The Black Market in Postwar Berlin
Colonel Miller and an Army Scandal
Fall 2002, Vol. 34, No. 3
By Kevin Conley Ruffner
U.S. and Soviet soldiers and German citizens at a Berlin black market, August 15, 1945. Allegations that American military personnel profited from such markets created a serious public relations problem for the military. (NARA, 111-SC-209943)
Col. Francis P. Miller's testimony on August 14, 1946, before the U.S. Senate's Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program unleashed an avalanche of allegations of wrongdoings in the US Office of Military Government (OMGUS) in Germany.1 Following reports of the breakdown of military discipline among army personnel in Europe in the months after the end of the war, Colonel Miller's complaints had a ripple effect in Washington, attracting the attention of politicians, senior policymakers, and military officials. Allegations that army personnel profited from the burgeoning black markets in Germany posed a serious public relations problem. The ensuing investigations in the fall of 1946 provide insights into the U.S. occupation of Germany, which have been generally ignored by the participants themselves as well as historians.
When he met with the special committee, Colonel Miller had just returned to the United States from his assignment as the executive officer and plans and policy officer with the Office of the Director of Intelligence (ODI) at OMGUS headquarters in Berlin. There, he had played a key role in planning for the structure of American intelligence in occupied Germany.2
The quick demobilization of the army in Germany and the division of command between the United States Forces European Theater (USFET), under Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, in Frankfurt and Lt. Gen. Lucius Clay as the deputy military governor and director of OMGUS in Berlin, frustrated Colonel Miller's plans for a large postwar intelligence organization. Miller resented Clay because he shifted most of the intelligence responsibilities and resources to the USFET headquarters.3 The military government itself had only a few intelligence officers in Berlin and scattered throughout the various German states (Laender), a fatal flaw in Miller's opinion.
Colonel Miller also held personal grudges against several of Clay's leading staff officers, especially then-Brig. Gen. James B. Edmunds, the director of administrative services.4 Miller regarded Edmunds as corrupt and involved in illicit relationships with German women. He also felt that Edmunds had been vindictive towards several subordinate officers on the OMGUS staff who complained of what they perceived as illegal activities within the headquarters.5 With the assistance of Col. Henry G. Sheen in ODI, Miller began an unofficial investigation into the activities of General Edmunds and his staff. When General Clay learned about the private investigation, he ordered it to cease. Miller and Sheen then took their complaints to Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress, the USFET inspector general, who dismissed their claims as lacking foundation. Burress, however, referred the two officers to the OMGUS inspector general. Miller refused to approach that officer because he fell under the direct supervision of General Edmunds.6
In April 1946, Miller complained to an old friend, Dr. Thomas Parran, surgeon general of the Public Health Service, who was on a fact-finding tour of Europe. Miller "confided that he was morally shocked over some of things that he believed were going on in Berlin." Parran, in turn, urged Miller to take his concerns to the Senate special committee and promised an introduction to its chair, Senator James M. Mead (D-New York). By July, Dr. Parran had informed the special committee and its chief investigator, George Meader, about Colonel Miller's concerns.7
The following month, while on terminal leave from the army, Miller appeared in an executive session of the special committee. His testimony provided the senators with a graphic view of the state of General Clay's intelligence organization and collection efforts, the "moral disintegration" of American officers and enlisted men and its effects on American "prestige and reputation," and the extent to which private economic interests, both American and German, influenced U.S. occupation policies.8
Colonel Miller flatly denounced his commanding officer. "General Clay," he stated, "does not attach importance to intelligence." Citing as an example the need for American intelligence to ascertain the extent of starvation in the Russian zone during the winter of 1945–1946, Miller reasoned that, "like many of the older Regular officers, [Clay] does not understand intelligence and is not interested in it." He went so far as to claim that the "success of our occupation depends upon the Deputy Military Governor [Clay] being informed in the field of politics, economics, and social affairs, and if he is not adequately informed, either he or his successor is, in the governmental sphere, some day going to get as badly caught out as we were in the military sphere at Pearl Harbor. It is just as simple as that."9
When discussing the state of discipline among army personnel, Miller said it was his "considered judgment that the German troops occupying France had a better record in their personal contact with the population than the American troops occupying Germany."10 Furthermore, he alleged that white officers were afraid to control Negro troops, and soldiers of both races behaved badly in front of German civilians. Soaring rates of venereal disease among Negro personnel, he claimed, were key indicators of the breakdown of discipline among these troubled units.11
The root of the army's overall problems in Germany, Miller explained, lay in its officer corps. Miller described what he had heard about officers involved in the black market and other illegal activities. Viewing the rising Soviet threat in Germany, the colonel complained to the congressional committee, "we have too many men in the Army who think of America as a pigsty in which the sows shove each other around to get at a delicious trough. There is something wrong with attitude of too many of our citizens towards this country and its future. It is," Miller flatly declared, "because these men are not thinking of the national interest and the American way of life, but of padding their own pockets, making what they can, from the officers down to the GI, that we have had the incredible situation in Germany where, as you realize, much more money was coming home than was being paid to the troops."12
When asked by the senators where the fault lay, Colonel Miller cautioned that it was only a "relatively small minority" of officers and soldiers who created this unfortunate picture in Germany. Yet "it is like a rotten apple that spoils the rest of the apples." The rot, in Colonel Miller's mind, started at OMGUS in Berlin. "Frankly," Miller admitted, "I can't understand General Clay's tolerance of some of the men I have named."13
The Black Market in Berlin
In the ten years after World War II, Europe relied, to a great measure, on goods and services produced and sold in the underground economy. The black market peaked during the first three years after V-E Day, before the Marshall Plan and currency reform sparked economic revival, especially in the new Federal Republic of Germany. While every European country suffered through various forms of the black market, Germany and Austria, and more critically, Berlin and Vienna, became the epicenters of this temporary economy.
By the summer of 1945, the black market was in full swing in Berlin.14 Following the arrival of American and British troops in July, two large markets opened in the Tiergarten and Alexanderplatz. Located in the British sector, the Tiergarten, the remnant of one of Berlin's largest parks in the shadow of the burned-out hulk of the Reichstag and the Brandenburg Tor, was Berlin's largest and best-known black market. Russian soldiers mingled with other Allied troops, German civilians, discharged German soldiers, and displaced persons in a great bazaar where everything and anything was offered for sale or barter.15
Cigarettes, chocolate, liquor, and small foodstuffs constituted the most easily disposable commodities.16 American soldiers purchased ten packs of cigarettes for fifty cents at the PX and sold them for one hundred dollars. Watches and cameras, however, were the most lucrative items on the black market.17 Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Frank Howley, commandant of the American sector in Berlin, witnessed firsthand the Soviet passion for watches:
On the Russian G.I. level, the immediate goal was a watch. Russians love watches for a number of reasons. They always have been associated in the Muscovite mind with affluence and an established, even exalted, position in life. Peasants never owned watches. A wrist watch— well! Watches soon became a universal commodity because troops had no confidence in Russian currency. Also, a soldier could send a watch home and his wife could barter it for a cow. Even our G.I.'s realized the fortune, in Russian eyes, represented by a watch and started selling their own and converting the money into American dollars, although our men were forbidden to enter these markets. Some Russian soldiers wore a half dozen watches. A Mickey Mouse watch was worth more than a jewel-studded trinket from Cartier. Some Russians paid the equivalent of US$1,000 for a watch.18
The black market was so lucrative that private soldiers sent thousands of dollars to the United States derived from their illegal earnings. In addition to the cash generated by the black market, soldiers also exchanged PX goods for precious German items, including antiques, artwork, family heirlooms, jewelry, rugs, china, and porcelain. The army shipped these valuable goods to America when the soldiers returned home. In July 1945 the army's finance office in Berlin disbursed one million dollars in pay, yet soldiers sent some three million dollars to addresses in America.19
The American decision in 1944 to give the Russians the plates for the Allied occupation marks appears to have the main factor behind the explosion of black market activities in Berlin. The Soviets printed untold amounts of occupation currency and used it to pay their troops in Germany. Those soldiers, who had served for years without compensation, were told to spend it in Germany because the money could not be taken back to the USSR. They then embarked upon a spending spree in 1945, fueling the black market in Berlin.20
The US Army incurred an estimated $300 million in extra costs because of the occupation plate fiasco and subsequent black market activities. Yet there was a higher price to pay. In time, the army instituted measures to restrict the amount of money that soldiers could send home, and it cracked down on the sale or trading of American goods.21 The black market affected all levels of the American army in Germany and strained early German-American relations. Officers, enlisted men, and civilians alike succumbed to the lure of getting rich quickly with little risk or worry.22 "The very prevalence of the petty black-market activities contributed to a gigantic fraud which gave many Germans the impression that Americans are fundamentally dishonest and weak. This was not an enviable reputation," concluded the official army historian in Germany, "and it detracted from the effectiveness of American efforts in Germany."23
From Victory to Disarray
The United States Army ended the war in Europe with more than three million men and women in uniform. By late 1946, the army's strength in the United States Forces European Theater (USFET) had been whittled to 200,000 troops, and it continued to drop until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.24 The victorious American forces degenerated into a largely poorly trained and ill-disciplined force mainly interested in living a soft garrison existence. According to a 1946 army intelligence report, German civilians regarded American troops as "men who drink to excess; have no respect for the uniform they wear; are prone to rowdyism and to beat civilians with no regard for human rights; and benefit themselves through the black market."25 In February of that year, a report issued by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), the successor to Office of Strategic Services (OSS), stated that Berliners felt that "an American is just a Russian with his trousers pressed."26
Indeed, the army found itself overwhelmed by the demands of demobilization in the rush to return home. The remaining troops, often inexperienced and poorly trained, were "occupied in occupying" the American zone of Germany and its sector in Berlin. "Much of Joe's 'activity' is simply sitting," said one observer. "Everything of value to us must be guarded. The objects that we have found it desirable to guard have ranged from major war criminals to thousands of ordinary POWs, the Reichsbank gold reserve, the looted and displaced art, our own radio stations, telephone exchanges, supply dumps, fuel reservoirs, headquarters, airports, machinery, finance offices, and mail." In addition, the army was responsible for the administration of military government in Germany, enforcing the denazification of the Germans, and general law and order duties. Little time remained to train for combat missions.27
As victors in the defeated land, many Americans assumed the role as a sort of imperial Raj. While the war raged, the army commandeered houses, factories, transportation facilities, and public buildings for military purposes. Coupled with this requisitioning, American soldiers "liberated" the property of the enemy. Looting fever continued after the German surrender, further accelerating the breakdown of military discipline. Soldiers of all ranks resisted Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's ban on fraternizing with German civilians. Enacted as the army first crossed into enemy territory in 1944, American personnel were expressly forbidden to have any social contact with the Germans. But this policy simply proved unenforceable and tied up army commanders just as the war's tensions eased. In June 1945, Eisenhower lifted the ban on American soldiers playing with children. The following month, the fraternization ban fell apart and was formally abolished in October (with the exception of American soldiers marrying Germans or billeting in the same houses).28
The dissolution of the fraternization ban effectively gave Army officers and enlisted men unbridled sexual license. One soldier in late 1945 revealed that "at the risk of letting the cat out of the bag, it must be admitted that all the GI wants in Europe is a 'good deal'— that is a comfortable place to sleep, food at all times, a woman to do laundry and pressing for cigarettes or candy, no Army duty requiring labor, and a chance to fraternize as often as possible." In this soldier's opinion, "in Germany, naturally, the GI finds the best deal."29
"Goin' frattin" soon became a major activity for American soldiers and a cause of significant disciplinary problems throughout the American zone and in Berlin. In some instances, black and white soldiers fought over German women who were eager to make friends with the victors. One result was a dramatic escalation of venereal disease— some 235 percent between May and December 1945— among American soldiers in Germany.30 VD soon became a major public health menace in occupied Germany. Prostitution among German women also rose to unprecedented levels. By 1946 an estimated 500,000 women made a living in Berlin on the streets, leading one German official to state that it had become "impossible to distinguish between good girls and bad girls in Germany. Even nice girls of good families, good education and fine background have discovered their bodies afford the only real living. "Moral standards," he exclaimed, "have crashed to a new low level. At the present rate, in two months I wonder if there will be a decent moral woman left."31
The rapid turnover of personnel in 1945–1946 created havoc for the army in Europe. The black market coupled with loosened sexual mores and permissive attitudes toward the appropriation of German property contributed to the army's poor command climate in the American zone and in Berlin.32 It did not take long for the deterioration of the army in Germany to become the subject of concern to commanders in Germany and in Washington. Starting in the summer of 1946, USFET was rocked by a series of congressional and War Department investigations coming on the heels of embarrassing courts-martial of officers and enlisted men who abused army soldiers at the Tenth Replacement Depot in Lichfield, Great Britain, during the war.33 The press also picked up on a series of scandals involving army officers and looted treasures.34
Political Firestorm
Colonel Miller's testimony to the Senate special committee was the match that ignited a political firestorm in Washington. Anxious to use scandals in the American military government's program in Germany to attack the Truman administration, congressional Republicans seized upon Miller's allegations as the fall electoral campaign approached. Senator Owen Brewster, a Republican from Maine and a member of the special committee, called for an immediate Senate investigation and accused Democrats of delaying for political reasons.35 "I know of nothing before the committee of comparable importance," he told reporters. "Munitions, scandals, questions of who received gifts for launching ships, and other matters are water over the dam. This occupation situation," Brewster asserted, "involves the welfare of our boys overseas, and the prestige of the United States and probably affects the course of future wars."36
Despite Brewster's charges, Democrats were also indignant. "I want to say," Senator Mead told Colonel Miller, "we appreciated your being here and you have told us a very interesting, although rather shocking story." Mead further declared that "it would be difficult for me to believe that men of the standing and integrity of General McNarney and General Clay would tolerate anything of this character, at least as widespread as it apparently is, according to your testimony."37 Senator Mead announced on September 12 that the special committee would undertake a review of the army's policies in Germany, including allegations of misconduct by military personnel. He did not, however, offer a specific date for any hearings.38 Two weeks later, Senator Mead resigned from the special committee in order to concentrate on his gubernatorial race in New York. Senator Harley M. Kilgore (D-West Virginia) was named acting chairman and, after consulting with the special committee and President Harry Truman, directed George Meader, the special committee counsel, to launch the investigation.39
The Meader Investigation
Meader launched an aggressive investigation and interviewed dozens of witnesses in Washington, including ranking members of the State and War Departments.40 On October 10, Meader flew to Paris to confer with Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg (R-Wisconsin) and Texas Democratic Senator Tom Connally, a member of the special committee and, more important, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both senators agreed to the need for the special committee to investigate the American military government program in Germany. Connally even expressed the sentiment that the United States was the "biggest sucker in the world" for accepting displaced persons from all over Europe and feeding them in the American zone of Germany.41
While in France, Meader also visited with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Walter Bedell Smith, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union and former chief of staff to Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. He then proceeded to Frankfurt to meet with senior army officers at USFET headquarters, where he encountered Melvin Benson, a former OSS officer and an investigator from the House Military Affairs Committee, who was also in Europe examining military government activities. From October 15 until his return to Washington on November 5, Meader met all of the senior officers in Germany and Austria, including General McNarney, Lt. General Clay, and Gen. Mark Clark.42
Mindful that his investigation cut across the jurisdictions of several standing Senate committees, Meader concentrated on the issues raised in Colonel Miller's testimony before the special committee in August.43 His report, completed shortly after his return to Washington, uncovered several cases of officer misconduct and other breakdowns in army discipline.44 In his conclusion, he noted that the "Committee ought to explore thoroughly and in a continuing investigation the conduct of government in occupied areas on the part of United States agencies."45
Bull in a China Shop
Meader completed his report on November 22, and even prior to his completion, it became the center of political debate.46 That same day, Senator Kilgore in West Virginia telegrammed Senator Mead in Washington urging the special committee to read the report carefully and guard against "leaks." Mead responded that "unfortunately Mr. Meader's confidential report has already been published in the press here and elsewhere."47
In fact, just days after Meader returned from his overseas trip, Owen Brewster, Republican senator from Maine and soon-to-be chairman of the special committee, had revealed the details of Colonel Miller's confidential Senate testimony in a Liberty Magazine article on November 9 entitled "Is a Scandal Brewing in Germany?"48
On November 13 Republican senators Brewster, Homer Ferguson, and William F. Knowland met with Senators Connally and Vandenburg in New York City. Both Connally and Vandenburg now expressed their firm opposition to an investigation of the military government. Connally stated outright that public hearings would create "a most unfavorable reaction and adverse publicity." Vandenburg, likewise, was reported as having urged his colleagues to drop the matter.49
While attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, Secretary of State Byrnes told the Republican senators what he felt about an investigation of the military government. The meeting went badly. Trying to sort out the costs of occupation over the next year and whether the State Department should assume responsibility from the army, Brewster acknowledged "in certain quarters, there is concern over the proposed investigation. We are not clear as to the source. But there is definitely a lack of enthusiasm in the State Department. The reason is not clear."50
Denying that Congress wanted to meddle in foreign areas, Senator Brewster explained that occupation costs would soon reach $350 million, including $125 million for Germany. The senator from Maine felt that the American taxpayers have a "right to know if that is to be a worthwhile investment, and whether it is to be economically expended." Brewster asserted that "we are not concerned with any long range foreign policy" but declared that it was critical to settle whether the State Department or the army would be responsible for the administration of Germany and the other occupied countries.51
Upon the senators' return to Washington, the special committee met on November 14 with Lt. General Clay, who was in the United States to discuss American and British plans for the economic unification of their zones in Germany.52 Four days later, Chief Counsel Meader addressed a memorandum to Senator Kilgore, summarizing the Truman administration's opposition to an investigation. This opposition, Meader remarked, centered on fears that an investigation would undermine negotiations by the United States. Noting that the special committee had withheld information about its investigations during the war when it feared that it would harm the war effort, Meader exclaimed, "now the war is over, the enemy is defeated. By no stretch of the imagination can secrecy be urged on grounds of military security." Meader conceded that the special committee would not, in this case, hold public hearings on military government. "The explanation of the disastrous consequences thought to ensue from making these facts available to the public," Meader told Kilgore, "must be made by those who urge it."53
In the meantime, the Democrats insisted that any investigation have the concurrence of the executive branch. The White House and the State and War Departments now all weighed in against congressional investigation. When asked at a press conference on December 3 whether he approved of such an investigation, President Truman answered simply, "I don't think it's necessary."54 The press reported that both Secretary of State Byrnes and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson were opposed to the special committee's plans.
The deputy military governor, Lt. General Clay, however, may have been even more opposed to an investigation. When he first learned of the special committee's plans in September, Clay was reportedly irritated and issued a "no comment" to press inquiries.55 In his meeting with the senators in mid-November, Clay said "the Soviet press and the German press in the Soviet zone utilize every opportunity to criticize and discredit not only the American but also the British military government." A congressional investigation would undermine Clay's ability to work with the Soviets, although he said that he would welcome a congressional "inspection" as opposed to an "investigation." "Whether we want it or not," Clay warned the senators, "we must recognize that we are in a direct political and ideological competition in Germany."56 In early December the New York Times reported that Clay threatened to resign if the Senate pursued its plans to investigate the military government in Germany.57
The Republicans, however, were not intimidated because they felt that the special committee did not require the "permission of any department to an investigation of its operation."58 After meeting with General Clay, Senator Brewster announced plans to launch a full investigation to "focus on the costs of occupation, black market activities, and 'sensational sex stories that have come from the occupied areas.'"59 Pressure mounted in Washington for a full-scale investigation of the military government.60 Drew Pearson, in his column "Washington Merry-Go-Round," commented on November 23 that "for some strange reason, Secretary of State Byrnes has become awfully jittery about having a Senate committee probe of what's going on in Germany." Pearson quoted Sen. William F. Knowland, a California Republican member of the special committee, as saying:
I was not particularly interested in the reported sexual aberrations of American troops in Germany or of black-market porch-climbing until I found out you [Secretary Byrnes] were so anxious to keep us out. But since there have been several carefully conducted tours of newspaperman through Germany, I see no reason why United States Senators should not have the same privilege.61
Chief Counsel Meader noted that "considerable opposition has developed to the Committee's investigation. In my opinion," Meader stated in his report, "the facts obtained in the preliminary investigation indicate clearly the need of a thorough study by the Committee. Efforts which have been made recently to block this inquiry fortify that conclusion by raising the suspicion that there is something to hide which the Committee might uncover if it did conduct the investigation."62
Among the leading opponents of a Senate investigation, the Washington Post weighed in on November 25 with its editorial "Bull in a China Shop." "For the first time in our memory," the paper's editors wrote, "we feel called upon to criticize the special investigating committee that was first presided over by Mr. Truman when he sat in the Senate." Criticizing the special committee's reliance on the testimony of "dissatisfied employees in Germany," the Post blamed the special committee, which "raked over isolated cases of misbehavior, mainly, it would seem, connected with what Senator Vandenburg calls porch climbing." The Post also feared that a full investigation "would be the equivalent to opening our confidential files in Berlin and Frankfurt to the world. It would damage our prestige in Germany and prejudice our negotiations about Germany." The standing committees in the Senate, not the special committee, which, in the paper's view, operated like a "witch hunt," would be better able to tackle the nation's sensitive issues regarding occupation.63
The same day that the Washington Post's editorial appeared, the special committee met in executive session for a knockdown fight over Meader's report. With only a handful of members present, the senators quickly became embroiled in partisan wrangling. The Democrats bitterly opposed any Senate efforts to launch a full-scale investigation of the army's regime in Germany. At the end of the meeting, Senator Kilgore called for a vote whether to proceed with an investigation by the special committee.64 After polling absent members, the vote split along party lines (six to four) and defeated Republican Senator Joseph H. Ball's motion to establish a subcommittee to travel to Europe to study military government expenditures and administration.65
Meader Blamed for Report
Meader faced a barrage of criticism as 1946 came to a close. His report became the target for attacks from several fronts. After the special committee's meeting with Secretary of State Byrnes in New York City on November 13, the New York Herald-Tribune and the Washington Post claimed that Secretary Byrnes had made disparaging remarks about both Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Gen. Douglas MacArthur. According to press reports, Byrnes reportedly called MacArthur a "prima donna." Meader was forced to defend himself against these leaks to Secretary Byrnes as well as to Senators Brewster and Mead.66
The press, in the meantime, paid considerable attention to allegations of misconduct by army personnel in Germany. Reports in both Collier's Magazine and Liberty Magazine illuminated the problems in Germany and were quickly followed by the New York Times and other major papers.67 The press seized upon allegations that the army had failed to impose order on the large numbers of displaced persons or its own Negro troops in Germany. The New York Times, for example, stated that the Meader Report claimed that "the denazification program is a glaring failure; the break-up of the cartel system (one of the root causes of the war) has gotten nowhere; that widespread fraternization with German women is undermining the effectiveness of military government; that the demands for luxurious accommodations by United States personnel have created a desperate housing situation; and that a number of high-ranking army officers are involved in gross black-marketing operations."68
Critics of the report, including the executive director of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society and the executive secretary of the NAACP, denounced the special committee's investigation as "unfair, biased and apparently based on hearsay or distorted facts."69 Meader, in turn, wrote the New York Times to explain that the "only expression of opinion that I made [on the topic of displaced persons] was that this problem should be thoroughly studied by Congress so that the people and the Congress, to the extent that they have responsibilities in connection with this problem, could make their decisions on the basis of knowledge rather than ignorance."70
Reporting by the Washington Post and the New York Herald-Tribune caused Meader the most grief. In an article on November 27, Meader was surprised to learn that Senator Kilgore had sent a private letter to the members of the special committee two days earlier. The Herald-Tribune obtained a copy of Kilgore's letter and reported that the senator had denounced the Meader Report as "hearsay, rumors, and gossip." Furthermore, Kilgore blasted his chief counsel because "this report goes far beyond the limits of the proper activities of our committee. The report deals with questions of foreign policy. In fact, this report constitutes advice, instruction and criticism in the field of foreign affairs, directed at the President, Secretary Byrnes, Senator Connally, Senator Vandenburg, and former Senator Austin and our other delegates to the United Nations." Referring to displaced persons and black soldiers, Meader's two most controversial subjects, Kilgore told his colleagues, "it is difficult to discuss those portions of the report which attack our own soldiers, and helpless victims of Nazism, without the strongest disagreement and condemnation."71
Meader Report Released
As the year drew to a close, Republican and Democratic members of the special committee continued to wrestle over the role of the American military government overseas. Republicans vowed to renew their efforts to launch an investigation when the new Congress convened under Republican control in early 1947. In the meantime, the Republican senators on the special committee took matters into their own hands and released the Meader Report on their own authority on December 4, 1946. The Republicans felt "compelled to take this action because excerpts of an earlier draft of the report by Mr. Meader and portions of the testimony given in these executive hearings, giving distorted and inaccurate impressions, have already appeared in the press and the only way to correct such inaccuracies is to release the full texts."72
The day before, Senator Kilgore, learning that the Republicans planned to release Meader's report, released the War Department inspector general's summary of its investigation into Colonel Miller's allegations. Hoping to defuse the impact of the Meader Report, Kilgore expressed "my own personal opposition to giving currency to the unverified chargeshich constitute so large a portion of the counsel's report and my opinion that its release by our Committee would be contrary to fair procedure."73
The release of the full Meader Report in December 1946 did not dampen the controversies raised by earlier leaks about black marketing by U.S. military personnel, disciplinary problems among black troops, or the army's management of displaced persons.74 While Senator Brewster was widely regarded as the source of the special committee's leaks, George Meader later fingered Herbert Schimmel, a member of Senator Kilgore's staff, as responsible for releasing portions of the draft report dealing with black soldiers and refugees in Germany.75 Schimmel, who later worked at the United Nations, was dismissed in 1952 by the secretary general for refusing to testify to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security about Communist activities at the UN headquarters in New York.76
Following on the heels of the Meader Report, the House Military Affairs Committee also issued its own report in December 1946 criticizing the army's operations in Germany. In particular, the House report cited the army's laxness with denazification, the lack of a foreign policy objectives, and black market activities by the "vast majority" of American soldiers. The House advocated stringent checks on income taxes as a means to gain control on black market profits brought into the United States.77
As Christmas approached, United States News observed, "whether it [the situation in Germany] is misleading, as is charged by the Army, or an indication of gross misconduct by US forces abroad, as is suspected by some Republican Congressmen, it is almost certain to result in full-scale investigation of the occupation of Germany by Congress next year."78
The Army's Counter-Attack
The army's response to Colonel Miller's August testimony before the special committee was swift. Upon learning of the soon-to-be discharged officer's unauthorized testimony, Under Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royall, ordered the army's inspector general (IG) to conduct a full investigation into Miller's allegations. On September 28, 1946, Brig. Gen. Elliot D. Cooke, the deputy inspector general, launched his investigation by calling Miller as a witness to go over his congressional testimony. Cooke then proceeded to interview fifteen other witnesses in the United States, including Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, former USFET G-2, and Dr. Thomas Parran, surgeon general of the United States.
Concluding that the witnesses then in the United States could not support Colonel Miller's allegations, the Cooke Inquiry Group proceeded to Germany. Meeting with General McNarney on October 6, 1946, Cooke learned that several investigations were already under way in USFET. As early as June 19, 1946, McNarney had ordered a confidential investigation in Berlin to determine if American civilian or military personnel were involved in the black market. Conducted by Col. Charles G. Dodge, the investigation was completed on August 2. While black marketing had been "prevalent" among Americans prior to November 1945, Dodge found "insufficient evidence" to "support charges of looting or large scale Black Market activity against American personnel now on duty in Berlin." He noted that it still existed in the German capital, but that "most cases involve only petty amounts of cash." Dodge simply recommended the continuation of several cases already under way and that any large investigation of the black market be turned over to officials in Washington for further action.79
When Lt. General Clay learned about the secret investigation of personnel under his command, he felt that it was insufficient. He ended the Dodge investigation and ordered a new investigation by the theater inspector general. USFET headquarters assigned Col. Perry L. Baldwin to begin a fresh examination that had just started when Cooke arrived from Washington.80 Thus, by mid-October, OMGUS in Berlin had four different sets of investigators— the Senate special committee (Meader), the House military affairs committee (Benson), the USFET IG (Baldwin), and the War Department IG (Cooke)— looking into matters there. The four groups reached an agreement for a division of labor, although the special committee reserved the right to review the various army IG investigations.81
After a few weeks, General Cooke wrapped up his work in Germany and returned to Washington to write his final report. The War Department Inquiry Group interviewed nearly fifty military officers and civilians, including a German woman, to ascertain the facts in Colonel Miller's charges.82 The inspector general faced a dilemma as to how to characterize the allegations and the officer who leveled them before a Senate hearing. "The conduct of Colonel Miller in this affair," General Cooke noted, "is most difficult to comprehend." In trying to present a picture of Miller's personality, Cooke stated:
His honesty, high ideals and impeccable character were testified to again and again by responsible witnesses. It has also been evidenced that certain general conditions existed in the early occupation of Berlin which aroused the moral indignation of Colonel Miller. Also, it was proved that Colonel Miller made several attempts while in Berlin to have these general conditions investigated and rectified, but higher authority refused to take cognizance of his complaints, because he had no actual proofs of the conditions he alleged existed in Berlin.83
Once Colonel Miller took up this crusade against the army, he "indulged in a frenzy of over-all vituperations which, by implication at least, impugned the character and integrity of persons about whom Colonel Miller had not the slightest knowledge." In particular, the IG was especially concerned about Col. Miller's "fixation" against former Brig. Gen. James B. Edmunds and, in turn, Lt. General Clay, the deputy military governor. "Colonel Miller," Cooke noted, "seemed desirous of placing blame for nearly everything wrong in the German occupation upon either Colonel Edmunds or General Clay who, according to Colonel Miller, protected Colonel Edmunds."84
The IG found no evidence to substantiate Miller's main allegations. "Aside from certain instances pertaining to personal conduct of individuals, the Inquiry Group could find no evidence to substantiate the general and over-all allegations made by Colonel Miller." Consequently, Cooke observed, "it is believed that the dark and gloomy picture painted orally by Colonel Miller before the Mead Committee was a figment of his own imagination, and not a true reflection of conditions as actually extant." Cooke, however, was critical of the USFET chain of command because "much of the embarrassment brought about by this entire incident could have been avoided if General McNarney and General Clay had utilized their inspectors general in the manner contemplated by War Department policies." Instead, USFET and OMGUS inspector general lacked sufficient command emphasis and, consequently, problems at the lowest levels within the military government were left to fester.85
The inspector general's final report of November 21 arrived at ten conclusions that absolved the military government in Germany. The IG made four recommendations for follow-up action, and it then turned to Colonel Miller, the man who ignited this firestorm. The Cooke Report closed by stating for the record that "a prominent notation be made in the AGO 201 file of Colonel Francis P. Miller, 0-524591, to the effect that these papers should be examined and considered in the event of any future evaluation of this officer's services."86
Gone and Forgotten
In Washington, political necessity dictated that Senate Republicans forget about the black market in Germany. With the new Congress in Republican hands, the Meader Report and a Senate investigation marked the first order of business in January 1947. Senate Republicans proposed to extend the life of the special committee for another two years and its new chairman, Senator Brewster, met with President Truman and George C. Marshall, the new secretary of state, to discuss a possible overseas inquiry.87
The Senate debated the issue of an investigation in Germany in the first floor fight of the Eightieth Congress on January 14, 1947. After a bitter debate that pitted both parties and threatened to divide the Republicans themselves, Senator Brewster offered to restrict the special committee's purview and limit its ability to conduct overseas investigations. In return, the Senate gave the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program an additional year—to January 31, 1948—despite Democratic wishes to transfer investigative responsibilities related to national defense to the standing Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. The special committee also had its authority clipped because it could investigate only things that had happened in the United States (including American territories) before June 1946. The threat of a full investigation by the Senate into the army's military government program receded as the special committee took up new investigations related to domestic defense programs.88
The Government Printing Office published Colonel Miller's testimony and the Meader Report in 1948, but emotions were spent. By this time, the Truman administration faced more pressing issues in Germany, including the growing Soviet threat in Europe and the Berlin airlift. Beyond the published report and a large body of documentary evidence, the special committee's actions in the fall of 1946 left little telltale signs. General Clay, for example, makes no mention of the Senate's actions or the War Department's investigations in his memoirs, personal papers, or official papers at the National Archives. Nor does Jean Edward Smith, Clay's biographer, mention either the Senate or War Department investigations in his landmark books.89 The extensive literature on President Truman likewise reveals no concern on his part as to the Senate's inquiries into military government. Coming at a time when Truman faced numerous domestic political and economic problems (including the Republican sweep in both houses of Congress and a nationwide strike by the United Mine Workers in late 1946), investigations of the army's military government program in Germany proved to be minor irritants.90
In the end, the scandals over the army's role in the black market in Germany faded away. Colonel Miller, seething over the army's treatment of his charges, decided to let the matter rest and returned to his active career in Virginia. He felt vindicated that he had brought the matter to a head and exposed the rot that had taken hold in the OMGUS headquarters in Berlin.91 His allegations and the ensuing investigations became footnotes in the larger sphere of the US Army's role in postwar Germany.
Kevin Conley Ruffner is a historian with the History Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, specializing in World War II and early Cold War intelligence. His two-volume book of documents, Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945–49, was recently declassified. Dr. Ruffner is currently writing a book on the black market and the U.S. Army in Berlin.
Notes
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis in this paper are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or the views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other U.S. Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government endorsement of the paper's factual statements and interpretations. This article has been reviewed by CIA's Publications Review Board and found to contain no classified information.
1 The U.S. Senate established the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program in March 1941 to investigate "excessive profits, fraud, corruption, waste, extravagance, mismanagement, incompetence, and inefficiency in expenditures, connected with the prosecution of the national defense program for World War II." Because Senator Harry Truman was the first chairman of the special committee, it is best known as the Truman Committee. Senators Harley M. Kilgore (D-WV), James M. Mead (D-NY), and Owen Brewster (R-ME) were successive chairmen. The committee held some 432 public hearings and 300 executive sessions, went on hundreds of field trips, and issued 51 reports. While the Truman Committee disbanded in 1948, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments (later the Committee on Government Operations) took over some of its tasks. Interestingly, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was a member of the Truman Committee during his first term in the Senate, later gaining notoriety as the chairman of the PSI in 1953 - 1954. For further details, see National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to the Records of the United States Senate at the National Archives, 1789–1989 (1989) and US Congress, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–1989 (1989).
2 Born in 1895 in Kentucky, Francis Pickens Miller was a scholar, educator, author, soldier, and humanitarian. Educated at Washington and Lee University, he also studied at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and in Switzerland. He later received a law degree in 1954. Miller was involved in a number of public interest groups before the war and served as organizational director of the Council for Foreign Relations prior to the American entry into World War II. He was among the influential American proponents of rearming the British in 1940. He joined the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1942 and transferred to the Office of Strategic Services upon its formation. After receiving an army commission, Lt. Colonel Miller was instrumental in organizing OSS agent operations into France from England prior to the Normandy invasion. He transferred to the army after a falling out with Gen. William J. Donovan in 1944. A veteran of army service in France during the First World War, Miller received numerous high decorations and led a distinguished postwar career. He held various positions in the State Department after World War II and was a candidate for Virginia governor in 1949 and US Senate in 1952. He died in August 1978. Miller's own recollections are found in Francis Pickens Miller, Man from the Valley: Memoirs of a 20th-Century Virginian (1971). See also Martin Weil, "Francis Pickens Miller Dies at Age 83, Father of Va. Senatorial Nominee," Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1978, p. B6; and ""Francis Miller Dies; Virginia Politician," New York Times, Aug. 5, 1978, p. 22.
3 Miller's testimony is found in US Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program: Hearings before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Part 42, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 14, 1946. These hearings and several others were not published until 1948. It is listed in the CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index as (80) S875-7 and is hereinafter cited as "Special committee hearing."
The results of the US Army's high-level investigation of Colonel Miller's allegations are found in Col. Eugene L. Miller, War Department Special Staff, Office of the Inspector General, to Kenneth C. Royall, Under Secretary of War, "Inquiry Regarding Certain Phases of the Army's Administration of the United States Zone of Occupied Germany," Nov. 21, 1946, in General Correspondence 1939–1947, Army of Occupation (Secret), File No. 333.9, Entry 26F, Boxes 34 - 35, Record Group (RG) 159, Records of the Office of the Inspector General (Army), National Archives at College Park (NACP). Hereinafter cited as the Cooke Report, after Brig. Gen. Elliott D. Cooke, deputy inspector general, who directed the investigation from September 28 to November 4, 1946.
4 Born in 1896, Brig. Gen. James B. Edmunds joined the Indiana National Guard in World War I and was promoted to lieutenant during the conflict. He remained in the National Guard during the interwar period and was brought back to active duty in 1941 as a lieutenant colonel. He was promoted to brigadier general in October 1945 but reverted to colonel in March 1946. See US Army, Adjutant General, Register of the Army of the United States for 1947 (1947). Edmunds and his wife were the subjects of extensive questioning by the War Department's IG in late 1946 after his return to the United States. Edmunds remained in the army until his retirement in 1953, and he later served as general manager of the New York City Transit Authority. He died in 1968.
5 In particular, Miller was concerned by Edmunds's treatment of Maj. Michael J.L. Greene, a member of the OMGUS staff, who had reported on illegal transactions at the army headquarters in Berlin. Miller had sought Greene's transfer to ODI, only to find that he had been moved to a regular unit in the American occupation zone. Author interview with Brig. Gen. Michael J.L. Greene, US Army (ret.), Washington, DC, January 10, 2002.
6 See "Events Leading Up to this Inquiry," Cooke Report, pp. 1–4, RG 159, NACP.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Special committee hearing, Miller testimony, pp. 25816 and 25818.
10 Ibid., p. 25823.
11 Ibid., pp. 25831–25833.
12 Ibid., p. 25834–25835.
13 Ibid., p. 25836.
14 Life Magazine reported on the rise of black market activities in Berlin soon after the arrival of Allied troops. See "Black Markets Boom in Berlin," Life, Sept. 10, 1945, pp. 51–54. For a photographic account of life in postwar Germany, see Frank Grube and Gerhard Richter, Die Schwarzmarktzeit: Deutschland zwischen 1945 and 1948 (1979). See also Tony Vaccaro, Entering Germany, 1944–1949 (2001).
15 Richard Brett-Smith, Berlin '45: The Grey City (1966), p. 94.
16 A Strategic Services Unit (SSU) intelligence report in early 1946 quoted one American officer in Berlin who said that he could sell the following items to Soviet soldiers in exchange for dollars: carton of American cigarettes for $200; an army wrist watch for $1,000; a five-cent chocolate bar for $5; a bottle of whiskey for $150; low-grade French cognac for $80; and a pair of army boots for $200. See SSU Intelligence Report, "Black Market Prices in Berlin and Frankfurt a. M.," Jan. 25, 1946, Intelligence Report No. A-64903, LB-114, WASH-REG-INT-139, box 169, Entry 108, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, NACP.
17 Julian J. Bach, Jr., America's Germany: An Account of the Occupation (1946), pp. 57–63.
18 Frank Howley, Berlin Command (1950), pp. 90 - 91.
19 Walter Rundell, Jr., Black Market Money: The Collapse of U.S. Military Currency Control in World War II (1964), pp. 46–47.
20 Ibid., pp. 41–46; Harry Dexter White, assistant secretary of the treasury and a suspected Communist agent, was instrumental in arranging the American transfer of the plates to the Soviets. White's role in World War II and suspected Communist activity is discussed in John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (1999) and Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era (1999). For a contrary viewpoint, see James M. Broughton, "The Case against Harry Dexter White: Still Not Proven," International Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/00/149, August 2000.
21 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (1950), pp. 63 - 64.
22 An army officer, later with the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote years afterwards that "nobody who sold a few cartons was considered a criminal. It was the big wheeler-dealers who dealt in cars, diamonds and tens of thousands of dollars that the CID [Criminal Investigations Division] was after. This army organization might call on you if you ordered 100 cartons a week from the US (at one dollar a carton), and enquire politely whether you were really such a heavy smoker. But they were too busy to investigate something like twenty cartons a month. For four packages of cigarettes you could hire a German orchestra for an entire evening." David Chavchavadze, Crowns and Trenchcoats: A Russian Prince in the CIA (1990), p. 142.
23 Harold Zink, The United States in Germany 1944–1955 (1957), p. 140.
24 For further details on the army in postwar Germany, see Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (1959); Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany 1945–1949 (1967); John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949 (1968); Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany; Retreat to Victory (1977); B. U. Ratchford and William D. Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment: Round One of the German Peace Settlement (1947); and Hans A. Schmidt, ed., US Occupation in Europe after World War II (1978).
25 Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946 (1975, reprint 1990), p. 421.
26 SSU Intelligence Report, "Rumors in Russian Zone," Feb. 12, 1946, Report No. A-65306, LP/5-660, WASH-REG-INT-39, box 169, Entry 108, RG 226, NACP.
27 Bach, America's Germany, p. 39.
28 Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946, pp. 321–327.
29 Theodore Singer, letter to the editor, New York Times, Nov. 30, 1945, cited in John Willoughby, "The Sexual Behavior of American GIs during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany," Journal of Military History 62 (January 1998): 166–167.
30 Another unforeseen result was the large number of illegitimate children born to German women. Official West German estimates of the number of American-German offspring during the American occupation period range from 37,000 to 85,000. See Zink, The United States in Germany, 1945–1955, pp. 137–138.
31 Douglas Botting, In the Ruins of the Reich (1985), pp. 191–192.
32 The wide range of criminal activity in Berlin, including murders, suicides, robbery, and rapes by army members, investigated by the Criminal Investigations Division are located in boxes 894–897, Records of the Public Safety Branch, Reports on Investigations 1946–48, Records of the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS Records), Records of United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II, RG 260, NACP. For the 1946 investigations of several U.S. Army officers involved in black market cases in Berlin, see box 4, Records of the Executive Office, Chief of Staff, Investigations, Political, Emergency and Occupation, 1947–1949, OMGUS Records, RG 260, NACP.
33 Jack Gieck, Lichfield: The US Army on Trial (1997).
34 The theft of the crown jewels of Hesse from Schloss Kronberg was just one of several high profile cases that came to light in 1946. For a discussion of this case and several others, see Kenneth D. Alford, The Spoils of War: The American Military's Role in Stealing Europe's Treasures (1994).
35 "Probe of MG in Germany Urged, Efficiency of ET Occupation is Questioned," Stars and Stripes, European Edition, Sept. 14, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, OP-58, Military Government in Germany, box 1011, Records of the US Senate, RG 46, National Archives Building (NAB).
36 Philip Dodd, "Charges Mead Holds Up Probe of AMG in Reich, Evidence in Months Ago, Brewster Says," Chicago Tribune, Sept. 13, 1946, ibid.
37 Special committee hearing, Miller testimony, pp. 258365–25836.
38 See Confidential Report to the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program on the Preliminary Investigation in the Occupied Areas of Europe (Meader Report), Nov. 22, 1946, in special committee hearing, pp. 26152 and 26175. See also Immediate Release, Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Sept. 12, 1946, Exhibit IV, in Meader to Mead, Dec. 18, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
39 Meader Report, p. 26152. The investigation's terms of reference, agreed between Senator Kilgore and President Truman, are found in the Meader Report, pp. 26175–26176.
40 George Meader was born in Benton Harbor, MI, in 1907 and graduated from the University of Michigan in 1927. He also took a law degree from the University in 1931 and entered private practice. After a stint as a county prosecutor, Meader moved to Washington to join the Truman Committee as assistant counsel in 1943. He remained with the special committee as its assistant and then chief counsel until 1947, when he returned to private practice. After brief service on the staff of another Senate committee, Meader was elected as a Republican congressman and took office in 1951. He remained in Congress until 1965 and then served as counsel for a joint congressional committee until 1975. He died in 1994. His personal and private papers are located at the University of Michigan's Bentley Historical Library. For further details, see Kathryn Allamong Jacob and Bruce A. Ragsdale, eds., Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–1989, Bicentennial Edition (1989), p. 1487. See also Obituary, George Meader, Washington Post, Oct. 30, 1994.
41 Meader Report, pp. 26152–26153.
42 The itinerary and list of persons consulted is found in the Meader Report, pp. 26176–26179.
43 The special committee devised a standard set of questions for its investigation in Europe. See Meader Report, pp. 26180–26184.
44 For a summary of the areas reviewed by the special committee, see Meader Report, pp. 26156–26175. During the course of the investigation, Meader assembled some 400 pages of documentary evidence and obtained stenographic transcripts totaling nearly 800 pages. All told, the special committee had enough files to fill six feet of drawer space. Meader Report, p. 26154. This material forms the bulk of Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, boxes 991–1018, RG 46, NAB.
45 Meader Report, p. 26175.
46 Meader distributed the draft report at an executive session on November 25 to Sens. Ball, Ferguson, Kilgore, Knowland, and Mitchell. Senator Mead received a copy on November 26, and Senators Brewster, Briggs, Connally, and Tunnell the following day. See note in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
47 Telegram, Kilgore to Mead, Nov. 22, 1946, and telegram, Mead to Kilgore, Nov. 23, 1946, ibid.
48 Miller, Man from the Valley, p. 137. See also Walter White, "Investigate the Investigators," Philadelphia Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
49 Probe of AMG Beaten 6-4 on Party Lines," Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1946, pp. 1 and 6.
50 Philip Dodd, "Move to Block Reich Quiz Laid to State Department," Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 15, 1946, p. 28, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
51 Ibid. A number of other articles in box 1011 provide details of the meetings in New York.
52 "Clay to Talk on Occupation," Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1946, ibid.
53 Meader to Kilgore, "Military Government Field Inspection Investigation," Nov. 18, 1946, ibid.
54 Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1946 (1962), p. 487.
55 "Probe of MG in Germany Urged, Clay Has 'No Comment' on Occupation Criticism," Stars and Stripes, European Edition, Sept. 14, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
56 "Probe on AMG Beaten 6-4 on Party Lines," Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1946, pp. 1 and 6.
57 Robert S. Allen, "Suppressed Report on Germany Lays Immorality to U.S. Forces," New York Times, Dec. 2, 1946, p. 2.
58 Mary Spargo, "Bitter Fight Looms on Probe of AMG," Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1946, p. 3, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
59 John H. Crider, "Clay Sees End Soon to Occupation Cost," New York Times, Nov. 14, 1946, ibid.
60 "Senators Ask Byrnes O.K. on AMG Probe," New York Post, Nov. 13, 1946; "Truman Discusses Cuts with Military Leaders," New York Herald-Tribune, Nov. 15, 1946; and Mary Spargo, "Bitter Fight Looms on Probe of AMG," Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1946, all in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
61 Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1946, ibid.
62 Meader Report, p. 26175.
63 Editorial, "Bull in a China Shop," Washington Post, Nov. 25, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
64 Kilgore telegrammed the absent members of the special committee to vote on the motion to send a subcommittee to Europe. See Kilgore to Briggs, Connally, Mead, and Tunnell, Nov. 25, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
65 "Probe of AMG Beaten 6-4 on Party Lines," Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1946, pp. l and 6.
66 Meader to Byrnes, Dec. 5, 1946; Mead to Meader, Dec. 4, 1946; Meader to Mead, Dec. 18, 1946; Brewster to Meader, Dec. 1, 1946; Meader to Brewster, Dec. 11, 1946; and Meader to Brewster, Dec. 20, 1946, all in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
67 Collier's Magazine published an article on October 19, 1946, by Edward P. Morgan entitled "Heels Among the Heroes." A copy is found in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 997, NAB.
68 Robert S. Allen, "Suppressed Report on Germany Lays Immorality to US Forces," New York Times, Dec. 2, 1946, p. 3.
69 "Meader's DP Report Criticized as Unfair," New York Times, Jan. 2, 1947, p. 13. A copy of the November 11, 1946, telegram from Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP, and Meader's November 14, 1946, reply are found in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1011, NAB. See also I.F. Stone, "Meader Never Visited Camp for D.P.'s," New York PM, Dec. 5, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1012, NAB.
70 Meader sent the New York Times a copy of the report released by the special committee. See Meader to Editorial Department, New York Times, Dec. 6, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1010, RG 46, NAB.
71 "Probe of AMG Beaten 6-4 on Party Lines," Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1946, pp. 1 and 6. Interestingly, a copy of Kilgore's letter of November 25 has not been found in the records of the special committee at the National Archives. Possibly, Kilgore's letter may be located in his papers at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library or the University of West Virginia. For further details, see Karen Dawley Paul, comp., Guide to Research Collections of Former United States Senators, 1789–1995 (1995).
72 Special committee, press release, Dec. 4, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1018, RG 46, NAB. The Republican members noted that they tried to "persuade the full Committee to authorize such a release, but were unable to do so and consequently are forced to direct the release ourselves in the interest of fairness to the public." The members expressed three qualifications about the report: it was not a committee report nor did it have the approval of the members; it was drafted as a confidential report for the committee and not intended for publication; and that it was the result of a preliminary report and not a statement of facts. See also Robert C. Albright, "GOP Divulges Secret Report on AMG Despite Protests," Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1946, and "Report on GI Misdeeds in Reich Barred," Baltimore Sun, Dec. 4, 1946.
73 Senator Kilgore, press release, Dec. 3, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1012, RG 46, NAB.
74 For press reaction to the full report, see "Ask Report on Conduct of Troops," Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 4, 1946, and "Conduct of Yanks in Reich Assailed," Brooklyn Eagle, Dec. 4, 1946, in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1012, RG 46, NAB.
75 Oral History Interview with George Meader by Charles T. Morrissey, June 12, 1963, Washington, DC, in Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
76 Peter Kihss, "Senator Urges Dismissal in U.N. as 6 More U.S. Aides Avoid Queries," New York Times, Oct. 15, 1952, pp. 1 and 13; "Lie Acts on 12 in UN. Silent on Red Link," New York Times, Oct. 23, 1952, pp. 1, 8; Richard H. Parke, "UN Editorial Aide Admits Red Links," New York Times, Oct. 25, 1952, pp. 1, 5; A. M. Rosenthal, "Lie Ousts 3 of His U.S. Aides Who Balked at Red Inquiry," New York Times, Nov. 1, 1952, pp. 1, 3; Pierre J. Huss and George Carpozi, Jr., Red Spies in the UN (1965), pp. 41–45; and US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Activities of United States Citizens Employed by the United Nations: Hearings, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. (1952).
77 For a copy of the report prepared by Melvin Benson, see Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, Investigations of the National War Effort, House Report 2740, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial Set Vol. 11026A, House Reports (1947). See also "Report on Black Marketing," Baltimore Sun, Dec. 8, 1946; "Army Personnel in Germany May Face Black Market Quiz," Washington Star, Dec. 8, 1946; "Inquiry Urged on G.I. Profits in Black Market," New York Herald-Tribune, Dec. 8, 1946; William F. Arbogast, "Probe Would Eye Army Men's Taxes," Washington Post, Dec. 8, 1946, all in Senate 79A-F30, National Defense Program, Military Government, box 1012, RG 46, NAB. See also "Study of GI Profits Urged," New York Times, Dec. 8, 1946, p. 53, and Walter H. Waggoner, "House Report Criticizes Military on Occupation Policy in Germany, Charges 'Vast Majority' of Troops Took Part in Black Market, Sees Laxity on Nazis and Failure to Back Foreign Policy," New York Times, Jan. 3, 1947, p. 1.
78 "Test of US Army in Reich: Charges of Confusion, Laxity," United States News 21 (Dec. 13, 1946): 27–28. See also "Softening Life of Occupation: Effect on American Troops," United States News 21 (Dec. 6, 1946): 27–28.
79 See "Conclusions and Recommendations Made by Colonel Dodge—Special Investigator for General McNarney," in the Cooke Report. A search for the complete Dodge Report in Record Groups 159 (Records of the Office of the Inspector General (Army)), 260 (Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II, OMGUS records), 331 (Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II), 338 (Records of United States Army Commands, 1942– , USFET records), 389 (Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, 1941– ), and 466 (Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany) at the National Archives has proven unsuccessful.
80 Brig. Gen. Cooke to Lt. Gen. Dan I. Sultan, Inspector General, Oct. 24, 1946, in Cooke Report. A copy of the completed USFET IG report has not been located. For further details, see Adjutant General to the Inspector General, "Interim Report on Investigation of Black Market and Kindred Activities in Berlin Area," Jan. 27, 1947, forwarding Col. George F. Herbert, Adjutant General, OMGUS, to Adjutant General, "Interim Report on Investigation of Black Market and Kindred Activities in Berlin Area," Jan. 14, 1947, enclosing Brig. Gen. Charles K Gailey, Chief of Staff, OMGUS to Adjutant General, "Interim Report on Investigation of Black Market and Kindred Activities in Berlin Area," Jan. 9, 1947, in Cooke Report. As late as mid-May 1947, the War Department had yet to receive a final copy of the Baldwin Report.
81 Cooke Report, p. 5.
82 Typescripts of the testimony taken in Washington and in Germany are included in the Cooke Report. The IG questioned Lt. General Clay among other senior officers in USFET.
83 Cooke Report, pp. 17–18.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., pp. 19–20.
86 A summary of the Cooke Report's ten conclusions include the following major points: that the military governor and deputy governor were receiving "sufficient" intelligence; that steps be taken to integrate G-2 personnel as to the role of intelligence on the military government's staff; that there had not been "sufficient" cases of misconduct to besmirch US troops in Germany; that individuals accused of crimes and misconduct were being investigated; that the State and War Departments review the barter and exchange system in Germany to reduce the opportunities for black marketing; that no commanders were afraid of their Negro troops or reluctant to administer disciplinary action; that the influence of American and German industrialists on military government policy was "negligible;" that many of Colonel Miller's statements raised questions as to his "integrity as an officer"; and that commanders did not properly utilize the services of inspector generals "to best advantage." See Cooke Report, pp. 20–21.
87 C. P. Trusell, "GOP Weighs Study of Forces Abroad," New York Times, Jan. 10, 1947, p. 10.
88 "Senate Fight Over War Inquiry," New York Times, Jan. 13, 1947, p. 5; Trussell, "Special War Fund May Get GOP Airing," New York Times, Jan. 16, 1947, p. 5; and Trussell, "GOP Wins First Test as Senate Extends War Inquiry Board," New York Times, Jan. 23, 1947, pp. 1 and 3. See also entry for Jan. 22, 1947, US Senate, Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 80th Cong., lst sess. (1948), pp. 66–67. The Senate did not take up the issue of the army in Germany until the summer and fall of 1947, although it does not appear that this investigation resulted in a formal report. See "Senators to Inquire into G.I.'s in Germany," New York Times, July 6, 1947, p. 40; and Jack Raymond, "Bridges and Taber Draw Army's Fire," New York Times, Oct. 24, 1947, p. 7.
89 Clay notes that he received some eighty-five congressional visitors while in Germany, although he does not discuss Meader's trip in the fall of 1946, his meeting with the special committee in November, or his interview with the War Department IG. See Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 236–237. In Clay's personal papers at the National Archives as well as his official OMGUS records, there is no mention of his role in the Senate and War Department investigations. In February–March 1947, Clay spent considerable time responding to an article, "An Army Wife Lives Very Softly in Germany," that appeared in the Feb. 15, 1947, issue of Saturday Evening Post. See Records of the Executive Office, Chief of Staff, Records Maintained for the Military Governor, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, 1945–1949, box 21, OMGUS Records, RG 260, NACP. See also Gen. Lucius D. Clay Personal Papers, April 1945–May 1949, National Archives Collection of Donated Materials, NACP. Likewise, the investigations are not mentioned in Jean Edward Smith, The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945–1949, 2 vols. (1974) or Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (1990).
90 For example, see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, vol. II (1956). For a list of published works on Truman and his presidency, see Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (1984), pp. 331–341.
91 Colonel Miller's reaction to the War Department IG's investigation is found in Miller, Man from the Valley, pp. 137–138.