Holocaust-Era Assets

Military Agency Records

1. Proposal by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau for controlling postwar Germany by converting the concentration of heavy industry to agriculture, to prevent Germany from being able to start World War III. The proposal was tentatively approved at the Second Quebec Conference held on September 11–16, 1944, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. On statement not contained in Morgenthua's original version was inserted in the communiqué signed by Roosevelt and Churchill. It held that the Allies were “looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in character.” A month later, Roosevelt rejected the proposal, but in the meantime Germans cited the plan as why they should fight to the end rather than being reduced to a non-industrial nation. His plan printed as the first few pages of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1945). Copies are also contained in the cited records. Researchers may find useful Warren F. Kimball, Swords or Ploughshares: The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943–1946 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976). [Back to text]

2. Military attachés (M/As) served long before World War II as War Department representatives attached to State Department diplomatic missions abroad for the purpose of sending regular and special reports on foreign military establishments to G-2, War Department General Staff. The attaché system was continued and expanded during the war. During the war the military attachés were under the general administrative jurisdiction of the chiefs of the diplomatic missions to which they were attached, but they were under the immediate supervision of the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, which relied on reports of the attachés as its main source of information on foreign military trends in the years 1939–1941. Military attachés were supplemented by military observers (MOs), who were assigned to localities where there was no attaché office, and by various military missions. Researchers may find useful Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). [Back to text]

3. Among the records are the Formerly Security-Classified Correspondence and Reports, 1917–1941 (1,810 ft.); Formerly Security-Classified Record Cards for the Unclassified and Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence, 1917–1941 (75 ft.); Formerly Security-Classified Name Index (378 ft.), Subject Index (103 ft.), and Geographic Name Index (10 ft.) to Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division, 1917–1941. [Back to text]

4. Throughout most of the war designated the Prisoner of War Branch. [Back to text]

5. Hitler's sergeant during World War I and early follower of Hitler and the Nazi Party. As Hitler's publisher, he published “Mein Kampf.” Along with Heinrich Hoffman, Hitler's photographer, he was the man most responsible for Hitler's wealth. He also enriched himself in his service to the party. In November 1933, Hitler made him Reich Leader of the entire National Socialist press as well as head of the Reich Press Chamber. [Back to text]

6. Professor of Economics, Munich Technical College. [Back to text]

7. Chief of the Field Command of the OT, Ministerial Director in the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production. [Back to text]

8. Banking firm of Merck, Finck & Co., Munich and Berlin. [Back to text]

9. Manager of the Deutsche Bank for Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Southwestern Germany. [Back to text]

10. Reich Minister of the Interior from 1933 to 1943 (during which time he drew up the anti-Jewish Nuremberg Laws), and from August 24, 1943, until the end of the war, served as Reichsprotekto of Bohemia and Moravia. [Back to text]

11. State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economics. [Back to text]

12. Financial and Economic Advisor to the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production. [Back to text]

13. Former Economic Editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung. [Back to text]

14. Former Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, OKW. OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) was the High Command of the entire Armed Forces. [Back to text]

15. Official of the Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy), OKW. [Back to text]

16. Initially the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) limited itself to confiscating libraries and archives in occupied countries belonging to political opponents. In September 1940, the ERR was instructed to confiscate precious objects and to transport them to Germany. Financed by the Nazi Party, the ERR's early confiscations benefited the Hochschule, the training school for the Party administrators. Göring started to use the ERR for his own ends early in the fall of 1940. In November 1940, he ordered the ERR to confiscate art collections owned by Jews in the Occupied Zone of France. Baron Kurt von Behr was the ERR's director in France and worked closely with Göring. [Back to text]

17. Director of the Office of Pictorial Art of the ERR, and after Gerhard Utikal [Head of the ERR, Berlin] the individual chiefly responsible for the initiation and execution of policy for the art confiscations undertaken by the ERR. [Back to text]

18. Photographer for the ERR, Paris, France, and later active at the Alt Aussee depot in Austria. [Back to text]

19. Art dealer and proprietor of the Galerie für Alte Kunst, Munich. Served as one of Göring's most important buyers in France. [Back to text]

20. Resarchers may find useful Kenneth D. Alford, The Spoils of World War II: The American Military's Role in the Stealing of Europe's Treasures (New York: A Birch Lane Press Book, 1994). [Back to text]

21. For related records see the National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records (RG 238). [Back to text]

22. These volumes contain the day-to-day proceedings and slightly more than half of the documents offered in evidence by the prosecution and the defense. Volumes 2–22 are the complete trial transcripts; volumes 25–42 are documents or excerpts from documents keyed to the transcripts. The documents are mostly in German, though each document is introduced by a brief description in English. Volumes 23 and 24 are indexes: Volume 23 to the testimony, and volume 24 to the documents. [Back to text]

23. These volumes, to some extent, duplicate the above volumes, but they also complement them since they include material not put before the court. They contain the documentary evidence prepared by American and British prosecutors who were responsible for the case against those charged with preparing for, and waging, aggressive war. [Back to text]

24. These volumes contain selected portions of the record in translation, including the most important parts of the testimony and a number of prosecution and defense exhibits. [Back to text]

25. A complete document list is available in the Textual Research Room. [Back to text]

26. Loaned to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, January 1995. [Back to text]

27. There are two collections of personal papers at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, that contain pertinent information. These are the Papers of Abijah U. Fox who served as the Deputy Director of the Finance Division from 1945 to 1946, and the Papers of Bernard Bernstein who served as Financial Adviser to General Eisenhower for Civil Affairs and Military Government from 1942–1945, and Director, Finance Division and Division of Investigation of Cartels and External Assets, U.S. Group Control Commission for Germany, 1944–1945. The Fox Papers contain two boxes relating to Military Government for Germany, including his diary (1946). The Bernstein Papers contain about a half dozen boxes relating to his SHAEF and OMGUS service. [Back to text]

28. Background information on the occupation of Germany may be found in Gabriel Almond, The Struggle for Democracy in Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949); Noel Annan, Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996); John H. Backer, Priming the German Economy: American Occupation Policies, 1945–1948 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971); John H. Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany, American Foreign Policy in Transition (Durham: Duke University Press 1978); Nicholas Balabkins, Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of the Industrial Disarmament, 1945–1948 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964); Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945–1946 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956); William Friedman, The Allied Military Government of Germany (London: Stevens, 1947); Carl J. Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart, 1948); John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968); John Gimbel, A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945–1952 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961); Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and The Division of Germany: The Clash With Russia Over Reparations (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972); E. H. Litchfield, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1948); James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950); Drew Middleton, The Struggle for Germany (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949); Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap, 1995); J. Peter Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945–1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951); Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1977); Gordon Schaffer, Russian Zone (London: Allen and Unwin, 1947); Hans A. Schmitt, U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978); Toni Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); John L. Snell, The War-Time Origins of the East-West Dilemma over Germany (New Orleans, Louisiana: Hauser, 1959); James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Ian Turner, ed., Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zone, 1945–1955 (New York and Munich: Berg, 1989); James P. Warburg, Bridge or Battleground? (New York: Harcourt, 1947); F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945–1950 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962); Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984); Earl Zimke, The U.S. Army Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1975); Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: Macmillan, 1947); Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944–1955 (New York: Van Nostrand, 1957); Frank Howley, Berlin Command (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1950); Constantine Fitzgibbon, Denazification (London: Joseph, 1969). [Back to text]

29. For the records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, see the Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (RG 466). [Back to text]

30. Researchers may find useful Lucius D. Clay's Decision in Germany (Melbourne, London, Toronto: William Heinemann Ltd., 1950) and John H. Backer, Winds of Victory: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1983); Jean E. Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1950 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). [Back to text]

31. Department of State, Press Release, March 24, 1947. [Back to text]

32. Department of State Bulletin, October 31, 1945. The Joint Chiefs initially sent their directive to General Eisenhower in December 1944. Eisenhower was unable to obtain its approval by the other Allied commanders. The Joint Chiefs then tried to obtain approval for it from the European Advisory Council, but were unable to, in part because the opposition of the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration. The directive was finally issued to Eisenhower in April 1945, as applying to the United States forces of occupation. It remained a secret document until October 17, 1945, over six months after the German surrender, and two months after much of it had been incorporated in the Potsdam Agreement. James P. Warburg, Germany: Bridge or Battleground? (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), p. 279. [Back to text]

33. The joint report of the Anglo-Soviet-American Conference held at Berlin-Potsdam, was released on August 2, 1945. It was the key document for guiding Allied policies in Germany during the initial years of occupation. It provided that “in accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached: 1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets. 2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claim of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the western zones and from appropriate German external assets.” In addition the Soviet Union was to receive certain percentages of some properties in the western zones. The Soviet Government, in the agreement, renounced “all claims in respect to reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the western zones of occupation in Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries.” There were exceptions. According to the agreement, “The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the eastern zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.” Finally, it was agreed that “The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.” Department of State Bulletin, August 5, 1945, pp. 153–161. On September 20, 1945, the Governments of Great Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, reached agreement about specific instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives in Germany. The agreement is entitled “Additional Arrangements For Control of Germany.” Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945, pp. 515–521. [Back to text]

34. Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1947, pp. 186–193. [Back to text]

35. For additional Clay records, see General Lucius D. Clay Personal Papers, April 1945–May 1949 (boxes 1–15; location: 130/75/45/06) in The National Archives Gift Collection (RG 200). [Back to text]

36. A joint United State-British effort in 1946, to locate any gold, silver, or jewels that had been missed after the initial occupation began. [Back to text]

37. The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was established by the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR in London in late 1943, after an agreement to form it had been reached at the Moscow Conference of October 1943. The EAC was empowered to formulate surrender terms for Germany and its Axis satellites and to draw up the arrangements for the post-war occupation and control of Austria and Germany. It also considered any question on the liberation of Allied countries which were submitted by any of the governments of the three participating powers. [Back to text]

38. The Allied Control Council (ACC) on October 30, 1945, established the German External Property Commission. It was empowered by the ACC to “assume control of all German assets abroad with the intention thereby of promoting international peace and collective security by the elimination of German war potentials...” The duty of the Commission was to take ownership of all rights and titles to German property outside of Germany, controlled by anyone of German nationality outside of Germany, or by any business or corporation organized under the laws of Germany, or “having its principal place of business in Germany.” [Back to text]

39. In September 1944, soon after United States troops had crossed the German border, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) promulgated this law, enabling the allies to take the action envisaged in the London Declaration of January 5, 1943. Law 52 made all property in Germany subject to seizure and management by the military government. It covered not only property owned or controlled by the German government, but also the property of organizations and clubs dissolved by military government, property of the governments and citizens of the United Nations, and of absentee owners. The law prohibited transactions in cultural materials of value or importance regardless of ownership and in property owned or controlled by religious, educational, cultural, and scientific institutions. Everyone having custody of property covered by the law was ordered to hold it subject to the direction of military government and to accept certain responsibilities for custody, preservation, and keeping of records. Law 52 thus was the foundation of “Property Control.” [Back to text]

40. As the allied forces advanced into Germany early in 1945, Military Government Law No. 53 was placed in effect in the occupied areas. It required the declaration of foreign exchange assets and obligations. It applied to the three western zones of occupation of Germany. A law of similar content and effect was enacted for the Soviet Zone. Due to the desirability of having a single law for Berlin which would apply to all sectors, the enactment of a law (Berlin Kommandatura Order BKO 46/337) which required declarations of assets and obligations, was delayed until 1946. [Back to text]

41. The Ministerial Records Section was organized in August 1945. The Section was made responsible for locating and exploiting records of the German government relating to concealed German external assets. The Section, which was deactivated in July 1946, prepared approximately 200 reports on cloaked German assets, in addition to turning over to the investigative branches a large amount of data relating to concealed German holdings of target industrial concerns. [Back to text]

42. Adopted by the Allied Control Council in October 1945. It directed that all foreign German assets were to be administered by the council's German External Property Commission. [Back to text]

43. For the MGAX form, see the records of the U.S. Census Section below. [Back to text]

44. During and after the war, Ardelia Hall served as a Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives adviser to the Department of State and as a Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officer in Europe. Researchers may find of interest her works: “The Recovery of Cultural Objectives Dispersed during World War II,” Department of State Bulletin 25, no. 635 (27 August 1951): 337–345 and “U.S. Program for Return of Historic Objects to Countries of Origin, 1944–1954” Department of State Bulletin 31, no. 797 (4 October 1954): 493–498. [Back to text]

45. The “Ahnenerbe” Organization was created by H. Himmler as an SS research foundation for the purpose of furnishing scientific underpinnings for the Nazi doctrine of Germanic superiority. During the war, the “Ahnenerbe” went in for the looting of cultural objects on a grandiose scale. Many millions worth of scientific collections and libraries, archival material, archaeological finds, miscellaneous works of art, the contents of entire museums, were shipped to Germany. The “Ahnenerbe” operated chiefly in Poland, Southern Russia and Lorraine, but also in Yugoslavia, Austria, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. The “Ahnenerbe” was founded on July 1, 1935, and incorporated on November 19th of the same year. In 1937, the dean of the philosophical faculty and later rector of Munich University, SS Hauptsturmführer Professor Dr. Walther Wust became its president and curator, and Wolfram Sievers, the business manager. For all practical purposes, Sievers was the acting head of the organization. The stated aim of the “Ahnenerbe” was the systematic exploration of the Northern Indo-Germanic race and its achievements. This was to be accomplished by the unified coordination of all separate disciplines of letters and sciences bearing upon the “living space,” spirit, achievements and heritage of the Indo-Germanic people. [Back to text]

46. Researchers may find useful Walter I. Farmer, “Custody and Controversy at the Wiesbaden Collecting Point,” in Elizabeth Simpson, ed., The Spoils of War, op. cit., pp. 131–134. [Back to text]

47. Owner of art auction houses at Munich and Vienna through which passed many objects of art confiscated by the Dienststelle Muehlmann in Holland. [Back to text]

48. The German Commission for the Protection of Works of Art in the Occupied Countries (under direction of the German Army High Command), better known as the Kunstschutz, was led by Count Franz Wolff-Metternich, a former art history professor at the University of Cologne. It was established May 11, 1940, and charged with compiling a list of artworks located in the war zone and protecting them in the name of the army of occupation and in conformity with international agreements. Wolff-Metternich was subsequently dismissed for defying Göring. [Back to text]

49. Researchers may find useful Craig Hugh Smyth “The Establishment of the Munich Collecting Point,” in Elizabeth Simpson, ed., The Spoils of War, op. cit., pp. 126–130, and S. Lane Faison, Jr., “Transfer of Custody to the Germans,” ibid., pp. 140–141. Researchers also may find useful Smyth's work Repatriation of Art from the Collecting Point in Munich after World War II: Background and Beginnings, with Reference Especially to the Netherlands (Maarssen/The Hauge: Garry Schwartz/SDU Publishers, 1988). [Back to text]

50. Ernst Hanfstaengl, art publisher in Munich and close friend to Hitler. [Back to text]

51. Architect in charge of the Füherbau, Munich (1938–1945), and received and catalogued all works of art for Hitler's Linz Museum. [Back to text]

52. An Austrian national and leading early Nazi who held the position of Staatssekretaer and Fine Arts Minister under the Seyss-Inquart's Austrian government. He also served as Special Commissioner for the Protection of Art in the Occupied Territories in Poland and the Netherlands under Hans Frank and Seyss-Inquart, where he was the individual most responsible for organized German art looting in Poland and Holland. He also served as Director of Dienststelle Muehlmann. [Back to text]

53. Art dealer and personal friend of Hitler, and for a time his principal buyer of works of art. She served as one of the most important purchasing agents for the Linz Museum. [Back to text]

54. Adolf Hitler's mistress from 1932, and his wife for a few hours in 1945. [Back to text]

55. “Melmer” gold or loot was used to describe SS loot from the Kaiseroda Mine. The term, “Melmer” gold, was derived from the name of the SS officer, Hauptsturmführer Bruno Melmer, Chief of WVHA AII-II (finance and payroll), responsible for receiving property from Jewish victims. He supervised its deposit at the Reichsbank in Berlin. [Back to text]

56. The Preparatory Committee for the International Refugee Organization. It was established on July 1, 1947. [Back to text]

57. Thoms served at the Reichsbank since 1910. He had been in the Precious Metals Department since 1930 and was named to head the department around 1939. [Back to text]

58. Howard was the senior Treasury Department official at the Foreign Exchange Depository. [Back to text]

59. Although the index cards do show file numbers for records relating to restitution, there are no corresponding files in this series. It is possible the files were transferred to another part of OMGUS or to the Office of the High Commission for Germany (see RG 466). [Back to text]

60. For General Keyes’ personal papers, see Lt. General Geoffrey Keyes “Personal-Official File,“ 1934–1954 (boxes 1–9; location: 130/76/01/04) in the National Archives Gift Collection (RG 200). [Back to text]

61. Researchers may find useful Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945–1946 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956). [Back to text]

62. Large salt mine in Austria where the Allies uncovered a significant collection of looted art work and other cultural treasures. [Back to text]

63. Researchers may find useful British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives, and Other Material in Enemy Hands, Works of Art in Austria (British Zone of Occupation): Losses and Survivals in the War Compiled from Reports Supplied by the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Branch of the Control Commission for Austria (British Element) (London: HMSO, 1946). [Back to text]

64. Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” p. 113. [Back to text]

65. This series also contains references to Reports (“Registers”) of Naval Attachés, 1886–1922 (Entry 98), which are located in the Archives I Building in Washington, DC. [Back to text]

66. These National Socialist monthly publications were edited by Alfred Rosenberg. [Back to text]

67. Researchers may find useful Joseph E. Persico, Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (New York: Viking Press, 1994); Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Knopf, 1992); Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1995); R. E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (New York: Harper & Row, 1983); E. Davidson, The Trial of the Germans (New York: Macmillan, 1967); G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Signet, 1961); A. Tusa and J. Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (New York: Atheneum, 1984); Bradley F. Smith, The Road to Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, 1981). [Back to text]

68. These volumes contain the day-to-day proceedings and slightly more than half of the documents offered in evidence by the prosecution and the defense. Volumes 2–22 are the complete trial transcripts; volumes 25–42 are documents or excerpts from documents keyed to the transcripts. The documents are mostly in German, though each document is introduced by a brief description in English. Volumes 23 and 24 are indexes: Volume 23 to the testimony and volume 24 to the documents. [Back to text]

69. These volumes, to some extent, duplicate the above volumes, but they also complement them since they include material not put before the court. They contain the documentary evidence prepared by American and British prosecutors, who were responsible for the case against those charged with preparing for, and waging, aggressive war. [Back to text]

70. These volumes contain selected portions of the record in translation, including the most important parts of the testimony and a number of prosecution and defense exhibits. [Back to text]

71. Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walther Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Karl Donitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Konstantin von Neurath, Hans Fritzsche, Robert Ley, and Gustav Krupp. [Back to text]

72. Case 1: U.S. vs. Karl Brandt et al. (“Medical Case” charging senior Nazi doctors with having conducted experiments upon the inmates of concentration camps), 1946–1947; Case 2: U.S. vs. Erhard Milch et al. (“Milch Case” involving forced labor and medical experiments at Dachau), 1946–1947; Case 3: U.S. vs. Josef Altstoetter et al. (“Justice Case” concerning abuses of legal process within the Third Reich), 1947; Case 4: U.S. vs. Oswald Pohl et al. (“Pohl Case” directed against SS officers involved in the administration of concentration camps and of the labor programs), 1947–1948; Case 5: U.S. vs. Friedrich Flick et al. (“Flick Case” involving industrialists' complicity in the confiscation of Jewish property and in the use of forced labor), 1947; Case 6: U.S. vs. Carl Krauch et al. (“I.G. Farben Case” probing similar offences by officials of the leading chemicals manufacturer), 1947–1948; Case 7: U.S. vs. Wilhelm List et al. (“Hostage Case” bearing upon ill-treatment of civilians in southeastern Europe), 1947–1948; Case 8: U.S. vs. Ulrich Greifeldt et al. (“RuSHA Case” mounted against officials of the SS Race and Settlement Office implicated in the policies of genocide), 1947–1948; Case 9: U.S. vs. Otto Ohlendorf et al. (“Einsatzgruppen Case” concerning SS units responsible for mass murder), 1947–1948; Case 10: U.S. vs. Alfred Krupp et al. (“Krupp Case” focusing on the industrial exploitation of slave labor and confiscated property), 1947–1948; Case 11: U.S. vs. Ernst von Weizaecker et al. (“Ministeries Case” directed against officials from the foreign office and other departments who had been engaged in laying the diplomatic, economic, and other foundations for Hitler's “New Order”), 1947–1948; Case 12: U.S. vs. Wilhelm von Leeh et al. (“High Command Case” charging senior military figures with offences against prisoners-of-war, and against civilians in occupied areas). [Back to text]