American Film Propaganda in Revolutionary Russia, Part 3
Fall 1998, Vol. 30, No. 3
By James D. Startt
© 1998 by James D. Startt
Obviously Bullard and his associates wanted to maximize the effectiveness of film propaganda. There is, however, no evidence that they attempted to provide background music during the showing of the motion pictures as was routine in presenting silent films in the United States. Although some musicians were among the near-destitute refugees gathered at Vladivostok, the fact that narrator-readers had to be employed for most presentations would have made musical accompaniment awkward. Nevertheless, the CPI made one interesting effort to combine music and film toward the end of its life in Siberia. That experiment was made after Charles Philip Norton became acting director of CPI's Russian operation in December 1918. Serious illness and hospitalization had forced Bullard from his post, and he wanted Norton as his successor.(48) Norton was the publicity director for the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, and he impressed Bullard as "the breeziest Westerner you ever saw and ONE live wire" as well as someone who understood publicity.(49) His wife accompanied him, and her presence is worth noting. She was a singer of some stature in the United States and had a great enthusiasm for the value of music in penetrating cultural barriers. Together they launched a series of benefit film-concerts, or "motion picture entertainments" as they were also called, in and around Vladivostok.
These were spirited presentations. Mrs. Norton perfected their organization and performed in them. She was joined by the military band of the Thirty-first Infantry Regiment, which was part of the American Expeditionary Force sent to Siberia; personnel from the cruiser USS Brooklyn, then harbored at Vladivostok, who provided a small orchestra and a violin quartet; and a few others who volunteered their services. The concerts were well advertised and were presented to overflowing audiences in the "Hut," a YMCA facility near the harbor. They opened with a rousing overture followed by selections by the violin quartet or a violin solo, and then various vocal solos and duets with piano accompaniment. Interspersed between the musical offerings were popular American films such as Thais, The Isle of Regeneration, and The Deemster. Advertisements for the last of these films promised "wonderful photography, beautiful exterior and interior scenes, maritime adventures, spectacular fights, an escape down an ivy-clad wall of a castle, prison scenes, the land of exile, . . . [a] burning ship at night, the return of the fugitives, [and] the lovers reunited."(50) The film-concerts were presented in the evenings, but there were special appropriately designed afternoon productions for children. On one occasion, the CPI ventured into the far outskirts of Vladivostok for a showing in a poor workingman's village where such entertainment was rare. All the proceeds from these concerts went to the benefit of the children of the area.(51) No wonder that "Amerikanka Compub," as the organization came to be known, gained in popularity as a result of these presentations with their blend of classical and lighter Russian and American music and exciting films. They received appreciative responses, and indeed, they were good entertainment. But did they have propaganda value?
|The CPI's propaganda effort included showing popular films such as Thais as well as educational pictures. (Courtesy of the Museum of Modern Art. Cannot be reproduced without written permission.)|
The CPI personnel left no doubt about how they felt that question should be answered. In their final reports on the subject they argued that now that the war was over, the purpose of the CPI in Siberia was to "win the hearts of the people [there] and to disseminate knowledge of American democracy and its methods of progress." Indications of the perceived success of these film concerts run throughout these reports. "Within a month this new phase of the 'Compub' work was a household topic in Vladivostok," the explanation ran.
The effect dissolved suspicion of American motives [e.g., greed or to gain commercial advantage], as far as the "Compub" was concerned. Its other propaganda gained in power, expanding American influence. Press and public were outspoken in their grateful praise. . . . The remarkable effect of music upon this people . . . [makes it] highly desirable to include this form of propaganda in any future publicity work among the Russians.(52)
Written at the time when the CPI in Siberia was preparing to terminate its work there, these rather self-congratulatory reports spoke repeatedly of using entertainment as part of the "applied psychology" involved in disseminating the ideas they hoped to promote.(53) The CPI group, in fact, had made that a consideration since they first made films an integral part of their Russian work.
As an episode in the history of American propaganda during World War I, the employment of film as an instrument of publicity in Russia is revealing. Like others involved in American film propaganda during the war, the CPI's Russian personnel perceived that motion pictures were capable of communication of great force. Increasingly they used the medium of film as an integral part of their total propaganda effort and in the process tried to increase its effectiveness as an instrument of publicity. Moreover, the manner in which they employed the films shows that they anticipated the next generation of propagandists in appreciating the value of entertainment in motion picture propaganda.(54) Most of all, they found that films could be used to communicate the messages they wished to disseminate among both literate and illiterate audiences.
A pro-democratic element came to dominate these messages. Although Russia's exit from the war and the eventual collapse of the Central Powers helps explain its growth, there was also another reason, really a hope, that elucidates it. As Bullard put it, "to have an ideal government you must have some ideal material." He explained his thinking in this way to his successor: "It all boils down pretty well to my slogan that our job here is to raise the political standard of living of these people." With that comment he had in mind the need he perceived to raise the people's vision and expectations regarding government and its responsibilities. The lack of demand by the people of Siberia for good roads, good schools, and good government disturbed him. So he concluded, "If we can give these people a picture of what an American taxpayer expects in the way of returns on his 'investment' we will have done something very valuable indeed."(55) Increasingly, he became interested in education as the only solution for Russia's myriad of problems ranging from Bolshevism to illiteracy to the country's many-sided backwardness. "This was . . . [the subject] on which we could always interest people in our American propaganda," he wrote after departing from Siberia.(56) Political partisans, teachers, peasants, all were fascinated by the idea of public education, and Bullard viewed it as the key to everything else--e.g., land reform, effective local government, stable central government, and economic regeneration and development. He contended that Russia had been undergoing a fundamental revolution for years, one that education and public opinion would ultimately determine. Accordingly, his commitment to placing the workings of institutions in a free and democratic society foremost in CPI propaganda and stressing education can be understood. The motto for our relations with Russia, he concluded, should be "Education, the road to Democracy."(57) American film propaganda in Russia was used with this end in mind.
Was the response to this employment of film favorable? The answer to this question is hampered by lack of record and by the fact of the eventual Bolshevik victory in the civil war and the control of life and opinion it entailed. It is impossible to make any long-range assessment of the use of American film propaganda in Russia. Interestingly, however, some indication of its short-term impact can be gleaned from the paper trail. Sometimes an effort was made to gather audience opinion of the film programs. Unfortunately, only one summary of these reactions could be found. This is a report written by one of CPI's Russian assistants for a program shown in the large village of Shkotovo. It was presented there in the High Foundation School to an audience of 345, composed of 95 adults and the remainder students and other youths. The program consisted of films of American cities and life, one of Odessa included for comparison with cities in the United States, and several newsreels featuring end-of-the-war events in the West. In summarizing the notes left in response boxes afterwards, the Russian assistant reported, "Never the notes complained." The responses were appreciative and favorable, despite one that read, "your film good for the devil." It is interesting to note that the assistant reported that the majority of people had previously seen and enjoyed cinemas.(58) The CPI was able to take advantage of that fact. Nevertheless, because of its singularity, this reported response, though worthy of note, does not encourage generalization.
More important was the response of various civic organizations to the American film effort. In this case the record is clear. The Vladivostok and other Zemstvos and various cooperative societies in the area valued American films, especially the educational programs. They were anxious to have them. When informed by the Vladivostok Zemstvo of this experiment with motion pictures, the local Zemstvos of the area even sent money to help with the expense of showing films in their districts. The reports following the showing of these films, Bothwell claimed, "were simply great." He reported that the villagers had a keen interest in American agriculture and asked "no end of questions" about it following the showing of the films.(59) Bullard also reported positive responses to these films and said there was a "great demand" for them, and Norton concurred in that judgment.(60)
The responses to the films that Bothwell, Bullard, and later Norton received encouraged them in believing in the strength of a Russian democratic impulse. It was a fragile impulse, and the Russian concept of popular power was too rooted in autocracy to allow it to grow at the time. Within the limits of what was possible, the use of motion pictures of all kinds helped the CPI members in Russia to maximize their outreach. Nevertheless, their hopes for postwar democracy in Russia, reflecting President Wilson's progressive international vision as they did, were illusory rather than realistic.
American Film Propaganda in Revolutionary Russia, Part 1
American Film Propaganda in Revolutionary Russia, Part 2
1. Films were used in portraying the Anglo-Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Spanish-American War. See Raymond Fielding, The American Newsreel 1911-1967 (1972), pp. 29-36; David H. Mould, American Newsfilm, 1914-1919: The Underexposed War (1983), pp. 7-8; and Elizabeth Grottle Strebel, "Primitive Propaganda: The Boer War Films," Sight and Sound (1976-77): 45-57.
2. The standard works on the CPI leave much room for deeper and broader inquiry into its international work. Stephen Vaughn's Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information (1980) deals only with the CPI's Domestic Section. James R. Mock and Cedric Larson's Words That Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information (1939) and George Creel's How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (1920) featured greater coverage of the CPI's Domestic Section than its Foreign Section, and their treatment of the latter can be described as an overview. Creel's book, like his earlier and more complete but lesser known, Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information (1920) is limited to a few selected records of the CPI's overseas operations and altogether neglect other primary sources. His works are valuable but far from comprehensive, and they fail to satisfy retrospective curiosity on the subject.
3. For example, Kevin Brownlow's classic study, The War, the West, and the Wilderness (1979), provides engaging information on the film as propaganda during the war but allows the subject to lapse in the case of American propaganda in Russia. It devotes only two lines about difficulties encountered in Moscow and Petrograd to the subject, and its more extensive coverage to American operations in Siberia is devoted entirely to the Photographic Section of the Signal Corps attached to the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, whose job it was to record by film rather than to propagandize by film. (See "The Russian Intervention," in part I, pp. 164-171). Michael T. Isenberg's excellent and otherwise useful study, War on Film: The American Cinema and World War I, 1914-1941 (1981) emphasizes how the subject of war was portrayed during the war but not the uses made of that portrayal. Harold D. Lasswell's classic study Propaganda Technique in World War I (1927; reprint, 1971) virtually overlooks film as propaganda in his discussion of American propaganda techniques in Russia. Richard Wood's Film and Propaganda in America: A Documentary History, Vol. 1, World War I (1990) contains only a single document pertaining to the CPI's work in Russia, a letter by Edgar Sisson (pp. 444-446). Two other quite useful studies for the subject of World War I films in general, Craig W. Campbell's Reel America and World War I: A Comprehensive Filmography and the History of Motion Pictures in the United States, 1914-1920 (1985) and Larry Wayne Ward's The Motion Picture Goes to War: The U.S. Government Film Effort During World War I (1985) concentrate on the production and description of films and related matters. They do not directly engage the subject of the present inquiry.
4. Creel, How We Advertised America, p. 4.
5. George Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (1961), p. 18.
6. Enclosed in Robert Lansing to President Wilson, June 8, 1917, in Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 64 vols. (1966-1991), 42: 464 (hereinafter cited as Wilson Papers).
7. R. H. Brace Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent (1932; reprint, 1950), p. 149. It can be noted here that the British made films a part of their propaganda effort in Russia. Using portable film projectors mounted on trucks, they gave shows to over 100,000 Russian troops in April-May 1916 alone. They were well received during the period of Russian success in the offense of 1916, but by 1917 "they served merely to increase the number of deserters." Ibid., p. 185, and Keith Neilson, "'Joy Rides'?: British Intelligence and Propaganda in Russia, 1914-1917," The Historical Journal (1981): 894.
8. Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, June 8, 1917, Wilson Papers, 42: 463.
9. "Plans for American Cooperation to Preserve and Strengthen the Morale of the Civil Population of Russia," synopsis and critique, enclosed in George Creel to Woodrow Wilson, June [Aug.] 20, 1917, Wilson Papers, 43: 526-530.
10. Charles Edward Russell to Wilson, Nov. 10, 1917, ibid., 44: 557-558.
11. Wilson to Russell, Nov. 10 1917, ibid.
12. Wilson to Creel, Nov. 10 1917, ibid.
13. "Motion-Picture Publicity: It's [sic] Relation to Aiding the Work of the Industrial Commission Which Has Been Sent to Russia," memorandum, P. A. Strachan to President Wilson, June 17, 1917, box 7, Charles Edward Russell Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (hereinafter, Russell Papers, LC).
14. Creel said the quality of posters was uncertain and that of Russian speakers was problematic. He thought distributing pamphlets and leaflets had no "merit at all." The British had tried it and had "muddled the situation." Creel was interested in a news service and in the use of films. Critique enclosed in Creel to Wilson, Aug. 20, 1917, Wilson Papers, 43: 526-530.
15. Charles Edward Russell to Wilson, Nov. 7, 1917,Wilson Papers, 44: 558. See also a memorandum, "Publicity and Recomments," n.d., Vol. 8, Russell Papers, LC.
16. John R. Mott to Robert Lansing, Aug. 22, 1917,Wilson Papers, 44: 67. As mentioned previously (note 7), the British used films in their Russian propaganda earlier. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the British experience with motion pictures in that instance influenced the American decision to make film propaganda part of their Russian operation.
17. Arthur Bullard to Mr. Wright (counselor at Petrograd), Oct. 11, 1917, box 6, Arthur Bullard Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (hereinafter Bullard Papers, PU).
18. "Report of Edgar Sisson on Installation of Committee of Public Information Service in Russia," pp. 6-7, May 29, 1918, ibid.
19. COMPUB (Washington) to COMPUB (Moscow), Mar. 6, 1918, folder "Bullard-Sisson Rus. Cables," CPI 17-A2, Records of the Committee on Public Information, Record Group 63, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (hereinafter, records in the National Archives will be cited as RG __ , NARA).
20. George Creel to Wilson, Dec. 27, 1917, Vol. 1, George Creel Papers, Manuscript Division, LC.
21. "Report of Edgar Sisson on Installation of Committee of Public Information Services in Russia," p. 9, and Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Days: A Personal Chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution (1931), pp. 180-183.
22. Malcolm Davis, "Report of Work in Connection with the Siberian Department of the Russian Press Division of the Committee on Public Information," pp. 1-2, n.d. [May 1919], folder "Davis-Harbin-Russian-Correspondence," CPI 17-A2, RG 63, NARA.
23. Bullard's group included George Bakeman, Otto Glaman, and Graham Taylor, who had left northern Russia with Bullard. They were joined by Dr. Joshua Rosett, Franklin Clarkin, Edwin Schoonmaker, Robert Winters, George Bothwell, Sid Evans, Prof. William Russell, William Carnes, Lem A. Dever, Dennis Haggerty, H. Y. Barnes, and Phil Norton (Creel, How We Advertised America, p. 380).
24. Edgar Sisson to Bullard, Sept. 6, 1918, folder "Bullard Cables-Russian Expedition," CPI 17-A2, RG 63, NARA.
25. Bullard to Mrs. Bagg, Aug. 28, 1918, box 8, Bullard Papers, PU.
26. Untitled report, n.d. [Sept. 1918], folder "Reports," CPI 27-B2, RG 63, NARA.
27. Malcolm Davis to Arthur Bullard, "Report of Siberian Activities," p. 8, n.d. [Jan.-Feb. 1919], Bullard Papers, PU.
28. The Czech Corps or Czech Legion was composed of men from Czech populations living in the former Russian Empire as well as Czech prisoners and deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army. They formed a separate detachment in the old Russian army. Although their number was frequently cited as 60,000 or 70,000, George Kennan estimates that it was considerably less, between 40,000 and 50,000. Kennan, Russia and the West, p. 70. Orlando Figes places the number lower yet, at about 35,000, in his recent study, A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution (1997), p. 576.
The exact number of American troops sent to Vladivostok is also open to some question. Although often cited as 7,000, it is probably higher. Gen. William Graves, who commanded the force, gave a total figure of 8,016 plus three support companies in his America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920 (1931), pp. 34 and 55, and President Wilson informed the Senate that there were approximately 10,000 men in the force, about 8,000 "effectives" and some "auxiliary" troops. See Wilson to the President of the Senate, July 22, 1919, Wilson Papers, 61: 579.
29. Although historians have displayed a keen interest in the American intervention, they have generally overlooked the CPI's involvement there or simply mentioned it in a nondescript manner. See, for example, William S. Graves, American Siberian Adventure (1931); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and the World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (1968); Clarence Manning, The Siberian Fiasco (1951); Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Towards Russia Since 1917 (1928); and Betty Miller Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920: A Study of National Policy (1956). Unterberger, however, did make a direct reference to the CPI's work in Siberia in a later conference paper, "Woodrow Wilson and the 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American relations," Southern Historical Association meeting, Houston, TX, 1985. In his study, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, George Kennan devotes an entire chapter to the CPI and provides a penetrating account of Arthur Bullard. See Russia Leaves the War (1956), pp. 190-208. Kennan, however, limits those comments to CPI's work in Northern Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution and deals with other matters in his coverage of the Siberian intervention. The role of the CPI has also failed to attract the interest of historians debating American motives for intervention. See, for example, Christopher Lasch, "American Intervention in Siberia: A Reinterpretation," Political Science Quarterly 77 (1962): 205-223; Eugene P. Trani, "Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia: A Reconsideration," Journal of Modern History (1976): 440-461; and Betty Miller Unterberger, "President Wilson and the Decision to Send American Troops to Siberia," Pacific Historical Review (1955): 63-74.
30. Bullard to Sisson, Sept. 11, 1918, folder "Bullard-Glaman-Aug.-Sept. 1918," CPI 17-A2, RG 63, NARA, and a Bullard report, "The Situation in Siberia," pp. 11-12, Oct. 6, 1918, box 6, Bullard Papers, PU.
31. Bullard to Sisson, report, "Re Films," p. 4, n.d. [Dec. 1918], RG 63, NARA.
32. "Report of George S. Bothwell, Director of Film Division, American Committee on Public Information, Russian Division, Vladivostok, Siberia," Report No. 1, pp. 3-4, and No. 2, p. 1, n.d. [Jan. 1919], CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA; Malcolm Davis, "Report of Work in Connection with the Siberian Department of the Russian Press Division of the Committee on Public Information," pp. 1-2, CPI 17-A2, RG 63, NARA; Malcolm Davis, "Report of Siberian Activities," pp. 12-13, Bullard Papers, PU; and Bullard, report, "Re Films," pp. 2-3, RG 63, NARA.
33. Although the number of films varied over time, when the operation terminated the films on hand included: twenty-nine dramas, thirty-eight comedies, nineteen scenic films, fourteen war pictures, seven reels of the War Review, thirty-three numbers of Pathé's Weekly, and twenty-eight numbers of the Universal Animated Weekly. (Bothwell, Report No. 2, pp. 4-5, CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA.)
34. Because of their romantic qualities, most of these films were favorably reviewed. See, for instance, reviews in The New York Times Film Reviews, 1913-1968 (1970) of The Conquest of Canaan, Thais, and the White Raven, in Vol. 1, pp. 3, 25, 26, and 99. The Isle of Regeneration was reviewed by Motion Picture News, Feb. 20, 1915, p. 48.
35. The Eagle's Eye, a film produced with government approval, was a serial film portraying Germans plotting to blow up the Lusitania and preparing a culture of infantile paralysis germs to infect horseflies to be turned loose upon innocent civilians. Some American theater managers refused to show the series for fear of offending German Americans in their audiences. See Moving Picture World, Feb. 23, 1918, p. 1065, and Mar. 9, 1918, p. 1344. See also Isenberg, War on Film, pp. 183-184, and Campbell, Reel America and World War I, p. 94. Inside the Lines was tamer. It featured a German Secret Service effort to destroy the British fleet at Gibraltar. See Moving Picture World, Sept. 7, 1918, p. 1464, and Campbell, Reel America and World War I, p. 178.
36. The comedies the CPI had available at the end of 1918 were: Eight Bells, All For Her, Colonel Heeza, His Day Out, His Golden Romance, It's a Great Life, Oh! What a Day, Recruit, Some Baby, Aeroplane Elopement, Ambitious Ethel, Back to Balkans, Crazy Cat Cook, Decoy, Faith of Sunny Sim, Good and Proper, Guilty Ones, Jack a Hall Room Hero, Jarr & Love's Young Dream, Jack Hires a Stenographer, Jarr and the Lady's Cup, Jarr and the Lady Reformer, Jarr Takes a Night Off, Kernel Nut the Footman, Kernel Nut the Janitor, Leak, Money-Maid-Men, Mutt and Jeff, On Ice, Pipe Dreams, Prize Winners, Rare Boarder, Seeing New York with John Dough, Speed, Tale of a Monkey, War Correspondents, Wedding Promise, and What's the Use. (Bothwell, Report No. 2, pp. 4-5, CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA.)
37. CPI correspondence and reports abound with references to this German and Bolshevik propaganda. For the former, see also John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk, March 1918 (1939), p. 32; and for the latter see also Figes, A People's Tragedy, pp. 417-418, and Arthur Bullard, The Russian Pendulum (1919), p. 79.
38. America's Answer and Pershing's Crusaders, Signal Corps Historical Films, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, RG 111, Motion Picture, Sound and Video Branch, NARA.
39. Creel, Complete Report of the Chairman, p. 47, and Bothwell, Report No. 2, pp. 4-5, CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA.
40. Isenberg, War on Film, pp. 73-74.
41. Malcolm Davis, report, "Work in Russia--Siberian Activities," in Creel, Complete Report of the Chairman, p. 239.
42. Bullard, The Russian Pendulum, p. 185. Reference to "German agents" trying to demoralize the Siberian population frequently also appears in CPI records through the fall of 1918. See, for example, excerpt from a Malcolm Davis letter to his father, in S. P. Davis to M. E. Lyons (a CPI secretary), Nov. 13, 1918, folder "Davis-Harbin-Russian-Correspondence," CPI 17-A2, RG 63, NARA, Jan. 25.
43. E. T. Weeks to Mr. Churchill, Jan. 25, 1918, folder "E. T. Weeks, Russian Expedition," CPI 15-A 1, RG 63, NARA.
44. Bullard to Phil Norton, Dec. 25, 1918, box 7, Bullard Papers, PU.
46. Bothwell, Report No. 2, pp. 4-5
47. Bullard, report "Re Films," p. 3.
48. At Norton's request, Bullard remained director of the Russia Compub after leaving Vladivostok and Norton became acting director.
49. Bullard to Sisson, Aug. 14, 1918, folder "Bullard Reports," CPI 17-A2, RG 63, NARA.
50. Program "Sunday's American Cinema--Concert Program," n.d, and a notice, Jan. 24, 1919, CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA.
51. Statement, No. 406 "Golos Primoria," Feb. 2, 1919, ibid.
52. [Charles Philip Norton], "Report on Vladivostok Musical Club," pp. 3-4, 8, n.d. [Jan.-March, 1919], CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA, and Malcolm Davis, "Report on Siberian Activities," p. 13, n.d. [Jan. 1919], box 7, Bullard Papers, PU.
53. See, in particular, [Norton], "Report on Vladivostok Musical Club," p. 1, CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA.
54. For example, entertainment content is mixed with serious matter in the classic Nazi propaganda film, Triumph of the Will.
55. Bullard to Phil Norton, Dec. 25, 1918, box 7, Bullard Papers, PU.
56. Bullard, The Russian Pendulum, p. 229.
57. Ibid., p. 247.
58. N. Tilicheieff, "The Zemstvos Scientific-Educational Cinema," n.d., CPI 27-B1, RG 63, NARA.
59. George Bothwell, memo, Jan. 18, 1919, in Creel, Complete Report of the Chairman, p. 245, and Bullard, report, "Re Files," pp. 3, 7-8, RG 63, NARA.
60. Bullard to Sisson, n.d., folder "Bullard Cables Dec. 1918," and [Charles Philip Norton], "Report on the Vladivostok Musical Club," p. 1, n.d., [Jan.-Mar. 1919], CPI 27-B1, both in RG 63, NARA.
|Articles published in Prologue do not necessarily represent the views of NARA or of any other agency of the United States Government.|