recognition of Ponto de Partido (Brazil)

We protest the recognition of the Brazilian group Ponto de Partida as a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International representing the LTF. In this respect we would like to make the following comments:

1) The Ponto de Partida group was formed in exile in Santiago at the beginning of 1971 by comrades of Ponto 1 and Ponto 2 on the basis of a democratic decision of the LTF. Since then, and as the LTF has decided, it has remained a single group.

2) Several months later this group split into two parts:

- a. Ponto de Partida 1
- b. Ponto de Partida 2, linked to the LTF

The split occurred on the basis of the decision of PP-1 to build an organization in Brazil, whereas PP-2, linked to the LTF, decided to carry on factional activity within

the PSR, Chilean section of the Fourth International, abandoning all plans to build an organization in Brazil. The entire Brazilian left is aware of this fact.

3) Today the majority of the LTF members are working inside the Argentine PST. They have two members in Canada and one in Mexico. They not only lack any members in Brazil but in addition have no political position or perspective with respect to revolutionary activity in Brazil.

4) For this reason, we formally protest to the Tenth World Congress the recognition of P-2 as the Brazilian sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

Delegations of POC-Combate (Brazil); PSR (Chile); Fracción Roja-PRT/ERP; POR-Combate (Bolivia); FIR-Combate (Peru); GCI (Mexico); Rossi. Toussaint (Rouge); Liga Comunista (Chile)

Attachment 10: Proposal Submitted by the Liga Socialista Chilena

The Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International has received a formal petition from the Chilean Communist League (Liga Comunista) asking to be recognized as a sympathizing organization.

Even without an exhaustive study of the Chilean situation and detailed knowledge of the political and organizational reality of the Liga Comunista, the antecedents in possession of the International's leadership, recommend to the Congress taking a favorable attitude towards the formal petition formulated by this organization.

Nevertheless, the comrades of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario), Chilean section of the Fourth International, have not ended their discussion in this matter among themselves and have not held the indispensable discussions with the Liga Comunista Chilena in order to take a definite position.

The Congress considers that, despite this, the petition

of the comrades must be received positively and fraternally recommends to the PSR comrades to take the means in order to adopt a position in relation to the L.C.'s petition in a favourable sense.

The importance of the political developments in Chile during these last 4 years, the lessons that must be drawn by the revolutionary Marxists, not only in Chile, but on a world scale, imply a profound discussion in the International, especially about the activity of the Chilean Trotskyists during this period.

The Congress mandates the new leadership in order to open the most rapidly possible a discussion with the Chilean comrades of the official section and the Liga Comunista, discussion which should lead to the unification of the two.

Proposal submitted by the Liga Socialista Chilena

Attachment 11: Protest Concerning Status of RCL (Iraq)

We regret the non-recognition (for the sake of a compromise) of the Revolutionary Communist League (Iraq) as section of the Fourth International, when this group has to wage its struggle in one of the most repressive states in the world.

Vergent (IEC)

Jaber (Lebanon)

Mikado (Israel)

Krasny (Arab Commission of the Walloon Section)

Laborde (Arab Commission of the Walloon Section)

Attachment 12: Statement by Mikado and Jaber

We have asked the Tenth World Congress to recognize our groups as sections. We based our request on the present statutes. But for the next Congress we will request that the statutes be revised so as to allow for the formation of an Arab section of the Fourth International.

In addition, for political as well as security problems,

we are asking to be identified only as sympathizing groups in the organs of sections and groups in the International.

Mikado, for Matzpen-Marxist (Israel)

Jaber, for Revolutionary Communist Group (Lebanon)

Attachment 13: Statement by the Japanese Delegation

We protest against recognition of the Iranian group as a sympathizing group of the International. The question of Iranian group of the International should be discussed among all the Iranian comrades of the International before the decision. We think the Iranian comrades in exile should

be members of the section or group in the country, according to the International statutes.

Asian comrades of the IMT support our protest.

Japanese delegation

Attachment 14: Statement by Alejandro

On the Unity Agreement Abstention

1. At its international congress, the GCI decided to apply for recognition as a section of the Fourth International on a political basis. Now, on organizational grounds, the unity agreement has invalidated the decisions of our congress.

2. Our abstention also signifies a vote for recognizing the need to wage a political struggle within the International to transform it into a party to fight for world

socialist revolution—an International where there would be no room for rightist tendencies like the Argentine PST or the Mexican Liga Socialista.

3. This abstention registers our disagreement with the concessions granted to the minority, especially in the cases of Spain, Mexico, Uruguay, and Brazil.

Alejandro, GCI (Mexico)

Attachment 15: Statement by Manuel

I abstain on the proposal of the majority and of the Presiding Committee to implicitly refuse to recognize the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista [GCI] as a section and

to maintain its current status as a sympathizing group.

Manuel, Grupo Comunista Internacionalista, Mexico

Attachment 16: Statement by Ramiro

On the Unity Agreement of the Presiding Committee:

I want to register an abstention for reasons having generally to do with the political and organizational question in Mexico; that is, we feel it is incorrect to give equal standing to the GCI and the LS, a numerically smaller group of *splitters*, which moreover has clearly refused to respect and put into practice the resolutions of the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International. Likewise,

this agreement gives the LS a justification for claiming more members than it really has, even with its decidedly semi-Menshevik conception of organization and recruitment, which are alien to the Leninist and Trotskyist tradition of the Fourth International and to our tradition in the GCI.

Ramiro, GCI (Mexico)

Attachment 17: Statement by Sebastian

I abstain in the vote on recognizing sections and sympathizing organizations, because the method employed in the discussion did not offer general political criteria or an informative view of the sections concerned. I am opposed to the concept of recognizing a section on the basis of

the number of members it claims without considering how rooted it is in the masses or the kind of political struggle it is carrying on.

Sebastián, FIR-Combate (Peru)

Attachment 18: Statement by LCR-ETA (VI) Delegation

The undersigned comrades oppose the non-recognition of the Spanish LCR-ETA (VI) and the Mexican GCI as official sections of the Fourth International, however we abstained in the voting so as to prevent any danger of

a split.

Enrique, Santiago, Roberto, Mikel (Spain) LCR-ETA (VI)

Attachment 19: Statement by Hoffman, Ana, Jesus

Our vote against the proposal reached by the presiding committee stems from disagreement with the refusal to recognize the LCR of Spain and the GCI of Mexico as sec-

tions, a move that encourages splits.

Hoffman, Ana, Jesus

Attachment 20: Statement by Juan

To the Presiding Committee of the Congress:

As a delegate of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores del Uruguay (PRT-U), I protest the unjustified resolution of this Congress not to recognize us as an official section of the Fourth International in Uruguay.

Our party has published a fortnightly (*Tendencia Revolucionaria*) for five years; we had a public headquarters from May 1971 until the June 27, 1973, coup d'état; and we have participated in most of the struggles of the mass movement in our country since May 1968, when we emerged as a party, consistently defending the positions of orthodox Trotskyism.

Given the fact that groups having neither an organ nor regular activity have been recognized as official sections—organizations which, moreover, have had nothing to do with the class struggle in their respective countries—this discrimination against the Uruguayan Trotskyists can be explained in no other way but as a factional maneuver by the International majority to keep out of the Fourth International a section whose majority has adhered to the Leninist-Trotskyist minority tendency (and later the faction) since its inception.

The argument has been passed around against us that we haven't kept in regular contact with the International. This ignores the very self-criticism made by the out-going leadership of the International regarding its inability to maintain regular relations with sections and sympathizing groups.

This argument also overlooks the fact that where it would have been most natural to maintain a relationship, with the Argentine section—the PRT (Combustión), the official Argentine section of the Fourth International—it consistently claimed that there was no need to build a party in Uruguay, since the Tupamaros already existed, and that the Trotskyists should enter this organization. This eliminated our most accessible means for establishing a relationship with the Fourth International.

Furthermore, failing to recognize our party as an official section means rejecting a Trotskyist organization that proved its firmness by maintaining its activity and regularly publishing the only underground left paper in Uruguay that has appeared since the coup d'état, despite the jailing and imprisonment of its members.

We have written this note for publication in the International Bulletin so that every militant of the Fourth International will know that despite the discriminatory positions of the current leadership of the Fourth, against which we will continue tirelessly to struggle, we will go on defending Trotskyism in Uruguay and fighting to build the World Party of the Socialist Revolution, that is, for a bigger and stronger Fourth International.

Fraternally,
Juan, delegate to the Tenth
World Congress
For the PRT (U), sympathizing
section of the Fourth International

STATEMENT OF THE MAJORITY TENDENCY AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TENTH
WORLD CONGRESS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The majority tendency accepted numerous organizational compromises in the preparation for, and the course of the World Congress:

- Excessive number of internal discussion bulletins;
- Counting the votes of sympathizing groups as well as those of sections (which tended to erase an important distinction inscribed in our statutes, and which partially falsifies the real relationship of forces between tendencies);
- Registering the total number of mandates claimed by each group, when some of them seemed (and still seem) to us to be greatly exaggerated (the clearest case being that of the Argentine PST whose 72 mandates we categorically challenge). This in turn falsified the tendency relationships, except in the composition of the IEC.

- Taking no action against the nonpayment of proper dues on the part of some formations (the PST's dues, in particular, are ridiculous in relation to the number of members it claims);

- Recognizing as sympathizing groups formations whose political weight and representativeness are highly dubious (the Brazilian Frente de Partida and the Iranian group);

- Recognizing as a sympathizing group a formation not only of doubtful membership, but whose orientation has also been a particular disgrace to the Fourth International (in Uruguay, the case of the PRT-U which can not fail to pose serious problems in our relations with the Latin-American vanguard);

- Not recognizing as sections formations which by their activities and their real political weight fully deserved such recognition—and these groups are in countries that are very important for the future of our movement (LOR-ETA (VI) in Spain and GCI in Mexico . . .);

- Recognizing the Mezhrayonka de facto as an international tendency, when the statements published during the congress (declaration of tendency, and the "semi-dissolution" statement) demonstrate its lack of a clear basis. The Mezhrayonka was set up and maintained for one week in order to "obtain a guarantee of equal rights" with the supporters of the majority and minority and "to defend the unity of our movement" (how?). It got 2.5 percent of the mandates. This sort of thing tends to deprive the very concept of international tendencies of its meaning (since the concept of forming international tendencies requires presenting political perspectives on the questions in dispute that constitute an alternative orientation to that of the other tendencies and an alternative for our movement as a whole).

In sum, these organizational compromises are considerable. They can make the development of our movement more difficult in certain cases. They put some of our organizational principles partially in abeyance. We accepted them for the following four reasons:

- To focus the international debate on the *political* differences and keep it from getting diverted and bogged

down in procedural or narrowly "organizational" questions (a foretaste of this danger was provided by the SWP leadership artificially creating a sensation over the Barzman letter "affair"). In this way, we could establish a majority on a clearly *political* basis.

- To eliminate any excuse to challenge the decisions of the World Congress by demonstrating that, even in the most favorable conditions for the minority, an unchallengeable majority had emerged. *The strength of this majority is substantially reflected by the composition of the IEC* (with a majority of 60 percent, and a minority of 40 percent), while still—let us emphasize once again—providing for representation of sympathizing organizations, particularly the Argentine PST.

- To create a political framework conducive to the application by the entire International of the majority line, one that would facilitate recognition of the authority of the World Congress, its political decisions, and the leaderships elected there, and avoid opening a procedural battle or an unlimited political debate that would endanger our work.

- To maintain a framework in this way that would preserve the unity of our movement a unity that would have been gravely threatened if there were no alternative World Congress and if our movement's work were paralyzed by the continuing internal debate.

That being said, the organizational compromises adopted at this World Congress should in no way be taken as precedents for the future functioning of our movement. The transformation of these exceptional measures into operating rules would endanger certain principles which guarantee and cement the unity of the Fourth International. The exceptional character of these measures is demonstrated, moreover, by the unanimous adoption of our new statutes.

We regret that, despite the agreement adopted in common by the Tenth World Congress, the minority faction has refused—up to now—to accept joint responsibility for the day-to-day leadership of the International. We proposed a United Secretariat *capable of acting* (with 20 or 21 members) in which the majority would have 55 percent of the positions (a *minimum* percentage if it is to be allowed to lead), the minority would have had five or six positions, and Herb would be elected for the German Compass (and not for the dissolved and inconsistent Mezhrayonka). The minority then refused to designate as its representatives in the United Secretariat comrades whose authority and position would make it possible to involve the most important minority section in the day-to-day leadership of the International. This leads us to a very dangerous situation where the representatives of the minority are not even in a position to vote on proposals for action without first consulting with their tendency leadership. This tends to transform the official leading organs of the International into consultative or-

gans or "sounding boards." Behind this lies a federalist conception of the International which contradicts the statutes and the line adopted by the World Congress. Whatever the circumstances, we will act in accordance with the statutes and the decisions of the congress which give the leadership of the International full authority to apply the decisions of the World Congress and to take all the necessary day-to-day decisions.

In view of this exceptional situation that arose in the

aftermath of the Tenth World Congress, the continuation of the debate on several limited subjects (Vietnam, China, the mass movements . . .) and the continuing activity of the minority faction, the majority tendency has decided not to dissolve and to continue to function as a centralized international tendency.

Submitted March 17, 1974

COPY

On December 15, 1953, the President of the United States issued the following statement:

"On September 6, 1939, January 8, 1943, and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act, including the illegal export or import of fissionable material, the illegal possession or transportation of fissionable material and the illegal production, transfer, or possession of any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon. 'Fissionable material' means plutonium, uranium-2 or other material which the Atomic Energy Commission has determined to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction. I am requesting that all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, report all information relating to violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner."

[See Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953 Vol., item 263)]

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On July 24, 1950, the President of the United States again issued a Directive which is quoted as follows, reiterating his previous Directives of September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943:

"On September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943, a Presidential Directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters. It was pointed out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive manner on a national basis and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion. I should like to again call the attention of all Enforcement Officers, both Federal and State, to the request that they report all information in the above enumerated fields promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is charged with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate agency.

"I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information relating to espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this same manner."

[See Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman (1950 Vol., item 199)]

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On January 8, 1943, the President of the United States issued a directive, which is quoted as follows, reiterating his previous directive of September 1939:

"On September 6, 1939, I issued a directive providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations, pointing out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a national basis and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility. I then requested all police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement officers in the United States, promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any such information.

"I am again calling the attention of all enforcement officers to the request that they report all such information promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is charged with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate agency.

"I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information relating to espionage and related matters to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner.

"I am confident that all law enforcement officers, who are now rendering such invaluable assistance toward the success of the internal safety of our country will cooperate in this matter."

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On September 6, 1939, the President of the United States issued a directive as follows:

"The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, and all information must be carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility.

"To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws."

(See The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roseman (1939 Vol. p. 478))

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APPENDIX

FBI JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

The following are citations of Federal Statutes upon which domestic intelligence-type national security investigations are based:

Title 18 USC 112, 970, 1116 - 1117, 1201 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States)

Title 18 USC 231 - 233 (Civil Disorders)

Title 18 USC 245 (Deprivation of Civil Rights)

Title 18 USC 844 - 845 (Explosives and Incendiary Devices)

Title 18 USC 953 (Private Correspondence with the Enemy - Logan Act)

Title 18 USC 954 - 967 (Foreign Relations - Neutrality Matters)

Title 18 USC 2101 - 2102 (Riots)

Title 18 USC 2151 (Sabotage)

Title 18 USC 2381 - 2382 (Treason and Misprison of Treason)

Title 18 USC 2383 - 2385 (Overthrow or Destruction of Government)

Title 18 USC 2386 (Registration of Subversive Organization)

Title 18 USC 2387 - 2388 (Activity Affecting Armed Forces - Sedition)

- 2 -

Title 18 USC 2389 - 2390 (Recruiting or Enlisting to Service Against U.S.)

Title 22 USC 401 and 1934 (Neutrality Matters - including Illegal Exportation of War Materials)

Title 28 USC 533 (Authority of Attorney General to Order Investigation by the FBI)

Title 42 USC 2011 - 2181 (Atomic Energy Act)

Title 50 USC 781 - 798 (Title 1, Internal Security Act of 1950 - as Amended)

The following are citations of Federal statutes upon which foreign intelligence-type national security investigations are based:

Title 18 USC 792 - 793 (Espionage)

Title 42 USC 2274 - 2278 (Atomic Energy Act)

Title 18 USC 951 - 953 (Agents of Foreign Governments and Related Sections)

Title 22 USC 611 - 621 (Foreign Agents - Propaganda)

Title 50 USC 851 - 856 (Persons Trained in Foreign Espionage)

Title 8 USC 1481 - 1486 (Loss of Nationality)

In addition to the Statutes cited above, the FBI has investigative responsibilities relating to the national security growing out of Executive Order 10450.

Executive Order 10450 was issued April 27, 1953. It revoked and replaced Executive Order 9835, issued March 21, 1947, which was based on the Hatch Act of August 2, 1939, and Title 5 USC 301 (Authority to Prescribe Regulations).

Executive Order 10450 was based on provisions of Title 1, Internal Security Act of 1950.

Executive Order 10450 was amended by Executive Order 11605 issued July 2, 1971.



Department of Justice

STATEMENT

OF

KEVIN T. MARONEY
DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

ON

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING FUNCTION

BEFORE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 20, 1974

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am happy to appear before you today on behalf of the Department of Justice in response to your request for our views on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's domestic intelligence-gathering function and in particular the Bureau's authority and responsibility to conduct such investigations.

Chairman Ichord is correct in noting that in recent times and in fact over the last few years serious questions have been raised concerning the FBI's authority to investigate subversive activities including the gathering of intelligence information concerning certain organizations and individuals. Members of Congress, legal scholars and journalists have addressed themselves to this problem. The Department of Justice and in particular the Federal Bureau of Investigation fully recognizes that its domestic intelligence-gathering functions must necessarily have a sound legal basis and more significantly these functions must be carried out in accordance with the great protections accorded all Americans by the Bill of Rights.

At the outset I would like to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to your distinguished legislative counsel, Mr. Alfred M. Nittle, for preparing his analysis of the statutory authority for the Bureau's domestic intelligence activities. Mr. Nittle's memorandum provides a good starting point for members of your Committee and others seeking to understand the difficult and

complex legal problems and considerations involved in understanding the FBI's domestic intelligence activities.

In response to your Committee's inquiry I shall attempt to set forth the basis for the FBI's authority and responsibility to carry out its domestic intelligence activities, while recognizing that additional constitutional, statutory and Presidential authority can and may be also cited to sanction the broad range of FBI activities in the field of domestic intelligence, particularly in instances of specific investigations carried out pursuant to the request of the President or the Attorney General. Broadly considered, the primary basis for the FBI's domestic intelligence activities is grounded in the constitutional powers and responsibilities vested in the President under Article II of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), in considering the problem of warrantless electronic surveillance in domestic national security cases observed:

"We begin the inquiry by noting that the President of the United States has the fundamental duty, under Article II, §1 of the Constitution 'to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.' Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means."
407 U.S. at 310.

Justice Powell, speaking for a unanimous Court, subsequently added:

"And unless Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered."
407 U.S. at 312.

Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, now Justice Rehnquist, in testifying on the constitutional and statutory sources of investigative authority in the Executive Branch before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 9, 1971, stated:

"The primary source of federal law enforcement power emanates from Article II, section 3, of the Constitution which assigns to the President the duty to ' . . . take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . ' The word [l]aws has been interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court as encompassing not only statutes enacted by Congress but ' . . . the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of Government under the Constitution. In Re. Nagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) '"

Furthermore, we should also take cognizance of the President's powers and responsibilities as Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief and his power to conduct our foreign relations. This latter power, of course, relates more particularly to the Executive's power to conduct foreign intelligence activities here

and abroad. In addition, Article IV, §4, of the Constitution provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State of this Union a republican form of government and shall protect them from invasion and on application of the legislature or of the executive against domestic violence. In connection with the foregoing I would call your attention to the fact that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the Government's response to civil disturbances. As you may be aware, a great deal of domestic intelligence has pertained to this problem, particularly in the recent past.

Without a broad range of intelligence information, the President and the appropriate departments and agencies of the Executive Branch could not properly and adequately protect our nation's security and enforce the numerous statutes pertaining thereto. Perhaps the thought I have in mind has been best expressed in short form by the Supreme Court in the case of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which upheld the constitutional validity of the Smith Act. Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2385. In discussing the "clear and present danger" test the Court warned:

"Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid, and the signal is awaited." 341 U.S. at 509.

Next we come to the statutory basis for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's assignment and activities in gathering domestic intelligence information. Many of the statutes which serve as the basis for the FBI's authority and responsibilities in this sensitive area have been set forth by Mr. Nittle, so I shall try to provide only a brief outline of the relevant statutes. Before proceeding to set forth the broad policy statutes underlying the Bureau's authority, I would like to call your attention to the fact that the Bureau's primary investigative jurisdiction to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations is grounded in the numerous Federal criminal statutes found throughout the United States Code which prohibit the type of activity under investigation. Statutes dealing with treason, espionage, sabotage, advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government, bombing, aircraft piracy, assaults on foreign officials and numerous other statutes dealing with all manner of subversive activities afford the legal basis for practically all domestic intelligence-type investigations. I will submit as an appendix

to my statement a list of significant statutes which serve as a basis for the FBI's jurisdiction and authority for national security investigations.

Pursuant to Title 3, U.S.C., Section 301, the President is authorized to designate and empower the head of any department or agency in the Executive Branch or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to perform without approval, ratification or other action by the President, (1) any function which is vested in the President by law or (2) any function which any officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval, ratification or other action of the President.

Title 28 U.S.C., Section 509, provides that all functions of other officers of the Department of Justice and all functions of agencies and employees of the Department of Justice are vested in the Attorney General, with certain limited exceptions. Pursuant to Section 510 of Title 28 U.S.C. the Attorney General may from time to time make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General.

Chapter 33 of Title 28, U.S.C., Sections 531-537, deals with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, its director, its investigative and other officials; the acquisition, preservation and exchange of identification records and the investigation of crimes involving Government officers and employees. Section 533 provides:

"The Attorney General may appoint officials

- (1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States;
- (2) to assist in the protection of the President and
- (3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General."

In addition, the functions of the FBI are more specifically detailed in the Departmental regulations found in 28 C.F.R., Section 0.85-0.89.

In the words of former Director, John Edgar Hoover, in appearing before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March 2, 1972:

"The fundamental authority for the activities for the Federal Bureau of Investigation is contained in Chapter 33 of title 28, United States Code."

Finally, Section 3052 of Title 18 U.S.C. specifically empowers the Director, the officials and agents of the FBI to carry firearms, serve warrants and subpoenas and make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. I would agree with Mr. Nittle that this Section is primarily an enforcement statute designed to give the FBI the same powers of arrest as those possessed by the United States Marshals and their deputies.

In addition to the constitutional and statutory basis for the FBI's authority to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations are the Presidential directives issued by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, as well as Executive Order 9835 issued by President Truman on March 21, 1947, and its successor, Executive Order 10450 issued on April 27, 1953, by President Eisenhower. In addition, Executive Order 10450 was amended by Executive Order 11605 issued on July 2, 1971, by President Nixon. The first three of the Presidential directives are amply discussed by Mr. Nittle in his memorandum, and your Committee is quite familiar with the history and purpose of the aforementioned Executive Orders. Section 0.85(d) of the Departmental regulations

found in 28 C.F.R. and pertaining to the Federal Bureau of Investigation specifies that subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall:

- (d) Carry out the Presidential directive of December 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.

Copies of these Presidential Directives have also been made part of the Appendix to my statement.

We recognize the complexity and difficulty of adequately spelling out the FBI's authority and responsibility to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations. The concept of national security is admittedly a broad one, while the term subversive activities is even more difficult to define. However, as the Supreme Court has recognized in numerous opinions, the Government has a right, in fact a duty, to protect itself from destruction and to safeguard its institutions from violence and forcible overthrow. The problems inherent in this complex field are touched upon by the Supreme Court in United States v. United States District Court, at page 322:

"We recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime'. The gathering of security intelligence is often long-range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of crime specified in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crises or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime." (Emphasis added)

I will be happy to entertain any questions which you have at this time.

Report on the Tenth World Congress

By Bill Massey and John Barzman

(Internationalist Tendency)

The Tenth World Congress, which was held in Sweden at the end of February, reflected the deepening political division of the International. The character of the Congress was predominantly that of recording the present stage of the debate. The discussion in the plenary sessions was frozen on a limited number of topics; the arguments were repetitious. However, the Congress took decisive strides forward on a number of fronts. The resolutions of the majority on the World Situation, Europe, Argentina, Bolivia and Armed Struggle in Latin America were adopted with a quite clear majority.

The discussion, the proceedings, and therefore the authority of the Congress itself could not be challenged by the minority faction. This opens the way for a viable outward orientation of the International under the leadership of the Majority. In addition, significant progress was made toward developing the IMT for the continuing struggle which the maintenance of the minority faction hampers. In this context, an organizational agreement was arrived at. Despite some organizational concessions to the LTF, it preserved the unity of the International on a principled basis, providing the framework for further progress on the external and internal fronts.

I. Origins of the debate

Although the first differences to emerge clearly between the two sides revolved around the question of armed struggle in Latin America—at the time of the Ninth World Congress—it was clear that they were merely the reflection of much deeper differences. In fact in all the questions under dispute, two different conceptions of the Transitional Program and of the role of the revolutionary vanguard organization appeared as the basis of the division. It was the adoption of the resolution on the "Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" by the International Executive Committee Plenum of December 1972 which led to the official announcement of the Minority Tendency. It was the Minority's vote against this resolution which led to the formation of the International Majority tendency.

In fact, the leadership of the future Minority Tendency had long before been making criticisms of the activity of the European sections. This tended to focus in particular around a vicious campaign against the young British section, the IMG. But as early as June 1969, Comrade Tom Kerry, representing the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party at a YSA National Committee Plenum, had used his greetings to make a direct attack on the newly formed Ligue Communiste's presidential election campaign. He attacked in particular the former Ligue's election propaganda as ultra-left. This attack corresponded with the YSA and SWP's turn toward

complete immersion in the anti-war movement at the time of the Moratorium, and the elimination of the red flag and Ligue-style hammer and sickles from the YSA's propaganda arsenal.

This first volley was later followed by the beginning of a systematic criticism of the Ligue's opposition to the document "The Worldwide Radicalization of Youth and the Tasks of the Fourth International." The essence of what the SWP leadership saw in this document was summarized by Comrade Barnes at the 1971 SWP convention in a paraphrase of Comrade Hansen's "Assessment of the Draft Resolution on Latin America": "Comrade Hansen's document centers on the central need to orient the world movement towards the radicalizing youth, primarily the student youth at this stage of its development, as the most advanced step in increasing the cadres of the world Trotskyist movement" (SWP DB, Vol 29, No 19). The Communist League came to be known among the SWP and YSA ranks as "ultra-left and vixenist." In the five years since 1973, all reports on the situation in France by the SWP leadership have always emphasized the opportunities for gains in the student and high school movement—most often, raising the CL's use of these opportunities—while passing under silence the tremendous strides forward made in implanting the Ligue among a layer of advanced workers. For example the SWP press showed only passing interest in the workers conference of Red Circles held in May 1973 in Rouen, and attended by 990 workers working with the Ligue.

Although the SWP leadership's lack of interest in the progress of our European co-thinkers' efforts at implantation reflected the exclusive work of the SWP in the petty-bourgeois milieu, the differences could not be reduced to a difference over work in the working class. In fact the European sections' estimate of the possibility of gains among advanced workers, through a certain type of activity was only one particular instance of their orientation to what was beginning to be codified as the new mass vanguard. On the other hand, the SWP leadership's worldwide youth radicalization perspective, was only one instance of its developing theorization of minimalist approach to the transitional program. This minimalist approach was evidenced in the activities and proposals of the elements under the influence of the SWP leadership. It was reflected in the lack of an anti-imperialist focus within the broader anti-war movement, the campaigns for the legalization of abortion, and the exaltation of strictly nationalist demands, as in its support for the slogan of a "Democratic Secular Palestine." It led to the isolation of those sections who carried out such an orientation from the advanced layers emerging out of the struggles of the period.

For a while, the differences over Latin America seemed

to be diminishing as Cde. Joe Hansen wrote in 1970: "Our Bolivian comrades made a correct turn in resuming activities in accordance with the method indicated in the 1938 Transitional Program. Trotskyists throughout the world will feel gratified that the Bolivian section was able to make this readjustment."

What appears to have rekindled the factional heat is the SWP and LSA's public disavowal of the action of the PRT, at that time the Argentinian section. In addition, it seems that a possible bloc with the tail-endist economist La Verdad group was beginning to appear. And so Comrade Linda Jenness took a trip to Argentina to teach the future PST about feminism, defensive formulations and electioneering. Despite the very different methodological tradition of the Moreno group--and its practice in a totally different milieu than the SWP, the working class, a political bloc seemed to have been established on the basis of abstract orthodoxy, and a tail-endist and minimalist approach to mass work.

The growth of the PST and the increasing difficulties of the PRT seemed to make possible a reversal of the numerical relationship of forces in the International and probably induced the SWP leadership to bring out its full differences, and announce political agreement with an international tendency. Thus, the vote at the IEC plenum, and the minimal platform of the Minority tendency, designed to allow the broadest possible combination of forces. The same minimal platform was maintained as the basis of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction which openly proclaimed its goal of overthrowing the leadership of the International with no heterogeneous combination and no stated alternative. There seems to have been a miscalculation in this plan. The LTF was unable to win any significant support in Europe and Asia, while the IMT gained fresh support in North America. For a time it seemed as if the LTF would boot from the international. This was particularly plausible at the August 1973 convention of the SWP, although Comrade Barnes' brinkmanship could also have been interpreted as blackmail to the ranks of the International. It was also the clear message emanating from the PST, already the perpetrator of several splits and confident in its linear growth throughout Latin America. The possibility of such a course by the LTF remains. However, it seems that the leadership and the ranks of the LTF who were less willing to dismiss the majority of the International as lost to Trotskyism prior to a more lengthy discussion temporarily had the upper hand.

II. Preparation of the congress

The Congress was attended by over two hundred people including a small technical staff. Fifty-two organizations from forty different countries were represented. This represented a qualitative numerical growth of the International since the last world congress, and the progress which has already been made toward regrouping vanguard elements around the world under the banner of Trotskyism. The problems of the International which were evident in the existence of tendencies and a faction are the problems which the International will continue to face in its efforts to transform itself from a propagandistic formation into a world party leading the revolutionary activity of the proletariat; the problems of linking itself

to the new vanguard emerging in the present situation of crisis of world capitalism and the crisis of the traditional leadership of the working class.

The growth of the International was illustrated by the presence of 26 delegates from the Walloon section, the first world congress to reflect this massive development. In addition, new sections in many European countries, in the Antilles, and the Middle East brought home the opportunities of the Trotskyist movement. Contrary to rumors of its disappearance, the Bolivian section, the POR, was represented by six delegates who reflected its proletarian composition and its deep traditional roots in the Bolivian class struggle. Even the growth of the PST was an expression of the renewed interest in Trotskyism. The most important loss was that of the majority of the PRT, a result of the International's failure to integrate this militant left-moving formation of considerable influence in the Latin American vanguard.

The Congress was prepared by the most thorough discussion ever conducted in the world Trotskyist movement. It included the publication in Danish, French, and Spanish of all the documents submitted. Particularly noteworthy was the achievement of the Walloon section, which was entrusted with the publication of the French documents at a time when the French section was banned and intervening in a situation of intense class struggle. In addition, the most important documents and many others were printed in other languages. In the vast majority of cases, the discussion was concluded by a special convention of the sections, and the election of delegates to the world congress on the basis of tendency positions. The number of votes of each section (mandates) was determined by the number of dues paying members in that section. The ratio of tendency representation in these mandates was determined by the total number of votes cast by full members in the basic units of the sections. Thus, candidate members who are required by the statutes of the International to follow a candidacy program could only cast consultative votes.

The discussion in the Walloon section for example was conducted in the following way. The documents were circulated to all members. The majority of the Central Committee announced the formation of a tendency in support of the IMT; other CC members formed a tendency Against the Stream (ATS); a few rank and filers declared for the LTF. Travel costs of all tendencies were paid by the section as a whole according to a budget and schedule approved by a parity commission. Discussions were held at the cell, section, regional, and national levels. A crew of twelve international representatives of the LTF was given a tour of the regional conferences, and equal time was given to all tendencies at the national convention. The Walloon section was thus allocated fifty-two mandates, reflecting a dues paying membership of over 2,600. Two mandates were given to each delegate. The LTF received only six votes throughout the section and thus could not receive a mandate--30 votes were necessary. The other mandates were divided proportionally with 48 to the IMT, and 4 to the ATS.

The major irregularities in the preparation of the world congress took place in the LTF products of splits in Argentina, Spain, and Mexico. Neither the Liga Socialista

of Mexico, nor the Liga Comunista de Spain held conventions for the world congress. As for the PST of Argentina, it claimed an alleged membership estimated at 3,500. This membership, contrary to the statutes of the FI, was not educated through a candidacy program. It was recruited on the basis of agreement with the platform of two election campaigns in the space of a year. The national convention, which by all accounts seems to have been more like a rally, voted unanimously, all 3,500 members for the LTF, with not a single vote for the IMT reported, not a single Kompass, not a single abstention. Even if this procedure was accepted as valid, there are strong indications that the actual membership was closer to 2,400. Using this methodology the Walloon Section could claim 5,000 members or 100 mandates.

The delegates at the world congress fell into two categories: delegates from recognized sections (such as the Belgian) or fraternal observers from organizations which used to be official sections, but could not maintain that status because of reactionary legislation (such as the SWP); and delegates from sympathizing groups petitioning for full status as sections (such as the Colombian Gruppo Espartaco) or splinters previously granted sympathizing status (such as the PST). The statutes allow for votes only from the actual recognized sections.

III. Composition of The Tendencies

Some of the outstanding results of the membership voting can be summarized here. In North America, about 160 members of the LSA, LSC in the pan-Canadian state, which included about 30 from the Dawson groups which was not represented in the LSA delegation, and approximately 900 members in the USA indicated their fraternal agreement with the political platform of the LTF. In Latin America, all the LTF support came from organizations which exist in a situation of split in the Trotskyist movement: Mexican LS, Uruguayan PRT(U), Venezuelan PST, Peruvian FIR-Blanco. In Europe, the LTF received the well known 35 votes of the Williams group in the IMG; an alleged 200 in the Spanish LC which did not hold a convention; 28 in Germany—the German LTF was allowed 1 delegate even though it did not have the 30 required votes, an example of bending over backward for minority representation which deserves to be emulated; and under a dozen in Sweden, Belgium and France. This despite the presence of a permanent LTF representative in Europe for a prolonged period. In Asia, the LTF received support on an unclear basis from the majority of the Indian section; only one vote in Japan; the majority of the small official Chinese section; and the votes of the SWL and SAL in Australia and New Zealand.

In most cases, the votes for the IMT were based on tendency declarations in each country which while endorsing the general line of its platform, included some criticisms and elaborations. The most significant of these was the declaration of the majority of the Walloon Central Committee. Its amendments included nuances to the characterization of the world situation by indicating secondary counter-tendencies, clarification of the concept of the new mass vanguard in Europe by distinguishing it from elements with only an episodic break from reformism, and a specification of the different stages of armed struggle

in Latin America and the means of linking the revolutionary nucleus to the armed struggle of the masses through transitional initiatives. The Japanese delegates gave support to the IMT on the basis of critical evaluations of its documents. In Latin America, the IMT received the support of the Bolivian POR delegates, the Chilean PSR and CL, the Antilles GRS, the Mexican GCI, the Columbian GE, the Peruvian FIR-Combate, the Brazilian POC, the Argentinian Fraccion Roja, Fraccion Bolchevique, and Grupo Obrero Revolucionario (GOR).

A third international tendency, "Mezhraionka," was formed at the opening of the congress and dissolved at its close. It arose out of a coalition of national tendencies. It was based on three separate kind of appeals. The first was represented by the German and Danish Kompass tendencies, and the Italian TMR. It is equally opposed to the sectoralism of the LTF and the new mass vanguard approach of the IMT, a point which was not apparent during Comrade Herb's intervention at the SWP convention at a time when he was seeking a bloc with the LTF to retain the leadership of the German section. One of the distinguishing features of the German Kompass is its characterization of the Social-Democratic Party as a bourgeois party, moving in the direction of the American, Democratic Party, a characterization which even the LTF and IMT opposed, although from different angles. The Kompass used formalist and workerist formulations, and denied any common features between the radical action of even a section of the advanced workers, and that of the militant non-proletarian youth. An interesting aspect was that Comrade Herb used quotations from Cannon long forgotten by the SWP leadership.

A second trend in Mezhraionka was the "Stop-the-Split-Save-Unity" appeal, which attempted to prevent further divisions by taking a middle of the road position. This seemed to be the basis that Comrade Kallias Chandra of India, who had come as a supporter of the LTF (although not a member of the faction), passed over to Mezhraionka. He stated he had not read all the documents.

Finally, in France, the 80 votes or so of the Against the Stream tendency (ATS) were mainly determined by discontent with the lateness of the discussion—which also caused a number of abstentions, and by a desire to register a critical vote in relation to specifically French questions, which were to come up at the French convention. Some of these criticisms were not incompatible with the general line of the IMT. Comrade Dumas' report to the national convention for example, dealt with a history of the FI's relation to centrist currents, without focusing on the actual questions in dispute. At the world congress, Cde Dumas, one of the two ATS delegates, disassociated himself from Mezhraionka, stating that their tactical bloc with the LTF was pushing them more and more toward LTF positions. He gave partial support to the IMT. We can expect a similar process to occur within the ATS tendency as a whole.

IV. The intervention of the LTF

Comrade Barnes reported, as an observer, on the political line of the LTF Political Resolution. It was the world

situation report that he had already given in Chicago in December. He claimed that the Ninth World Congress could be reduced to a turn toward minority confrontation with the bourgeoisie and its state. Such direct interventions into the struggle between classes should only be conducted by our organizations when they have obtained a majority within the working class—more modestly referred to as the "masses," in the case of the USA—"organizations." Until then, the tasks should be limited to "propaganda, agitation, and organization," as they always have since 1938, and even before. Every problem is answered always and everywhere with a call to accumulate cadre around the transitional program. There can be no revolutionary situations without a revolutionary party, he said—raising questions about what his interpretation of the Cuban and Chinese events might be. Therefore, the revolutionary organization should stick to propaganda. This abstract, circular, and sectarian rhetoric was the dominant theme of the LTF throughout the Congress.

The purpose of this dogmatic verbiage is two-fold. On the one hand, it represents a real reflection of the sectarian, abstentionist retreat of the STP in the American situation. On the other, it provides formulations so general and so vague that they could serve as an umbrella for a political bloc with the anti-feminist, sectarian "Kommass," and the dynamically opportunist PST. The IMT pointed out that, in fact, in practice, the LTF did not use the Transitional Program, but rather a minimal program; and that the propagandistic approach could only lead to abandoning the possibilities of strengthening the revolutionary potential of the working class, which is decisively affected by the experience of its vanguard.

The PST observers delivered the LTF's presentations on Bolivia and Argentina. On Bolivia, they appeared as an extremely sectarian group, grinding an old factional axe against the leader of the Bolivian section, apparently considered as a rival, Comrade Moscoso. The fundamental political differences did not come out clearly amidst a deluge of accusations of betraying the 1952 and 1971 revolutions, and of the successive mistaken analyses of the Political Command, Popular Assembly, and the FRA. One of the PST speakers who had accused the International of betraying the 1971 revolution was apparently forced by his faction to retract his statement, which he tried to explain as a misunderstanding. In fact, conversations with Comrade Norma of the PST confirmed that the PST analyzes the Fourth International, and in particular its leadership and its French section, as petty-bourgeois and unreformable, and considers the tradition of Morenoist Trotskyism to be the most "non-sectarian" and consistent trend of Trotskyism.

On Argentina, the opportunist character of the PST was more clearly visible. The PST dodged the main question of analyzing the nature of the period, of the Peron regime, dismissed the possibilities of a coup or a repressive turn of the regime. They stressed the numerical gains, the possibilities of legal work, and the damage done by the armed struggle. Comrade Norma even analyzed the elections as a massive defeat that the working class inflicted on the ultra-left at the polls. The level of debate of the PST sometimes sunk to a ridiculously low level, as when one of their speakers summarized the positions of the IMT as "Nada, Nada, Nada" (Nothing) and those of the LTF

as "Partido, Partido, Partido" (The Party). Comrade Paille's intervention was somewhat more honest. He described his experience with the Cordoba workers, and in so doing vividly showed how the problem of self-defense had posed itself. However, he failed to provide a systematic line to solve this problem, which is not surprising since the PST denounces the Fraccion Roja efforts to deal with the problems of self-defense as a new "strategy of self-defense" replacing the old "strategy of armed struggle," which replaced the "strategy of the urban guerrilla," which replaced the "strategy of rural guerrilla," and offers nothing in its place except peaceful mobilizations to demand democratic rights.

The LTF view, expressed in Comrade Joe Hansen's observations, protested the decision to present the armed struggle in Latin America statement of the IMT to a vote. They even staged a walk-out to gain a four-hour extension of the discussion on this point. In the process, they made the congress lose five hours, displaying a cavalier attitude towards the representatives of the ranks of the International, and attempting a new split blackmail. The former secretary of Trotsky—as he frequently identified himself (probably for the benefit of the "raw green youth" not steeped in the reading of Trotsky, and unfamiliar with any of the other secretaries of Trotsky—some of whose presence at the world congress they may not have noted either)—claimed that the IMT resolution represented a generalization of the mistaken line of the Ninth World Congress, and the theorization of minority violence. He characterized this as a fundamental revision of Marxism, the most important issue facing the Fourth International.

Comrade Cesar of the PST stated that armed struggle could not be posed for either the masses or the vanguard before the party had been built.

Comrade Roman answered this with a comparison between the instant defeat of the working class at the hands of a military coup in Chile in 1973, and the resistance to the fascist coup in Spain in 1936, an obviously more desirable course, although still not sufficient for victory. In neither case was a revolutionary party present. However, the education and practice of the Spanish workers vanguard in self defense provided for the possibility of reaching a higher level of the class struggle.

Comrade Roberto of Spain spoke for the LTF, using the Spanish experience as the test of the two lines in Europe. The two main themes were 1) attacks on conciliation to terrorism, as allegedly took place in relation to the execution of Carrero Blanco, and 2) the need for a strategy of the workers united front mobilizing the masses for their immediate concerns. Comrade Scott of the Susan Williams tendency of the IMG brought back memories of May 1970. He posed the Red University strategy as the central focus of the IMG in the general strike situation of Britain at the time of the Congress.

On the whole, the gap between the LTF and the rest of the International was widened. Many comrades of the IMT were seeing the LTF leadership in a political debate for the first time, and many were shocked by the contrast between the image of Cannonite Trotskyism and mass leaders that they had seen projected, and the actual reality. The CRS of the Antilles, who had come uncommitted, came over to the IMT. The LTF strategy appeared to be

predicated on the need to win a base in Europe through a bloc with Kompass. This required the ability to continue to operate within the International. In contrast, the PST was clearly on an immediate split course, characterizing the International as unreformable, and steaming ahead full blast in the establishment of new splits and PSTs throughout Latin America. Even the British LTF tendency has moved to establish a "Friends of Intercontinental Press" chapter. . . .

There are clear differences between the SWP and the PST on the applicability of women's liberation work in Latin America (reflected in the contradictory influences on the Mexican LSI; the analysis of the Chinese workers state which the PST dates to 1949 and a break of Mao from Stalin; and the class nature of the NLF which the PST considers as a proletarian force. There are also differences on the analysis of the Latin American bourgeoisie, the nature of the Unidad Popular, and the Uruguayan Frente Amplio. The Spanish LC had definite Lambertist colorations. It is no secret that the Lambertists applauded the LC's expulsion of a Varguist minority (linked to the CCI splinter of the Hungarian Varga). However, the LC seems to be rapidly assimilating the SWP's focus on democratic demands, and unreserved stance in relation to nationalism, something which goes against the grain of the Euro-centric Lambertists.

V. The intervention of the IMT

The factional conditions under which the congress was held prevented the holding of the panels on a number of issues which were supposed to be discussed: Women's Liberation, the National Question, the youth radicalization, China, and Cuba. These discussions were left for the post-congress period, to be taken up either within the monthly internet discussion to be conducted on a few key issues in the International as a whole, or within the tendencies, or both. The IMT report on the world situation was given by Comrade Walter. He answered the accusations of catastrophism and of an objectivist, mechanical determinist view of the relation between the economic crisis, and a rise of world revolution. Walter pointed out that the explosive character of the period was not determined by such a one to one relation between the deterioration of living standards and workers' militancy, but rather by the combination of three factors: the general crisis of social relations (values and political rule of the bourgeoisie); a broad cycle of economic downturn; and a cycle of mutually reinforcing successful workers struggles and rising combativity, centered in Europe. Comrade Alberto of the PST answered that the International did not need economic geniuses—he later added under the Argentinian point that it did not need military geniuses either.

Comrade Walter pointed out how the LTF's vision of masses on the one hand, and the Revolutionary Party on the other, failed to take into account the important different levels of mediating factors between the objective factors and the subjective factor: the strength of the mass movement, the degree of development of the workers vanguard, the intervention of the revolutionary nucleus. In comparing Europe and America, he described the successful resistance of the European working class to the bosses'

offensive, that to the relative cohesion of a broad vanguard which was able to outflank the bureaucracies in major struggles (like the Fiat actions, May 68, the British strikes). This resistance has already had a serious impact on the health of European capitalism. In America, the atomization of such elements made it possible for the bosses with the help of the bureaucracies to impose the wage control contracts with few struggles, thereby allowing capitalism to weather the first storm.

In the discussion, Comrade Roman demonstrated how the Indochinese revolutionary forces had actually strengthened their military and political positions within the framework of the Accords of Paris. Comrade Mill of the Quebec GMR showed how the practice of the LSO reflected the ultimate logic of the LTF's position. He pointed out that although the LSO was constantly shifting its position, which made any attempt at a rational debate comparable to attempting to nail a bowl of jelly on the wall. It was possible to give two concrete examples of their tail-endism. On one instance, the LSO, criticizing the Parti Quebecois for not being consistent nationalists, challenged it to call not only for an independent Quebec, but also for the indispensable tool of such an independent state, the formation of a regular army. A week later, the PC, taking heed, had called for an 8,000 man strong army. The LSO then withdrew its call, hopefully having realized that it was wrong to call for an army of unspecified class character. He also criticized how the LSO's emphasis on the struggle strategy on nationalist demands such as French unilingualism had led it into a Common Front with as sole partners two proto-fascist groups: the Jeune Garde Mutilée of Quebec and the Knights of Independence who had denounced English Canada, U.S. imperialism, and . . . international Jewry.

In the discussion by Comrade Horowitz stated that the SWP had ever supported "consistent" nationalism. Comrade Massey was able to refute this attempt to cover-up with a quote from Comrade Barnes 1971 political report, indicating that unrestrained love for feminism and nationalism were distinctive features of the revolutionary. He then invited Comrade Horowitz to form a tendency to get repudiation of that position, saying that he would use all his influence to protect Horowitz's democratic rights.

The discussion on Europe was in large part taken up by answering the accusations of the LTF. Comrade Garcia answered the slanders of Moreno against the former Communist League. He pointed to the Ligue's consistent work in defense of those struggling against French colonialism, a campaign which was directly responsible for the Amigos GRS joining the FI. He described in detail the progress of work toward Black Africa. Throughout the discussion, LTF delegates, apparently suffering a morbid obsession, not unlike that of frightened pacifists, repeatedly brought up the question of the execution of Carrero Blanco. Comrade Maizan, while criticizing the "total" support formulation used by some of the FI's press, and pointing out that it could not substitute for a revolutionary strategy, reaffirmed the traditional Marxist position that such actions must be judged by their concrete effect on the development of the class struggle at a given juncture.

The need to patiently answer the misunderstandings, distortions, and incantation of dogmatic truths emanating from the LTF, seriously reduced the discussion about the real problem faced by our European comrades. How-

ever, some questions could be taken up, and will probably reappear and be settled at national conventions of the sections. In France, the problems include the need to balance central initiatives and the patient work of implantation; the exhaustive activity of expansion and the need for Marxist education. The tremendously diversified work of Rouge—in the CGT, in the CFDT, in the teachers union, through factory red mole work, the Chile committees, the FSI, the anti-abortion law MLAC, the women's liberation movement, immigrant work, high school Red circles, and student work—calls for politically centralizing themes, and the concretization of an overall action program and of the call for unity of the class. There is also a general discussion on governmental slogans, the role of Social-Democracy, and the evolution of the CP's links with Moscow.

The position of the IMT on Latin America represented an evolution in the light of the experience since the last world congress. Significant contributions were made by the comrades from Bolivia, and those from Argentina, who had evolved in a struggle against the liquidationist faction of Sanucho. In general, the resolution of the Ninth World Congress was seen as a positive attempt to come to grips with a problem whose full dimensions had not been entirely mastered. A large section of the Latin American vanguard has rejected the CP's view of a peaceful road to socialism, and is aware that the problem of armed struggle will be posed in any revolutionary strategy. Within this framework, two answers have been given as to how the revolutionary vanguard should relate to instances of armed struggle which occur, wholly or partly, prior to the actual insurrections—partial insurrections, fascist attacks, police repression, land seizures, etc. The trend referred to as spontaneist-insurrectionalist believes that the revolutionary vanguard should stay out of and not relate to any armed struggle prior to the masses as a whole being confronted with it. The other wing, the Leninist wing, believes that the revolutionary vanguard must bring answers to the armed aspects of the class struggle under whatever form they appear.

The PRT represented a militarist deviation. It telescoped different kinds of armed struggle corresponding to different stages of the class struggle, and it started from the false premise that Argentina was already in a state of civil war which would of course require the building of a revolutionary people's army. The international leadership was unable to back up the Trotskyist wing of the PRT—which had suffered severe blows from repression—in part because of the weakness of the international center, at a time when the PRT leadership might still have responded to a discussion.

Comrade Serrano of the POR defended the POR's past record, and reaffirmed its commitment to leading the masses as it had repeatedly done over a period of thirty years. He mocked those who kept exhorting the POR to link itself to the working class, saying that the POR was OF the working class, and had been for many years. He analyzed the cycle of Bolivian class struggles: mass upsurge, formation of workers and peasant militias, and defeat at the hand of the superior army. He said the Transitional Program had in great part been adopted by the Bolivian unions long ago with the Theses of Pulacayo, and that this was not the panacea. He pointed to

the peasant battles in Cochabamba at the time of the Congress itself as further evidence of the role of rural guerrilla in the Bolivian revolution. The cycle could be broken by a vanguard conscious of the problems of armed struggle. He concluded with a call for relaunching the struggle of the POR to win the masses to its program and its actions.

Comrade Saul of the Fraccion Roja made a precise analysis of the Argentine situation, pointed to the limits of the Peronist regime's democratic overtures, the economic situation, and the multiple forms under which armed struggle was already appearing in the conflicts between the masses and the police, union bureaucracy, the army, or the fascists. Comrade Rossi of France demonstrated how the PST's analysis of the Latin American class struggle was based on a triangular conflict between the masses, imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie. This explained their positions on the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, and their formulations in relation to the Peronist regime and the Justicialist state. Comrade Pierre Frank described precedents to the position of the PST, and characterized this party as a centrist formation. The status of the PRT(U) in relation to the Frente Amplio is somewhat unclear. However, years after the SWP's public criticism of the PRT(U)'s participation in this popular front, no public statement by the PRT(U) dissociating itself from the front has yet been issued. In fact, the PRT(U) boasted that to the extent that the Front still existed, it was still participating in it. This blatant act of class-collaboration can only be described as a scandal to the international. Persistence in error raises serious questions as to the appropriateness of this formation's existence in the international. Only the desire on the part of the IMT to make every concession to the needs of maintaining the unity of the international stayed off the raising of this particular question. However, every desire has its limits of patience.

Comrade Roman reported on the IMT resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America. The IMT's position started from the same orthodox Marxist-Leninist position which led the Kompass tendency to call for the formation of armed wings of sections of the Fourth International. The contradiction of the Kompass is that it is unable to say what these armed wings should be used for. This would require a concrete analysis of the problems posed by the Latin American class struggle. This was the purpose of the Ninth World Congress resolution. The mistakes followed from a failure to realize the consequences of the right turn of Cuban diplomacy, and unclearity as to the distinct forms of armed struggle required by the distinct stages of the class struggle. Roman reaffirmed the centrality of the Marxist conception of the revolutionary crisis. Armed struggle is not a strategy, but one of the strategical axes around which our Latin American sections must be built—that is to say that it is present at every stage of their construction, as it is present at every stage of the class struggle in general. Revolutionary parties are not built in a vacuum.

On a more general level, the reporter took up the question of the relationship between the masses' ability to victoriously conduct struggles, and the degree of awareness both political and practical that the broad vanguard has acquired on the question of armed struggle. One aspect of this problem is the ability of the masses to successfully

world revolutionary violence and the degree to which this depends on the experience of its natural organizers and leaders—the broad vanguard—with violent actions. This problem was referred to as the question of the dialectic of minority violence and mass violence, to the dismay of the former secretary of the leader of the Red Army, who as an observer was reporting on the political views of the LTF.

VI. The organizational settlement

The strategy of the IMT to the world-congress had been to make a certain number of organizational concessions (postponement of the world congress, limitation of the issues to be settled, proportional representation of LTF groups outside the Fourth International) in order to insure a clarification of the key political differences. THE IMT THUS WON A CLEAR POLITICAL MAJORITY IN THE DEBATE. The World Congress had to settle two organizational questions: the credentials of voting mandates claimed by several groups, and the post-congress status of a whole number of groups aspiring to become sections. One of the main considerations in this matter was to establish the authority of the World Congress, reaffirm the principles of democratic centralism, and strengthen the international center sufficiently to give effective leadership to the international.

Although there were numerous grounds on which the credentials committee could have challenged the figures of the PST and others, it was agreed that in order to avoid a giant-organizational hassle, no credentials whatsoever would be challenged. It is very difficult to gauge exactly the amount of puffing which went into the PST figure. We have already discussed the conditions of the discussion in the PST. It may be useful to add that at the time three IMT representatives traveled to Argentina, they only reported to approximately two thousand people present at various meetings. Furthermore, the character of the audience, which called the French Comrade an agent of French imperialism, and shouted him down for twenty minutes with chants of "Si O No" (Yes or No) calls into question the seriousness of this organization's interest in Trotskyism. The question of the lack of a candidacy program is not irrelevant either. Although the development of the YSA modifies the judgment, the SWP is obviously affected by the absence of such a requirement of political education and commitment. What can be said then about formations like the PST who recruit directly to themselves, or like the Mexican LS which claimed to have grown threefold in the two months before the deadline for the for the world congress? Unfortunately, the congress was not able to fully clarify such questions, but it refused to establish a precedent for further such breaches.

The final voting results are not available to us at this time. The voting took place by placing check marks on questionnaires. However the provisional figures on voting results fell into three categories: the vote of sections; the unchallenged votes of all present; and the unanimously agreed to estimate of proportional representation for the IEC. The first category, which is the voting procedure outlined by the statutes of the FI, and which is based on only the votes of recognized sections of the FI (this does not include former sections, like the SWP or other organi-

zations like the PST, at present prevented from affiliation by reactionary legislation) yielded approximately the following results: 114 for the IMT, 14 for the LTF, and 7 to Mezhrayonka. The second category of voting procedures which lumped together every group that staked a claim at the outset, and with no possible challenge, yielded approximately the following results: 142 for the IMT, 115 for the LTF, and 7 for Mezhrayonka. Given these figures, the LTF and IMT accepted that the proportional representation of the tendencies of the IMT would be based on a ratio of 60 to 40 in favor of the IMT.

As far as the organizational status of groups was concerned, a resolution was passed with the support of the IMT and LTF. About thirty abstentions and a few no votes were recorded; they came mainly from Latin America, Spain, and a few French delegates, and reflected the comrades' awareness of the problems posed by an undisciplined minority posing as representatives of the international in their countries. The observers of the IT cast a fraternal vote for the agreement although we felt that it left many problems that would arise in the immediate future, unresolved. The agreement contained three basic principles and a number of commitments arrived at through meetings of a parity commission. The main points were that 1) no groups would be left out of the Fourth International 2) that those substantial groups not recognized by neither side would be recognized as sections 3) that in countries where a division existed no section would be recognized until a merger was achieved. The agreement included pledges to abide by democratic centralism, to stop all public attacks, and to strengthen the center. Some of the outstanding results are the recognition of the GMR and RMG as a sympathizing section of the FI in the pan-Canadian state. The USA which had expelled some, and refused to recruit the others remained the official section, but in a considerably weakened state. On the other hand, in Mexico and Spain, the GCI and LCR which had functioned for years as the only organization linked to the FI, and which had clearly been victims of LTF spats, were not recognized as official sections, but only as sympathizing groups like their spin offs.

The Congress then moved on to the election of the leadership of the International. The IEC was expanded to 54 full members and 21 alternates. The IMT received 60 percent representation, the LTF 40 percent, and the Mezhrayonka 2 spots. A consultative IEC status was established for representatives of sympathizing groups.

Then came the election of the United Secretariat. The LTF was offered 7 seats out of 21, on condition that it actually dispatch top cadre as a guarantee of serious intentions to participate in the work of building the center. The LTF protested this slightly lower representation on the United Secretariat (33 percent instead of 40 percent) even though the USFI is executive and not deliberative. It also put up candidates that the IMT considered to be mere note-takers and phone-callers who would paralyze the work of the center. As a result only 3 of the LTF's candidates were elected, and two slots were left open for LTFers, and two more in case of a permanent move by top cadre to Europe.

The question of finances of the International was raised. The norm is for sections to contribute one sixteenth (6.25 or 6 percent) of their income to the international center.

Since most sections have a system of single progressive taxation, the calculations are rather simple. Other sections, however, have a financial system based on nominal dues, large sustainers, and special funds of all types. Some of them have been known to use this nominal dues system to only contribute small sums to the international and they were warned that this practice would have to cease. Some Trotskyist parties, like the SWP, who are prevented by reactionary legislation from affiliating to the Fourth International, can make no financial contribution.

VII. Prospects and Responsibilities

It should be clear from this report that we believe that the International remains threatened by a sectarian opportunist trend. While this trend embodied in the LTF is by no means the only problem of the International, it tends to act as the most important internal block to its development through its retrograde business-as-usual, and tail-ending approach. This situation calls for a struggle on two fronts: an outward campaign to further expand the International and its lines with the vanguard, and an internal political fight to clarify the role of the LTF, isolate it, and potentially overthrow it. The International Majority is being maintained for the purpose of directing this two-fold struggle, of balancing both aspects in relation to the conjunctural needs of the class struggle.

In summary, although the Congress only dealt with a limited number of issues, it represented a significant step forward. A line was set, the principle of democratic centralism was reaffirmed. A number of international campaigns were decided. It is now the responsibility of every section and every member of the International to see to it that this line is fully implemented, and that the positions of the International are vigorously defended. We of the IMT in the United States, although not members of the Fourth International, intend to take all the necessary steps to see that this takes place. This should in no way be construed as a provocation against the minority faction, which retains the right to hold its ideas, and whom we hope to win over to our views in the greatest possible numbers. It is not our putting forward of the line of the Tenth World Congress that would be "undisciplined" or "disloyal," but our refusal to put it forward. Likewise, anyone who would seek to stop comrades from putting forward this line would be guilty of disloyalty or indiscipline. Concretely, any refusal on the part of a national or local body to defend the line of the World Congress must be called to order and brought to a halt. This is part of the duty of all loyal supporters of the Fourth International.

The turn taken by the Ninth World Congress was reaffirmed, clarified, and strengthened at the 10th World Congress. The Fourth International sees itself not simply as a propaganda sect carrying out moral duties for all times in all places, but rather as the World Party of the Socialist Revolution in the era of the New Rise of the World Revolution. The Minority Faction has had five years to get its line out to the World Movement—the cadre of that World Movement have listened, have debated, and have voted in their majority to reject the line of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction. While the members of the Faction have the right to maintain their faction, they also have

the higher duty, with the close of the discussion and the vote, to carry out the line. The cadre of the World Movement will now turn their eyes to see how the Faction acts in carrying out the line of the Majority. All the future declarations of the Faction will be weighed on the scale of how loyally they have sought to carry out the line of the Tenth World Congress.

The line of the International is quite clear, it calls for an active intervention with the political line of the FI into the emerging vanguard of the class struggle. It calls for solidarity campaigns with the struggles going on in the various parts of the World. In particular the struggles in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe and Japan, in Latin America and specifically in Chile, and in Southeast Asia, where the heroic struggle of the Indo Chinese peoples goes on. This calls for militant campaigns of solidarity with the fighters of the French Lio factory, the British Miners, the MIR of China and the National Liberation Front of Vietnam. The International takes on the responsibility not only to be the militant supporters of these struggles, but also to give a political explanation to them and more than that to carry them in them and give them leadership. The main result of the decisions of the Congress was to affirm the line point that we are not mere observers of a world but rather the agents to change it. The Fourth International, today will either push itself forward in the emerging radicalization of the working class on a global scale, or it will fail and become just one more, not so very interesting propaganda sect. The decisions of the Tenth World Congress mandate that we move forward. It is on this note that the unification of the International rests. If in the course of the unfolding class struggle the various components of the LTF cannot change their outlook and practice, it intensifies the chance that they will find no other course than to split off from the revolutionary dynamic of the International. Their tendency has been in this direction since the Ninth World Congress. The lines put forward by observers like Comrades Barnes, Hansen, and Moreno at the Tenth World Congress does not lend itself to our being able to see a change in this course of events. The LTF, whose political supporters include the petty bourgeois SWP, and the workerist PST, the non proletarian based North American parts and the Argentinian economists, in addition to the Lamberst-like Spanish group, and the PRT-U of Uruguay, to add a popular front dimension, faces the choice of either stopping its course at five minutes before the decisive hour or proceeding on its downward plunge. At this point the disease is not yet gangrene, but it is certainly more, considerably more, than a scratch.

In conclusion, the IMT views the outcome of the World Congress as having accomplished the main task set for it. The World movement and its cadres went thru a most extensive discussion. Every organizational concession necessary to keep the International united was made while at the same time conceding nothing to principle in the political sense. The International has now decided its line, there is a Majority, and there is a leadership. Forward to the Building of the Sections of the Fourth International—Forward to the Victory of the World Revolution.

April 16, 1974

APPENDIX: Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain Unity of the Fourth International

Adopted by Fourth World Congress Since Reunification
(Tenth World Congress)

1. No exclusion of any groups or members now belonging to the tendencies or factions in the Fourth International.

2. No reduction in status of groups currently recognized as sections or sympathizing sections.

3. Adoption of a general formula to determine status in the following special situation:

In countries where adherents of the Fourth International are divided into two or more groups acting publicly apart from each other no group shall be recognized as a section, but all groups shall be recognized as sympathizing sections. But if the groups in any of these countries fuse before the next world congress, the International Executive Committee is empowered to recognize the united group as a section.

These are exceptional measures not to be taken as setting a precedent of any kind. It is not the purpose of these measures to encourage splits by giving minority groups the hope that they will receive recognition from the International if they leave a section and set up a public formation.

4. No recognition of challenges to mandate claims placed before the mandate commission by sections, sympathizing sections, or groups applying for recognition.

5. The vote cast on the counterposed political resolutions

shall be taken as the criterion in determining the approximate proportional representation in membership of the different tendencies or factions on the incoming International Executive Committee and Control Commission.

6. Enlargement of the membership of the incoming international Executive Committee to reflect the growth in size of the Fourth International since the last world congress.

7. Adoption of the following two categories in the membership of the incoming International Executive Committee:

a) Full status for members of sections.

b) Consultative status for members of sympathizing sections.

Full members and consultative members shall have the same rights in everything except voting. Full members shall have decisive votes; consultative members consultative votes. For purposes of replacement, alternate members shall be listed according to tendency or faction and placed in numbered rank.

8. Reaffirmation of the ten-point agreement defining the preconditions for an authoritative world congress that was unanimously adopted by the United Secretariat September 19, 1973.

9. As part of the implementation of this agreement, each of the tendencies or factions shall make statements at the close of the congress proclaiming their firm support to maintaining the unity of the Fourth International.

Recommendations to the Delegates of the Coming World Congress

Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat, September 19, 1973

The fear has been voiced that the differences under discussion in the Fourth International and the organizations in sympathy with it could lead to a split. To counteract this danger and to strengthen the unity of our movement, the United Secretariat reaffirms its statement "The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress" that was unanimously adopted on April 9, 1973.

In addition, the United Secretariat unanimously recommends to the delegates of the Fourth Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) that they adopt the following proposals:

1. That there be no expulsions or suspensions or application of disciplinary measures against sections of the Fourth International or any of its sympathizing groups.
2. That all sections and sympathizing groups be granted full voting rights at the world congress in accordance with the number of their members in good standing, as specified in the statutes of the Fourth International.
3. That the present temporary statutes of the Fourth International be accepted without change.
4. That in those countries where two or more groups exist because of splits or other reasons, the united moral authority of the Fourth International be brought to bear for the earliest possible fusion of the groups on a principled basis.
5. That only resolutions and counterresolutions on the

following points be placed on the agenda of the coming world congress for a vote: (a) the world political situation; (b) the question of orientation in Argentina; (c) the question of orientation in Bolivia; (d) European perspectives; (e) statutes of the Fourth International.

6. That the international discussion on these points be closed following the world congress for one year unless the IEC decides to reopen the discussion earlier.

7. That the following points be considered in commissions or panels at the coming world congress: (a) the "cultural revolution" and China; (b) youth radicalization; (c) women's liberation; (d) Middle East; (e) Vietnam; (f) Eastern Europe.

8. That votes on these topics not be taken at the coming world congress.

9. That the international discussion on the questions listed in point No. 7, excluding analysis of conjunctural events in Vietnam and Eastern Europe, be conducted in literary form following the coming world congress in a monthly bulletin not to exceed 45 pages.

10. That the Fifth Congress After Reunification (Eleventh World Congress) be held within two years following the coming world congress.

September 19, 1973

The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress

Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat, April 9, 1973

In view of the backlog of translations still to be done of documents submitted to the preparatory discussion for the next world congress and the number of documents already announced for presentation in the coming weeks, it appears unlikely that these can be placed in the hands of the rank and file before the conferences of the sections are held to choose delegates for the next world congress.

To overcome this difficulty and thus help to assure a fully democratic discussion and election of world congress delegates, the United Secretariat therefore unanimously recommends to membership of the I. E. C. postponement of the world congress. In accordance with the new date it also recommends that the final date for submission of material be set approximately three months in advance of the world congress. The United Secretariat is not bound to translate and publish material submitted after that date.

All national pre-world congress conferences should be rescheduled to be held as close to the world congress

as practical, but not earlier than 6 weeks before the congress.

Some comrades have expressed fear that the delay in translating documents might be part of a process that would bring into question the authoritativeness of the next world congress.

The United Secretariat is of the unanimous opinion that fulfillment of the following conditions, regardless of the date of the congress, will assure recognition of the statutory authority of the decisions of the next world congress by all sections, sympathizing groups and international tendencies of the Fourth International.

- 1) A fully democratic preparatory world discussion.
- 2) Translation and circulation at least into English, French and Spanish of all documents submitted before the final deadline.
- 3) The democratic election of delegates to the world congress.
- 4) Democratic conduct of the congress.

INFORMATION BULLETIN

April 1974

No. 4 in 1974

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Published by

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

14 Charles Lane, New York, N.Y. 10014

Introductory Note

On March 24 the SWP National Office invited the Leninist Trotskyist Faction and the Internationalist Tendency to submit written evaluations of the world congress, based on the reports being given to their respective caucuses, to be published for the information of the party in a special Internal Information Bulletin.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction submitted the report given by Comrade Joe Hansen to a meeting of the New York supporters of the LTF on March 12, 1974.

The Internationalist Tendency submitted a report by Comrades Bill Massey and John Barzman on April 16, 1974.

The Socialist Workers Party proclaims its fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International but is prevented by reactionary legislation from affiliating to it. All political activities of members of the SWP are decided upon by the democratically elected national leadership bodies of the SWP and by the local and branch units of the party. Unconditional acceptance of the authority of these SWP bodies is a prerequisite of membership. There are no other bodies whose decisions are binding on the SWP or its members.

April 17, 1974

Preliminary Report to New York Caucus of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on Fourth World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress)

By Joseph Hanson

I have been asked to present a balance sheet of the Fourth World Congress of the Fourth International Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) from the viewpoint of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction. Some of the conclusions I will offer are subject to modification after we have had an opportunity to study the final versions of the documents presented at the congress by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency. These were adopted by a majority of delegates but were subject to amendment and to editing, and are not yet available.

On arrangements at the congress there was a considerable improvement over the congress held in 1969. The facilities were better in general. For the first time the problem of translations was met in an adequate way. With the up-to-date equipment that was used, it was possible to have simultaneous translations in three languages—Spanish, French, and English. The time for discussion was thus utilized much more efficiently than at any previous congress.

The congress was the largest yet held by the Fourth International. Delegates and observers were present from all continents and all the major countries except the Soviet bloc.

In addition to delegates elected by official sections of the Fourth International, the congress was open to observers from sympathizing organizations—like the Socialist Workers Party—which are prevented by reactionary legislation in their own countries from affiliating to the International. Such observers were invited to express their views on all disputed political questions.

The discussion, which was quite intensive, centered on issues of the greatest importance to the future of the world Trotskyist movement. Some of the differences were sharp and deep-going.

To understand the congress, its limitations, and its outcome, it is necessary to bear in mind the context in which it was held. The context was a crisis in the orientation and leadership of the Fourth International.

The general outline of the development of this crisis can be indicated by noting the key points in the deepening internal differentiation.

The differences can be pegged roughly as having originated in the adoption by the Ninth World Congress of a "turn" that included an orientation toward "rural guerrilla warfare." A minority at that congress voiced strong opposition to the new orientation, predicting that the "turn" could do serious damage to the Fourth International, and that if it were persisted in, it would spread beyond Latin America and begin to impinge on the basic principles of our movement.

The debate on this question was resumed about a year

after the Ninth World Congress. Already it was possible to draw certain conclusions from the test of events, and these were made more emphatic by further developments, including the desertion of the PRT (Combatiente), the official Argentine section of the Fourth International.

The crisis in orientation and leadership of the Fourth International was precipitated by the failure of those responsible for the adoption of the orientation toward rural guerrilla warfare, and later urban guerrilla warfare, to recognize the lessons of the events in Bolivia and Argentina. This was shown by the documents they wrote going to great lengths in the effort to justify their course, and by the extension of their erroneous line in a modified form to other areas. ("The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe.") Their insistence on their mistaken course was formalized in the positions they upheld at the plenum of the International Executive Committee in December 1972.

The IEC plenum was followed by a sharpening clash over how to resolve the crisis.

The minority sought to reverse the guerrilla war orientation. It sought to gain adequate time for the ranks of the international to discuss the issues. Time was required for the presentation of documents, their translation and distribution, and clarification of the differences through debate. To this end the minority urged postponement of the congress. And at the IEC plenum it called for organization of a tendency to advance this point of view.

The majority sought an early congress. It talked about imposing stronger centralism in the international, a position that aroused fears that if it gained a majority it would attempt to resolve the differences through organizational means. It was reluctant about agreeing to postpone the congress, considering this to be an organizational concession to the minority instead of a genuine need of the world Trotskyist movement as a whole if clarification were to be reached among the ranks on the differences. At the IEC plenum itself, the majority announced the formation of a tendency to defend its positions, naming it the "International Executive Committee Majority Tendency."

At a conference held in Santiago, Chile, March 5-8, 1973, some of the leading comrades in the world Trotskyist movement who agreed with the minority position, formed the "Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency" on a principled platform stating the basis of membership.

Later it was discovered that the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency was in actuality functioning as a secret faction; that is, on an undeclared basis. It was discovered, in addition, that some of its leaders favored working toward a split in the Fourth

International.

In face of this evidence, the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency modified its platform somewhat, adding a call for a change in the leadership of the Fourth International and announcing that it was converting to an international faction and assuming the rights of such a formation, with the consequent change in functioning that this involved.

As the internal struggle continued to sharpen and to broaden in its ramifications, leaders of both sides recognized the danger of a split that would be politically unjustified.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction was particularly concerned over the delays in translating documents into languages other than English, the delay in providing French translations being particularly bad. This signified that the congress would not be well-enough prepared to settle the key issues in accordance with Trotskyist norms. In addition, the existence of a wing in the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency favoring splitting the movement was ominous. It remained to be seen whether those in the undeclared faction opposed to a split could keep them under control.

Yet the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency insisted on holding the congress without further postponements. They cited the statutes requiring a congress at least every three years; and on this they of course had a point.

The outcome of this situation was the unanimously agreed upon ten-point agreement of September 19, 1973. This limited the agenda to five points: (1) the world political situation, (2) the question of orientation in Argentina, (3) the question of orientation in Bolivia, (4) European perspectives, (5) statutes of the Fourth International. Other points of the agreement included refraining from expulsions or suspensions or application of disciplinary measures against sections or sympathizing groups, assurances on voting rights, and adoption of the temporary statutes without change. It reaffirmed the commitment to translate and circulate all contributions to the international internal discussion bulletin in at least French, Spanish and English.

Another important item was to hold over for further discussion the following questions: (1) the "cultural revolution" and China, (2) the radicalization of the youth, (3) women's liberation, (4) the Middle East, (5) Vietnam. It was agreed to publish a monthly internal bulletin of up to forty-eight pages for articles on these subjects.

It was also agreed that the next congress would be held within two years.

In face of the deepening and widening differences in the movement as a whole, the ten-point agreement outlined a possible *modus vivendi* until the next congress. However, it remained to be seen what would happen at the congress itself.

A New Point Added to Agenda

The actual agenda turned out to be somewhat different from what had been agreed on in September. In particular, a point called "Armed Struggle in Latin America" was included—I will come later to the reason for this—so that the actual order was as follows: (1) world po-

litical situation, (2) orientation in Bolivia, (3) orientation in Argentina, (4) armed struggle in Latin America, (5) European perspectives, (6) statutes.

Since the resolutions themselves and the reports on them should soon be available for everyone in the Trotskyist movement to read and study, I will not attempt to go into them in detail or even to outline them. For purposes of a tentative balance sheet, I will try to give the gist of the positions. To do this as clearly as possible, I will put them in a certain logical order—which is not the same as the actual order.

First, the positions of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency:

On the world political situation, they held that there has been a revolutionary upsurge since 1958. The outstanding manifestation of this has been the rise of a "new mass vanguard." They cited Europe as the prime example of these developments, but maintained that similar phenomena are observable elsewhere in the world.

From this they drew the conclusion that the major task facing the Fourth International is to influence and win this new mass vanguard; and that the most effective way of achieving this is through a policy of "initiatives in action."

Comrade Ernest Germain, the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, summarized it as follows: "The problem of initiatives in action is at the center of the debate in the international."

On "Armed Struggle in Latin America," the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, Comrade Roman, made some sweeping generalizations which I will return to later. The resolution falls in place here because it amounts to a generalization of the problem of initiatives in action, of "minority violence," and of "injecting violence into the class struggle."

It includes criticisms of particular formulations made at the Ninth World Congress in relation to the "turn" adopted then, but these are secondary.

The reporter theorized on the question of "armed struggle," viewing the question from the angle of "initiatives" that might be taken by small groups, whatever the eventual link might be between such actions and those of the masses in motion in prerevolutionary or revolutionary situations.

On the question of perspectives in Europe, the reporter on this point, Comrade Livio Maitan, handled it as a particular application of the position taken by the majority on the political situation in the world as a whole.

Similarly on the question of the events in Bolivia, the reporter, Comrade Serrano, viewed this as a particular application of "armed struggle," maintaining that the orientation adopted at the Ninth World Congress was completely correct as a whole. Whatever criticisms could be lodged fell within the framework of application of the line. In this respect there had been some wrong estimates of the relationship of forces, and some tactical errors had been committed.

Argentina was dealt with in the same way. Comrade Saoul reported that what had occurred in Argentina was an application of the "armed struggle" orientation. The line still remained valid despite the experience with the PRT (Combatiente). The main error in Argentina had been a "militarist deviation." The speakers defending the

position of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency made some self-criticisms for having delayed so long in taking up the deviations of the PRT; but said nothing about having presented the PRT (Combatiente) as a model section, particularly in the way it had carried out the proguerrilla line of the Ninth World Congress.

As for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, its main positions on these questions should be presented in a quite different order inasmuch as its objective was to put up the strongest possible case for reversing a wrong orientation.

On both Bolivia and Argentina, the reporters for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, Comrades Lorenzo and Arturo respectively, started from the concrete situations in those countries and the actual experience of our comrades there. This included a résumé of the contrasting results of the application of two different lines in Argentina; that is, the disaster suffered by the Fourth International in the case of the PRT (Combatiente) and the successes gained for the Fourth International by the PST.

Likewise on the question of perspectives in Europe, Comrade Roberto, who was the reporter for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on that subject, besides offering a theoretical analysis, emphasized the concrete experience of the past few years, especially in Spain where the Trotskyist movement has made big strides.

On "Armed Struggle in Latin America," as the comrade explaining the views of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, I pointed out how the guerrilla orientation had now been generalized in such a way as to become a line for all continents, as had been predicted by the minority at the Ninth World Congress. I showed how the resolution contradicted the positions held by the Trotskyist movement since its foundation, and warned of the disasters that could be expected from revising the program of Trotskyism on this question.

Finally, on the world political situation, Comrade Jack Barnes, explaining the views of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction offered a broad analysis of the objective reality for the past few decades. The purpose of this was to call special attention to the changing pattern of the world revolution, which was now bringing to the fore the leading role of the working class, including in the imperialist centers, and opening up immense new opportunities for the world Trotskyist movement. In taking up the tasks facing the Fourth International, he called for a realistic assessment of the stage of development of the Fourth International and particularly of the resources at its disposal. If this were done, then the world Trotskyist movement had every reason to count on highly encouraging advances in the coming period.

In general, what the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction sought to do at the congress was the following:

1. Clarify the issues, particularly the meaning of the resolution on "armed struggle" placed on the agenda by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency.

2. Block the would-be splitters, those who were counting on the congress ending in a blow up.

3. Maintain the unity of the Fourth International despite the development of some very deep differences.

4. Prepare the best possible conditions for the next stage, in which our movement can expect big openings in the class struggle in various areas.

A third tendency participated actively in the debate that took place at the world congress. It was announced at the beginning of the sessions. It called itself the Mezhrayonka Tendency.

In its announcement, it said that it was formed to gain equal rights in the discussion and to fight against any split. Its platform consisted of documents advanced for the most part by the Kompas Tendency and a lengthy critique of the IEC Majority Tendency's political resolution, which was distributed in French at the world congress itself.

The components of the Mezhrayonka Tendency consisted of the Kompas Tendency in the German section; the Kompas Tendency in the Danish section; the Revolutionary-Marxist Tendency in the Italian section; Comrade Krasno, a member of the steering committee of the Contre le Courant Tendency in France; and Comrade Kailas Chandra, a leading member of the Indian section.

The Mezhrayonka Tendency played a progressive, if brief, role at the congress, dissolving itself after the vote was taken.

On the world political situation, Comrade Luigi of the Mezhrayonka Tendency gave a counterreport based on their document. It was highly critical of the positions of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency.

On "Armed Struggle in Latin America" the report by Comrade Willi was likewise highly critical, coming close to the position of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction except on the question of forming an "armed wing" of the party. This flaw made the position of the Mezhrayonka Tendency unacceptable to the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

On European perspectives, the reporter for the Mezhrayonka Tendency was comrade Herb, whose position was likewise critical of the resolution of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, particularly its concept of a new mass vanguard, which he held to be amorphous and open to all kinds of interpretations.

On Bolivia and Argentina, the Mezhrayonka Tendency agreed with the general line of the balance sheet submitted by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction and did not ask for separate reporters on those two points.

In announcing that it was dissolving, the Mezhrayonka Tendency said that this did not affect its components. These would be maintained on a national basis and would correspond and collaborate with each other in the coming period.

Significance of the Outcome

The International Executive Committee Majority Tendency carried the vote on its resolutions, although by a narrower margin than at the Ninth World Congress. For example, on Bolivia and Argentina 51 percent of the delegates voted for the IEC Majority Tendency's resolutions, 46 percent for the balance sheet of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, and 3 percent abstained.

What is the significance for the Fourth International of this outcome?

It means, in brief, that in face of vigorous and increasing opposition, the ultraleft course on which the international was placed at the Ninth World Congress will be continued until at least the next congress.

First of all, the vote meant reaffirmation of the "turn"

of the Ninth World Congress along with rectification of what have been called "unfortunate" or "elliptical" formulations, plus some criticisms of what have been put down as "tactical mistakes" and "wrong estimation of the relationship of forces," and some self-reproof for having failed in time to criticize the tactical errors and political deviations of the now admittedly "non-Trotskyist" former official section of Argentina.

Secondly, the vote meant generalization of the "turn" taken at the Ninth World Congress. The generalization has been codified in the resolution on "armed struggle in Latin America" and the accompanying report. It could be said that the "turn" has now been virtually completed. It goes far beyond Latin America. It includes adoption of a policy favoring "minority violence."

The adoption of this line means that a new stage in the history of the Fourth International has been opened. A key point of program—the position of the Fourth International opposing "minority violence" in both theory and practice—has been revised.

In conformity with this change, the axis of work has been officially shifted toward a supposed "new mass vanguard." That means—above all in Europe—away from the masses who are organized in the Communist and Social Democratic parties and in the trade unions.

Of first concern now are the interests of the "new mass vanguard," or more correctly what the "new mass vanguard" is interested in. The orientation is toward small demonstrations of a "spectacular" nature—"initiatives in action" and "exemplary" deeds.

In this orientation, the one saving point—if it can be called that—is that it includes work among the radicalizing youth, especially in the high schools and universities. But the basis of the approach is a disorienting one that stands in the road of the key task facing our movement of becoming integrated and rooted in the working class.

Lest anyone draw hasty and unwarranted conclusions, the adoption of the new line on "armed struggle" should not be taken as signifying that the Fourth International is beyond reform. It is a situation conducive to sharp internal differentiation and struggle; but so long as democratic centralism is observed and no ban is placed on the organization of tendencies or factions, the Fourth International can be brought back to the correct course on this issue.

In fact, the maintenance of unity at the congress and the organizational conditions that were agreed to at the end of the sessions make it possible to test the line further, to review its results during the preparations for the next congress, and in all likelihood to reverse it at that time.

It should be said, however, that strong centrifugal forces were observable at the congress. It must be said, too, that while the immediate danger of a split was averted and an agreement was reached on measures to help maintain unity following the congress, unity remains precarious. Recognition of this reality facilitates the struggle against a split that would be quite unjustified politically.

The unity of the Fourth International remains precarious because of the nature of the resolution on "armed struggle." It involves the public stand to be taken on current events of an acute political nature.

Unlike broad theoretical questions that can be discussed in a leisurely way within the movement, events involving the use of violence in the class struggle require taking

public positions—and without delay.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the mounting unrest observable throughout the world today has been the recrudescence of primitive and outmoded forms of struggle such as individual terrorism. This is highly symptomatic, signaling the approach of more effective forms of struggle. In anticipation of the great mass actions to come, it is absolutely essential for our movement to take clear public positions on events of this kind that gain wide notoriety. The issue cannot be evaded. To attempt to evade taking a correct public stand would mean political death for our movement.

Thus a heavy responsibility rests on the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency. If they resolve the contradiction between their newly adopted position on "armed struggle" and the classic Marxist position by completely junking the old Trotskyism, this could place the unity of the Fourth International in jeopardy.

The issue, of course, is not confined to an abstract level: it will take very concrete forms. The question depends on how each individual case is handled. Consequently it would be a mistake to attempt to forecast what the variations might be.

A Transitional Situation

The outcome of the congress; that is, the vote and the accompanying organizational agreement on measures to help maintain the unity of the Fourth International was unsatisfactory to both sides. But it reflected a transitional situation in the world Trotskyist movement that still remains to be resolved. Most importantly, a split was prevented.

The centrifugal forces observable at the congress go back as far as 1968 when the Argentine section split wide open in a struggle involving adaptation to the strategy of rural guerrilla warfare. Since that time splits have occurred in other sections or groups.

The primary cause of the divisions was the influence of Castroism, Ho Chi Minhism, and ultimately Maoism on our movement, the intermediate link being the ultraleft currents that appeared as part of the process of the radicalization of the youth. This pressure, however, could become a major problem for our movement only because it was coupled with the failure of the leaders of the majority to oppose it effectively—in fact by their bending to it.

Another important element in the outcome at the congress was the lack of understanding among the ranks of the issues at stake. This was one of the consequences of the uneven development of the groups and sections of the Fourth International. Some of them are very new and very inexperienced. In addition, the discussion prior to the congress was quite uneven. In some areas the discussion had barely got under way because of the difficulties of translating and distributing documents.

An additional complication was the pace of recruitment. The world Trotskyist movement as a whole has made considerable gains in this respect in the past few years. In the feeling of satisfaction over the number recruited, it is easy to overlook the relative possibilities—what could have been gained—and to miss the meaning of the considerable recruiting that has been scored by competitive groupings during this same period. It is also easy to miss the significance of a high rate of turnover in member-

ship. Consequently, one of the harsh tests of the validity of a line—its capacity to win members of the working-class vanguard and hold them—has not come prominently to the fore in this period.

The new recruits, of course, in the first stage of their life in the movement come heavily under the influence of the cadres who first brought them the message of revolutionary Marxism and who are not always, above all, indoctrinating them along factional lines.

In this transitional situation, the congress could not resolve the issues in a definitive way. A considerable part of the world Trotskyist movement still faces the task of catching up with a discussion that in some areas reached the point of temporary exhaustion.

This uneven situation was reflected in the voting pattern. In a number of European sections on the eve of the world congress, high rates of abstention indicated a justified refusal by many comrades to vote on questions they felt had not been adequately clarified.

The reports presented to the mandates commission at the congress confirmed the fact that neither the IEC Majority Tendency nor the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction have yet won a majority of the ranks of the International. While a few more comrades actually voted for the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction (5,563 as against 5,277 for the IEC Majority Tendency) the important fact is that neither tendency has yet convinced a majority of the members of the Fourth International.

Under these circumstances, to demand that the delegates at the congress make a decision on a far-reaching new line on "armed struggle" represented, in my opinion, a grave default in responsible leadership.

Single Most Important Development

The adoption of the resolution "Armed Struggle in Latin America," which was submitted by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, was the single most important development at the world congress.

First as to the circumstances of its inclusion on the agenda:

It was originally submitted to the discussion as a statement of position, being published in the English edition of the *International Internal Discussion Bulletin* in October 1973; that is, a month after the September agreement on the agenda of the congress.

Later, on the eve of the congress, the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency made a unilateral decision to include it on the agenda in the form of a resolution. This unilateral decision was, of course, in violation of the ten-point agreement defining the preconditions for an authoritative world congress.

Thus many sections and sympathizing groups were unaware that the statement was proposed for adoption as a resolution by the congress even if they had received it, translated it, and made it available for consideration by the membership in advance of the congress. The result was that it was debated in only a few countries. And it was not voted on in most countries as a basis for selection of delegates.

No final version was offered for discussion at the congress. Many extensive amendments were offered after the congress opened and some of these were presented in an incomplete form.

This undemocratic procedure met with strong protests, particularly on the part of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction. The procedure was clear evidence of the lack of adequate preparation for the congress. In view of the circumstances, it was highly in order for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency to request postponement of the congress so as to provide time for discussion of their resolution on "armed struggle" and the selection of delegates on the basis of that resolution.

The leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency had no adequate reasons to offer for not requesting postponement of the congress in view of their decision to place this question on the agenda. They maintained (1) that they had a "right" as a majority to do this, and (2) that, after all, the question of orientation on "armed struggle" had been one of the central issues in the internal discussion since 1969.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction decided in caucus to agree under protest to discuss the question of "armed struggle" as a separate point and to do the utmost in the limited time available to clarify the question. Against the objections of prominent members of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction succeeded in doubling the time for discussion of this point from four hours to eight.

The "Problématique" of "Armed Struggle"

The discussion on the resolution was quite revealing. The reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, Comrade Roman, said that the question arose for the Fourth International in the context of the economic, social, and political conditions in Latin America but that the "problématique" of "armed struggle" is not confined to Latin America. (The translators are still undecided on how to put the term "problématique" into good English. It appears to mean the technique of posing problems or the set of problems you succeed in getting into a single bag.) In the opinion of the reporter, the Trotskyist movement had not answered the questions posed by the "problématique" of "armed struggle" and it was high time that this was done.

To prove how far the subject extended beyond Latin America, the reporter placed great stress on the pattern of resistance in Spain to Franco's bid for power in 1936. And he sought to construct an analogy that could be applied in considering the events in Chile when the military seized power there last fall.

In addition to that, the reporter sought to establish some general rules that the world Trotskyist movement could apply in situations involving urban uprisings on any of the continents. These rules included the following:

1. Advancing propaganda in favor of arming the working class. This, he maintained, was one of the themes of the Transitional Program, why shouldn't it be advanced like any of the other themes?
2. Carrying on work in the army. This meant not just seeking to democratize the army, or to defend the democratic rights of members of the armed forces, but to split off segments at the appropriate time and place in conjunction with "armed struggle" conducted by small civilian groups.
3. Intervention by the party through "armed struggle" under its own guidance both before and after a riotous

coup such as the one seen in Chile.

4. Preparing well in advance for all technical and military contingencies. This did not mean opposition to mass action but it did mean opposition to any "pseudo massist" concepts such as those supposedly displayed by the PST in Argentina.

In addition to the above, the reporter stressed an alleged dialectical relationship between "minority violence" and "majority violence."

Perhaps the most significant item was the statement by the reporter that he was formulating only the first approach and that a lot still remains to be done in working out the "problématique" of "armed struggle."

He said he was all for the Transitional Program but the specific forms it outlines does not provide the answers for new situations.

He ended by promising to follow up this encouraging beginning with theoretical and practical work.

Frequent references to the assassination of Franco's prime minister Carrero Blanco by the Basque nationalists in December were made during the discussion.

A Spanish leader of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, for instance, reaffirmed the position that the assassination gave an "impulse" to the class struggle in Spain and caused a crisis in ruling circles. His defense of the assassination followed the classical lines of the terrorist position long ago analyzed and opposed by the revolutionary-Marxist movement.

In showing how the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency had bent to the pressure, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction pointed to a scandalous headline in the January 11, 1974, issue of *Red Weekly*, the paper of the International Marxist Group: "Spanish Trotskyists give total support to Carrero Blanco assassination."

Comrade Mario Maitan was perhaps the most consistent in advancing the new line. He argued that the headline of the *Red Weekly* was in error. The British comrades should not have said "total support"; they should have said "critical support to Carrero Blanco assassination."

Comrade Maitan offered his own version of the resolution on "armed struggle in Latin America," or some very extensive amendments—I am not sure which, nor am I sure of their full content inasmuch as page 2 of his four-and-a-half page draft resolution was missing in the copy I received and a corrected copy was not readily available. Here are two revealing sentences from the pages of the copy I received. In explaining what the resolution on armed struggle passed by the Ninth World Congress was about, Comrade Maitan included the following:

"That it was imperative for sections of the Fourth International, particularly in certain countries (Bolivia, Argentina)—where the threshold of a minimum accumulation of cadres had already been reached, not only to elaborate an orientation for armed struggle, but also to engage in the concrete implementation of such an orientation. Guerilla warfare was considered the predominant form of armed struggle at this particular stage."

What is new in this is the statement that in Bolivia and Argentina a minimum accumulation of cadres had *already been reached*. Hitherto the "minimum accumulation" has remained algebraic. Now the arithmetic has been supplied. The number is astonishingly low.

Here is another proposal offered by Comrade Maitan:

"We must reject any cursory characterization, which, under the disguise [guise?] of remaining faithful to the anti-terrorist concepts of revolutionary marxism, would condemn forms of struggle which have been widely implemented in the past few years (expropriations, kidnappings of exploiters, executions of those responsible for massacres and torture, etc. . . .)."

The evidence could hardly be clearer of the influence of alien class pressures. Comrade Maitan proposes rejecting a characterization that remains faithful to the anti-terrorist concepts of revolutionary Marxism. And why? Because of the number of violations of those concepts in the past few years!

In defending the orientation toward rural guerrilla warfare adopted at the Ninth World Congress, the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency said: "So we lost a section in Argentina. But then we won one in Spain and another in the Antilles."

Comrade Germain added the following comment: "We did not lose one in Bolivia; and this sticks like a fish-bone in the throat of Jack Barnes."

More significant was Comrade Germain's silence on the assassination of Carrero Blanco. Despite repeated challenges to state his position, he refused to do so, keeping his lips buttoned on that question.

Comrade Maitan filed a statement for inclusion in the minutes stating that while he had voted for the resolution he disagreed with some aspects of it; but he made no specifications.

A noteworthy reaction was that of Comrade Kailas Chandra of India. He said that he had come to the congress with an "absolutely open mind," but after hearing the speeches on Latin America made by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency he had "felt quite sad," and had become convinced by the discussion that they were wrong.

The reporter for the majority on "armed struggle" had used a language that was "alien and strange" in comparison with the language used heretofore in congresses of the Fourth International. This was a significant judgment since Comrade Chandra has been a member of the Fourth International since 1939 and belongs to the older generation of leaders.

He said that with respect to Comrade Germain he had admired him and expected a great deal of him. His "psychological block against split" was an admirable thing.

Comrade Chandra said that he had not joined either of the two main tendencies out of fear of a split and the feeling that he could counter a split better if he remained outside of the two main tendencies.

He found Comrade Germain's arguments on Chile "astonishing"; particularly the view that one or two thousand armed guards could have saved Allende. Not even ten thousand armed guards could have saved Allende in face of the political training that had been given to depend on the army.

The strategy followed in Bolivia had proved to be a disaster, in the opinion of Comrade Chandra. "Now it is to be realized on a global scale," he said. "It is a bad approach, a dangerous approach."

He ended by calling for reversal of the line of the Ninth

World Congress.

Later he told some of the comrades that in India, before coming to the congress, he had misjudged the situation. After what he had seen at the congress, he was convinced that the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction had saved the congress from a split.

In conclusion on this point, let me reiterate that passage of the resolution on "armed struggle" was the gravest development at the world congress. It affects orientation on tasks in an unhealthy way and constitutes a political time bomb.

Agreement to Help Maintain Unity

I have referred several times to an organizational agreement that was reached at the end of the congress to help maintain the unity of the Fourth International. This consisted of reaffirming the agreements previously reached in April and September 1973. The new agreement included general formulas to be followed in determining the status of sections and sympathizing groups in various special conditions. (See Appendix: "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain Unity of the Fourth International.")

The application of these general formulas aroused protests among members of both sides. Among other things it was clear that the distinction between sections and sympathizing groups was breaking down, and it could create a very bad precedent.

There were other reasons for dissatisfaction. A sector of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency was particularly unhappy. I think that this was because some of these comrades had been counting on a split and had based their calculations for the future on that perspective.

In any case, there was an extraordinary amount of caucusing by the majority tendency over the nine-point agreement before it was accepted.

Nature of the IEC Majority Tendency

I have spoken about the political conclusions to be drawn concerning the outcome of the congress—that is, that the main line of the Fourth International will continue to be ultraleftist for the next two years.

There are some other aspects that warrant consideration.

The International Executive Committee Majority Tendency can be viewed as a bloc consisting of two tendencies—one that favored a split at the congress. This wing gave every indication of being disappointed at the outcome. The other wing was opposed to a split and sought to circumvent it, seeing that such an outcome would be a big setback for the world Trotskyist movement.

As between these two wings, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction did what it could to help the wing favoring unity, although it must be added without much encouragement from that wing.

In the final analysis, however, the differences between these two wings, viewed from this angle, may amount only to a matter of tactics. Such differences are not decisive in the long run.

There is still another way of looking at the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency that may prove enlightening; that is, gauging the sociological pressures

to which it is responding.

We have refrained up to now from taking up this question inasmuch as it could appear to some comrades to be a mere exercise in epithet-mongering and a diversion from an objective discussion of the political issues in dispute. Up to this point we have deliberately sought to confine our polemics mainly to the political differences. This required careful examination of the concrete experiences of our movement; the facts had to be established as accurately as possible. We sought to examine the connection of all this to the general positions held by the Trotskyist movement since its foundation.

But certain questions remain to be answered; and some of the comrades, especially the Argentinians, have pressed for answers. For example:

1. How are we to explain the attraction of the "strategy of armed struggle" to the leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency?

2. How are we to explain the blindness of these leaders to the lessons of events showing the bankruptcy of that strategy?

3. How are we to explain their persistence in continuing it with whatever partial self-criticisms?

4. How are we to explain their growing tendency to generalize this line and to convert it into something of universal application?

5. How are we to explain their tendency to elaborate a new theory on it the way their reporter did at the world congress?

6. How are we to explain their striking drift away from the positions long ago reached on this question by the revolutionary Marxist movement?

7. How are we to explain their brazen, or in some instances shame-faced, support of such a terrorist action as the assassination of Carrero Blanco?

8. How do we explain their mounting determination to put this line more and more into practice?

Where are the answers to such questions to be found?

I think that the key lies in their lack of roots in the working class and the labor movement. They lack the steadying influence of immersion in the proletariat.

Consider how revealing is their constant preoccupation with the problem of "linking up" with the workers. If you are rooted in the working class this problem does not arise.

Consider again their insistence on small group actions. This is not characteristic of the working class, which prefers to use the most powerful weapon at its disposal—the mobilization of its vast numbers in a cohesive way as seen in strikes.

The rural guerrilla warfare, with which these leaders were enamored in 1969 and for a time after that, is characteristic of the peasantry. The appearance of guerrillas is a sign of a rising peasant movement.

Similarly urban guerrilla warfare, which the leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency took up next, is characteristic of the lower layers of the petty bourgeoisie of the cities. It is an anticipatory sign of a general proletarian upsurge or an accompaniment of it.

Or take the theory of the wonders to be worked by the "exemplary actions" of individuals or small groups. It is

held that such actions set examples for the masses to which they can be expected to respond. But this is quite false. Individuals may respond but not masses.

What the theory of "exemplary actions" on a small scale expresses is the hope of radicalized petty-bourgeois elements impatient about moving ahead. The same holds for the theory of an alleged dialectic between "minority violence" and "majority violence."

From this angle, what does the theory of the "new mass vanguard" amount to?

It consists by and large of a search for ways and means to utilize the radicalized petty bourgeoisie to "link up" with the working class and impel it into motion from the outside.

This is a most telling indication of the isolation of sectors of our movement from the working class and from the labor movement.

Thus we can say that the class nature of the majority line is coming to the fore. Enough evidence is accumulating to make it possible at some point fairly soon to offer a convincing analysis so that the term "petty bourgeois" will appear as a correct label and not as an invidious epithet applied to persons.

The distinction between *line* and *persons* is very important. The line of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency represents a bending to the radicalized petty-bourgeois milieu from which many young cadres of the Fourth International have emerged and in which they are still working.

Role of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction

In conclusion, a few words on how the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction functioned.

It held several meetings in advance of the congress to get acquainted, to hear the latest reports, to exchange impressions, and to discuss preparations. The discussions were exceptionally free and comradely. Such differences as appeared concerned tactical questions. A steering committee was elected to coordinate actions during the congress.

During the sessions, the steering committee was on constant call, while the caucus as a whole met almost every day. There were continual reports. Discussions sometimes lasted until early morning.

The faction displayed increasing effectiveness in its organization and functioning. It acted in a disciplined and cohesive way. Throughout the congress there were not more than a couple of speeches that could be said to have been counterproductive.

The Bolshevik way in which the faction functioned was shown by the impact of its arguments and the difficulties faced by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency in trying to answer them.

For some comrades this was the first time they had traveled outside their country. For many it was the first world congress they had attended. And for most of them it was the first time they had participated in a faction struggle.

It was a tremendous educational experience for them. And it was remarkable to see the comrades develop in such a short time. Of course, it was an intense experience. Moreover, they had the good fortune to be participating

in a faction that was a good one, that gave a model demonstration of its principled nature, and of its capacity to play a positive role in the life of the world Trotskyist movement.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction sought only limited objectives at the congress. All of these were achieved.

In the discussion, the members of the faction did an extraordinarily good job in clarifying the issues and arguing for a reversal of line in light of the experience of the International since 1969.

They succeeded in blocking any exclusionary moves. For example, a move was on foot to exclude the Chinese section, but this died without ever coming before the delegates.

The campaign that had been waged against the PST and the PRT (Uruguay) was set back considerably. It will be recalled that the PRT (Combatiente) had urged the expulsion of the PST. Instead, all the mandates of the PST were recognized. Representatives of the PST were included as part of the incoming International Executive Committee. Perhaps most important of all, through first-hand encounter the delegates of the International Executive Committee Majority were able to see for themselves that the propaganda used against the PST had to be discounted, and it had to be admitted that the PST is a Trotskyist organization, an integral part of the Fourth International.

Another objective of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction was to do its utmost to block any splitting moves. Its course was decisive, in my opinion, in enabling the congress to chalk up a success in this respect.

Finally, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction sought to establish the best possible conditions for the maintenance of unity following the congress. While it remains to be seen how well this works out, the caucus assured the delegates that it would act as a responsible minority in continuing this policy in the coming period.

Following the congress, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction held a two-day conference in which there was a free and very educational discussion assessing the outcome and what course to follow in the coming period. All of the points I have touched on were taken up there.

Four decisions were made:

1. To try in the coming period to relax the factional tensions that built up before the congress. Both sides as a whole will welcome this, I think.

2. To give the majority an opportunity to make a further test of its line. One can hope that this will not provide further ammunition for the minority when the discussion resumes, but a realistic assessment of that line indicates that the minority will probably face an embarrassment of riches.

3. In view of the nature of the resolution on "armed struggle" that was adopted, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction will not dissolve but will continue to function in a disciplined, coordinated way.

4. The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction recognizes that the unity of the Fourth International remains precarious because of the possible consequences of the majority line on "armed struggle."

March 12, 1974

STATEMENT OF THE LENINIST-TROTSKYIST FACTION

At a meeting held February 22, that is, a week after the world congress, representatives of the "Majority Tendency" asked representatives of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction if they would agree to the MT attaching a statement to the minutes of the world congress explaining why they had voted for the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International," the nine points that were adopted at the congress.

The LTF representatives were somewhat surprised at the request. They could see no real need for such a statement, since the nine points had been jointly settled on by representatives of the two sides at a series of meetings at the congress. They held that the agreement spoke for itself and that the main thing now was to put it into practice, a course that would make it possible to relax tensions and facilitate carrying out the daily work of the international.

However, in view of the request of the MT, the LTF representatives stated that they would not object to a statement being attached to the minutes provided that one by the LTF could also be annexed in the event that the MT statement proved to be of tendentious nature.

The MT did not have their proposed statement ready since it was still under consideration. It took another three weeks to prepare it, a copy not being given to the LTF until March 17.

These facts are important inasmuch as the MT statement consists of two parts: (1) their reasons for voting for the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International," and (2) their view of the course followed by the LTF in the four-week period since the world congress, including the three weeks from the time the subject of a possible statement was brought up until a draft was made available.

I.

The relationship of forces in the Fourth International following the discussion preparatory to the world congress was not as pictured in the MT statement. According to the information presented to the Mandates Commission, a total of 5,277 comrades voted for the positions of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, while a total of 5,663 voted for the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, and 245 voted for the positions of the Kompass Tendency or of positions close to them.

The rest of the members, which was a considerable number, either failed to vote or abstained because they were not yet sure about the differences, or, in some sections where supercentralist statutes are in force, were denied the right to vote because of their status as "candidates" (their membership being used nonetheless as part of the basis for mandates at the congress).

It should be noted, too, that the votes of youth groups were not included in these figures, or even registered for the record, although some of them participated actively in the discussion. In general the youth groups that expressed an opinion favored the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

As for the mandated votes at the congress, which were weighted in favor of the IECMT because of the abstentions or restrictions, the vote was still only 137 to 125 with 7 abstentions and 1 not voting on the IECMT resolution on Argentina. In other words, the IECMT resolution on Argentina received 50.5 percent of the votes. On the counterposed world political resolutions, which the two sides had mutually agreed should constitute the decisive resolution to determine who held the majority on the incoming International Executive Committee and by what proportion, the vote was 142 for the IECMT resolution, 124 against, and 4 abstentions, giving the IECMT 52.6 percent of the votes.

This outcome reflected a discussion that was far from completed. Besides the inordinate procrastination in translating even the key documents into languages other than English, the distribution of documents did not come up to the norms of the Trotskyist movement, nor did the organization of the discussion in some sections. Certain sections and groups had hardly begun the discussion on the eve of the congress. A resolution with such far-reaching implications as "On the Question of Armed Struggle in Latin America," submitted unilaterally at the last minute by the IECMT as a new point on the agenda of the world congress, was neither discussed nor utilized as a basis for election of delegates in important sections and groups.

To this should be added the disturbing fact that a substantial wing of the IECMT, as revealed by Comrade Buzman and as corroborated by other evidence, had a split orientation.

In view of this situation, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction felt that the interests of the Fourth International as a whole called for exceptional organizational measures to counteract the centrifugal tendencies and to strengthen the possibility of maintaining the unity of the movement following the congress. Taking the initiative, representatives of the LTF approached some of the leading comrades of the IECMT on this. Their response was positive. They indicated that they had a similar interest in avoiding a split. This led to the joint meetings that worked out the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International."

In our opinion, the adoption of this agreement by a very large majority, including all but a small wing of the IECMT, augured well for reducing tensions in the international following the congress despite the continued existence of deepgoing differences on various important political and theoretical questions.

The statement which the Majority Tendency submitted March 17 for attachment to the minutes of the congress runs counter to this perspective, in our opinion.

The statement presents the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International" as a series of organizational concessions granted by the IECMT to counter supposed threats of the LTF to divert the discussion and to demonstrate that "even in the most favorable conditions for the minority" it could not win on the basis of its political positions. The statement describes the concessions as so extensive as to "put some

of our organizational principles partially in abeyance," one of "the consequences being that the concessions "can make the development of our movement more difficult in certain cases."

This contrasts with the position of the LTF, which we thought was shared by the MT, that the nine points would help maintain the unity of the Fourth International.

Not once does the statement indicate that the organizational compromises were jointly reached in the interests of the movement as a whole. It makes no mention whatsoever of the considerable organizational concessions yielded by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction for the sake of avoiding a split and strengthening the unity of the movement.

It passes by in silence, for example, the concession made by the leadership of the Canadian section giving the status of "sympathizing group" to an opposing formation that had just fostered a split in the section. That concession was accorded only after the most careful consideration. Of all the blows dealt at the congress to the Fourth International's concept of the integrity of sections, this was the gravest one. The Canadian comrades agreed to make the concession only because the IECMT had given every intimation that the decision might well determine whether a split occurred at the world congress.

The MT statement says nothing at all about the rather notable fact that the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction acquiesced in granting only the status of "sympathizing group" to the largest party in the Fourth International, the PST of Argentina, which had upheld the program of Trotskyism and applied it in the class struggle in an exemplary way during the years when the official section was preparing to desert. In this instance, too, the IECMT placed inordinate importance on the organizational concession, which was why it was consented to.

In its listing of organizational complaints and grievances, the MT statement singles out the fact that in accordance with the formulas followed in the nine-point agreement, the LCR-ETA (VI) in Spain and GCI in Mexico were not recognized as sections. But it was the leaders of the IECMT who insisted on the formula applied in these cases. The LTF representatives argued for a more objective formula. That is, in countries where splits had occurred, they proposed recognizing the largest group as the section. This would have meant recognition as sections for the LCR-ETA (VI) and the GCI among others. The IECMT leaders rejected this formula for reasons they did not explain to us but which we assume they made clear to their caucus. Presumably their recommendations were approved by the membership of the caucus.

The MT statement names two sympathizing groups, "the Brazilian Ponto de Partida and the Iranian group," whose "political weight and representativeness are highly dubious." These two groups appear to have been singled out for this qualification on grounds of their agreement with the political positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction. It is to be noted that groups that supported the IECMT are not singled out and characterized in this way although such a procedure would certainly be called for if one were to apply the same criteria to both sides. It appears to us that it is not in the best interests of the Trotskyist movement as a whole to subject groups of sincere and devoted cadres facing totalitarian conditions like those in Brazil and Iran to such invidious treatment.

The same goes for the subject of payment of dues. A number of sections and sympathizing groups are badly in arrears in dues. This is a serious question and warrants serious handling. To single out the PST in this respect while saying nothing about the others reveals an attitude that is not even-handed, to say the least.

Perhaps the worst instance of this factional approach is the decision to pillory the PRT of Uruguay as "a particular disgrace to the Fourth International." This is an echo of vile insinuations that were vigorously answered on the floor of the congress. To resume factional mudslinging immediately following the congress can only arouse the gravest doubts as to the motives of those engaging in it.

The gratuitous remarks concerning the Mezhrayonka Tendency fall into the same pattern. In reality the participation of the representatives of the Mezhrayonka Tendency in the discussion at the world congress furthered the clarification of issues. The MT, however, seems to frown on the formation of "small" tendencies that try to take an independent stand and to think for themselves. This reflects a supercentralist concept of the international that tends to carry over from the organizational level to the sphere of political opinion.

The heavy stress in the statement on the "unchallengeable majority" held by the MT deserves attention. First of all, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction did not challenge the outcome of the vote. As we stated at various times in advance of the congress, we expected that under the circumstances the IECMT would emerge with a majority. All we can add is that we were astonished at the slimness of that majority. Apparently the narrowness of their base is now a source of some worry to the MT, which would explain both their sensitivity on this question and their current course of action, including the nature of the statement they decided to append to the minutes.

They now "categorically challenge" the 72 mandates of the PST recognized by the Mandates Commission at the congress. They registered no such protest in the Mandates Commission. That was because both sides had agreed in advance not to challenge mandates. The agreement to refrain from challenges was reached with the objective of helping to center the discussion on the political issues in dispute and to prevent the discussion from bogging down on procedural or narrow organizational questions. This decision—reached in common—was correct in our opinion. In the absence of such an agreement, it is certain that the surprising number of mandates claimed by some of the groups supporting the IECMT would have been challenged by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

On the basis of their narrow ratio of 53 to 46 in mandated votes, which, as the figures presented to the Mandates Commission show, did not reflect the majority vote cast by the cadres of the Fourth International for the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, the MT leaders decided to set a ratio of 60 for their side and 40 for the other side on their slate for the incoming International Executive Committee. This ratio was picked unilaterally in their caucus.

On the basis of that unilateral caucus decision, they decided to set a still more disproportionate ratio of 66 to less than 33 for the United Secretariat (14 seats for the IMT, "five or six" for the LTF, plus one for the Kompass Tendency). On top of this, they violated Bolshevik

norms by insisting on determining in their caucus which individuals among its elected IEC members the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction must include among its representatives.

The members of the International Executive Committee adhering to the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction objected to this undemocratic procedure and voted against it. Nevertheless, in the interest of doing everything possible to maintain the unity of the movement, the LTF made some nominations. These were rejected by the MT as unacceptable. The LTF then asked for time to attempt to work out the necessary arrangements for possible additional nominations. This was granted by the representatives of the MT, although with evident reluctance.

II.

At the March 16 meeting of the United Secretariat, the representatives of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction reported that they were working on the problem of additional nominations to meet the difficult conditions laid down by the Majority Tendency as to the composition of their representation on the United Secretariat.

They were then confronted with a new problem. The MT representatives on the United Secretariat stated that they had decided on the following composition for the Bureau, which handles the day-to-day work of the international between sessions of the United Secretariat. For the MT, 10 members; for the LTF 3 members.

But the LTF was not to freely select three comrades among their representatives who had been elected to the United Secretariat. At least one had to meet specifications laid down by the MT as to "political level" and "authoritativeness." If this ultimatum was not met, then none of the three could serve on the Bureau. The LTF would go ahead and set up a "homogeneous" Bureau, but if the LTF did not advise a new composition from participation in the day-to-day leadership of the international.

The representatives of the LTF voted against this anti-Leninist procedure. As a consequence, the three members of the United Secretariat selected by the LTF to participate in the work of the Bureau, Hugo Bianco, Marcel, and Johnson, were rejected as not meeting MT specifications, and the MT set up a Bureau consisting solely of their own members.

References to this turn of events are included in the final two paragraphs of the MT statement, which was handed to the LTF the following day. Summing up the four-week period following the world congress, the MT leaders aver that "the minority faction has refused—up to now—to accept joint responsibility for the day-to-day leadership of the International."

They characterize this alleged refusal as reflecting "a federalist concept of the International which contradicts the statutes and the line adopted by the World Congress."

The MT—within four weeks!—is already suggesting that the LTF is guilty of violating the statutes and the line of the world congress. What does this show about *their* course?

The only possible interpretation of such astonishing assertions is that the leaders of the MT have decided to try to provoke a heightening of tensions within the International.

They do not assume responsibility for this course making it out to be a legitimate reaction to "this exceptional situation that arose in the aftermath of the Tenth World Congress." The "exceptional" postcongress situation resulting from their own handiwork is turned to further account. It is utilized as part of their justification for a decision "not to dissolve and to continue to function as a centralized international tendency."

What they mean by functioning as a centralized international tendency is shown in practice by their factional actions in the aftermath of the congress, inflating their majority in the leading bodies of the international to the point of setting up a "homogeneous" Bureau and excluding the LTF from participating in the day-to-day leadership of the international unless an anti-Leninist demand is met as to the qualifications of its representatives.

The LTF had hoped for a course in accordance with the spirit of the agreement on a united international. But the unity of the "Fourth International" as the LTF announced at the congress, its own course has been aimed at reducing tensions so as to facilitate putting the agreement into practice.

The MT appears to have decided on a different course as their statement itself shows. That does not bode well for working relations in the coming period. We regret that the MT decided to make such provocative moves.

April 3, 1974