

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER AND SECURITY AT PARKER CENTER

The following is a narrative of the activities at the Emergency Control Center (E.C.C.) and security measures taken at Parker Center on June 5, 1968, from 12:25 a.m. to June 6, 1968, at 2:30 p.m. The E.C.C. was activated in order to provide personnel and logistics to the field forces, to collect and disseminate information from field command posts, and to coordinate the activities of the Department. Security of Parker Center became essential in order to provide maximum protection for both Sirhan Sirhan and the E.C.C.

12:25 a.m.

While in the vicinity of Parker Center, en route home from a late meeting, Deputy Chief E. M. Davis learned of the assassination attempt on the life of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. He immediately reported to the Business Office and assumed the duties of Department Commander. After being briefed on the situation by Captain W. O. Fudge, he telephoned Chief Reddin to apprise him of the shooting. Reddin advised him to dispatch Fudge to Central Receiving Hospital to assume command there.

Lieutenant W. E. Hogue, who was on an off-duty status at the Business Office, reported his availability to Deputy Chief Davis. Davis directed him to report to Central Receiving Hospital as his aide to relay information on the situation there.

Sergeant F. O. Ellis instructed Clerk Typist Madline Duddles to commence and maintain a "log of occurrences."

12:45 a.m.

Sergeant W. P. Lenocker was ordered by Deputy Chief Davis to activate the Emergency Control Center (E.C.C.) and to notify its commander, Captain W. G. Brown. Brown, upon being notified, immediately employed his "emergency call-up system" whereby he telephoned several key supervisors who in turn notified other assigned E.C.C. officers.

12:50 a.m.

The E.C.C. was activated and temporarily manned by Sergeant Lenocker, Officers M. S. Bach, J. H. Mooney, R. A. Nelson and C. R. Sanford. They remained on this assignment, in room 147, until relieved by the regularly-assigned E.C.C. personnel.

12:50 a.m.

Deputy Chief Davis ordered all "Response Units" to report to Rampart Station for assignment to the Field Task Force.

1:00 a.m.

Captain H. O. Mack, after learning of the shooting while off duty at his residence, reported to Detective Headquarters Division to assist if needed. As senior officer, he assumed command of Detective Headquarters. Shortly before Sirhan arrived at Parker Center from Rampart Station, Captain Mack organized the officers on duty on the third floor and completely sealed it off. He instructed his security force not to allow anyone on the third floor who was not connected with the investigation. News reporters attempting to gain entry via stairways or elevators were refused admittance.

1:15 a.m.

Upon learning of Sirhan's impending arrival at Parker Center from Rampart Station, Deputy Chief Davis ordered the Central Division Watch Commander, Lieutenant S. M. Stoffel, to provide security for Parker Center. Stoffel, aided by Sergeants F. O. Ellis and L. D. Zimmerman, deployed a skeleton crew of unassigned officers to the building's entrances. Zimmerman also contacted his five assigned vice officers and instructed them to report to Parker Center for security duty.

Officers assigned to guard the building's entrances were instructed to route all non-police personnel to the Los Angeles Street main entrance for clearance. Guards at the main entrance searched all non-police personnel for concealed weapons.

1:20 a.m.

Sirhan Sirhan, in custody of Sergeants W. C. Jordan, A. B. Melendres, F. J. Patchett and Officer F. R. Willoughby, arrived at Parker Center. Sirhan was taken to the freight elevator in the basement and up to the third floor, then to the squad room in Homicide Division.

Deputy Chief Davis instructed Inspector M. W. Howe to take personal charge of the security for Sirhan. Additionally, Inspector Howe was to isolate Sirhan in a jail cell as soon as possible.

1:20 a.m.

Venice Division Officers R. J. Gilmore and J. J. Robinson received a radio call directing them to transport Chief Reddin to Parker Center.

1:20 a.m.

Inspector D. H. Speck reported to Deputy Chief Davis in the E.C.C. and was assigned to obtain information relevant to the crime. These notations were to be used by Chief Reddin during a news release tentatively scheduled for 3:00 a.m.

1:30 a.m.

Sergeant D. N. Cooke arrived at Parker Center and immediately assumed the duties as the Department's Press Relations Officer. A short time later, after learning of Chief Reddin's impending press conference, Cooke established a "press pass" desk at the main entrance. At this time reporters were instructed to go to room 519 which is normally used as a press conference room. Before being allowed in the building, these news reporters were searched for weapons. Prior to Chief Reddin's news conference at 3:00 a.m., Sergeant Cooke issued a total of one hundred and twenty-seven temporary passes to accredited press representatives from various news agencies throughout the world.

1:30 a.m.

The first of fifteen officers normally assigned to the Emergency Control Center's "B" Watch reported for duty. Liaison was promptly established with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the California National Guard and the United States Army Intelligence. These agencies later provided liaison officers at the E.C.C.

1:40 a.m.

Arriving at Parker Center from Rampart Station, Inspector P. F.

Hagan went directly to the press conference room on the fifth floor. He noted the room was filled to capacity with news reporters while a number of others were crowded in the hallway. In order to accommodate all the newsmen, Hagan changed the location of the news conference to the auditorium on the first floor.

Prior to leaving Rampart Station to go to Parker Center, Inspector Hagan met with a group of newsmen who were causing a minor disturbance because they were not allowed to photograph Sirhan. Hagan, too, refused to allow them to interview or photograph Sirhan. He informed them that a news conference would be held at Parker Center later.

2:00 a.m.

Chief Reddin arrived at Parker Center and immediately went to the E.C.C. where he was briefed by Deputy Chief Davis.

2:10 a.m.

Deputy Chief J. G. Fisk arrived and reported his availability to Chief Reddin at the E.C.C. Chief Reddin immediately dispatched him to the Good Samaritan Hospital as an emissary of the Department to the Kennedy family.

2:45 a.m.

Captain L. R. Walton, Commander, Central Division, arrived and conferred with Lt. Stoffel regarding the security of Parker Center and the deployment of Central Division personnel. Noting a shortage of officers available to respond to normal radio calls, Walton ordered Stoffel to recall certain divisional off

duty personnel. A total of eleven officers and two sergeants were recalled to work. Upon reporting for work, these officers, under the supervision of Sergeant J. S. Miller, were assigned as "X" units to provide replacements for the depleted Central Division patrol force.

3:00 a.m.

Due to an extreme shortage of patrol units and a large backlog of radio calls, Lieutenant W. H. Byron, the E.C.C. Commander, initiated a "Tactical Alert" affecting all Patrol and Traffic Divisions.

3:00 a.m.

Chief Reddin held a news conference in the auditorium and discussed the following topics: (1) the number of times Senator Kennedy was shot; (2) the Senator's condition; (3) the names of three doctors attending the Senator; (4) the time Senator Kennedy was taken into the operating room; (5) the time of the shooting; (6) Senator Kennedy's refusal to have police security in the past; (7) the names of three other victims; (8) the make and caliber of Sirhan's gun; (9) the physical description of Sirhan; (10) the type of charge Sirhan was booked under; (11) the security and detention of Sirhan; (12) the time Sirhan was transferred from Rampart Station to Parker Center; (13) the names of the first persons who allegedly helped subdue Sirhan at the hotel; (14) that Sirhan's appearance was of Mid-Eastern extraction; (15) the name of Sergeant A. B. Melendres as being in charge of the interrogation of Sirhan; (16) the time Sirhan's

fingerprints were sent to Washington D.C. in an attempt to identify him; (17) Sirhan's booking as "John Doe"; (18) that there was no evidence of any other person involved other than Sirhan; (19) Sirhan's silence during the interrogation; (20) that there was no request by Sirhan for an attorney; (21) the time Sirhan's "mug" shots would be available for the press; (22) and the Department's "Tactical Alert."

3:45 a.m.

In hopes of identifying Sirhan through the news media, numerous Department-made photographs of him were distributed to press representatives by Inspector Hagan and Sergeant Cooke.

4:25 a.m.

All divisions were notified by the E.C.C. to allow the night watch patrol units, except those on special security details, to go "end of watch." Mid watch officers were not affected by this order.

5:00 a.m.

Central Division day watch officers were ordered by Captain Walton to report for duty to alleviate the burden in the depleted field forces.

6:35 a.m.

A teletype was sent to all Patrol and Traffic Watch Commanders from Lt. Byron, E.C.C. Commander, advising them to relieve all watches as normally scheduled except for officers assigned to special security details. The "Tactical Alert," city wide, was to remain in effect.

Captain Walton, desiring maximum deployment during Sirhan's expected arraignment, ordered all Central-Division officers to remain on duty until Sirhan was in custody of the Sheriff's Department.

7:30 a.m.

Shortly after Sirhan was arraigned in Department 40 of the Hall of Justice, Chief Reddin held a second news conference. During this televised press release, Chief Reddin generally reiterated statements from his 3:00 a.m. press conference. Additionally, he announced that the "suspect" (Sirhan) had been arraigned shortly after 7:00 a.m. and that bail was set at \$250,000.

8:40 a.m.

Officers on security duty at Parker Center were relieved by Sergeant D. C. Cornell and nine other day watch Central Division officers. They were assigned to the building's entrances.

12:01 p.m.

The city-wide "Tactical Alert" was secured. The E.C.C., however, remained fully staffed and activated.

2:30 p.m.

Maximum security of Parker Center was secured. All officers assigned to this detail were relieved and instructed to resume their normal duties.

2:40 p.m.

Deputy Chief N. A. McQuown relieved Deputy Chief Davis and assumed his duties as Department Commander.

5:00 p.m.

Lieutenant C. J. Chapman, Van Nuys Division, notified the E.C.C. of a communique recieved from Major L. Ellis, California Air National Guard, advising him that should the situation require Federal troops, the Van Nuys Airport would be the primary landing and dispersal area for the initial U.S. Army troops from Colorado.

8:00 p.m.

Public inquiries regarding the Senator's condition became so numerous that a "Police Citizen's Information" switchboard was activated in Communications Division. Seven police recruits and three police student workers manned the eight telephones answering questions only as to the Senator's health as reported from the E.C.C. Other inquiries from the news media were referred to the E.C.C.'s Press Relations Officer.

June 6, 1968

5:30 a.m.

Deputy Chief D. F. Gates relieved Deputy Chief N. A. McQuown and assumed the duties as Department Commander.

11:45 a.m.

U.S. Army Intelligence Agent R. S. Hamilton, while at the E.C.C., received a telephone call from his office informing him that an unidentified male had been arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department for threatening to kill members of the Kennedy family.

Note: Investigation revealed that the above "suspect,"
William F. Crosson, had been arrested by Venice

Division officers, D. A. Schemenauer and O. P. Franklin for 647(f) P.C. (drunk). Crosson had made a remark earlier to a complaining witness that the Senator's airplane had been sabotaged and that he, Crosson, had to get to the Kennedy family to protect them.

2:30 p.m.

The Emergency Control Center (E.C.C.) was ordered deactivated by Deputy Chief Gates.

The following is a list of personnel who were assigned to the Emergency Control (E.C.C.) at various times from June 5, 1968, at 1:30 a.m. until June 6, 1968, at 2:30 p.m. During the thirty-seven hours that the E.C.C. was in operation, an average of eleven officers were on duty at any given time.

Information Services Division

Lieutenant G. E. Conroy
Lieutenant G. W. Lewis
Sergeant J. Halligan
Sergeant (P/W) G. D. Harber
Sergeant R. L. Kenney
Officer J. A. De Coup Crank
Officer D. E. Reid

Management Services Division

Captain W. G. Brown
Lieutenant W. H. Byron
Sergeant J. A. Gunn
Officer G. L. Avans
Officer D. G. Brath
Officer R. M. Farkas
Officer J. F. Kenady
Officer R. W. Molony
Officer A. W. Sjoquist
Officer D. W. Sprinkle
Officer D. C. Watson

Personnel Division

Lieutenant F. W. Borowitz
Lieutenant T. S. Jonoski
Lieutenant W. J. Riddle
Lieutenant M. R. Ward
Sergeant R. T. Allison
Sergeant E. E. Markley
Sergeant B. Vartanian

Public Affairs Division

Policewoman L. F. Chronister
Officer F. R. Evans
Officer G. K. Galewick
Officer R. F. Green
Officer R. Jauregui

Public Affairs Division (cont)

Officer A. J. Johnson
Officer D. G. Kringen
Officer C. M. Pryor
Officer R. L. Quint

Supply Division

Officer J. E. Dougherty
Officer R. J. Gillenberg
Officer R. J. Stanzell

Traffic Services Section

Officer F. A. Knepp
Officer B. Lewis

The following personnel, although not normally assigned to work in the E.C.C., were detailed to assist in this function during the early morning hours of June 5, 1968, until relieved by the regularly assigned personnel.

Accident Investigation Division

Unit

Officer L. W. Altemueller	12T53
Officer M. S. Bach	12T59
Officer R. J. Brian	12T53
Officer J. L. Higgins	3T34
Officer J. H. Mooney	3T34
Officer R. A. Nelson	6T35

Business Office Division

Sergeant W. P. Lenocker	-
Officer C. R. Sanford.	-

Central Division

Sergeant R. J. Cynar	1L40
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The following personnel provided the security at Parker Center at various times between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on June 5, 1968.

Accident Investigation Division

	<u>Unit</u>
Sergeant H. D. Bonar	T-10
Officer M. S. Bach	12T59
Officer R. D. Chrisco	12T59
Officer R. L. Felix	1T18
Officer J. L. Higgins	3T34
Officer R. E. Kalstrom	6T91
Officer P. F. McConnel	2T66
Officer J. H. Mooney	3T34
Officer C. W. Scott	2T66
Officer J. W. Warford	1T18

Business Office Division

Sergeant F. O. Ellis

-

Central Division

Captain L. R. Walton	Commander 1
Lieutenant S. M. Stoffel	2L10
Sergeant T. W. Hooker	-
Sergeant R. S. Newell	-
Sergeant L. D. Zimmerman	1V20
Officer K. G. Baker	-
Officer F. J. Bielman	1A47
Officer C. W. Carrington	1A47
Officer L. J. Chancey	Vice
Officer B. Herrera	1A75
Officer M. R. Jackson	1A75
Officer N. D. Johnson	Vice
Officer A. R. Melendres	Vice
Officer R. L. Minich	Vice
Officer J. J. Santolla	1B2
Officer J. H. Smith	1B2

Newton Street Division

Sergeant K. N. Snelson	13V20
Officer D. Barker	13Z3
Officer D. C. Binger	Vice
Officer G. R. Currie	Vice
Officer B. J. Dunaway	13Z2
Officer F. G. Lewallen	13A41

Newton Street Division (cont)

Officer L. W. McElrea	Vice
Officer J. T. Merritt	1323
Officer D. E. Walter	1322

North Hollywood Division

Officer S. E. McKim	15L73
Officer G. E. Hawes	15L78

Van Nuys Division

Officer J. D. Shust	9L21
Officer M. J. Thies	9L47
Officer H. J. Wilkerson	9L68

West Valley Division

Officer P. R. Bruno	10L55
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The following Central Division off-duty officers were recalled to duty to assist in the security of Parker Center and/or to patrol the division as replacements for the depleted field forces.

Sergeant T. W. Hooker
Sergeant J. S. Miller
Officer J. Lopez
Officer R. D. Hill
Officer R. Hinrichs
Officer R. M. Lanphere
Officer R. Manrique
Officer J. J. Papac
Officer R. L. Reyez
Officer D. Rodriguez
Officer S. C. Schwartz
Officer B. C. Tedreck
Officer W. J. Van Dyck

TRANSFER OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S BODY FROM GOOD SAMARITAN
HOSPITAL TO THE LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

On June 6, 1968, following the death of Senator Kennedy, security for the transfer of his body from the hospital to International Airport was arranged by the Secret Service and Intelligence Division.

Intelligence Division provided seven vehicles to transport members of the family.

The route from the hospital to the airport was as follows:

- Depart from Good Samaritan Hospital
- Southbound on Lucas to Seventh Street
- Eastbound on Seventh to Bixel
- Southbound on Bixel to the Harbor Freeway
- Southbound on the Harbor Freeway to the westbound Santa Monica Freeway
- Westbound on the Santa Monica Freeway to the southbound San Diego Freeway
- Southbound on the San Diego Freeway to Imperial Highway
- Westbound on Imperial Highway to the West Imperial Terminal of the airport.

A request was made by Darwin Horn of the Secret Service for escorts. Deputy Chief Daryl Gates approved the request and dispatched Sergeant W. M. Sherman, Traffic Services Division, to meet Sergeant P. C. Duncan and ten motor officers at the Good Samaritan Hospital.

In anticipation of security and crowd control problems, Sergeant F. W. Premo established a Command Post at the International Airport, West Terminal, 6661 West Imperial Highway.

At 10:30 a.m., Sergeant Sherman arrived at Good Samaritan Hospital. He learned there was to be two motorcades; the first transporting the Kennedy staff, and the second with the body of Senator Robert Kennedy and the Kennedy family. While preparations were being made for the motorcade, Frederick Dutton arrived at the hospital with seven civilian escort officers from the California Mortuary Service. He requested that the civilians escort the motorcade instead of the Los Angeles Police Department. Secret Service Agent Horn informed the civilian officers that they should not be involved in the motorcade.

Captain J. E. Stephens, Commander, Metropolitan Division, contacted Inspector Howe who gave instructions that the special officers were not to join, or escort the motorcade. All seven of the civilian escort officers, J. R. Valentine, A. J. Gaumont, D. P. Mitcham, C. Batista, C. Riggs, C. Dukes and C. Granger subsequently left the hospital.

At 12:10 p.m., an unescorted motorcade containing the Kennedy staff left Good Samaritan Hospital for the International Airport. At 12:33 p.m., the second motorcade followed. Sergeant Sherman led the second motorcade in a marked police vehicle. Sergeant Sherman did not have the motorcade stop at red traffic signals for fear that spectators might interfere with the progress.

At the West Terminal two motor officers were assigned to the Terminal entrance and six motor officers to traffic control on Imperial Highway. Sergeant Zink assigned a squad of men along the chain link fence between "Air Force #2" and the Terminal building.

At 1:12 p.m., the motorcade arrived. At 1:30 p.m., "Air Force #2" was airborne returning the body of Robert Kennedy, the family and several others to New York City.

Total complement of officers was as follows:

Venice Division	2 Sergeants	6 Officers
West Los Angeles Division		7 Officers
Traffic Enforcement Division	1 Sergeant	18 Officers
Traffic Services Division	1 Sergeant	1 Officer
Intelligence Division	11 Sergeants	1 Officer
Administrative Vice Division	12 Sergeants	2 Officers
Central Division	1 Sergeant	10 Officers

U. S. Department of Justice

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FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION


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VOLUME I
PAGES 1-118


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**An INVESTIGATION SUMMARY
of the
SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION**

June 5, 1968

**VOLUME I Pages 1--118
DETECTIVE BUREAU—LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT**



April 4, 1969

TO: Thomas Reddin
Chief of Police

FROM: Deputy Chief Robert A. Houghton
Commander, Detective Bureau

SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION

This is the report of the investigation into the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The investigation was accomplished by an investigative task force created within the Detective Bureau, and designated Special Unit Senator. This report was prepared by the special unit.

This report is considered to be confidential. The report distribution is: One to your office; one in my office and one to remain with the master files to serve as a file summary and an access reference.

At the time of this report the trial of the accused, Sirhan B. Sirhan, is still in progress. A supplemental report will be compiled at the conclusion of trial and will additionally cover miscellaneous investigations completed too late for inclusion in this report.


**ROBERT A. HOUGHTON, Deputy Chief
Commander, Detective Bureau**



**An INVESTIGATION SUMMARY
of the
SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION**

**The FINAL REPORT
February 1969**

**SPECIAL UNIT SENATOR
DETECTIVE BUREAU — LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT**



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VOLUME I

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

On June 5, 1968, at 12:15 a.m., United States Senator Robert F. Kennedy was mortally wounded at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, California. His assailant, a young Jordanian immigrant named Sirhan Bishara Sirhan, waited in a serving pantry of the hotel as the Senator concluded an election night victory speech in a nearby ballroom. Responsibility for the investigation of the crime was upon the Los Angeles Police Department and, initially, with the concerned geographic detective division, Rampart Detectives. To grasp the scope of this task, one needs to take a brief look at the setting, the individuals involved and the historical significance of the incident.

The shooting occurred against a backdrop of election night activities featuring supporters of Presidential Candidate Kennedy and the winners in the primary election for United States Senator, Democrat Alan Cranston and Republican Max Rafferty. At midnight Senator Kennedy made a victory speech to an overflow crowd of about two thousand enthusiastic celebrants and newsmen in the Embassy Room. At the end of his speech he left the stage and, surrounded by staff workers and well-wishers, was led into the serving pantry en route to the temporary press headquarters in the nearby Colonial Room. As the mass of people were proceeding through the corridor-like pantry Sirhan fired several shots at pointblank range into Senator Kennedy, fatally wounding him in the head and additionally in the right armpit.

Those nearest the suspect immediately grappled with him as he continued to fire. Five additional persons were wounded by the fusillade of bullets. Instantly the scene degenerated into one of pandemonium and mob hysteria. The hysteria quickly spread as news of the shooting reached Kennedy workers and supporters still massed in the adjoining ballroom. Police response was quick and shortly involved in excess of four hundred officers.

The ramifications of Sirhan's act so profoundly affected the political atmosphere in the United States that a thorough assessment of its significance can probably not yet be made. Moreover, the international consequences of Kennedy's death, seen as a political assassination in most parts of the world could not be ignored. His death followed the recent assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King and the murder of President John F. Kennedy. The massive task confronting this Department must be viewed in this light. The Department's reputation quite literally was on the line, and we were being watched by most Americans to see if we could perform the job which law enforcement in America is charged with doing. It was obvious that history would look upon the results of our investigation to ascertain if we had exhausted all possible means to uncover the complete truth about the event.

The objectives of this investigation were identical with those of any other homicide investigation, expanded in obvious areas to compensate for the national prominence of the victim, the overwhelming number of potential witnesses and the numerous

leads indicating the possible existence a conspiracy. Simply stated, the objectives of the investigation were to locate and interview all the witnesses, ascertain all the facts, to document and record the activities, background and relevant observations of all the individuals who were even remotely involved. The probability of future reference to the investigative records regarding the assassination necessitated a high degree of detail and accuracy. Public speculation regarding real or fancied connections between this assassination and the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King would eventually put the results of this investigation and the reputation of the Department to a severe test.

Although the initial responsibility for the investigation was routinely with Rampart Detectives, it was obvious that the magnitude and complexity of the total investigation would create a workload far in excess of the capabilities of the divisional detectives. The potential of a conspiracy and the number of side issues magnified the scope of this investigation. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation had entered the case to investigate violation of Section 245 of Chapter 13, Civil Rights, Title 18, United States Code, the responsibility for the murder investigation remained with the Los Angeles Police Department. On June 9, 1968, Deputy Chief Robert A. Houghton, Detective Bureau Commander, conducted a meeting with representatives of the District Attorney, United States Attorney General, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service and Los Angeles County Sheriff, which reaffirmed the Department's acceptance of its

responsibility. Recognizing the need for an investigative unit outside the normal structure of organization of the Department, the Detective Bureau Commander created a special task force to conduct the investigation. On June 10, Chief Houghton assigned Captain Hugh Brown, Commander, Homicide Division, as the Commander of the Task Force. On June 11, three detective lieutenants, eighteen detective sergeants and two clerical employees were selected for the task force, designated as Special Unit Senator.

Personnel were selected from throughout the Department to fulfill specific responsibilities. The majority of those selected were men then assigned to homicide details in detective divisions or those with previous homicide investigation experience. The highest caliber of investigator was obtained to insure quality in the investigation. Other personnel were selected for their language skills, for scientific skills such as the utilization of the polygraph, or for backgrounds in intelligence operations. Personnel were also assigned to the unit from Metropolitan Division as the need for additional investigators became known. In addition, clerical personnel were specifically assigned to the unit to implement a S.U.S. record retention and filing system to account for the vast amount of paper flow which would ultimately be produced. Within one week the original complement was expanded to thirty-seven sworn personnel and seven civilian employees.

The investigation itself was developed along three specific

lines. The first was case preparation. Standard procedures and techniques were followed with an application of painstaking and professional thoroughness. Three investigators under the direction of a lieutenant were assigned this phase with the primary function of locating and interviewing all potential trial witnesses, evaluating the physical evidence and assisting the District Attorney in the prosecution of the suspect. The enormous task of identifying, locating and interviewing every person present at the Ambassador Hotel the night of the shooting was accomplished by meticulously identifying every name through all sources of information available. When these means were exhausted, a inquiring letter was distributed through the California Democratic Party, to 10,500 Kennedy workers in California. The letter solicited the assistance of additional persons who had been at the hotel, but had not been identified and interviewed.

The second aspect of the investigation involved an intensive inquiry into Sirhan's personal background. A complete profile was developed covering Sirhan's life from his birth in Palestine until his arrest for the assassination. This included, among other things, his education, work history, social activities and religious background. Although investigators were never permitted to interview Sirhan, the completeness of their background investigation was later corroborated by information released through the defense staff and by testimony in court.

The third phase of this investigation inquired into the numerous

leads and allegations which, if true, would reveal the possibility of a conspiracy. With the arrest of Sirhan, an alien who had lived in the United States for eleven years, the implications and allegations that the crime was an international or subversive plot were obvious and numerous. By the time that this report was completed, attempts had been made to link Sirhan with groups encompassing the full political spectrum. Publicity seekers, political adventurers, opportunists and the honestly mistaken presented their "evidence" that Robert Kennedy's death had been the result of a treacherous plot of one group or another.

In view of the world attention and rumor-laden atmosphere surrounding the assassination, it was considered prudent that comprehensive administrative and command control be maintained throughout the investigation. In addition to the usual inspection and approval techniques found in major investigations, daily meetings between the Detective Bureau Commander and the S.U.S. staff were devoted to a critique and evaluation of various facets of the investigation. Particularly close scrutiny was given to the many conspiracy leads, regardless of their surface implausibility or the apparent publicity-seeking nature of the informant. Similar discussions among unit personnel occurred daily to provide maximum coordination of the various phases of the investigation.

The close personal involvement and participation of the Detective Bureau Commander and Task Force Commander in the direction of the investigation, was even beyond the type of review traditionally exercised in major investigations. This involvement

was necessarily a major part of the conduct of the investigation due to the liaison and coordination required with other agencies, and the frequent need for command decisions at many points in the investigation. The responsibility for the many major decisions regarding the direction and depth of the investigation lay with the Commander of the Detective Bureau. These were decisions which involved the opening of new areas of exploration and the terminating of old areas, which necessarily regulated commitment of the available investigative manpower of the unit. Illustrative of these command decisions was that which resulted in a survey of the shooting ranges in the four surrounding counties and the screening of 76,000 names on range rosters. Sirhan's presence at a Corona range three days before the assassination was verified through this type of in-depth investigation. Supervisors and investigators assigned to the unit understood the need for this level and degree of participation and direction, and responded to it in a professional manner.

Additional administrative review and coordination were effected by the Inter-Agency Meetings. These monthly meetings, called and chaired by the Detective Bureau Commander, were attended by representatives of the District Attorney, F.B.I. and the United States Attorney General. The purpose of these meetings was to exchange current information, minimize work duplication, provide a means for review and criticism and to assign responsibility for various phases of the investigation. The meetings were also specifically intended to give other agencies the opportunity to voice their views as the investigation progressed

and to involve them in the decision-making of the investigation whenever desirable.

A major undertaking was the creation and maintenance of a file system which would permit both the storage of all the documents accumulated during the investigation and the prompt retrieval of any information in the files. This was accomplished by the establishment of a master file, divided into alphabetical sections containing one copy of every document, report, letter, photograph, exhibit, tape or other pertinent item. At the same time, index card files were initiated, with complete cross referencing. All relevant material was sorted into categories according to the outline of the anticipated final report, including investigative summaries, pertinent portions of case progress reports, F.B.I. reports, records and other data.

Complete security measures were taken to insure the integrity of the investigation. An alarm system protected the special facilities which were established in Room 803 at Parker Center for Special Unit Senator. All entering personnel were carefully screened and only authorized personnel were allowed in the rooms. Special locks were installed and a prescribed number of keys were issued to specific supervisors.

The final report is basically a synthesis of the master files which constitute a complete record of the investigation. The project has been documented by approximately 50,000 pages of reports and related data, 155 items of evidence and 1,700 photographs. The first portion of the report is a summary and

conclusion, a condensation of the final report. This confidential report has been completed in three copies. One, the file copy, has been retained with and is a part of the master files. A second copy has been retained in the office of the Detective Bureau Commander and a third copy has been forwarded to the Chief of Police.

The judicial "Alarcon Admonition," restricting dissemination of information to the news media was issued within days after the assassination, and prevented publication of any relevant material until the trial of Sirhan. The "on going" nature of the incident also delayed final preparation of this report.

A complete documentation was maintained on the expenditure of manpower and material. A total of approximately five thousand man days has been expended at the time of the submission of this report. Supplies and other logistical support totalled approximately twelve thousand dollars. A breakdown of the cost to the Department from the initial police response to the conclusion of the investigation and report is presented in the appendix to the report.

The helpful participation and generous assistance rendered by other agencies and departments contributed materially to the success of the investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation brought its vast investigative resources into the case at the onset and made the results available to the Department. Once the procedures were established, the Department and the F.B.I. had complete access to information in each other's file system.

The degree to which this cooperation assisted this investigation is reflected in the completeness of this report. The Pasadena Police Department, in whose jurisdiction the Sirhans resided, gave outstanding support to the investigation in many ways. The State Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, greatly assisted this investigation by consenting to make its criminal and other information available on all the subjects checked in the investigation. Many other agencies responded in a very gratifying manner when assistance was requested. Without such thorough cooperation the investigation would have been materially impaired.

Several innovative techniques were applied during the investigation and are worthy of mention. The Program Evaluation and Review Technique was experimentally applied to the entire project. It proved to be of limited value since the investigative activities were not for the most part adaptable to network scheduling. From this trial application of P E R T, however, evolved several time charts of considerable value as investigative tools. One was a time chart graphically depicting Sirhan's activities during the several critical days prior to the assassination. Another chart visually developed a profile analysis of Sirhan, providing a ready reference to his background in the United States. A third chart revealed the comparative activities and locations of Kennedy and Sirhan. Portable tape recorders installed in brief cases were used extensively and to good advantage in expediting field interview situations. All available news media film was screened, and selected portions were combined into a

Twenty minute film which depicted the activity surrounding Kennedy before and after the shooting. This was used to identify subjects as well as for the later orientation of witnesses.

Mock-ups of the main floor of the hotel and of the kitchen area were of great value during the investigation. The kitchen mock-up featured a grid-coordinate system which facilitated the precise location of all the witnesses in the area of the shooting.

Cost to the Department in terms of manpower was returned in the form of knowledge, experience and training realized. A significant benefit of the operation was the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of a specially organized investigative task force. Some of the problems encountered and their solutions will be documented at a later date. A tactical manual will be constructed as a necessary guide for future use in the implementation, staffing and administration of similar task force investigations. This manual will prescribe the policies, procedures and techniques to be followed in order to attain the highest degree of quality and thoroughness in the investigation. The so called Task Force concept selectively applied was proven to be worthwhile and should be considered as a standard approach to complicated investigational problems in the future.

A valid assessment of the overall effectiveness of Special Unit Senator cannot perhaps be made until the final resolution of the Sirhan trial. At the time of this report there is every indication that the case preparation phase of the investigation was thorough, complete and professionally developed. The conspiracy

potential phase of the investigation is a continuous effort. The facts established by the investigation thus far have clearly resolved every allegation and inquiry.

Our investigation and its documentation will be examined for years to come. The degree to which these examinations supply the desired answers will be the ultimate test of the integrity of our investigation.

SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION

THE ASSASSINATION

On the afternoon of June 2, 1968, Senator Robert Francis Kennedy, his wife and four of their children arrived at Orange County Airport to begin the final two days of his campaign to win the California Democratic Party Presidential Electors being selected in the June 4th primary election.

In the course of those two days he addressed a festival in Orange County, visited Disneyland, traveled to San Francisco for a rally, returned to Long Beach for a speech and a motorcade to Venice, flew to San Diego for an appearance and spent the day of the election at the home of a friend in Malibu. At 8 p.m., on June 4th, he was driven to the Ambassador Hotel to await the election returns and his anticipated victory. The shooting of Robert Kennedy at 12:15 a.m. that night and the subsequent events surrounding that incident is the subject of this report.

Security Provided For Senator Kennedy

The ultimate question which will be asked - the same question which is still asked about the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King - is whether law enforcement in a free society can provide the necessary security for its leaders and political candidates. Important to this question, as it should be, is the right of individuals to come and go freely whenever they wish; and to express their desires to be free from the unsolicited concern of others.

The assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy magnified the

importance of this question and momentarily centered the attention of the world on the Los Angeles Police Department. This investigation, therefore, closely examined the security provided for Senator Kennedy's visit to Los Angeles and the attitude of the Kennedy staff toward police security.

This Department has a prescribed policy applicable to protection of dignitaries and their participation in public gatherings. The Department assumes a position of neutrality toward personalities and political issues and the policy provides that the Department takes enforcement action wherever necessary. It further provides that Los Angeles Policemen are not assigned to public gatherings or crowd control situations for non-enforcement or extra-enforcement purposes. This includes the screening of visitors at events, acting as guards at private parties, or providing dignitaries with personnel for nonpolice purposes.

Intelligence Division is responsible for security of public figures and responds to requests for security made by dignitaries. Unless a threat has been received or a specific request for protection is made, security is not provided. During the primary campaign of Senator Kennedy in California Department security policies and the attitude of Senator Kennedy toward security came into conflict. This conflict measurably affected the conditions which existed just prior to Senator Kennedy's assassination.

Kennedy Motorcade of May 29, 1968

Department personnel became involved with Kennedy campaign

activities during a motorcade in downtown Los Angeles on May 29, 1968. On May 28th, the Department received a telegram from a Kennedy aide advising that a motorcade was planned for the next day. No request for security was made to this Department. The incidents which occurred at that motorcade illustrate the Kennedy party's attitude toward the police.

Officers of this Department were assigned to observe the course of the motorcade and to insure the even flow of traffic along the motorcade route. Several violations were observed during the motorcade as civilian motorcycle officers blocked intersections and allowed vehicles in the motorcade to drive through against red signal lights.

At one point in the motorcade, at 9th and Santee Streets, the vehicles came to a stop and Senator Kennedy was pulled from his vehicle by a large enthusiastic crowd. A Traffic Enforcement Division sergeant attempted to assist the Senator back to his vehicle when it appeared to him that Kennedy needed help.

Kennedy and his aides berated the sergeant and told him that they had not asked for the assistance of the police.

Several other incidents occurred along the route of the motorcade involving this Department's officers and Kennedy aides.

At one point, Frederick Dutton, Kennedy's California campaign manager, shouted obscenities at several officers who were attempting to keep the crowd from becoming unmanageable and spilling onto the street. These remarks were highly inflammatory and the officers considered making an arrest of Dutton for disturbing the peace.

The identification of several persons in the motorcade was obtained for the purpose of making applications for complaints for various criminal and vehicle code violations. The applications were withdrawn in the interest of justice after the assassination.

Personal Security for Senator Kennedy

William Barry, an ex F.B.I. agent, acted as sole security for Senator Kennedy. His primary assignment was to act as personal bodyguard for Kennedy and he was responsible for liaison with local law enforcement agencies. Barry did not contact the Department to request security for the Senator for June 2/4, 1968.

After the assassination, Barry advised investigators that he had been concerned about Senator Kennedy's security. He had observed security problems at other events and had intended to speak to Kennedy on their return to New York. Barry told investigators that Kennedy was very difficult to protect because of his desire to allow supporters to be close to him.

Plans for Senator Kennedy's movements prior to the election night were made by Barry, Dutton and Richard Tuck, another Kennedy aide. Rafer Johnson had joined the Kennedy staff a few weeks prior to the assassination to assist in crowd control. Dutton advised investigators that police were not used for Kennedy's personal security except when they anticipated an unruly crowd. Dutton and Tuck arranged appointments for Kennedy and Barry and Johnson provided the sole physical security for him.

Hotel Security and Police Deployment In The Area

In anticipation of several victory parties scheduled to be held at the Ambassador, eleven regular hotel security guards were assigned to work crowd control election night. The head of hotel security, William Gardner, told investigators that no request was made to the hotel to provide personal security for Kennedy.

Gardner arranged for six additional guards, from Ace Guard Service, to work at the hotel. The total security force consisted of eighteen uniformed guards. Six Los Angeles Fire Department inspectors were assigned to the hotel for the evening to enforce fire and occupancy regulations.

Rampart Division deployed an additional eight officers, in four radio cars, in anticipation of the large crowds planning to attend festivities at the hotel. The radio cars were to be deployed normally and not specifically at the hotel. These arrangements were the total security arrangements which were made for the election night proceedings at the hotel.

Election Night at The Ambassador

By 6 p.m. on June 4th, many people were crowding in to the hotel where parties were beginning for Senator Kennedy, Democrat Alan Cranston and Republican Max Rafferty. Other guests were in the hotel for business conventions. 514 guests were registered in the hotel.

The polls closed at 8 p.m., and the public bars opened in the hotel. Volunteer workers and news media personnel were preparing

for the speeches and celebrations which would come when the election results were announced.

By 8:30 p.m. admittance to the Embassy Room, where the Kennedy Victory Party was to take place, was becoming difficult. Guards were having trouble restricting the flow of persons into the room which was reaching the occupancy limit. Many people were able to circumvent the guards by using unguarded entrances and service entrances. At 9:30 p.m., a Fire Department inspector ordered the main doors to be closed to all entry, except on a one-in one-out basis. Witnesses later reported that people were able to easily circumvent these measures. By 11:30 p.m., the crowd in the room restlessly awaited the anticipated appearance of Senator Kennedy.

Press Coverage At The Ambassador

The night of the assassination a large number of press personnel crowded into the Ambassador Hotel to report on the anticipated victory of Senator Robert Kennedy. Representatives of the world press were also present. More than 150 of those interviewed in this investigation stated that they were reporters who were at the hotel the night of the shooting. The Colonial Room of the hotel had been set aside for the press. The Kennedy Anchor Desk was established near this location. Several Kennedy workers stated that their specific assignments involved assisting or directing the media.

Because of the late returns of the primary, news items were slowing down by 10:30 p.m. Reporters in search of news followed Senator Kennedy wherever he went and photographed him whenever they could. It was rumored that some of the "writing press" were unhappy that they had no interviews with Kennedy and this was thought to be one of the reasons why Kennedy was going to the Colonial Room for a late night news conference. However, no newsmen reported being poorly treated by the Kennedy staff. Several newsmen actually observed the shooting and some assisted in the capture of Sirhan. Photographers took thousands of feet of film and video tape yet no one came forward with a photograph of the shooting.

The Victory Speech

Jesse Unruh, speaker of the California Assembly, spoke to the enthusiastic crowd. His legislative assistant, Jack Crose, had gone to Senator Kennedy's fifth floor suite to ask the Senator to come down to the ballroom. On the way to the elevator Kennedy told a Life Magazine correspondent to avoid the crowd and meet him in the Colonial Room after the speech. He told her that the Kennedy party was planning to go from the hotel to a private party at "The Factory," a Hollywood discotheque bar.

The small group accompanying Kennedy took a service elevator to the kitchen area at Kennedy's request so that they could avoid the crowd in the lobby of the hotel. They then walked through the employee's lunch area and Kennedy stopped to shake hands