

John Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

His Finest Hour—Or a Botched-Up Period?

Each Presidential administration does its best to manage the news and the history of its deeds and misdeeds while in power. Since Dallas, hundreds of books and untold magazine articles about John F. Kennedy have poured off the presses with the result, observed Andy Logan recently in *American Heritage*, that the late President's "fine-liberal-fellow image had expanded uncountable times, been transformed and purified, burst all mortal bounds, and soared toward the realm of the supernatural."

Now we have the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's recollections of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 in the November issue of *McCall's*. The recollections seek to perpetuate the thesis, already expressed by Sorensen, Schlesinger, and Salinger in their books and articles, that the crisis was, indeed, the late President's finest hour, more than making up for the disaster that was the Bay of Pigs.

From Robert Kennedy's article emerges the picture of a courageous President who moved swiftly and surely to deal with the mortal threat of nuclear-tipped Soviet missiles emplaced 90 miles off America's shores, thus saving the world from nuclear holocaust. The title of the article, which is scheduled to be published in January as a book by W. W. Norton of New York City, is "Thirteen Days: The Story About How the World Almost Ended."

Two Opposing Views

Two recently published books by respected authors cast grave doubts about this picture. They are *Memoirs* by Arthur Krock of the New York Times, and *Dagger in the Heart* by Mario Lazo, an international lawyer who once represented U.S. Government interests in Cuba. From passages in both works (and this is confirmed perhaps unwittingly by Robert Kennedy's recollections) there emerges the clear inference that the late President and his brother relied more upon the assurances of the Soviets that offensive missiles were not being put into Cuba than they did to the warnings of none other than John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that the missiles were being prepared. Both Mr. Krock and Mr. Lazo state that Mr. McCone first expressed his view to President Kennedy in August—10 weeks before the President, on Oct. 22, 1962, went on television to inform the world that many American cities now sat within the range of Soviet missiles off its shores.

During that 10-week period, it will be recalled, President Kennedy and the U.S. State Department denied time and time again that Soviet missiles were going into Cuba. Now hear what Robert Kennedy has to say in his article.

"On Tuesday morning, Oct. 16, 1962, shortly after 9 o'clock, President Kennedy called and asked me to the White House. He said only that we were facing great trouble. Shortly afterward, in his office, he told me that a U-2 had just finished a photographic mission and that the intelligence community had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba. . . . The dominant feeling at the meeting was stunned surprise. No one had expected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. . . ."

"No official within the Government had ever suggested to President Kennedy that the Russian build-up in Cuba would include missiles. . . ." (Italics added.)

Says Mr. Krock in his *Memoirs*:

"Aug. 10. After examining secret intelligence reports he had received, McCone dictated a memorandum for President Kennedy, expressing the belief that installations for the launching of offensive missiles were being constructed on the island. His subordinates who prepared the 'national estimates' papers of the [Central Intelligence] Agency recommended that he omit a statement of this belief until it was completely documented. He ordered that it remain in the paper."

Again on Aug. 17, says Mr. Krock, Mr. McCone stated his case in a high-level meeting attended by Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, both of whom disagreed with him. Mr. McCone issued similar warnings on Aug. 22 and 23.

Mr. McCone's Daily Cables

Then, incredibly, in the midst of what he believed to be a gathering crisis, Mr. McCone departed a few days later for his wedding in Seattle, Wash., and on Aug. 30 for his honeymoon on the French Riviera. But he continued to receive intelligence reports, and on the basis of these he sent back almost daily cables to Washington recommending that the "national estimates staff" of CIA "make a firm statement of opinion that the SAM-sites [surface-to-air missiles] discovered in Cuba were being developed for emplacements of surface-to-surface missiles with a 1,200-mile range and more, and that these missile parts and IL-28s [Soviet

bombers] were already being assembled on the island by the Russian 'technicians.' He also told his staff to reiterate his recommendation, which McNamara had successfully opposed some weeks earlier, that low-level observation flights over Cuba be made to help verification of what the regular U-2 flights were photographing."

Mr. McCone's deputy, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, overruled him, and did not include his recommendations in the national estimates. "Carter's explanation is that, as *charge d'affaires*, and in possession of all the intelligence reports textually, which at that point McCone was not, it was his responsibility whether or not to include these statements," says Mr. Krock.

Mr. Lazo's account goes into much greater detail than does Mr. Krock's, noting that "in brushing aside the CIA warnings, the Kennedy Administration relied to some extent on assurances it was receiving from the Kremlin that the Russians meant no harm. On Sept. 4, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, had called on Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy with a message from Khrushchev. The chairman wanted the message passed along by his (the President's) brother and no one else. It was a promise that the Soviets would create no trouble for the United States during the election campaign. . . ."

Robert Kennedy discusses this and other meetings with the Soviets during this period, conceding: "We had been deceived by Khrushchev, but we had also fooled ourselves."

Mr. McCone returned from his honeymoon, says Mr. Lazo, flabbergasted to discover that "western Cuba had not been flown over for a full month, and he reacted immediately, recommending that the entire island be photographed at once, especially western Cuba. This recommendation was made on Oct. 4." Ten days were lost, however, before Mr. McCone's orders were carried out, the delay caused by disagreements in the top-secret "Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance," which determined the U-2 flight schedules, and by Mr. McNamara, who "insisted that the U-2 squadron be placed under the jurisdiction of the Air Force, under his control." This was done—over CIA's stern objections.

The U-2 flight of Oct. 14 confirmed that the Russians were preparing offensive missile sites. "McCone's warning could no longer be ignored," writes Mr. Lazo. ". . . The Kennedy Administration finally realized that the Kremlin had lied. The missile crisis was on."

SOC. 4.01.2 - Thirteen Days
- Dagger in the Heart
- Memoirs

C.I.A. 4.02 U-2

Continued

OCT 26 1963

Milt Freudenheim

How to 'win' a negotiation

As we maneuver to get off the hook in Vietnam, it is useful to refer back to one of the few recognized success stories of recent U.S. foreign policy — the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Robert Kennedy's long, insider's account, published in McCall's magazine, is a reminder of important lessons half-learned, misread and on occasion forgotten.

First, there was the brazen Russian lying, Gromyko's deceit with President Kennedy, even as American spy planes were photographing the Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Obviously nations don't mind lying when they think they are doing big things in their national interest. The Russians and many others have proved that repeatedly.

Trust must be founded on observable deeds. There is not much point in wasting major effort trying to wrest a particular set of words from another nation.

SECOND, THERE WAS the key role played by give and take. In the secret American debate, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson proposed giving up the U.S. base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and American missile installations in Turkey and Italy. In exchange, the Russians would pull out their nuclear-potent missiles, 90 miles from us, in Cuba.

The Stevenson exchange plan was rejected with the hawks of that day denouncing Stevenson's proposal as a sellout, a Munich.

The Russians, in two messages from premier Nikita Khrushchev, set their own terms for removing the missiles. One message called only for an American commitment to refrain from invasion attempts against Cuba. (This was 18 months after the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion.) The other Russian message demanded removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey.

President Kennedy couldn't let himself be pushed into such an exchange by the Soviet audacity in sneaking their missiles into Cuba. But he went a long way toward meeting Khrushchev halfway.

IN A LETTER to Khrushchev, he proposed steps by which the United States would "give assurances against an invasion of Cuba" while the Russians were to agree to remove their missiles under UN supervision.

Furthermore, the President sent his brother, Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy, to tell the Soviet ambassador what we would do.

"He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them," Robert Kennedy wrote that he told the Russians.

"He raised the question of our removing the missiles from Turkey. I said there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure . . ." But Robert Kennedy added:

"However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone."

Later the American missiles were removed from Turkey and Italy. They had become militarily out of date, because equally effective Polaris missiles that could be launched from submarines in the Mediterranean had less chance of being knocked out by enemy attack.


A THIRD LESSON is the snags that great powers encounter when they try to make deals involving their two-bit allies. The Russians agreed to remove the missiles under UN supervision. But Cuba's Fidel Castro was furious at the whole deal and refused to permit UN inspectors.

The Russians had to pretend to ignore Castro's complaints. They removed the missiles in such a way that American intelligence could be assured this was really happening.

A final lesson was in the suicidally narrow horizons of some of the top military advisers including then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Curtis LeMay. Some yearned for "preventive war" with Russia. One was disappointed when Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles.

As he listened before the crisis cleared to a member of the Joint Chiefs advocating using nuclear weapons, Robert Kennedy thought wryly "of the many times I had heard the military take positions which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know."

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C.I.A. - Cuba (Bay of Pigs)
Kennedy, Robert



Freudenheim

October 26 1968

McNamara, Robert S.
Kennedy, Robert
C.I.A. 7.01

Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis

By ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Introduction by Robert S. McNamara

IN THE FALL of 1962, the Soviets moved offensive weapons, including ballistic missiles, into Cuba. The world was faced with what many of us felt then, and what since has been generally agreed, was the greatest danger of a catastrophic war since the advent of the nuclear age. Prime Minister Macmillan has said that the weeks of the crisis represented the greatest period of strain which he faced in several decades of public service, including the whole of World War II.

The performance of the U.S. Government during that critical period was more effective than at any other time during my seven years' service as Secretary of Defense. The agencies of the Government—the State Department, the civilian and military leaders of the Defense Department, the CIA, the White House staff, the U.N. Mission—worked together smoothly and harmoniously. That they did so was in large part a result of the efforts of Robert Kennedy. It was he, acting with his brother's consent, who did so much to organize the effort, monitor the results, and assure the completion of the work on which the recommendations to the President were to be based.

But his contribution was far more than administrative. On the basic policy question of whether to force the missiles out by massive air and ground attack or by the far less risky application of a maritime quarantine, he strongly supported the quarantine.

He did so because he saw that the air and ground strikes favored by so many would have brought death to thousands of innocent Cuban civilians and to thousands of U.S. military

personnel. He saw, too, that such attacks ran the risk of triggering the launch of nuclear weapons from Cuba against the United States and the risk of Soviet retaliatory attacks on Berlin or on some other vulnerable points on the periphery of NATO.

And he opposed a massive surprise attack by a large country on a small country because he believed such an attack to be inhuman, contrary to our traditions and ideals, and an act of brutality for which the world would never forgive us.

He understood that above all else a U.S. President must, while defending our vital interests, prevent the confrontations between nuclear powers which can lead to nuclear holocaust.

His objective was to force the missiles out of Cuba without war. That objective was accomplished. It was accomplished by a strategy which he helped to shape and which his brother directed—a strategy which applied pressure against the Soviets without ever pushing them to the point where they were forced to an irrational, suicidal, spasm response.

He showed a shrewd sense of diplomacy both in the concept and in the application of the strategy. As a matter of fact, it was Robert Kennedy's suggestion, when we had received two contradictory messages from Khrushchev—the first favorable and the second unfavorable—that we reply to the first and not the second. He actually drafted the reply, stating the terms we were willing to accept, plucking them from the several often disparate Soviet messages. They were the terms on which the settlement ultimately was based.

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See 4.01.2 Thirteen Days

Kennedy Memoir Details 1962 Crisis

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 20—

"It looks really mean, doesn't it? But then, really there was no other choice. If they get this mean on this one in our part of the world, what will they do on the next?"

That was what Robert F. Kennedy remembered his brother, the President, as having said as they both waited, extremely tense, to see whether the Soviet Union would choose to pull its offensive missiles out of Cuba as President Kennedy had demanded or would risk a world war with the United States.

"I just don't think there was any choice, and not only that, if you hadn't acted, you would have been impeached." Mr. Kennedy—who was Attorney General at the time of the 1962 crisis—said he told the worried President.

President Kennedy thought for a moment, according to his brother, and said, "That's what I think—I would have been impeached."

The agony, the doubts and the quiet triumph of those critical days were told by Robert Kennedy in a lengthy article written last year and scheduled to be published posthumously tomorrow by McCall's magazine under the title "Thirteen Days."

The publication is taking place on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the speech in which President Kennedy informed the nation and the world that Soviet offensive missiles had been detected in Cuba and warned Moscow that the United States was prepared to go to war to make sure that the missiles were removed.

Robert Kennedy's account adds little to what already has been published by others about the details of the crisis, but it provides some intimate glimpses of his brother's Administration under the pressure of a possible world war.

The New York Senator wrote the article for publication in the New York Times Magazine to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the crisis last October. But he informed The Times last fall that he had decided

against publication because he did not want it alleged that he was trying to use the article out of political motives.

Following the Senator's assassination last June, his estate decided to offer the 25,000-word manuscript for sale. It was purchased by the McCall Corporation for an advance of \$1-million, probably the most ever paid for a manuscript of that length.

W. W. Norton & Co. has purchased the book rights from the McCall Corporation for an amount in excess of \$250,000.

Mr. Kennedy gave details of the crisis from the time he was informed on Oct. 16, 1962, that missile sites had been discovered by a U-2 reconnaissance plane flying over Cuba until the denouement on Oct. 28, when the then Soviet Premier, Nikita S. Khrushchev, agreed to withdraw the missiles.

The confrontation between the two great powers, Mr. Kennedy wrote, "brought the world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind."

The crisis actually had two distinct phases. The first was from Oct. 16 to Oct. 21, when President Kennedy and his advisers worked in extreme secrecy to devise their course of action in light of the discovery of the missiles. The second was from Oct. 22 until Oct. 28, when the entire world wondered whether the crisis could be resolved short of war.

The President decided against an immediate military strike at the island's missile bases—an action, Robert Kennedy wrote, that was advocated by the military leaders including the then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, now the American Independent party's candidate for Vice President.

Instead, the President adopted as a first step, a plan for a quarantine of Cuba that was supported by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and by his brother.

U.S. Ready for War

The blockade of the island, aimed at giving Mr. Khrushchev time to withdraw the missiles without Soviet humiliation, was seen as a means of showing United States determination to force the missiles out, while stopping short of actually initiating military action. However, in the event the Russians tried to run the blockade, the United States was prepared to go to war, Mr. Kennedy's article asserts.

The blockade was scheduled to go into effect on Wednesday morning, Oct. 24, and Senator Kennedy recalled that as

the President and his advisers awaited news of whether the Russians would accept this measure, "the danger and concern that we all felt hung like a cloud over us all and particularly over the President."

A few minutes after 10 a.m. an intelligence report stated that two Soviet ships, the Gagarin and the Komiles, were accompanied by a Soviet submarine, as they neared the 500-mile blockade barrier. They were due to be intercepted in the next hour if they tried to enter the forbidden area. This raised the real possibility of a conflict, Senator Kennedy's article asserts.

The aircraft carrier Essex was to signal the submarine by sonar to surface and identify itself. If the Soviet craft refused, said Secretary McNamara, depth charges with small explosive would be used until it surfaced, the Senator's article says.

Time of Gravest Concern

"I think these few minutes were the time of gravest concern for the President," the Senator wrote. "Was the world on the brink of a holocaust? Was it our error? A mistake? Was there something further that should have been done? Or not done?"

"His hand went up to his face and covered his mouth. He opened and closed his fist. His face seemed drawn, his eyes pained, almost gray. We stared at each other across the table. For a few fleeting seconds, it was almost as though no one else was there and he was no longer the President."

"Inexplicably, I thought of when he was ill and almost died; when he lost his child; when we learned that our oldest brother had been killed; of personal times of strain and hurt," the article continues.

"The voices droned on but I didn't seem to hear anything until I heard the President say: 'Isn't there some way we can avoid having our first exchange with a Russian submarine—almost anything but that.'"

Mr. McNamara's reply, Senator Kennedy wrote, was:

"No, there's too much danger to our ships. There is no alternative. Our commanders have been instructed to avoid hostilities if at all possible, but this is what we must be prepared for, and this is what we must expect."

McNamara Remains Firm

President Kennedy then said: "We must expect that they will close down Berlin—make the final preparations for that."

Senator Kennedy recalled that "I felt we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off."

The tension was broken, the Senator declared, when a messenger brought a note to John A. McCone, then director of the Central Intelligence, disclosing that some of the Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line had stopped dead in the water—an indication that Moscow did not want a confrontation.

Robert Kennedy recalled that his brother had recently read Barbara Tuchman's book, "The Guns of August," which told how the major powers of Europe were drawn into World War I largely out of miscalculation.

The President vowed, Senator Kennedy wrote, that if some future historian were to write a book on the critical events of that October, it would be understood that "we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move."

Throughout the second week of the crisis, President Kennedy exchanged letters with Premier Khrushchev. The correspondence has not been published in full, but Senator Kennedy did excerpt some of the letters, including an emotional one sent by Mr. Khrushchev on the night of Friday, Oct. 26, that indicated to the Americans that he wanted to negotiate a solution.

Similar excerpts from Premier Khrushchev's letter were published by Elie Abel in his book "The Missile Crisis" (J. B. Lippincott, 1966), which covered the whole Cuban affair in detail.

Mr. Khrushchev called for a statesmanlike approach and asserted that if the United States would give a pledge not to invade Cuba, the problem of the missiles would disappear.

The letter, as printed in Mr. Abel's book, concluded:

"If you have not lost your self-control, and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more we pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when the knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and it will be necessary to cut that knot; and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

"Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this."

Continued

21 OCT 1968

SOC. 4.01.2 Thirteen Days

Kennedy; Robert

RFK Says The Joint Chiefs Were Itching for War Over Cuba

This Was The Moment That Was

The gravest moments of the Cuban missile crisis came when a confrontation nearly occurred between a Soviet submarine and a U.S. aircraft carrier, according to newly published memoirs of the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy.

The memoirs, published from the Kennedy estate for more than \$1 million and published yesterday in McCall's Magazine, added new details to the historical record of the showdown between the United States and Russia in October, 1962.

At the height of the crisis on Wednesday, Oct. 24, Sen. Kennedy reported, two Soviet cargo ships approached the U.S. Navy "quarantine" barrier set up across the Atlantic approaches to Cuba. A Russian sub was sailing submerged between the two ships.

SIGNAL

The U.S. Aircraft Carrier Essex was to signal the submarine by sound equipment to surface and identify itself, Sen. Kennedy said. He said that if it refused, the Essex was to drop depth charges with "a small explosive" to force compliance.

Robert Kennedy described the appearance and thoughts of his brother President John F. Kennedy, at this moment:

"Was the world on the brink of a holocaust? Was it our error? A mistake? Was there something further that should have been done? Or not done? His hand went up to his face and covered his mouth. He opened and closed his fist. His face seemed drawn, his eyes pained, almost gray."

Robert Kennedy quoted the President as saying: "Isn't there some way we can avoid having our first exchange with a Russian submarine — almost anything but that?"

Minutes later, a message came that some of the Soviet ships headed toward Cuba had stopped. President Kennedy ordered the Essex to do nothing but give the Russian vessels an opportunity to turn back. One stage of the crisis was over.

EMOTIONAL EXCHANGE

The memoirs also reveal some new glimpses into the unpublished correspondence between President Kennedy and then Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. In one letter, President Kennedy told the Soviet leader: "I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win..."

In an emotional letter to the President Oct. 26, parts of which have appeared in print previously, Khrushchev said: "If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin."

Robert Kennedy also reported that at one point in the crisis President Kennedy ordered U.S. missiles with atomic warheads in Turkey defused, so that if the Russians attacked Turkey in response to the Cuban crisis, the President personally would have to give permission before they could be used.

The article also told of a poignant moment when the two brothers, both later assassinated, were alone after the crisis had ended.

The President, recalling Abraham Lincoln's death after the Civil War, wryly commented: "This is the night I should go to the theater."

"If you do, I want to go with you," Robert Kennedy replied.

MILITARY ANXIOUS

Robert Kennedy's account details how close the Cuban crisis came to actual war in several ways — how military advisers pressed for an attack against Cuba; how advance preparations for such an attack were made; and how, as the climax approached, the chances for miscalculation by both countries grew.

From the beginning, he said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in advocating immediate military action.

Sen. Kennedy wrote that Gen. Curtis LeMay, then Air Force Chief of Staff and now George Wallace's vice presidential candidate, argued strongly with the President that military attack was "essential."

When the President asked the likely response of the Russians, Robert Kennedy wrote, Gen. LeMay insisted there would be none. The President was skeptical and told Gen. LeMay the Russians could not "do nothing" about a U.S. attack on Cuba — that they would reply either in Cuba or Berlin.

Sen. Kennedy said his brother was distressed that, with the exception of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, his military advisers "seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of the steps they suggested."

He said the experience emphasized the need for "civilian direction and control" and for raising "probing questions" to military recommendations.

Then Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara was an early advocate of the "blockade" tactic finally used, Sen. Kennedy reported.

ADVANCE STATISTICS

He described how other preparations were far advanced for an attack against Cuba should the blockade fail. Mr. McNamara, for example, already had figured that 250,000 men would be required for an invasion, including 90,000 Marines and airborne forces, and 2000 air sorties against Cuban targets.

As the crisis unfolded, Robert Kennedy reported, his brother "was not sanguine about the results... Each hour the situation grew steadily more serious. The feeling grew that this cup was no going to pass and that a direct military confrontation between the two great nuclear powers was inevitable."

He recalled that when a U2 reconnaissance plane was shot

down over Cuba, "at first there was almost unanimous agreement that we had to attack early the next morning with bombers and fighters and destroy the Sam (surface to air missile) sites."

Robert Kennedy said the first days of strategy meetings were dominated by consideration of the "morw question" of whether, despite what had happened, the United States could attack a small nation like Cuba and still maintain a moral position at home and in the eyes of the world.

His final conclusion was that war was averted by making it firmly clear to Russia that the United States would not tolerate an offensive missile base in Cuba, while at the same time refusing to push Russia to the extent that her own vital security was affected.

He quoted his brother, as saying: "If anybody is around to write after this, they are going to understand that we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversaries room to move. I am not going to push the Russian an inch beyond what is necessary." (UPD)


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R-Burt, Al

C.H.A. 3-03 Cuba

P-Krock, Arthur
Kennedy, Edward



Two New Books Will Tell Us What Went On Before We All Saw This

Behind The Missile Crisis

By AL BURT

Herald Editorial Writer

TWO new books will tell us more of what was happening in Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

One is by Arthur Krock, and the Cuban incident is included in his memoirs of 60 years as a reporter. It has been published by Funk and Wagnalls.

The other comes from the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, a million dollar story from inside the White House which will be published by McCall's.



Burt

During August and September, the book says, the CIA pressed for action but was opposed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

It relates the play of influence among them as a decision was shaped. It was a high level affair and most of the nation knew nothing of what was taking place.

But a few did, and some of them were in South Florida.

* * *

THE MEMORY of stories told years later sticks in the mind. It makes you think of credibility in terms that do not involve newspapers.

While the secretaries were debating the nation's course in Washington, the men who supplied much of their Cuban intelligence began to have agonizing doubts.

They believed the missiles were an imminent military danger to the United States, and could not understand why Washington did not react.

Weeks passed, and confirming reports piled up. Still nothing happened. The search for explanations became imaginative.

It went from impatience to exasperation to doubts and then worse: was the country being betrayed?

A way was found to share the burden of fears. The information was leaked to newspapers. Cuban exile organizations virtually shouted it. A U.S. senator took it up.

Then came Oct. 22. President Kennedy challenged the Russians, and at home there was understanding, and unity of purpose during a crisis.

* * *

MR. KROCK and the late Sen. Kennedy will tell us how high officials in Washington moved the chess men around.

Theirs will be significant tales, but no more intriguing in a human way than those of the little people who played the pawns.

THE KROCK book tells us that the Central Intelligence Agency warned the late President Kennedy on August 10, 1962, that long-range missiles were being installed in Cuba.

EXCLUSIVES

Maximizing the Article

In early 1967, Senator Robert Kennedy began work on what was to have been a New York Times Magazine article based on his 1962 Cuban-missile-crisis notes. The Senator's outline called for a piece of about 5,000 words for which he would have received a standard \$400 fee. But by the time the work was finished about a year ago, it was five times its intended length and, in the Senator's view, might have appeared too politically self-serving in a pre-election year. So he put it away and never collected his \$400.

Last week all rights to the 25,000-word manuscript were sold to the McCall Corp. The initial payment was \$1,000,000, probably the highest figure ever for a piece of its length. Depending on the bidding for book rights, the final figure could be even higher.

McCall Corp.'s Editor in Chief Norman Cousins promised that the article in the November *McCall's* would contain never published information on "the thinking and feelings at that time of the President and Attorney General, the estimates and reports of the CIA." In addition, it would tell of Security Council deliberations and "the significant secret meetings between the Attorney General and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin." Other editors who had seen the manuscript emphasized other virtues. "The thing that comes across," said one, "is the terribly close relationship between the two Kennedy brothers. It's not as great for what it tells you as for who is saying it and the relationship it describes."

Ted Sorensen, who represented the estate in the negotiations and did "very minor editing," insisted that all of the actual writing was the work of the late Senator. Asked why the Kennedy family had consented to the sale and its attendant publicity, Sorensen said that the executors (Mrs. Ethel Kennedy, Senator Edward Kennedy and Mrs. Pat Kennedy Lawford) "are required by law to maximize the estate, particularly when there are eleven minor children."

COLUMNISTS


Memoirs of a Mourner

His furred umbrella and powerful cigar are familiar to every newsman in Washington. He is a regular participant in the lunchtime poker-dice games at the bar of the Metropolitan Club. His counsel has been sought—or pointedly ignored—by every President since William Howard Taft. Woodrow Wilson often talked out his problems with him during the Paris peace talks that ended World War I. F.D.R. once regarded him as a "Hoover agent," twice tried unsuccessfully to get him fired. Both Jack and Bobby Kennedy submitted the manuscripts of their first books to him

for critical comment. To his secretary, Laura Waltz, his ponderous prose is "notoriously bad." To his former colleagues at the New York Times, he is "Mr. Krock." Says Washington Bureau Chief Tom Wicker, "I wouldn't dream of calling him Arthur."

Arthur Krock, 80, has been the courtly, if usually critical, dean of the Washington press corps for longer than most correspondents can remember. An active reporter from 1906 to his retirement two years ago, he has been closer, longer, to the power centers of U.S. politics than perhaps any other man, journalist or politician, living or dead. He mourned most of what he saw. In

GEORGE TAMES



AVERELL HARRIMAN, JOHN KENNEDY & KROCK (1953)

Was F.D.R. naive? Did L.B.J. sin?

his memoirs, *Sixty Years on the Firing Line*, published this week by Funk & Wagnalls, Krock details the complicated reasons for his pessimistic views.

Spurious Liberalism. He was born to a genteel family in post-Civil War Kentucky. His mother, he recalls, "had been brought up, like all Southern girls of her class, to do nothing," and he himself was raised "in the shadow of the Lost Cause." Admits Krock: "I looked upon the Confederate veterans as my boyhood heroes." Thus, although he considers himself a "Democratic liberal," he has been increasingly horrified at "the men and events that have reshaped our political system for the worse in the name of a 'liberalism' both spurious of ancestry and destructive in practice."

His observations are not particularly new. If Wilson had been less unbending, he believes, he might have persuaded the Senate to go along with the League of Nations and thereby perhaps have averted World War II. He blames Coolidge, rather than Hoover,

bemoans the "transmutation" of U.S. democracy into a "judicial autocracy" in which the Supreme Court has assumed "overlordship of the government and all the people to fit the political philosophy of the current majority."

To some extent, Krock himself takes the blame for the Supreme Court's liberal outlook. It was he who suggested, in 1939, the appointment of Justice William O. Douglas, one of his closest Washington friends, who turned out to be one of the Court's most unyielding liberals.

Who Was Kleist? When Krock joined *The Times*, in 1927, he was already a leading figure in American journalism. He had been shot at while covering Kentucky elections for the Associated Press in 1909, challenged to a duel for insulting a French newspaperman in Paris in 1918 ("Somehow, I managed to crawl out of that fix"). As assistant to Publisher Ralph Pulitzer on the old New York World, he was assigned to "ride herd on Herbert Swope," the paper's imperious editor, and to

'62 Cuba Stories Stir '68 Fears

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Sept. 22 (NEWS Bureau) — A replay of Cuban missile crisis decisions in 1962 — with more controversy promised next month — threw the Washington intelligence community into an uproar today.

The intelligence experts were already disturbed over the announcement that the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's version of the critical hours preceding the U.S.-Russian confrontation over installation of missiles in Cuba would be published. They noted the announcement, by McCall's magazine, said information in the 25,000-word Kennedy account of the crisis would include data from Central Intelligence Agency reports.

Reviews and news stories published today concerning a new book by Arthur Krock, retired columnist and bureau chief of The New York Times in Washington, revived fears that the missile crisis controversy would burst into the current presidential campaigns.

Krock included in his memoirs a detailed account of CIA efforts to warn President Kennedy of the Cuban missile threat 10 weeks before key White House decisions were made.

It is expected in intelligent circles here that the forthcoming magazine article by Sen. Kennedy, to be published Oct.

25, will present a somewhat different version of the events leading to the decisions.

In any event, the intelligence experts, principally those in the CIA, are caught in the middle of a potential row over information which was available to the top levels of government. CIA spokesmen today declined any comment.

Rusk, McNamara Balked

In his account, Krock wrote that former CIA Director John McCone warned President Kennedy on Aug. 10, 1962, that Russian technicians were building medium-range ballistic missile installations in Cuba. McCone repeated his warnings persistently until finally, in mid-October, low-level flights produced photographic confirmation of his fears.

The Krock book said that McCone's recommendation for the reconnaissance flights was opposed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, former secretary of defense.

Theodore Sorenson, special counsel to President Kennedy, who announced the sale of Sen. Kennedy's recollections on the crisis, said that he, McNamara and Fred Dutton, former under-secretary of state, had read the Kennedy manuscript and decided

no review for security purposes was necessary.

It was learned today that McCone's warnings were the result of his own analysis and opinion and that there had been disagreement within the CIA over the importance of the missile installations during August of 1962.

McCone Disputed

The Office of National Estimates in the CIA, then headed by Sherman Kent, since retired, did not accept the McCone theories. Similarly, McCone was unable to convince the National Intelligence Board, which included representatives of the CIA, the State and Defense departments, that the sites being prepared in Cuba were intended for offensive missiles.

McCone was so intensely concerned over the potential threat that he took time off from his honeymoon in September 1962 to send personal memos back to CIA headquarters, urging further efforts to verify construction of the missile bases.

The experts here were puzzled over the urgency and speed involved in the publication of the Kennedy manuscript in McCall's 10 days before the Nov. 5 election—and barely a month after the Krock book's publication.

in D.C.

P-Greene, Jerry
Kennedy, Robert

Krock, Arthur

C.I.A. 1101 McCone, John

C.I.A. 1.03 Kent, Sherman

C.I.A. 2.01 Office of
National Estimate.

Robert Kennedy's Account of Missile Crisis Sold for \$1-Million

By HARRY GILROY

A 25,000-word account of the Cuban missile crisis written last year by Robert F. Kennedy was sold yesterday by the Senator's estate to the McCall Corporation for an advance of \$1-million. It will appear in the November issue of McCall's, which will be on newsstands Oct. 22.

The memoir was written at the request of The New York Times Magazine. Mr. Kennedy began work on a magazine article in April, 1967, but in October informed The Times that he did not wish to release his account because it might be suggested that he was using it in a bid for the Presidency.

Norman Cousins, editor in chief of the McCall Corporation described the \$1-million advance at a news conference as probably the highest amount ever paid for a manuscript of that length.

The sale was announced at the Fifth Avenue Club, 10 East 56th Street, by Henry E. Bowes, president of McCall's, and Theodore C. Sorensen, lawyer for the estate's executors — Mrs. Robert F. Kennedy, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Mrs. Patricia Kennedy Lawford, widows, brother and sister of the slain Senator, who was Attorney General during the crisis.

Mr. Sorensen, who was Special Assistant to President Kennedy, indicated that there were facts in the manuscript that had not been printed before, notably in regard to correspondence between President Kennedy and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev of the Soviet Union.

Asked if the memoir indicated the then Attorney General regarded the settlement of the crisis — when the missile sites in Cuba were dismantled and the missiles returned to the Soviet Union — as "a victory for the United States," Mr. Sorensen said: "He regarded it as a victory for world peace."

When asked for details in the article, Mr. Sorensen brushed aside questions, saying: "We will all have to wait with bated breath to read McCall's."

He said Mr. Kennedy had kept detailed notes on the crisis and had used the material when writing his account. Mr. Sorensen said he wished to emphasize that Mr. Kennedy had written the account himself and had never even edited it. Mr. Sorensen added that he had done some slight editing.

Mr. Sorensen, who is an editor at large of the Saturday Review, a McCall's magazine, said he had offered the manuscript to other magazine and



The New York Times

Theodore C. Sorensen, attorney for estate of Robert F. Kennedy, and Norman Cousins, rear, editor in chief of McCall Corporation, tell of sale of Senator's document.

book publishers as well as McCall's. He declined to give details other than that there had been "a rise in bidding from the start."

The contract was completed late Wednesday night. Mr. Sorensen took the contract to Washington for the executors' signatures yesterday morning and returned to New York with the document in the afternoon.

Mr. Cousins said the magazine began to set type on the article Wednesday morning "when it appeared probable that a deal would be reached." He said the issue would have a normal press run of 8.5-million copies.

In addition to the \$1-million advance, the Kennedy estate will share in the sale of subsidiary rights, which McCall will handle. These rights include book publication, serial-

ization, films, television and recordings.

Two New York book publishers are reported to be heavy bidders for the manuscript, but Mr. Bowes said: "The contest for such rights is only beginning this minute."

The contract for the manuscript, he said, gives the Kennedy estate approval of advertising copy, excerpts for serialization, photographs and other publishing details. Differences will be arbitrated by Mr. Cousins and Mr. Sorensen.

Mr. Cousins said after the news conference that he had not known until yesterday morning that the manuscript began as an article for The Times Magazine.

The article was intended for publication in The Times Magazine of Oct. 22, 1967, the

fifth anniversary of President Kennedy's announcement that Soviet missile sites were being prepared in Cuba.

Senator Kennedy indicated aides that he would write the articles and asked The Times for suggestions on topics to be covered. On April 27, he expressed through Frank Mankiewicz, his press secretary, general agreement with an outline submitted by The Times Magazine.

The outline recommended a length of 3,500 words, or up to 5,000 words. On Aug. 22, 1967, the Senator's office reported he was working on the article with some 5,000 words on paper and the story only half told.

In October, after repeated inquiries, the Magazine was informed by Mr. Mankiewicz that the Senator was reluctant to release the article. The Times had been told that the article was 25,000 words long and was preparing to devote most of the issue of Oct. 22 issue to presenting it.

Senator Kennedy sent word that he felt publication of the article might make him appear to be using his inside knowledge of events in President Kennedy's administration to advance himself for the 1968 Presidential nomination.

The article was found among Senator Kennedy's effects after his death. Two months ago, The Times Magazine sought to find out through Mr. Mankiewicz if the account might now be released.

When Mr. Sorensen said this week that the manuscript was for sale, The Times declined to bid.

Asked yesterday what disposition would be made of the proceeds, Mr. Sorensen said that the money would go to the executors.

"It is their duty," he said, "to maximize the estate, particularly when there are 11 minor children." He was referring to the fact that Mrs. Kennedy is expecting a child in addition to the 10 in the family.

UNIT 5.03 Cuba
Kennedy, Robert

Robert Kennedy Article on Cuban Crisis Brings \$1 Million

Soc. 4.01.1 McCall's

NEW YORK (AP) — A 25,000-word article about the Cuban missile crisis, written by the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, has been sold to McCall's magazine for \$1 million plus reprint and broadcast rights.

Norman Cousins, editor in chief of McCall's, announced the sale at a news conference yesterday. He said the cash price for the manuscript — \$40 a word — was the largest ever paid for such material.

Cousins said the magazine containing the article would appear on newsstands Oct. 22, the sixth anniversary of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Cuba. He said the issue would have a normal press run of 8.5 million copies.

Theodore C. Sorensen, an aide to both Sen. Kennedy and his brother, the late President John F. Kennedy, said Robert Kennedy, then attorney general, had kept detailed notes on the crisis, which ended when the Russians dismantled their Cuban missile sites and took the missiles back to the Soviet Union.

Sorensen said Kennedy began writing the article at the request of the New York Times magazine in April 1967, but later decided not to submit it for publication because it was too long and because some persons might feel he was using it in a bid for the presidency.

The article was found in the assassinated senator's personal effects and was sold to McCall's after bids were taken from various publishers, Sorensen said.

Henry E. Bowes, president of McCall's Corp., said two other key figures in the crisis — former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan — are contributing introductions to the manuscript.

The purchase agreement, concluded in Washington yesterday morning, gives McCall's all rights to the manuscript, includ-

ing book publication, serialization, film, television and recordings.

The estate retains the right to approve advertising copy, excerpts for serialization, photographs and other publishing details. Bowes said "agreed-upon arbitration procedures will come into play" in the event of a disagreement between the publisher and the estate.

Sorensen refused to disclose the contents of the article in

detail, but said the manuscript contained new information about the "thinking and feeling at the time" of both John and Robert Kennedy, as well as correspondence between the late President and then Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Sorensen, who was special counsel to John Kennedy at the time of the Cuban crisis, included his own account of the confrontation in a book several years ago.

He said it also contained previously unpublished estimates and reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, and an account of deliberations by the National Security Council. ✓

50C.4.01.2 Thirteen Days
p. Oberdorfer, Don
Kennedy, Robert
C.I.A. 3.03 Cuba

RFK Cuba Memoir Sold for \$1 Million

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Sept. 19— Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's personal memoir of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, found among his papers after his assassination, was sold by his executors today to McCall Corp. for \$1 million.

McCall's magazine will publish the 25,000-word memoir, titled "Thirteen Days," in its issue appearing Oct. 22, on the sixth anniversary of the confrontation with the Soviet Union.

McCall editor-in-chief Norman Cousins, announcing the purchase here, said the manuscript contained "far more information than has previously been published on the thinking and feelings at that time of the President (John F. Kennedy) and Attorney General (Robert Kennedy), the estimates and reports of the CIA, deliberations and interplay of personalities around the National Security Council table, significant secret meetings between the Attorney General and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, the contents of the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and the military preparations undertaken by the United States."

Theodore C. Sorensen, who was White House counsel at the time and who has written his own memoir of the Kennedy Administration, negotiated the sale on behalf of the Senator's estate. Sorensen also said there is much hitherto unpublished information in the memoir.

Apparently no state secrets are involved, however. Sorensen said that former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, former Assistant Secretary of State Fred Dutton and himself had determined that Government security clearance of the manuscript prior to its publication was unnecessary.

According to Sorensen, Sen. Kennedy dictated his memoir into a tape recorder about a year ago, working from diaries and other detailed records.

At the time, Kennedy felt that publication would be inappropriate. Sorensen reported. The decision to publish now was made by the three executors of the Senator's estate—Mrs. Robert F. Kennedy, Sen. Edward Kennedy and Mrs. Patricia Kennedy Lawford.

Major magazines and publishing houses were invited to bid on the manuscript last week. Sorensen said the bidding process was designed "to maximize the income to an estate with 11 minor children." Book publication and a possible motion picture are in prospect later.

The publishing contract gives the Kennedy estate the power of approval over "appropriate and tasteful standards" in advertising copy, excerpts for serialization and other details. This was intended to avoid the sort of literary battle that erupted when the Kennedy family objected to parts of William Manchester's book on the John F. Kennedy assassination, "Death of a President."

Senate Urged to Back Treaty on Astronauts

Associated Press

The Johnson Administration appealed yesterday for Senate approval in this session of Congress of a treaty providing for the rescue and return of any astronauts downed in a foreign country.

The request was submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by representatives of the State and Defense Departments and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The treaty, signed formally last April 22 in Moscow, London and Washington, already has been ratified by the Soviet Union, the official news agency Tass reported. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet took the action Tuesday, a Tass editor said.

July 14 1968

P-Dick, William
Garrison, Jim
C.I.A.-4-New Orleans
P-Lane, Mark
King, Martin Luther
Kennedy, Robert F.
Orig. under Lane

Exclusive Interview With Mark Lane

Bobby, JFK & King Assassinations All Plotted by the CIA

By WILLIAM DICK

"The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy was plotted by the same people who ordered the murders of President Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King.

"All three killings were ordered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency," said attorney Mark Lane.

Lane, author of the best-selling book, "Rush to Judgment," in criticism of the Warren Commission's findings on the assassination of President Kennedy, said that all three men were ordered shot for the same reason — their opposition to the U.S. war machine.

And, Lane said, Senator Kennedy knew his life was in danger and told his aides:

"There are guns between me and the White House."

On June 7, two days after Senator Kennedy's murder, Lane related to The ENQUIRER:

"I believe that Senator Kennedy was killed because of his opposition to the U.S. war machine.

"There seems little doubt that his brother, President Kennedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King, were killed for the same reason — and on orders of the same people.

"If police are faced with a series of robberies in which the same method is used, they suspect it is the same group committing them.

"The deaths of President Kennedy,

Dr. King and Senator Kennedy are linked in the same pattern of assassination.

"It seems clear to me that the slayings were organized by the same people. I believe these people are the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Why? Because they have a great deal of power to lose if the war machine is stopped.

More lives must be in danger. I sincerely hope that what happened to Lee Harvey Oswald will not happen to the assassin of Senator Kennedy.

"But one must fear for the assassin's safety."

Lane said he fears that the life of New Orleans

District Attorney James Garrison may be in danger.

Garrison is convinced there was a powerful conspiracy behind President Kennedy's murder. He has conducted his own investigation and has already charged two men with conspiracy in JFK's murder.

Lane said: "Garrison's life must be in danger if he succeeds in beating the legal methods presently being used to try and stop him proceeding with,



MARK LANE

He says there was a plot by the CIA.

MARK LANE ASKS IS BOBBY SILENT BECAUSE



KILLED

HIS

BROTHER?

MARK LANE

For more than four years since the death of President Kennedy I have declined to make public an analysis of the strange conduct of Robert Kennedy vis-a-vis the assassination and its aftermath. Although I have met with Robert Kennedy in the past, and worked with him for the election of his brother in 1960, my reluctance to discuss his odd behavior has had little to do with any personal feeling toward him or previous contact with him. The death of a brother may be a deeply moving experience — one which leaves scars that strangers or near stranger best not disturb. So long as Robert Kennedy was but one of

a hundred senators, and but one of a thousand other officials who remained silent about the fraudulent governmental explanation of the event, it might appear that the reason for singling him out for special disdain or condemnation might be his familial relationship with the deceased.

During much of this period Robert Kennedy has permitted his name to be used in support of some rather unreal conclusions. This was accomplished first by his silence, and when that proved to be insufficient, by his self-proclaimed ignorance coupled with his public acceptance of the Warren Report.

For some years I have lectured

about the assassination at universities in the United States and Europe. Following each of those more than two hundred lectures was a question period, and I think it safe, therefore, to assert that I have some knowledge of the questions that occur. The trend established by the questions can, in fact, be closely mapped. During the first year following the murder, the leading question, always asked, sometimes asked more than once in variable forms was: "How about Earl Warren's integrity? Certainly a man of that integrity could not, would not, sign his name to a document..." I am sorry to have to report that questions designed to offer Mr. Warren's integrity as a positive factor have not been raised for the last two to three years.

Taking its place has been the refrain, "Certainly Robert Kennedy, with all his money..." as if, I imagine, survivors in a lower income group might be less concerned with the cause of death. The refrain goes on, "He WAS the Attorney General at the time. He is said to be, although I do not know this as a fact, somewhat ruthless." It is marvelous to observe the line being drawn rather than offend one in power or even one who might one day be: "—and even he accepts the Warren Report."

Yet, in the face of these temptations put before me with evil regularity I have refused to offer an analysis of Robert's role. I reasoned that while the questioners isolated Robert Kennedy from other corrupt persons in public office, my answer might well be published without the

Continued

*Kennedy, Robert
de Vosjoli, Philippe*

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
TRIBUNE

M- 832,146

S-1,158,975

APR 30 1968

REPORT BOBBY - HEARD OF SPY RING IN FRANCE

New York, April 29 [Reuters]

—A top Russian intelligence defector told Robert Kennedy, then attorney general, of the existence of a soviet spy ring in President Charles de Gaulle's entourage in three meetings in 1962, Look magazine reported today.

The meetings were arranged after the Russian, a former headquarters chief of the soviet intelligence organization [KGB] balked after several weeks of questioning by the central intelligence agency [CIA].

The disclosure led the French intelligence chief in Washington, Philippe Thiraud de Vosjoli, to resign his post and remain in the United States after his superiors allegedly failed to take action against soviet infiltration.

5
NEWSDAY
17 APR 1968

P-Fritchey, Clayton
P-Alsop, Stewart
SOC. 4.01.2 The Center
Kennedy, Robert
McCarthy, Eugene
C.I.A. 1.01 Dulles, Allen

CLAYTON FRITCHEY

Other Issues Besides the War

Washington—Both Sen. Eugene McCarthy and Sen. Robert F. Kennedy at one time had doubts about challenging Lyndon Johnson for the Democratic presidential nomination because the President was in a position to eliminate the peace issue whenever he saw fit.

After McCarthy took the plunge, however, he gradually discovered there was plenty to talk about besides Vietnam. He also found much of the opposition to Johnson was personal and independent of the war policy. After McCarthy's success in the New Hampshire primary, it was obvious that a peace move on the part of the President would no longer make it impossible for other Democrats to sustain a campaign against him for the nomination. So two things happened: Kennedy came in and Johnson went out.



Clayton Fritchey

There seems little doubt that even before New Hampshire the President was thinking of retiring, but also there is little doubt that McCarthy and Kennedy would still be in the race today even if Johnson's bombing cutback had not been accompanied by his retirement statement. By the time the President made his historic announcement, his rivals had already begun to broaden the scope of their challenge well beyond just the war issue, and in recent days this tendency has become still more marked.

Some historians will surely surmise that Johnson would have had a clear field for re-nomination if he had made his peace move before McCarthy took the plunge against him. Also, it is quite possible that, before New Hampshire, McCarthy might have withdrawn if the President had defused the war issue.

All that is water over the dam now. McCarthy is, in fact, beginning to question the seriousness of the Johnson peace bid. He notes the quibbling over a negotiating site, the continued bombing of North Vietnam on a

heavy scale, and the launching of the biggest U.S. ground offensives of the year.

Aside from the war, however, both he and Kennedy have been pressing against other exposed nerves. The death of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., for instance, has focused fresh attention on the President's coolness to the recommendations of his own commission on civil disorders, and his earlier brushoff of similar proposals after last year's riots.

McCarthy seems to have hit political paydirt with his pledge (if elected) to put a tight rein on the "CIA, FBI, and the draft boards under General Hershey." The cheers this generated indicates how the country has changed since 1960. After John F. Kennedy's election, his first major appointments were the renaming of J. Edgar Hoover as director of the FBI and Allen Dulles as head of the CIA. He came to regret this, and following the CIA's Bay of Pigs disaster, he removed Dulles.

Robert Kennedy is no more enchanted with the FBI and CIA than McCarthy is. He is one of the few attorneys general who has not quailed before Hoover. If he becomes President it is not likely he would entrust civil rights investigations to a director who referred to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. as "the most notorious liar in the country." The Bay of Pigs disillusioned Sen. Kennedy with the CIA as much as it did his older brother, so it, too, is in for control if either the Minnesotan or New Yorker is elected.

Actually, in a quiet way, the CIA has already been considerably tamed. In a forthcoming book on "People and Power in Political Washington," Stewart Alsop gives an inside account of how the spy organization has lost some of its old derring-do.

His absorbing report concludes that the clique of "Bold Easterners" who planned and executed so many of the agency's most melodramatic operations has gradually been displaced by less adventurous spirits. He rather regretfully calls it the "triumph of the prudent professionals." Anyhow, the CIA has not overthrown any foreign governments for some time now. So far as we know, that is.

The Center

THE STATES ITEM
New Orleans, La.
29 March 1968

C.I.A. 1.01 Dulles, Allen
org P-Lynch, B.I.
Garrison, Jim
Kennedy, Robert F.

Bobby Asks Protection from Garrison Subpena

By BILL LYNCH

(States-Item Bureau)

BATON ROUGE—Sen. Robert F. Kennedy has asked Gov. John J. McKeithen to prevent any service of a subpoena on him by District Attorney Jim Garrison when he appears in New Orleans April 5; the States-Item learned today.

McKeithen, who was said to have been contact-

ed by the New York senator yesterday, refused to confirm or deny the report.

KENNEDY REPORTEDLY FEARS Garrison will try to subpoena him in connection with the probe of the assassination of President Kennedy.

In New Orleans, Garrison himself was unavailable for comment, but Assistant DA James L. Alcock said he knows of no plans to subpoena Ken-

nedy, and added that he "doubts if Garrison has any."

The governor said he has been asked by Crowley City Judge Edmund M. Reggie to attend a reception in honor of Kennedy at Crowley on April 6 and he has accepted.

A HIGH STATE OFFICIAL TOLD the States-

Item there have been negotiations between Kennedy and McKeithen on the subpoena matter.

However, the source added, McKeithen has not contacted Garrison himself.

Kennedy, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for president, will be a guest at a reception by the Louisiana Young Democrats at the Roosevelt



N. Y. SEN.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY



N. O. DA
JIM GARRISON

Continued