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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher w

SUBJECT: Night Note, Thursday, March 23, 1995

My meetings in Geneva with Andrei Kozyrev last night and today focused on preparations for the May 9 Summit. In our one-on-one three hour session over dinner on Wednesday night, most of the time was spent in a vigorous exchange on NATO and European integration issues, with Kozyrev carrying on at great length on Russian apprehensions about NATO enlargement. Kozyrev said that (in contrast with most foreign policy issues) Yeltsin has taken a personal interest in the NATO enlargement issue, and that the issue is no longer solely under Kozyrevs' control. Although I had pressed Kozyrev repeatedly to set a date for signing the NATO-Russia documents, he finally said that he simply did not have authority to act. He indicated that approval of those documents could come only after an improvement in the atmosphere at the Summit.

On the plus side, Kozyrev did not reject the dual-track approach that all of us have been discussing with our Russian counterparts, namely, that discussions regarding the enlargement of NATO would proceed in parallel with discussions of the Russia-NATO relationship. But the Russians clearly hope to nail down the Russia-NATO agreement before any decisions on enlargement are made by the alliance. The Russians are also anxious to emphasize the importance of the Partnership for Peace and we should do more of that. When I told Kozyrev that I thought it was "ironic" that the Russians wanted to pursue the Russia-NATO track as well as the Partnership for Peace but were not prepared to sign the documents that provide a foundation for those two parallel approaches, he said it is more than ironic, it is "tragic".  So there is some frustration on Kozyrev's part, real or feigned.

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Despite his tendentious statements in Paris and elsewhere, Kozyrev-privately accepts the inevitability of NATO expansion. He said several times that Russia is not asking the U.S. to "abrogate" its commitment to NATO expansion. He has unrealistic fears about the pace of expansion, no doubt compounded by Yeltsin's politically-driven paranoia. Even the prospect of a discussion of enlargement this spring at the NATO Ministerial (without any decision) gives him heartburn.

Kozyrev described your letter to Yeltsin as "very, very, important."  Although we had discussed the substance of a Yeltsin reply in our consultations prior to this meeting, Kozyrev inexplicably stated that no reply was planned. I pressed him and he agreed to seek a response from Yeltsin as the next step in the process. In all Kozyrev's comments about NATO, I was struck that he is preoccupied with the domestic "political" consequences rather than strategic arguments on the merits of various approaches. Everything seems focused on lining up voting blocs for Russia's parliamentary and Presidential elections.

We made some progress on the Iran nuclear issue. We agreed to set up a special pre-Summit working group on non-proliferation, and we can say publicly that its work will include Iran nuclear issues. I handed over to him some scrubbed U.S. intelligence on Iran's nuclear intentions, and Kozyrev said that Yeltsin has ordered a special review of their nuclear commitments to Iran. Kozyrev says that if we can get some money ($100-200 million) to Russia's Atomic Energy Agency through peaceful nuclear cooperation, their zest for the Iran deal will diminish. I think the Foreign Ministry knows that Iran is a lousy customer. Kozyrev and I agree that approval of the COCOM regime relating to conventional arms sales to Iran can probably come at the Summit.

The Russians have agreed that your bilateral with Yeltsin can occur on May 10 (obviating the round trip to Kiev, provided the Ukrainians can receive you on May 11). I told Kozyrev that you no doubt would want to see other political leaders in Moscow that day as well as making contact with the Russian people via television. This was to lay down a marker that you wouldn't be able to spend the entire day at Yeltsin's dacha, as they had hinted.

We are working together well enough on a number of issues (Croatia, NPT, some arms control issues), but Chechnya casts a dark shadow. It is likely to get worse before it gets better, though Yeltsin will probably be sensitive to world opinion

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around the May 9 ceremonies. We have a lot of work to do if we are to insure a successful summit (you shouldn't have any other kind) and Kozyrev and I agreed to meet again in late April, probably in Washington D.C.

 At the press conference following our meeting, Kozyrev said that the U.S.-Russian "honeymoon" was over, but that the end of the honeymoon has not resulted in divorce. Fair enough, but his comment reflects the fact that the Russians will be pursuing their own concept of self-interest. We need to remain clear-eyed in pursuing our own interests as we develop this most important relationship in the weeks and months ahead.

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